Analyzing the sources and impact of segmentation in the banking sector: a case study of Kenya by Upadhyaya, Radha
1 
 
Analyzing the Sources and Impact of 
Segmentation in the Banking Sector:  
A Case Study of Kenya 
 
 
 
Radha Upadhyaya 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree PhD in Economics 
 
2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) 
University of London
2 
Declaration: 
 
I have read and understood regulation 17.9 of the Regulations for students of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the 
material presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in 
whole or in part by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase 
from the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged 
in the work which I present for examination. 
 
Radha Upadhyaya 
 
 
Signed: ________________________                     Date: _______________________ 
 
3 
Abstract 
 
The banking systems in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in general and Kenya in particular, are 
shallow and fragile. This is reflected in low lending levels, high interest rate spreads, high 
levels of non-performing loans and several bank failures. This thesis aims to understand 
the sources of this shallowness and fragility in Kenya and begins with the 
acknowledgement that the banking system in Kenya is highly segmented by size and 
ownership factors. The four segments identified are foreign owned banks, government 
owned banks, large private owned banks and small private owned banks. Within the 
framework of segmentation, this thesis analyzes three different relationships: between a 
bank and its borrowers (lending relationship), between a bank and its depositors 
(deposit mobilization), and between the shareholders and management of a bank 
(corporate governance).  
 
The analysis shows that different segments of the banking sector face clients of 
significantly different size and type, and that this segmentation has a strong impact on 
performance of banks in each of the segments. The analysis shows that segmentation is 
based partly on economic factors such as the size of banks and structure of ownership, 
but largely on social factors that determine the trust between banks and their clients. 
The thesis demonstrates that due to segmentation, there are varying ‘radiuses of trust’ 
within one banking system and that segmentation is a result of fragmentation rather 
than specialization. The thesis argues that segmentation affects lending decisions, 
deposit mobilization and governance of banks and therefore the structural constraints 
faced by banks in Kenya are varied, complex and grounded in social factors.  The 
analysis shows that segmentation is both a cause and consequence of the shallowness 
and fragility of the banking sector.  
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PROLOGUE 
 
In September 1998, I was back in Nairobi after completing my undergraduate degree in 
Economics at Cambridge and my Masters at SOAS. I was working as a research 
assistant at the African Economic Research Consortium, carrying out lots of cross- 
country regression analysis of just the type I have eventually come to criticize in this 
thesis.  
 
During this time five Asian-African banks were put under statutory management by the 
Central Bank of Kenya: including Trust Bank which was the 6th largest bank by 
deposits at the time. One of these banks was Bullion Bank. Unfortunately when Bullion 
Bank closed my family’s deposits with the bank represented all our savings. The Central 
Bank Governor at the time – Micah Cheseram, did something very unusual: he 
appointed Depositors’ Committees to assist the Central Bank statutory managers revive 
the bank. Maybe it was due to pressure from the World Bank, or perhaps reflected a 
recognition that previous episodes of statutory management had barely returned 10% of 
deposits back to depositors and a genuine desire to do better for the depositors of these 
recently failed banks.  
 
These committees had no real legal mandate. As a depositor, my father was on the 
Depositors’ Committee for Bullion Bank. He set about it with zeal and ended up 
uncovering a fraud committed by the CBK statutory manager at Bullion Bank in 
cahoots with the previous shareholders after it had been taken over by the CBK. 
Unfortunately, due to the undiplomatic manner in which he passed on this information, 
the Governor asked for his resignation from the Depositors’ Committee. But, 
unexpectedly, the Governor said that I could be on the committee as my father’s 
representative.  
 
I stopped being an economist and became a debt collector, financial analyst, and 
negotiator with lawyers and accountants. I became the Secretary of the Committee and 
as a result got a very unique insight into the progress of the Committee’s work. Bullion 
Bank was reopened in 2000 on a debt-equity swap where depositors converted 45% of 
their deposits to equity, and I became a Director of the bank. As a board member, I 
helped to negotiate the merger with Southern Credit Banking Corporation which 
ensured that depositors finally got paid the remaining 55% of their deposits.  
17 
 
In 2003, when I decided that I wanted to go back to being an economist, I realised that 
there was relatively little written about commercial banking in Sub Saharan Africa, and 
Kenya in particular, and therefore decided to focus my thesis on this area. As social 
scientists we always have to question whether we are ‘too close to the subject to be 
objective’. But on the other hand that personal connection allows us to identify pressing 
problems that economics can help to solve: and isn’t that what economists are supposed 
to try to do – understand real world problems that affect real people?  
 
While I was working at Bullion Bank I also worked for my family business, an estate 
agency. We managed several properties and collected rent on behalf of landlords. I had 
the extremely emotional, and sometimes surreal, experience of having clients leaving 
their gold bangles with me in lieu of rent. They had lost their life savings in Trust Bank. 
So yes, the reasons for embarking on this line of research were very personal – but as a 
result I believe that the insights and conclusions that spring from this work have a wider 
application to the functioning of credit markets throughout Sub Saharan Africa and 
further afield.  
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CHAPTER 1 – MOTIVATION, CONTEXT AND 
STRUCTURE 
1.1 Introduction 
It has been recognized that financial systems in Africa in general and Kenya specifically, 
are both shallow and fragile and therefore cannot fulfil the real economy objectives of 
growth and poverty eradication (Mkandawire, 1999, Stein et al., 2002, Serieux, 2008 
Ffrench-Davis 1994; Mkandawire 1999; Nissanke & Stein 2003).1 The shallowness and 
fragility is reflected in low lending levels, high interest rate spreads, high levels of non-
performing loans and several bank failures.  
 
The main aim of this thesis is to provide a deep understanding of the working of the 
banking system in Kenya and the constraints faced by banks that explain the reasons for 
the poor performance of the banking system. The key contribution of this thesis is to 
show that a major factor in this poor performance is that the banking system in Kenya 
is segmented and that this segmentation is based mainly on social factors. Social factors 
determine the trust levels between banks and their borrowers and depositors and in turn 
affect the performance of banks. Segmentation also implies that regulation aimed at 
changing corporate governance of banks may not have the desired impact in terms of 
improving bank performance.  
 
In Section 1.2 this chapter discusses the background and context of this study by 
presenting data on the shallowness and fragility of the banking sectors in SSA and 
Kenya. In Section 1.3 the framework of analysis of this research is discussed. In 
particular we define the segments of the banking sector in Kenya that we are 
investigating – foreign owned banks, government owned banks, large private owned 
banks and small private owned banks. We also define the three main relationships in 
banking that we are analyzing - lending, deposit mobilization and corporate governance. 
Section 1.4 discusses the main research questions of this thesis. The methodological 
basis and methods used in the research are discussed in Section 1.5. The chapter 
concludes with Section 1.6 in which contributions and structure of the thesis is outlined.  
                                                 
1 There remain several debates in the literature on the links between finance and growth. These are 
discussed in Chapter 2. However, there is consensus that finance fulfils certain functions that are 
necessary for growth.  
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1.2 Background of the Study – The Performance of Banking 
Systems in SSA 
In general African financial markets are shallow compared to financial markets in 
emerging and high-income countries. 2  A regional comparison of selected banking 
system indicators is displayed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1:  Regional Comparison of Banking System Indicators 2004 
 Kenya  Ug. Tz. Ghana SSA 
Average 
Low 
Income 
East 
Asia 
High 
Income 
 
Depth Indicators 
Liquid 
Liabilities to 
GDP 
40% 19% 22% 29% 31% 29% 49% 100% 
Deposits to 
GDP 
33% 15% 17% 20% 24% 22% 42% 85% 
Private Sector 
Credit to GDP 
25% 6% 8% 12% 18% 15% 35% 107% 
 
Efficiency Indictors 
Loan on 
Deposit Ratio 
73% 40% 47% 59% 66% 66% 81% 100% 
Net Interest 
Margin 
7% 13% 8% 10% 8% 8% 3% 2% 
Interest rate 
spread 
13% 14% 13%  12%   4% 
NPLs on Total 
Loans 
41% 7% 12% 29% - - - - 
 
Source: -  
1) All data except data on non-performing loans is from Financial Structure 
Database, as described in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine (2000 - revised 2009), 
hereafter referred to as World Bank Financial Structure Database (2000 revised 
2009).  It is for the year 2004.  
2) Data on spreads is from Beck & Fuchs (2004) and is for the year 2001.  
3) Data on Non-performing loans is from Buchs & Mathisen (2005) and is for the 
year 2001.  
                                                 
2 Data for this section is from Financial Structure Database, as described in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & 
Levine (2000 - revised 2009) and available through the World Bank web page on 
http://go.worldbank.org/X23UD9QUX0. This dataset combines data from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics and Fitch’s BankScope Database.  
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There are two main measures of depth of the financial system - ratio of liquid liabilities 
to GDP and ratio of private credit to GDP.3 The former is a measure of monetary 
resources mobilized by banks. The latter is a measure of the ability of banks to channel 
resources to productive uses and therefore the growth potential of financial 
intermediation.4 At a bank specific level, the measures refer to the liability (deposit 
mobilization) and asset (lending) side of individual banks balance sheets.5 In 2004, the 
ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP averages 31% in SSA, compared to 49% in East Asia & 
Pacific and 100% in high-income countries.6 In 2004, the ratio of private credit to GDP 
averages 18% in SSA compared to 35% in East Asia and 107% in high-income 
countries.  
 
Interest rate spread and interest rate margins are the most common measure of bank 
inefficiency and therefore an explanation for the shallowness of banking systems. The 
spread is often thought of as a ‘premium in the cost of external funds’ introduced due to 
informational and enforcement frictions (Gertler & Rose, 1994; Honohan & Beck, 
2007). Interest rate spread is measured as the difference between the average lending 
rate and the average deposit rate. Interest rate margins are measured as net interest 
income as a percentage of total earning assets.  Interest rate margins and spreads in SSA 
are generally higher than the rest of the world. In 2004, the net interest margin for 
African banks was 8% compared to 3% for East Asia and 2.2% for high-income 
countries. It should be noted that this is the mainstream definition of spread. We would 
                                                 
3 As will be seen below in Chapters 3 and 4, historically monetary aggregates have been used to measure 
financial depth M2 (broad money) is normally defined as defined as M1 plus time and savings deposits 
plus certificates of deposits plus deposits of NBFIs. M1 is defined as currency outside the banking system 
plus demand deposits. There are also other definitions of broad money that differ from country to 
country. M3 normally includes deposits of non-bank financial institutions (Black, 2002). However liquid 
liabilities over GDP has become the preferred definition to M2 over GDP as the former excludes 
currency outside the banking or financial system.  
4 As will be shown in Chapters 2 and 3, there was an assumption in the finance and growth literature that 
an increase in deposits, reflected in an increase in M2, would ‘automatically’ lead to an increase in lending. 
This has not been the experience of developing countries post liberalization.  
5 In developed financial markets a bank’s balance sheet will include a variety of instruments on both the 
liability and asset side. However in a developing country a bank’s balance sheet is relatively simple with 
the main liability consisting of deposits and the main assets consisting of loans and investment in 
government securities.  
6 Deposits form the core of liquid liabilities in developing countries and the deposit to GDP ratio of SSA 
is also low compared to East Asia or high-income countries. 
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like to argue that that while a high overall spread shows weakness in a banking system 
an analysis of different segments in a banking system shows that the source for high 
spread is not necessarily inefficiency but based on trust and social factors. This is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  
 
The main cost of shallowness of the banking sector is low access to finance and low 
levels of investment in SSA. Despite changes in policy stance from high levels of 
government intervention in the financial systems in SSA between the 1960s to 1980s, to 
more liberalized financial systems from the 1990s, savings and investment levels in SSA 
remain extremely low (Mavrotas, 2005; Serieux, 2008 pp., 5; A Soyibo, 1997).7 
 
Furthermore, the banking systems in SSA are fragile and unstable. It should be noted 
that instability is difficult to define and it usually measured as the lack of stability – 
therefore in terms of bank failures. Appendix 1 lists bank failures in SSA from 1997 – 
2005. The list is extremely general, but highlights the frequency of bank failures 
throughout SSA and also the high levels of non-performing loans accrued in the banks 
prior to the bank failures.  
 
Theoretically the cost of bank failures can be categorized as: - 
• Financial distress and loss experienced by depositors. It has been argued that 
bank failures may result in loss of deposits that represent depositors’ life savings 
and therefore bank failures arguably impose significantly more costs than the 
insolvency of a normal firm (Mayes, 2004). 
• Loss of information and reputational capital experienced by borrowers who 
have to find other sources of credit to continue their business (Bernanke, 1983; 
Bernanke & Gertler, 1987). 
• Disruption of the payment system. 
• Systemic risk of contagion effects leading to closure of other banks (Guttentag 
& Herring, 1987).  
                                                 
7 The average figure for total domestic savings to GDP for 19 African countries stood at about 11 % in 
1965. It peaked at 14 per cent of GDP in 1974 and declined to a nadir of just over seven per cent in 1982. 
It recovered modestly to around 11 % and then stagnated at around 10 per cent through the 1990s, 
showing signs of a renewed rise only after 1999. Total investment followed a similar pattern starting at 
around 13%, peaking at 20% in the 1970s, falling to 14% in the 1980s with rise after 1999 but still 
remaining below 20% in 2005. In contrast savings rates and investment rates in East Asia and the Pacific 
stood at 20% in 1965 but rose to over 30% throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s (Serieux, 2008). 
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Empirically there have been some attempts to measure the fiscal cost of bank failures in 
SSA. The estimated cost of bank restructuring between 1984 – 1993 for 11 sub-Saharan 
African countries was between 7% - 15% of their GDP (Popiel, 1994).8 There has also 
been an attempt to measure the impact on GDP through a reduction in credit. It is 
estimated that in Ghana, growth fell from 3% in the five years before the crisis of 1983-
89 to 2.5% in the three years after it (Goodhart, Hartmann, Lleewllyn, Rojas-Suarez, & 
Weisbrod, 1998).9 The estimated levels of NPLs, the fiscal cost of restructuring and 
output loss due to reduction in GDP post bank failures for most SSA countries are 
listed in Appendix 1. It has been acknowledged that costs of bank failures are inherently 
difficult to measure and costs usually vary according to the measure used (Hoggarth, 
Reidhill, & Sinclair, 2004; Mayes, 2004). Nonetheless, these figures highlight the costs 
stemming from financial fragility and bank failures. From the high cost of recapitalizing 
banks, it can be deduced that the impact of fragility on depositors in SSA has been 
high.10  
 
Table 1 shows that by regional standards the Kenyan banking system is relatively deep. 
In 2004, compared to the SSA average of 32%, the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP was 
38%, and the ratio of private credit to GDP was 24% in Kenya as compared to the SSA 
average of 18%. The intermediation ratio – the loan to deposit ratio is also relatively 
high at 73% compared to a SSA average of 66%.11  
 
However there are several areas for concern in terms of depth, efficiency and stability in 
the Kenyan banking sector.12 In terms of depth as measured in terms of access to 
finance, surveys of firms in Kenya have identified access to finance as a major constraint 
                                                 
8 For Tanzania it is estimated that the fiscal cost of recapitalization was as high 40% of GDP (World 
Bank, 1994). 
9 Another estimate for Ghana based on output loss as a percentage of GDP due to reduction in credit 
puts the figure at 15.8% (Caprio, Klingebiel, Laeven, & Noguera, 2005). 
10 Refer to Chapter 4 for estimates of total deposits lost in failed banks in Kenya.   
11 It should be noted there is no consensus on what the ‘ideal’ level of loan deposit ratio should be. A 
higher ratio indicates higher intermediation efficiency but a ratio much higher than 100% would indicate 
that lending is funded from other sources besides deposits. The crisis in 2007 of the British bank 
Northern Rock highlights the problems of banks relying on non-deposit funding such a funding from the 
money market to give loans (Chick, 2008). 
12 A detailed analysis if the historical development of the banking sector in Kenya and the structure of the 
banking sector in Kenya is given in Chapter 4.  
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to firm growth.13 By constructing industry wide balance sheets of manufacturing firms 
in Kenya, it has been found that the majority of firms rely on equity and retained 
earnings for over 85% of their financing and only subsidiaries of multinational 
companies rely on credit for over 30% of their financing (Isaksson & Wihlborg, 2002). 
Furthermore, as shown in the table above, the ratio of private sector credit to GDP 
while higher than the SSA average is much lower than the ratio of East Asia of 30% or 
of high-income countries of 107%.  
 
In terms of efficiency, while the interest rate margins in Kenya of 7.8% are better than 
the SSA average of 11.1%, they are still very high compared to the margins for East Asia 
and high-income countries stated above.14 One of the key problems of the Kenyan 
banking sector is the extremely high level of non-performing loans – even by regional 
standards. In Kenya in 2001, the average non-performing loans over total loans ratio 
stood at 41%. As displayed in Table 1, this level is much higher than the levels for 
Uganda of 6.5%, Tanzania of 12.2% and Ghana of 28.8%. This high level of non-
performing loans also contributes to the fragility of the banking sector with 42 bank 
failures since 1984.15  
 
1.3 Conceptual Framework – Segmentation and Relationships in 
Banking 
The general aim of this thesis is to develop a deep understanding of the sources of 
shallowness and fragility of the banking sector in Kenya. In Chapter 3 we engage with 
the literature on finance in SSA. We show that because of the dominance of mainstream 
methodology and methods, these studies have limited power in explaining the poor 
performance of banking systems in SSA as described above. In particular, many studies 
attribute the poor performance of banking systems in SSA to the high level of 
concentration of the banking systems, which it is assumed leads to lower competition 
                                                 
13 There is a plethora of papers from the World Bank’s Regional Program on Enterprise Development 
(RPED), which conducts surveys amongst small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Africa and finds that 
access to finance is a major constraint facing SMEs. See www.worldbank.org/rped. This thesis only 
discusses access to finance in terms of access to formal finance. The low provision of financial services to 
the poor has been widely addressed in the microfinance literature and is not discussed in this thesis. 
14 The world wide average for interest margins is 6.5% in 2004 (Cull, Fuchs, & Lovegrove, 2008). 
15 Detailed list of bank failures in Kenya is given in Chapter 4.  
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and ergo poor performance.16 However, we reject this simplistic explanation and argue 
that the reasons for the high level of concentration also have to be explored and 
explained.  
 
In contrast, this thesis begins with the recognition that the banking sector in Kenya is 
highly segmented on the basis of ownership and size factors. The four segments that we 
will identify on this basis are: foreign-owned banks (FOB), government-owned banks 
(GOB), local large private owned banks (LPOB) and local small private owned banks 
(SPOB).17 We show that not only is the overall performance of the banking system in 
Kenya poor, but within the banking system there is a differential performance between 
the FOB, GOB, LPOB and SPOB. While the poor performance of government owned 
banks has been well documented, we show the SPOB segment also performs poorly.  
This study analyzes each of the segments of the banking sector and attempts to 
understand the constraints faced across the sector (in all segments) and those faced by 
just certain segments to understand this differential performance.18 The key argument of 
this thesis is that the poor performance of the banking system in due to the segmented 
nature of the banking system and that this segmentation is based on social factors and in 
particular different levels of trust in each of the segments.  
 
Within this framework of segmentation, this thesis studies three relationships: between a 
bank and its borrowers (lending relationship), between a bank and its depositors 
(deposit mobilization), and between the shareholders and management of a bank 
(corporate governance).  
 
                                                 
16 As we will discuss in Chapter 3, banking systems in SSA characteristically have 3 or 4 large banks 
controlling 60 – 80% of the market share.  
17 Banks are classified as LPOB and SPOB, on an economic measure – the capital of the banks. Banks 
with a capital base of KShs. 1 billion (approximately USD 13.8 million at end of 2005 exchange rates) or 
more are classified as LPOB.   
18 It should be noted that fragmentation of the financial sector between informal and formal finance has 
been well documented (Nissanke and Aryeetey 1998; Johnson 2005; Nissanke and Aryeetey 2006). 
However, very few studies have focussed on segmentation within the formal banking sector. 
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Figure 1 following provides a visual description of this framework and the relationships.  
 
Figure 1: Framework of Analysis – Segments and Relationships in Banking 
Sector in Kenya 
 
 
There is a fourth relationship that is extremely important in banking - the regulatory 
relationship. This thesis does not focus on this relationship mainly because there is 
already significant literature on the weakness in prudential regulation and supervision of 
banks in developing countries in general and Kenya in particular (Alawode, 2003; Barth, 
Caprio, & Levine, 2006; Brownbridge & Kirkpatrick, 2002; Brownbridge, Kirkpatrick, & 
Maimbo, 2005; Kagira & Kirkpatrick, 2001; Lleewllyn, 2005). However, throughout the 
thesis, prudential regulations pertaining to lending, deposit mobilization and governance 
are listed where relevant, and the response by banks to this regulation is discussed. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
The research questions with specific reference to each of the relationships are now 
detailed.  
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1.4.1 Lending Relationship  
It is generally accepted in the literature that banks have particular expertise in processing 
information and monitoring borrowers (Freixas & Rochet, 1997).19 As will be shown in 
Chapter 5, the relationship between a bank and its borrowers is usually analyzed solely 
in terms of information asymmetry and the market imperfections that prevent the 
resolution of this information asymmetry (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). 20 This thesis argues 
this concept is limited and has to be extended to get a deeper understanding of the 
relationship. Chapter 5 outlines other theoretical concepts from Marxist, Post-
Keynesian and Institutional schools that are useful in understanding the lending 
relationship – in particular the concept of knowledge creation and the embeddedness of 
credit relations in social relations (Dow, 1998; Johnson, 2005; Lapavitsas, 2003; Uzzi, 
1999). These theoretical concepts are used to analyze the qualitative data on lending 
relationships in the banking sector in Kenya. Furthermore, it has been argued that poor 
performance of banks in sub-Saharan Africa is due to their inability to gather sufficient 
information on borrowers and because they face a weak legal environment which 
prevents them from enforcing contracts (Aryeetey, 2003). Yet, there is little empirical 
work done to show how banks gather information and monitor borrowers and this 
study attempts to fill this gap in relation to the banking sector in Kenya.   
 
The questions that we attempt to answer with reference to banks in Kenya are:- 
1) How is information collected, what type of information is collected, and how is 
this information processed before a credit allocation decision is made? 
2) What are the differences in credit allocation processes and monitoring that lead 
to differential outcomes in terms of good loans or bad loans? 
3) What are the differences in the credit allocation process between different 
segments? 
4) How do social relations affect credit relationships and how are these different 
amongst different segments?  
 
                                                 
19 Refer to Chapter 2.   
20 In other mainstream theories on finance and development, in particular the McKinnon-Shaw model, 
there is very little discussion on the relationship between the bank and the borrower (McKinnon, 1973; 
Shaw, 1973). It is assumed that key constraint is the level of resources available for lending and that an 
increase in interest rate will resolve this problem. Refer to further discussion on McKinnon-Shaw model 
in Chapter 2 and 3.  
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1.4.2 Deposit Mobilization 
As will be shown in discussions in Chapter 3 and 5, the literature has paid very little 
attention to the relationship between a bank and the depositor. In mainstream literature, 
particularly the McKinnon-Shaw financial repression hypothesis, the relationship 
between the bank and its depositor is discussed. However, it is assumed that the only 
factor affecting the depositor is a price factor – the interest rate. Therefore, it was 
argued that replacing an artificially low government specified interest rate with market 
determined interest rate would lead to an increase in deposits (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 
1973). We draw attention to alternative heterodox concepts including Chick and Dow’s 
Post-Keynesian framework of stages of banking development (Chick, 1992, 1997; Dow, 
Ghosh, & Ruziev, 2008), which emphasize that the relationship between a bank and its 
depositor is based on trust. Therefore our study attempts to understand the factors that 
shape this trust and the nature of the constraints faced by banks when mobilizing 
deposits.  
 
The questions that we attempt to answer with reference to banks in Kenya are: - 
1) What are the main constraints faced by banks when raising deposits? 
2) What are the differences in constraints between different segments in the 
banking sector in Kenya? 
 
1.4.3 Corporate Governance  
Recently, there has been an acceptance in the literature that corporate governance of 
banks affects their performance. However, the literature is dominated by mainstream 
literature where it is assumed that ‘best practice’ corporate governance is defined in 
terms of the Anglo-Saxon governance model of diffused share ownership and 
separation of ownership from management. In Chapter 7 this thesis discusses this 
literature and also considers alternative views on corporate governance and shows that 
empirically it is difficult to specify ‘best’ corporate governance practices. In Chapter 8, 
the thesis considers corporate governance of banks in Kenya in light of these debates.  
 
The research questions that we consider in reference to the Kenyan banking sector are:- 
1) What is the structure of ownership and management of the banking sector and 
how is this different across different segments of the banking sector? 
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2) What is the impact of international codes of corporate governance on the 
development of regulations on corporate governance in Kenya? 
3) What is the impact of changes in regulations on corporate governance on the 
corporate governance practices of banks?  Is the impact of these regulations 
different for different segments? 
 
Having outlined the research questions, we now consider the ontology and data 
collection methods of this thesis.  
 
1.5 Methodology, Methods, Data Collection and Data Analysis 
1.5.1 Ontology and Methodology 
Ontologically this research views the economy as an open system: that is, a system that 
is very complex and not all relevant variables are known, where boundaries of the 
system cannot be specified, where interrelation within the system changes and 
knowledge is rarely held with certainty (Dow, 2002). This is as opposed to a closed 
system, which is one where all the relevant variables can be identified, all boundaries 
specified, and where all relationships are either knowable or random and is the basis of 
mainstream work (Dow, 2002; Downward & Mearman, 2007).  
 
The discussion of studies of finance in SSA in Chapter 3 shows that they are based on a 
closed systems ontology. In discussions with mainstream economists in Kenya, the 
methodology of this thesis was criticized, as there is no functional relationship specified 
a priori.  It was argued: 
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“You need to be specific about what you are trying to explain – is it high 
interest rate spreads, high non-performing loans, low intermediation levels 
or bank closures? Say you pick non-performing loans, and then you can 
think of it in the following function form: The degree of loans going bad 
(X1) = f (trust, management of credit, efficiency of intermediation). As 
these cannot be measured quantitatively you need to think of which proxies 
you can use. As a proxy for trust you can use the length of relationship, as a 
proxy for management of credit you can use the qualifications of staff or 
for efficiency of intermediation you can use current assets / total assets 
etc..” 
Kenyan Economist in interview with author 21  
 
 
At an operational level, this method is not pursued due to a basic data constraint - 
information on individual non-performing loans and length of relationship between a 
bank and their client is considered confidential by banks and therefore not readily 
available. However, the main reason this methodology is not followed is an ontological 
one – it is too deterministic and unidirectional. Using an open systems ontology, this 
thesis also rejects the necessity to investigate the subject in terms of functional forms 
and causal relationships (Fleetwood, 2007). 
 
The Kenyan banking system is shallow, inefficient and fragile and one of the main 
outcomes of this is the high level of non-performing loans, which this thesis attempts to 
understand. But it is impossible to disentangle and define a single, measurable 
dependent variable. High non-performing loans, high interest rate spreads and high 
levels of bank failures could all be considered a symptom of the fragility and therefore 
dependent variables. But equally they could be the cause of fragility and therefore be 
used as independent variables. Furthermore, we would like to emphasize that 
shallowness and fragility of the banking system are also interlinked. While shallowness 
and fragility are measured using different indicators, our research shows that 
shallowness contributes to fragility and vice versa.   
 
Furthermore, it will be shown in Chapter 7, that empirically it is extremely difficult to 
define a single corporate governance variable that has a strong impact on performance. 
                                                 
21 All interviews are non-attributable and therefore each of the interviewees has been given a label.  
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Therefore, attempting to link a single corporate governance indicator in a functional 
form equation with performance would also be futile.  
 
However, we recognize that all research involves some form of partial closure 
(Downward, Finch, & Ramsay, 2003; Mearman, 2003) and that there will be factors that 
affect the stability of the banking sector in Kenya that are not revealed by this study. 
Using an open systems ontology is also in line with one of the core concepts of this 
thesis - that segmentation of the banking sector in Kenya is both a cause and 
consequence of the fragility in the banking sector.  
 
Ontology in economics has been mainly discussed by the Critical Realism School 
(Lawson, 1997, 2003). Political economists have criticised critical realism and argued 
that ontological and methodological concepts are developed independently of context, 
and therefore, critical realism is trans-historical (Fine, 2004). This thesis takes these 
criticisms into account and is firmly rooted in the specific context and experience of the 
Kenyan banking sector. However, the process of thinking about and stating the 
ontology of research has helped the author in the process of making the research more 
holistic and appropriate to the topic of study.  
 
In an attempt to understand sources of financial fragility, this thesis follows heterodox 
methodology and methods. It follows other heterodox economists including Post 
Keynesians, Feminists and Marxists in having a ‘common sense view of the economy’. 
“Post Keynesians characterise their common-sense propositions by stating that the real 
(actual) economy is a non-ergodic, independent system with human agency and 
economic-social-political structures and institutions embedded in an historical process” 
(Lee, 2002 pp., 790). It is also grounded in a pluralist theoretical approach advocated by 
many heterodox economists. 22 In Chapter 5, we discuss theoretical concepts from 
different schools that are useful in understanding lending and deposit mobilization. In 
Chapter 7 we engage critically with mainstream literature on corporate governance.  
 
                                                 
22 Also see Olsen (2006) who discusses how attempting to analyze a problem, in this case tenancy in rural 
India from three different theoretical schools – neoclassical, institutional and Marxist - allows a more in-
depth look at the assumptions of each theory and leads to an improvement in dialogue regarding policy 
changes aimed at poverty reduction.  
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1.5.2 Strengths of Qualitative and Quantitative Data 
The core of this thesis is based on semi-structured interviews of banks and analysis of 
qualitative data to understand each of the relationships described above – lending, 
deposit mobilization and corporate governance. While other social scientists – 
anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists - rely heavily on qualitative data, in 
economics, qualitative data generation techniques are normally rejected for not being 
‘rigorous and objective’ (Harriss, 2002).  As will be shown in Chapters 2, 3 and 7, this is 
reflected in the dominance of quantitative analysis in economic journals (Blin & 
Siegmann, 2006; Lee, 2007). This is also the view held by most African economists and 
the use of qualitative data in our research methodology was severely criticized in 
discussions with another leading Kenyan Economist. 
 
However, qualitative data can be extremely useful. Miles and Huberman (1994) describe 
several strengths of qualitative data. For this author, the key strength of qualitative data 
is:  
 
“their richness and holism, with strong potential for revealing complexity; 
such data provide ‘thick descriptions’ that are vivid, nested in a real context, 
and have a ring of truth that has strong impact on the reader”  
Miles & Huberman (1994 pp., 10).  
 
 
With specific reference to financial sector regulation the importance of qualitative 
evidence has been highlighted in a study of prudential regulation in Zambia. It is argued:  
 
“The CAMEL model used by the Bank of Zambia during the banking crises 
offered a systematic framework for analysing bank performance. However, 
its lack of performance benchmarks and, more importantly, non-quantitative 
indicators of financial distress, and its sole focus on financial ratios means 
that it ignored a lot of indicators in the industry of distress that appeared 
long before the bank’s financial ratios began to deteriorate”  
Maimbo (2002 , pp.271).23  
 
                                                 
23 Emphasis added 
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It is further argued that in Zambia, the excessive use of price based competition and 
overinvestment in Treasury bills highlighted the financial distress of weak banks long 
before financial ratios started to decline (Maimbo, 2002). The CAMEL model of 
understanding bank performance stands for Capital, Asset levels, Management quality, 
Earnings and Liquidity. The key point to note here is that one of the most important 
factors determining bank performance - the M for management - is extremely difficult 
to measure quantitatively.  
 
We do not advocate an outright rejection of statistical and econometric studies as 
suggested by many in the Critical Realist school such as Lawson (1997). We concur with 
Downward and Mearman (2007) who argue that mixed methods analysis, where both 
qualitative and quantitative data is triangulated can be viewed as a form of retroduction 
which is the methodology espoused by critical realists. We also agree with Olsen & 
Morgan (2004) who make a distinction between methodology and methods. They argue 
that through the use of the method of multivariate regression, a researcher can still 
follow a retroductive methodology and interpret the results to form non-intuitive and 
non-atomistic explanations.  However, it will be argued in Chapter 3, the majority of 
work done on the formal financial sector in SSA, which follows mainstream 
methodology and methods, does not meet these criteria.  
 
For this study, quantitative data was collected and analyzed to reveal basic trends. 
Econometric analysis was not carried out due to the limitations of other econometric 
studies highlighted in Chapters 2 and 3.  
 
Through the use of qualitative interview data, this thesis provides an alternative 
understanding of constraints of the banking sector in Kenya that are not revealed by 
looking at quantitative data. We particularly highlight how social factors and trust impact 
the performance of the banking system and these cannot be measured quantitatively. An 
extremely interesting parallel can be drawn between our methodological approach in 
which we use both quantitative and qualitative data and one of our key findings in 
Chapater 6 – in assessing credit applications, banks view hard (quantitative) and soft 
(qualitative) information as complimentary and not subsitutes.  
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1.5.3 Summary of Data Collected 
Empirical analysis in this thesis is based on semi-structured interviews of directors and 
senior management of 7 banks in Kenya carried out in the summer of 2006. These 
included one foreign owned bank (FOB), one government owned bank (GOB), three 
large private owned banks (LPOB) and two small private owned banks (SPOB).24 The 
questions used are listed in Appendix 2 and covered three main areas – lending and 
non-performing loans, deposit mobilization and corporate governance. The interview 
questions were designed keeping in mind the theoretical concepts on lending and 
deposit mobilization discussed in Chapter 5 and the concepts on corporate governance 
discussed in Chapter 7. The semi-structured interview questions were discussed and 
reviewed by two respected Kenyan economists and one senior banker and adjusted 
before the interviews were conducted with bank staff.  
 
Quantitative data collected included the summary of audited financial statements 
(balance sheet and profits and loss) of all banks in Kenya from 2000-2005. A list of the 
variables collected is given in Appendix 3. We also developed a database on corporate 
governance indicators for all Kenyan banks from 2000-2005 directly from banks’ 
financial statements. The list of variables collected is given in Appendix 4.  
 
1.5.4 Limitations of Data Collected 
Several problems were faced and these limitations should be kept in mind throughout 
the thesis. With reference to the quantitative data on banks’ financial statements, this 
was not available in a consolidated form from the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK). This 
would have been ideal, as the total figures in this dataset would have matched with total 
figures in the CBK’s supervision reports. Therefore the dataset used was from a Kenyan 
business magazine – Market Intelligence. This business magazine publishes an annual 
report on the banks in Kenya and they prepare the dataset from accounts of banks 
published in the newspapers. We took great care to check the data, and for all years, the 
summary balance sheet and profit and loss data was verified directly with a hard copy of 
actual banks’ financial statements, which were obtained from the Central Bank of Kenya. 
                                                 
24 The literature on banking in Africa for example Brownbridge & Harvey (1998) use the term government 
owned banks, however literature from other regions for example China refers to these as state owned 
banks. In this thesis, the term government owned banks is used where the state is the majority 
shareholder.  
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There were several errors in this dataset that we corrected.25 However, there are a few 
gaps in the database where we were not able to obtain financial statements of the banks.  
 
With reference to the qualitative data several limitations were faced. First, there was no 
random sampling in the choice of banks interviewed. The only criterion used was the 
willingness of the banks to be interviewed. However, we ensured that we had at least 
one bank from each of the segments identified at the start of the fieldwork. The 
resulting sample of banks therefore followed a mix of replication logic and sampling 
logic (Yin, 2003).26  
 
Second, bankers were very busy and often not willing to spare more than an hour per 
interview. Therefore for some banks, certain questions in the semi-structured interviews 
were skipped. For some banks, we were able to interview only two people in a bank and 
in others five different people answered the questions. Third, there is a high turnover of 
bank staff in Kenya. Therefore, some of the bank managers interviewed had been in the 
position for less than six months and often did not know the past history of the bank. 
Fourth, bank managers were very cautious when talking about ‘current problems’. They 
preferred to talk about 'what went wrong in the past' and ‘what had been changed’ and 
‘strategies for the future’. In particular the answers to questions on the level of insider 
lending, were so vague, that it was impossible to get any meaningful insight from them. 
Fifth all banks were very categorical that they did not want to 'be quoted' and would 
only participate in the interviews if their names were not revealed. Therefore interview 
data is non-attributable. Each bank is given a number (Bank 1 to Bank 7) and also a 
segment tag (FOB, GOB, LPOB, SPOB). Also, the banks were not willing for the 
interviews to be recorded. Therefore, they may be some human errors in the 
transcription. Sixth, the GOB interviewed was not very keen to discuss governance 
measures or political interference that had led to high levels of non-performing loans.  
 
                                                 
25 The main error was when a bank had subsidiaries outside Kenya. The dataset was not consistent and 
sometimes the figure of the bank was quoted and sometimes for the whole group. We consistently used 
the data for the Kenyan operations only.  
26 Selection of cases based on replication logic is the process whereby cases are chosen because similar 
observed outcomes in all the cases. Evaluation then attempts to look for similar processes that took place 
in each of the cases as explanations for the outcomes. Selection of cases based on sampling logic is 
different as cases attempt to represent a broader universe therefore chosen according to representation 
criteria (Yin, 2003). 
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The interviewees kept re-iterating that they had undergone several reforms and were 
free from political pressure in terms of lending decisions. Therefore the discussion in 
non-performing loans of GOB in this thesis relies heavily on secondary data.  
 
The main shortcoming with this thesis was that we found it impossible to speak to any 
of the statutory managers / liquidation agents appointed by Deposit Protection Fund 
Board (DPFB) to manage and liquidate failed banks. DPFB required the author of this 
thesis to get a letter from the Office of the President approving this research and this 
permit was not possible to obtain due to time constraints. Furthermore, the Central 
Bank of Kenya only gives very general information in the supervision reports and does 
not even name the banks that have failed.27 This has meant that the possibility of 
comparing the lending practices of failed banks with surviving banks, which would have 
formed an interesting case study, has not been possible. 
 
1.5.5 Data Analysis 
In general this study follows a comparative case study approach. “A case study is 
defined as an in-depth, multifaceted investigation into a particular object or theme, 
where the object or theme gives it its unity” (Lee, 2002 pp., 799). Case study approach is 
appropriate when a phenomenon is not easily distinguishable from its environment (Yin, 
2003). It is particularly applicable when there are more variables than data points (Yin, 
2003).  Therefore, this method is best suited to understand the research questions 
outlined above. However, it should be noted that as the interviews are non-attributable, 
this is not a typical case study approach.  
 
Even advocates of case study approach highlight that it is difficult to generalize and 
compare or generate theories from this type of research (Blaikie, 2000). This study refers 
to theoretical concepts before attempting to make generalizations. Furthermore, when 
generalizations are made, they refer specifically to the context of the banking sector in 
Kenya and generalizations are not attempted for other African countries.  
 
                                                 
27 Detailed list of bank failures in Kenya is given in Chapter 4. For example, the report for 1998 simply 
states: “During the year, 5 banks were placed under statutory management” (Central Bank of Kenya, 
1998). 
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Data analysis generally followed the advice of Miles and Huberman (1994). After the 
interviews were transcribed, general patterns were detected in the data. The data was 
coded and a summary of the coding was used to make the tables in Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 8.28 After that, we worked back and forth, extending the coding and going back 
to theory. Generalizations were made when each segment reflected some of the same 
constraints. This methodology reflects our open systems ontology.  
 
1.6 Structure and Contributions of the Thesis 
In this chapter we discuss the background and context of the study. We also define the 
framework of research – we are trying to understand the reasons for the shallowness 
and fragility of the banking sector in Kenya by exploring the nature of segmentation of 
the banking sector in Kenya and how this segmentation affects lending, deposit 
mobilization and corporate governance of banks. We then discuss the research methods 
and explain our reasons for focussing on qualitative interview data. The rest of the 
thesis consists of eight chapters.  
 
Chapter 2 discusses the main schools of thought and debates on the role of finance in 
economic development. The chapter provides a synthesis of the literature on the key 
functions finance can play in the economy, but underlines that the literature is weak in 
trying to explain the specific institutional constraints that prevent finance from fulfilling 
these functions. Chapter 3 is a methodological critique of the current literature on 
finance in SSA. It argues that due to the overwhelming reliance on mainstream 
methodology and quantitative methods, this literature is severely limited in its ability to 
understand and explain finance in SSA.  
 
Chapter 4 begins by exploring the establishment of banking in Kenya, followed by a 
discussion of present day performance and ownership structure. The chapter then 
carries out a critical review of studies on the banking sector in Kenya. In line with other 
studies in SSA this chapter shows that due to the reliance on mainstream methodology 
and methods, the literature on the banking sector in Kenya is deficient. Our historical 
analysis shows that not only is the banking sector in Kenya highly concentrated, but that 
the first three banks to be established, between 1896 and 1910, remain the three 
dominant banks in 2005.  We argue that this dominance is based on high levels of trust 
                                                 
28 Initially the tables were made a bank specific level and then consolidated at segment level.  
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that borrowers and depositors have in these banks, and explaining this dominance is 
essential to understanding the reasons for the shallowness and fragility of the bnaking 
sector. The chapter analyses financial statement data on the four segments - FOB, GOB, 
LPOB and SPOB – and shows that the performance between these segments is 
differentiated. FOB have good performance in terms of low non-performing loans, 
while GOB and SPOB have relatively high non-performing loans. We show that LPOB 
have been able to increase their market share while SPOB have lost their market share. 
Most importantly we show that the cost of funds and spreads are highly variable. While 
mainstream theory would infer that as the best performers, FOB would have the lowest 
spreads, we show, that they actually enjoy the highest spreads. GOB also enjoy high 
spreads even though overall they are poor performers. And SPOB are poor performers 
but they enjoy very low spreads. Using qualitative data and understanding the nature of 
lending and deposit mobilization is key to explain these conflicting and variable 
performances.  
 
Following a pluraist methodology, Chapter 5 discusses theoretical concepts from 
Marxist, Post-Keynesian and Institutional schools that are useful in understanding 
lending and deposit mobilization relationships. These include knowledge creation and 
the embeddedness of credit relations in social relations and stages of banking 
devopment framework (Chick, 1992, 1997; Dow, 1998; Dow et al., 2008; Johnson, 2005; 
Lapavitsas, 2003; Uzzi, 1999).  
 
Chapter 6 uses these theoretical concepts and analyzes the interview data to reveal that 
the constraints faced by different segments. The analysis shows that different segments 
of the banking sector face clients of significantly different size and type, and that this 
segmentation has a strong impact on performance of banks in each of the segments. 
The analysis shows that segmentation is based partly on economic factors such as the 
size of banks and structure of ownership, but largely on social factors that determine the 
trust between banks and their clients. The chapter demonstrates that due to 
segmentation, there are varying ‘radiuses of trust’ within one banking system and that 
segmentation is a result of fragmentation rather than specialization. The key 
contribution of the chapter is to show that segmentation affects lending decisions, 
deposit mobilization and governance of banks and therefore the structural constraints 
faced by banks in Kenya are varied, complex and grounded in social factors. 
 
38 
Corporate governance is viewed as a method to improve performance of firms and 
banks and therefore, Chapter 7 is a critical review of corporate governance literature 
with reference to banks and shows that empirically there is very little consensus on what 
constitutes ‘best’ corporate governance practices. Chapter 8 analysis a data set of 
corporate governance variables that we have collected and interview data. The chapter 
shows that the new regulation on corporate governance that attempts to enforce ‘best’ 
practice standards on banks in Kenya and will have little impact on the performance of 
banks because they do not consider the structural features and segmentation of the 
banking sector. Chapter 9 synthesizes the conclusions of the empirical chapters and 
identifies key areas for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2  – FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the main schools of thought and debates on the links between 
finance and development. Section 2.2 discusses the studies on the links between finance 
and growth and Section 2.3 the debates on financial system design. Studies on bank 
failure and financial fragility are discussed in Section 2.4 while Section 2.5 provides the 
concluding remarks to this chapter.  
 
2.2 Debates in Finance and Development I – Finance and Growth 
Is financial development an engine for economic growth? The proponents of finance 
and growth focus on cross country evidence. It is argued that:  
 
“Cross-country comparisons have shown the importance of a well-
developed financial sector for long-term economic growth and poverty 
alleviation. Countries with better developed banking systems and capital 
markets enjoy higher growth rates.”  
Beck and Levine (2004)29 
 
They refer to graphs of cross-country data that display a positive relationship between 
financial development and growth. An example of such a graph is displayed in Figure 2.  
 
                                                 
29 This paper was written when the authors, Beck and Levine, were both working at the World Bank. In 
general, the majority of World Bank economists are proponents of the school that financial deepening 
leads to growth.  
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Figure 2: Cross Country Evidence on the Links between Financial Development 
and Growth 1960 - 1999 
 
Source: Beck and Levine (2004) 
 
The existence of an interrelation between financial deepening and growth has been 
recognized in early works including Goldsmith who constructed a financial interrelation 
ratio and showed that this ratio grew with a country’s economic growth (Goldsmith, 
1969). 30  However, Goldsmith was cautious in interpreting this interrelationship as 
causation. Another early paper also highlighted this association between financial 
development and growth: 
 
 “An observed characteristic of the process of economic development over 
time, in a market-oriented economy using the price mechanism to allocate 
resources, is an increase in the number and variety of financial institutions 
and a substantial rise in the proportion not only of money but also of the 
total of all financial assets relative to GNP and to tangible wealth. However, 
the causal nature of this relationship between financial development and 
economic growth has not been fully explored either theoretically or 
empirically”  
Patrick (1966 pp., 174).31  
                                                 
30 This ratio is calculated by dividing the total value of all financial assets by the total value of tangible 
assets plus net foreign balance.  
31 Emphasis added.  
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This observation seems as relevant today as it did in 1966. There are several papers that 
attempt to explain a causal link between financial development and growth. The key role 
of financial institutions is intermediation – transferring assets from savers to borrowers. 
Levine (1997) and Freixas & Rochet (1997) provide summaries of the existing 
contemporary theoretical literature and focus on a causal link between finance and 
growth in terms functions of finance and the role of intermediaries in reducing 
information costs and transaction costs. 32 Due to adverse selection and moral hazard 
issues, information costs and transactions costs can never be zero in any realistically 
defined financial market and therefore intermediaries are more efficient than individuals 
in transferring assets (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981).33  
 
The figure below summaries the theoretical links between finance and growth. 
                                                 
32 They summarize several seminal works including: -  
Gurley and Shaw (1960), Benston and Smith (1976) and Fama (1980) consider how banks transform 
assets; 
Diamond (1984) and Holmström and Tirole (1993) which considered banks as delegated monitors; 
Freixas and Rochet (1997) consider how economies of scale and scope prevent individuals but allow 
banks to play a financial intermediation role;  
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) which considers banks as “pools of liquidity” that provided households with 
liquidity insurance; 
Leland and Pyle (1977), Diamond (1984) and Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) which interpret banks as 
information sharing coalitions; 
Boyd and Prescott (1986)  and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) emphasize the screening role of 
intermediaries and the pooling of idiosyncratic investment risks which stimulates growth; 
Bencivenga and Smith (1991) emphasize how financial intermediation reduces the need for project 
liquidations and therefore stimulates growth; and, 
Pagano (1993) emphasizes the impact of financial innovation on growth.  
33 Adverse selection is defined as the tendency for any contract offered to all comers to be most attractive 
to those most likely to benefit from it. For example, if an insurer offers health insurance without any 
medical examination, the expectation is that people with poor health prospects are likely to accept it, 
while people with better health prospects, who can get better terms from a more selective insurer, will 
reject the unconditional contract. In trying to be non-selective, adverse selection causes the worst risks to 
select themselves. Moral hazard is defined as the danger that if a contract promises people payments on 
certain conditions, they will change their conduct so as to make these conditions more likely to occur. For 
example, moral hazard suggests that if possessions are fully insured, their owners are likely to take less 
good care of them than if they were uninsured, or even to connive at their theft or destruction (Law & 
Smullen, 2002).  
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Figure 3: Theoretical Links between Finance and Growth 
 
 
Source: Levine (1997) 
 
The main functions financial intermediaries play that facilitate economic growth are: - 
• Encouraging saving – by providing a return on saving, financial intermediaries 
play a key role in mobilizing savings.  
• Efficient allocation of resources – specialised financial institutions are better able 
to get information on borrowers, select projects and provide ongoing 
monitoring of projects and ensure that contracts are enforced.  
• Agglomerating capital – economies of scale means that institutions more 
efficient than price mechanism in playing the intermediation role.  
• Pooling Risk - providing liquidity and converting short-term liabilities to long-
term assets, that is, maturity transformation.  
 
There still remains a debate on the direction of causality. Robinson (1952) argued that 
the causality runs from economic growth to financial deepening: where enterprise led, 
finance would follow. Marxist economists for example Aybar and Lapavitsas (2001) 
have argued that “far from being the driving force of financial accumulation, the 
financial system is an outgrowth of accumulation of industrial and commercial capital”. 
Patrick (1966) suggests that the relationship is not linear. In the early stages of 
development, financial development may lead to growth, but in later stages, growth is 
likely to determine the speed of financial development.  
 
There are several empirical studies that find a positive relationship between financial 
deepening and growth (Fry 1978; Harris 1979; Lanyi & Saracoglu 1983; Fry 1988; Gelb 
1989; King & Levine 1993a, 1993b). However, empirical tests conducted by other 
economists failed to find support for this relationship, as they find that growth co-
existed with negative real interest rates (Agarwala, 1983; Khatkhate, 1988).  Evans, 
Green et al. (2002) combine the finance and growth literature with the more traditional 
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endogenous growth models inspired by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988).34 They find 
that financial development is at least as important as human capital in the growth 
process.35 
 
The finance and growth empirical studies should be treated with caution at a theoretical 
level. They are generally based on the work of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) who 
postulated positive relationship between financial deepening and growth. In their work, 
which has come to be referred to as the financial repression school, they advocated 
financial liberalization and in particular the removal of government controlled low 
interest rates. The causal mechanism in the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis between 
finance and growth is high (market driven) interest rates, which increases savings. It is 
argued “high rates of interest for both lenders and borrowers introduce the dynamism 
that one wants in development, calling forth new net saving and diverting” (McKinnon, 
1973 pp., 15). However, the empirical studies do not explain the causal link from 
savings to financial development, and in turn, to growth. Empirical studies have focused 
on either one of the links - either on the link between monetary aggregates (as a measure 
of financial development) and growth; or the link between savings and growth 
(Mavrotas, 2005).36 Evidence from research on post liberalization suggests that the 
relative size of the financial sector has had little impact on savings (Mavrotas, 2005).37 
 
At a methodological level, several arguments can be raised about these papers. By its 
nature regression analysis works within a closed system where is it assumed that all 
variables are known and measurable. We concur with Kenny and Williams (2001) who 
carry out a large survey of the growth literature and argue that: 
 
“..any account which takes as an assumption that the process of economic 
growth works more or less unaltered across enough countries to be proved 
or disproved through the statistical testing of variables in large cross 
country regressions is likely to be inadequate”  
Kenny & Williams (2001 pp., 2).  
                                                 
34 The model uses a translog production function rather than the normal Cobb-Douglas production 
function and covers 82 countries for a period of 22 years.  
35 Emphasis added.  
36 See Mavrotas (2005) for a summary of the debates.  
37 The impact of financial liberalization on SSA and Kenya is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4.  
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Therefore econometric studies by their nature will have disappointing results as they 
assume that the process of development is homogenous, whereas history has shown 
that it is highly heterogeneous (Kenny & Williams, 2001). The criticisms levied by 
Kenny and Williams (2001) against growth equations in general, can also be levied 
against the finance and growth studies mentioned above. First, the studies are ahistorical. 
Even more complex studies, like Evans, Green et al. (2002) mentioned above,  covers a 
period over which the role of finance in the world economy changed dramatically yet 
the study does not account for this. Concerns can be raised in the reference to leap 
between correlation and causation, the quality of data, and the large number of variables 
that are put into the regressions (Kenny & Williams, 2001). While the reliance on 
quantitative methods is based on the need to be objective, most of the indexes 
constructed to measure institutional conditions are based on subjective criteria (Cramer, 
2002, 2003). At an ontological level, these studies can also be criticised as by its nature, 
regression analysis works within a closed system and looks for unrealistic ‘empirical 
regularities’ across the world (Dow, 2002). 
 
Even though the literature on the link between finance and development is mammoth, 
the movement towards large quantitative regressions has meant that attempts to show 
correlation between finance and growth have become more important, than attempts to 
understand the exact mechanisms through which finance leads to development either 
empirically using either quantitative or qualitative data.  
 
We concur with Moss (2003) who has argued: 
 
“To a certain degree, all of the economic research seeking to explain the 
“causes” of economic growth in poor countries may be a futile search for 
the holy grail of development. Although studies considered above attempt 
to draw connections between financial systems and economic growth, there 
is in fact a host of other variables that an army of economists is exploring” 
Moss (2003 pp., 73). 
 
It should be recognized that heterodox economists also concur that financial 
intermediaries fulfill important functions that facilitate the economic process. However, 
they stress that the complexity of the links. We concur with Ruziev (2006) who has 
argued: 
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“In general, a more cautious suggestion is that economic development can 
occur without financial deepening, and financial development may not 
always lead to economic development. The former centrally planned 
economies of the socialist camp reached a considerable degree of economic 
development without any financial deepening. Whereas, although some 
offshore centres have developed sophisticated financial systems, 
economically they are still underdeveloped economies” 
Ruziev (2006 pp., 91). 
 
But, this brings us back to the key point on the role of banks – it is the intermediation 
by banks determines whether these savings are actually turned into investment. 
Schumpeter (1911)  was an early proponent of the importance of finance for 
innovation, growth and development: 
 
“The banker, therefore, is not so much primarily a middle man in the 
commodity “ purchasing power” as a producer of this commodity….He 
makes possible the carrying out of new combinations, authorizes people, in 
the name of society as it were, to form them. He is the ephor of the 
exchange economy”  
Schumpeter (1911 pp., 74).38  
 
2.3 Debates in Finance and Development II – Financial System 
Design 
Another area of debate in the literature concerns the design and structure of financial 
system matters for economic growth. A key problem with the graph in Figure 2 is that it 
does not capture the heterogeneity in the design of the financial system of countries that 
are in the top right hand corner of the graph.  Therefore, some countries for example 
Germany and Japan have more bank based financial systems. Whereas, some countries 
for example the UK and USA have more market based systems. Proponents of the 
bank- based view argue that banks are better at performing the monitoring and 
                                                 
38 The use of this word by Schumpeter is extremely interesting. Ephor refers to each of the five 
magistrates elected by Spartans in ancient Greece. However this notion of a banker as an overseer of the 
exchange economy is often in conflict with the notion of bankers who take excessive risk leading to 
fragility in the economy as a whole.  
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screening role of intermediaries (Stiglitz, 1985). It is argued that stock markets suffer 
from free-rider problems and inability of small stockholders to discipline managers 
leading to an inefficient allocation of savings (Stiglitz, 1985).  
 
Ajit Singh who is one of the most fervent critics of stock markets argues that bank-led 
growth is more appropriate for developing countries whereas stock markets would bring 
more instability to already fragile economies (Singh 1992, 1997; Singh & Weisse 1998). 
Some authors find evidence for the disintermediation view – where the intermediary 
role of the banks is undermined by financial markets (Jeucken, 2001). Using a cross-
country model with an interaction effect between stock market development and bank 
development authors find a negative interaction. That is the impact of banks on growth 
becomes less positive the higher the level of stock market development (Deidda & 
Fattouh, 2005).  
  
Though these arguments have been criticised as being “too alarmist”, there is also a 
recognition that overstating the potential role for stock markets can also be dangerous 
(Moss, 2003). Even in the mainstream literature, there is now a recognition that starting 
stock markets in SSA has not led to the expected increase in financing for firms 
(Honohan & Beck, 2007; Lin, 2009). 
  
We would like to argue that, while the role of stock markets in generating long term 
finance for enterprises in sub-Saharan Africa has been overstated, they do serve an 
alternative channel for personal and institutional saving and diversification as shown by 
the high level of interest in initial public offerings (IPOs).39 Furthermore, the existence 
of stock markets and bond markets allows alternative sources of borrowing both for 
governments and institutions. However, there needs to be a recognition that stock 
markets in developing countries are not a neutral allocating mechanism. As argued by 
Harris (1994): 
 
“Economies in the process of transition are fragmented to a different 
degree from established capitalist economies so that greater differences in 
monopolistic power and rent accumulation occur. Participants in stock 
                                                 
39 For example, the IPO the mobile phone company Safaricom in Kenya in June 2008, was five times 
oversubscribed and the government manages to raise KShs. 50 billion or US$ 715 million (Ewing & 
Barclay, 2008).  
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exchange activities form one stratum with the ability to extract rents from 
their dealings in securities whose price, on thin markets, fluctuates without 
relation to ‘underlying fundamentals’. The degree of fragmentation and 
both the thinness and narrowness of the markets means that dealing cannot 
be considered as equilibrating arbitrage.” 
Harris (1994 pp., 18) 
 
This is in stark contrast to recent literature by the World Bank entitled “Making Finance 
Work for Africa” which continues to argue: 
“Financial development can help broaden the elite class because wealthy 
and middle-class people can acquire a share in the success of local economic 
ventures and begin to define their own prosperity in terms of national 
prosperity without reference to ethnic or local advantage. One concrete 
example is the way in which national elites have become interested in the 
fortunes of recently privatized firms…..If elites are invested in national 
economic prosperity…, they may work harder to introduce policies that 
underpin economic growth”  
Honohan and Beck (2007) 
 
As we have argued elsewhere there is evidence that the elites close to the Kibaki 
government in Kenya amassed phenomenal wealth through the Nairobi Stock Exchange 
(NSE) in a very short period of time between 2002 and 2005 and one cannot rely on the 
stock exchange to enforce governance or ensure equitable distribution of wealth 
(Upadhyaya, 2008).40  
 
However, we concur with Nissanke and Stein (2003) who have argued that the challenge 
of finance in developing countries is much more profound than simply an issue of 
bonds vs. stocks vs. bank lending as a source for productive investment and the need 
for financing so severe that no single source of financing should be ruled out.  
 
                                                 
40 Chapter 4 discusses the developments of the banking sector in Kenya but also details the different 
political leaders in post Independence Kenya.  
48 
Finally, there has been a development in the mainstream literature called the ‘financial 
services’ view. They argue that the debate should not be between bank based vs. market 
based finance, but about developing an enabling environment in which financial 
institutions can fulfill their functions and services (Beck & Levine, 2002; Demirgüç-
Kunt & Levine, 2001; Levine, 2002). This recognition should have provided a positive 
impetus for the literature to move in the direction of developing a deeper understanding 
of financial institutions in a context specific basis. Instead, the debate has got mired in 
the law and finance debate.  
 
The law and finance school was first propagated in what is now considered a seminal 
paper by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny now popularly known as 
LLSV(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). The school divides the 
world into two ‘families’ of legal origin - common law vs. civil law. The paper showed 
an association between legal origin and financial development – common law countries 
had better financial development indicators. It was argued that common law countries 
share certain properties – specifically better shareholder protection and creditor rights, 
leading to better access to finance for firms and in turn economic growth (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine, 2003; Beck & Levine, 2004; Bruno & Claessens, 2007; La 
Porta et al., 1998; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). 
 
It should be noted that this literature has largely been based upon cross-sectional studies 
of the quality of corporate and insolvency law at specific points in the late 1990s. Recent 
panel data work has begun to question this view. A recent large study, constructs more 
complex indices which track legal changes over time in the areas of shareholder rights 
for the period 1995-2005 for 20 developed and developing countries.41 They found that 
while common law countries had more shareholder protection, civil law countries 
during the period were catching up. They also found no evidence for the link between 
shareholder protection and stock market development casting doubt on the key claim of 
LLSV that shareholder protection leads to financial growth (Armour et al., 2008).42 
                                                 
41 The countries are Germany, France, UK, US, Japan, China, India, Pakistan, South Africa, Malaysia, 
Canada, Spain, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Italy, Switzerland, Brazil, Latvia, Czech Republic (Armour, 
Deakin, Sarkar, Siems, & Singh, 2008).  
42 A similar study covering a longer period 1970 – 2005 but 5 economies UK, France, Germany, the US 
and India also found very little evidence that shareholder rights and also creditor rights were weak in civil 
law origin countries (Armour, Deakin, Lele, & Siems, 2007).  
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In another study, using a dataset of shareholder protection consisting of 60 annual legal 
indicators for the period 1970-2005 in France, Germany, the UK and the US for the 
period 1970 – 2005, changes in the legal system and shareholder protection are analyzed 
using principal component analysis (Fargernas, Sarkar, & Singh, 2007). This study finds 
evidence that common law countries do not necessarily have better shareholder 
protection than civil law countries (Fargernas et al., 2007).  
 
These two studies raise two very important methodological issues with the law and 
finance school. First, relationships that hold across countries at certain points in time 
are lost when looking at time series analysis (Fargernas et al., 2007). Second, dividing the 
world in two large families masks the great diversity in institutional arrangements within 
each country and how these institutions evolved (Armour et al., 2007; Armour et al., 
2008).43 The problem is not that the law and finance school underlines that legal 
mechanisms are important for finance, but that ‘legal origin’ can be so neatly divided.44 
The above arguments further emphasize the need to understand the evolution of a 
country’s legal system on a country-by-country basis and to understand what are the 
specific strengths and weaknesses of the legal system that support the financial sector. 
 
Heterodox economists have emphasized the time consuming nature of the institutional 
development of banking (Dow et al., 2008; Ruziev, 2006). In Chick and Dow’s Post-
Keynesian framework of stages of banking development, there is an emphasis on how 
banks evolve over time from pure intermediation to credit creation (Chick, 1992, 1997; 
Dow et al., 2008). A summary of the seven notional stages has been detailed in 
Appendix 5.45The framework stresses the complex institutional characteristics that are 
                                                 
43 It should be noted that the studies by Fargernas et al. (2007), Armour et al. (2007) and Armour et al. 
(2008) while useful in highlighting the problems of the LLSV school, still suffer from the problems of 
large cross country studies as discussed above in section on finance and growth. However, it seems that 
the authors are at least aware of the value of doing specific country case studies. Armour & Lele (2008) is 
an extremely thoughtful piece on the evolution of financial regulation in India which emphasizes the 
political explanations and the role of interest groups in influencing legislation as opposed India’s common 
law heritage.  
44 The LLSV and related literature reflects a general trend in mainstream economics of the excessive use 
of econometrics and in turn, the tendency by economists to look for binary relations - such as common 
law vs. civil law, or greed vs. grievance in the literature relating to civil war - which are easier to test using 
econometric methods.   
45 The seven stages are: stage 1 - pure financial intermediation; stage 2 - bank deposits used as money; 
stage 3 - inter-bank lending; stage 4 - lender-of-last-resort facility; stage 5 - liability management; stage 6 -  
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necessary for banks to play their full intermediation role. Therefore, rule of law is only 
one of the institutional conditions that is important for financial development. We 
would like to highlight the framework’s emphasis on the necessity for the public to have 
full confidence in banks and the Central Bank before bank liabilities are accepted as a 
means of exchange. As will be discussed in Chapter 5 and 6, a key source of the 
segmentation of the banking sector in Kenya is differences in confidence and trust 
levels that the public has in different segments of the banking sector.  
 
2.4 Bank Failures and Fragility – Theoretical and Empirical Studies 
Bank fragility has been analyzed by looking at the special nature of banks that make 
them vulnerable to panics. Banks are different from normal firms on both the assets and 
liability side.   
 
Like any profit-oriented organization, a bank faces two problems – illiquidity and 
insolvency. A bank is said to be illiquid when it cannot meet the liabilities that are 
coming up for repayment (Soyibo, Alashi, & Ahmad, 2004).  However, the balance 
sheet of a bank is quite different from a representative firm. A simplified balance sheet 
of a bank is displayed in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Simplified Balance Sheet of a Bank 
Asset Liability 
Reserves Deposits 
Loans Capital 
Source: Rochet (2008) 
 
The fractional reserve banking system involves banks financing illiquid assets (long term 
loans) against liquid liabilities (short term deposits) and it is that makes them vulnerable 
to runs (Klausner & White, 1993).  Generally a breakdown in trust that would lead all 
depositors to withdraw their funds at once – a bank run - would lead to illiquidity and 
extended illiquidity can lead to insolvency. Deposit insurance and lender of last resort 
                                                                                                                                          
securitization; and stage 7- market structural diffusion (Ruziev, 2006). The last two stages were were 
added only in Chick’s and therefore an indication that the process of evolution of the banking sector is 
still taking place (Ruziev, 2006).   
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measures have been put in place precisely to counter this inherent instability in the 
banking system46. Yet, the jury is out whether these facilities may compound the moral-
hazard problem by transferring the risk to the tax-payer (Arun & Turner, 2004; Vives, 
2001).  
 
Despite leaving the system vulnerable to runs, this short term debt (deposits) has been 
considered in the literature as an important monitoring and market disciplining 
mechanism (Calomiris & Kahn, 1991; Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). This market 
disciplining mechanism does not always work. Rochet (2008) makes a distinction 
between a fundamental run which is efficient and a speculative run which is inefficient. 
It has also been recognized that the wide dispersion of depositors and the free rider 
problems (Freixas & Rochet, 1997) and opaqueness of banks financial statements 
(Mayes, 2004) often prevents depositors from playing this role.  
 
On the asset side, moral hazard has also been used to analyze why banks owners may 
take excessive risk which would jeopardize the solvency of the bank (Brownbridge 
1998a; Vives 2001; Senbet & Otchere 2005). First, the highly leveraged nature of a bank 
with limited liability, means that the downside risk is low compared to the upside gains. 
This induces banks to take more risks (Vives, 2001). In other words, moral hazard and 
bank capital are inversely related and furthermore, financial distress itself worsens these 
incentives (Berger et al. 1995; Brownbridge 1998a; Senbet & Otchere 2005).  Moral 
hazard is worsened by other factors: for example, high deposit rates lead to banks to 
charge higher lending rates encouraging borrowers to also adopt a high risk strategy 
(Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). A low level of diversification of the loan portfolio due to 
structural factors of the economy would also lead to a risky portfolio. This factor is 
particularly prevalent in developing countries where markets are segmented and lending 
is concentrated to firms within one industry (Brownbridge, 1998a; McKinnon, 1988).  
Recently there has been a lot of literature focusing on the East Asian financial crises 
where banks runs are analyzed as part of a wider economic crises where currency and 
financial crises are inter-related (Nissanke & Stein, 2003). For an extended literature 
                                                 
46 In particular speculative runs or runs based on rumour and form the rationale for lender of last resort 
facilities provided by Central Banks. 
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review see Nissanke and Stein (2003). Currency crises have not played a role in financial 
crises in Africa therefore this literature is not reviewed here.47  
 
There have been several cross-country econometric studies assessing the causes of bank 
failures. Using a multivariate logit econometric model Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1997) analyze the factors that increase the probability of bank failures occurring. They 
find that bank failures are more likely when economic growth is low, inflation is high, 
real interest rates are high, the country has an explicit deposit insurance scheme and that 
there is weak law enforcement (Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 1997). However as it is 
the problem with econometric studies of this nature several possible explanatory factors 
are not considered – all variables related to the financial system such as the 
capitalization of banks are not included in the specification of the model.48  
 
Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) also carry out a cross country analysis of factors affecting 
bank failures.49 They find that some of the factors that could precipitate bank failures 
include excessive credit growth, volatility in output and prices combined with shallow 
financial markets and reduction in franchise values or profitability of banks. Again, 
methodological issues can be raised with this sort of work where the authors are looking 
for unrealistic ‘empirical regularities’ across the world (Dow, 2002). As the authors 
themselves admit, “the rate at which credit growth becomes excessive and the amount 
of time it needs to persist before being clearly indicative of a problem are difficult to 
gauge” (Caprio & Klingebiel, 1996). 
 
Honohan (2000) categorises bank crises into 3 main types depending on the symptoms 
displayed – epidemic macro crises (associated with a macro shock), endemic failures 
(associated with high government intervention) and epidemic micro crises (associated 
with bad management at micro level). The third type - epidemic micro crises - are seen 
to be more prevalent in developing countries (Honohan, 2000). We find this typology 
quite useful and we believe that to understand the banking system in Kenya, one needs 
to carry out a microanalysis for the sector. However, there is a need to move beyond 
                                                 
47 Literature on the East Asian financial crises with specific reference to corporate governance is discussed 
in Chapter 7.  
48 We believe that the predictive ability of the model is also highly questionable as it does not predict a 
crisis or predicts a crisis 3 years before in 39% of the cases.  
49 Their sample includes Kenya where episodes of systemic crises are recorded for 1985-89, 1992 and 
1993-95.  
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this typology. As we argue in Chapter 6, the segmented nature of the banking sector 
means that management failures will be different for different segments of the banking 
sector.   
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks  
This chapter discussed the debates on whether finance leads to growth, the debates 
surrounding the design of the financial system and the sources of financial fragility. The 
chapter showed that there is consensus on how finance can lead of the growth and the 
function that finance and banks should fulfill. However, the chapter showed that there 
is very little consensus on the circumstances and institutional characteristics that assist 
or impede finance to fulfill its functions.  
 
At this stage it would be useful to look at the work of Gerschenkron. Though 
Gerschenkron is often cited as a proponent of the finance for growth school, his 
argument is a lot more nuanced and emphasizes the diversity of the development 
process and the institutional arrangements that emerge (Serieux, 2008; Tobin, 2008).50 
Gerschenkron made a distinction between three types of countries in terms of their 
ability to mobilize capital.51  In “advanced” countries typified by Britain during the 17th 
and 18th centuries, original capital accumulation and private wealth could easily be 
mobilized to finance enterprise growth without the need for banks. In contrast 
“moderately” backward countries such as Germany and France banks provided the 
long-term capital for industry to catch up with England. 52 The tensions created by this 
backwardness led to institutional developments including the amalgamation of German 
banks which forced the cartelization of German industry (Gerschenkron, 1962 pp., 15). 
However, in the “third” category of “very backward” countries such as Russia where 
                                                 
50  “It is the main proposition of this essay that in a number of important historical instances 
industrialization processes, when launched at length in a backward country, showed considerable 
differences, as compared with more advanced countries, not only with regard to the speed of 
development (the rate of industrial growth) but also with regard to the productive and organizational 
structures of industry which emerged from those processes (Gerschenkron, 1962 pp., 7).  
51 In terms of methodology this can be linked to earlier arguments. In his analysis, Gerschenkron captures 
the diversity of economic development process in a manner that is not captured by econometric growth 
equations.  
52 “A German bank, as the saying went, accompanied an industrial enterprise from cradle to grave, from 
establishment to liquidation throughout all the vicissitudes of its existence” (Gerschenkron, 1962 pp., 14). 
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“backwardness appear in such an accentuated form” (Gerschenkron, 1962 pp., 16) that 
“no banking system could conceivably succeed” (Gerschenkron, 1962 pp., 19). The 
circumstances required “special institutional factors designed to increase supply of 
capital to nascent industries” (Gerschenkron, 1962 pp., 354).  In the case of Russia, state 
intervention was necessary to mobilize resources.  
 
The data displayed in Chapter 1 shows that SSA can be placed in Gerschenkron’s third 
category. But an extremely complex problem arises - both the state led financial 
development and the market led financial development have not lead to financial 
deepening - yet, the need for long term finance for productive investment remains 
critical. It is hoped that this thesis with its focus on the experience of Kenyan banks 
with lending, deposit mobilization and corporate governance, will give insights into the 
institutional arrangements that constrain the banking sector in Kenya.  
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CHAPTER 3 – STUDIES ON FINANCE IN AFRICA 
“A major irony of African development history is that the theories and models employed 
have largely come from outside the continent. No other region of the world has been so 
dominated by external ideas and models.” 
Mkandawire and Soludo (1999  pp., vii) 
 
“African Studies enjoys an increasingly close connection with bilateral and multilateral 
development co-operation, providing research and researchers (along with their own 
conceptual frameworks and concerns) to assist in defining and providing direction for aid 
and related policies. This is leading to unhealthy practices, whereby African research is 
ignored in the formulation of international policies towards the continent; while external 
Africanists assume the function of interpreting the world to Africa, and vice versa. This 
dynamic reinforces existing asymmetries in capacity and influence, especially given the 
crisis of higher education in most African countries. It also undermines Africa's research 
community, in particular the scope for cross-national and international exchange and the 
engagement in broader development debates, with the result that those social scientists who 
have not succumbed to the consultancy market or sought career opportunities elsewhere are 
encouraged to focus on narrow empirical studies.” 
Olukoshi (2006 pp., 533) 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, we laid out the main characteristics of the financial sector in SSA and 
showed that in general the formal financial sector in this region is shallow, inefficient 
and fragile. The major debates on the links between finance and development in the 
literature were discussed in Chapter 2. In light of these debates, this chapter considers 
the literature on the formal financial sector or banking in SSA that is attempting to 
understand the reasons for the shallowness, inefficiency and fragility.53   
 
In Section 3.2 we discuss the studies that discuss the link between finance and growth in 
SSA. Studies on the impact of financial liberalization in Africa are discussed in Section 
3.3. Section 3.4 and Section 3.5 discuss studies on market structure and competition of 
                                                 
53 As said in Chapter 1, banks form the key portion of the formal financial sector in SSA and these terms 
will be used interchangeably.  
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studies on efficiency of banks in SSA respectively. Section 3.6 discusses studies on 
excess liquidity in SSA banks while studies on banks failures are discussed in Section 3.7. 
Finally Section 3.8 discusses the few studies that attempt to understand how banks 
mobilize deposits in SSA with Section 3.9 providing concluding remarks to this chapter.  
 
There is substantial literature on the financial sector in Africa. Heterodox economists 
established the importance of informal finance in the financial landscape in Africa 
(Aryeetey & Udy, 1997; Nissanke & Aryeetey, 1998; Wai, 1992).  Following this, there 
has been significant research on informal finance - the segmentation between informal 
and formal finance, the role of microfinance institutions, and access to finance for poor 
- by both mainstream and heterodox economists. With specific reference to Kenya, 
some of the most interesting heterodox work in microfinance is by Susan Johnson and 
emphasizes the importance of social or ‘real’ factors affecting financial markets 
(Johnson, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005). 
 
With reference to the formal financial sector or banking in SSA, Nissanke and Aryeetey 
(1998) was one of the first, and remains one of the key heterodox texts.  The authors 
highlighted the extremely complex nature of the failure of liberalization in SSA and were 
one of the first to draw attention to the problem of excess liquidity of commercial banks 
in SSA.  Following this, as the broad literature review below shows, the majority of the 
work done on formal financial sector and banking in Africa is from mainstream schools. 
This work is focussed on quantitative methods with very little attention paid to the 
structural and historical factors affecting the banking sector. The literature review also 
highlights that the majority of these studies do not consider the social or non-price 
factors that are essential to understanding the structural features of a banking system in 
SSA.  
 
3.2 Studies on the Link between Finance and Growth in Africa 
Chapter 2 discussed the debate between finance and growth in the literature. This 
debate has also been tested empirically with data from SSA and the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) regions, and these papers are discussed below.  
 
In one of the early cross country studies of 32 SSA countries Ndebbio (2004) attempts 
to measure the link between finance and growth using two variables of financial 
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deepening – the first is ratio of M2 over GDP and the second is growth rate of per 
capita money balances. 54 He concludes that financial deepening positively affects per 
capita growth in output. 55  The author reaches this conclusion even though the 
coefficient associated with the ratio of M2 over GDP was insignificant: 
 
“Fair enough… that of financial intermediation was insignificant. Both 
variables coefficients, however, had the right signs. This is important for 
policy”  
Ndebbio (2004 pp., 16)56  
 
Drawing extremely strong conclusions from such weak quantitative data is highly 
problematic.  
 
Ghirmay (2004), carries out a cross country study of 13 African countries and concludes 
that there is a positive and causal relationship between financial development and 
economic growth.57 The author himself acknowledges that while there is evidence for 
causality in 8 out of 13 countries, there is apparent reverse causality in 9 countries in the 
sample. The conclusion is based on evidence of bi-directional causality in just 6 
countries in the sample, and is therefore highly questionable.  
 
Akinboade (2000) studied the relationship between financial deepening and growth in 
Tanzania using total bank deposits to measure financial deepening. The paper finds that 
in line with McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, removal of interest rate restrictions and 
positive real interest rates led an to increase in bank deposits. However the regression 
results for the relationship between financial deepening and growth were more mixed. 
The relationship is negative and significant during the period of financial liberalization 
(1982- 1996) but insignificant during the period of financial repression (1966-1981).  
 
                                                 
54 The Ndebbio study and the majority of the studies discussed in this chapter by African economists 
have been sponsored by the AERC (African Economic Research Consortium) see www.aercafrica.org.  
55 The author uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and covers the period 1980-1989, using decade 
averages for the variables.  
56 Emphasis added.  
57 The author uses vector autoregression (VAR) framework. Economic growth is measured in terms of 
increase in real GDP and financial development is measured in terms of level of credit to the private 
sector by financial intermediaries.  
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Two studies of the link between finance and growth in the MENA region also give 
conflicting results. An analysis of eleven MENA countries from 1980 to 2001, shows 
that besides the variable credit to the public sector, no other indicators of financial 
development have a significant impact on growth (Al-Zubi, Al-Rjoub, & Abu-Mhareb, 
2006).58 Another study of six MENA countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Syria 
and Tunisia) uses four different measures of financial deepening for the period 1963-
1993 and finds a strong unidirectional relationship between financial development and 
growth in five of the six countries (Abu-Bader & Abu-Qarn, 2008a).59 In the sixth 
country Israel, the country with most developed financial system, they do find not 
evidence of the impact of financial deepening on growth and only weak evidence of the 
impact of growth on financial deepening. They argue that their results “are in line with 
earlier studies that found stronger support for the supply-leading hypothesis in 
developing countries and the demand following hypothesis in developed countries” 
(Abu-Bader & Abu-Qarn, 2008a). The conviction with which they present their results 
is particularly surprising considering that the same authors, in another paper, found 
evidence for bi-directional causality between finance and growth for Egypt (Abu-Bader 
& Abu-Qarn, 2008b).  
 
All the papers show that empirically it is very difficult to prove a strong link between 
finance and growth and results often depend on the model specification, countries in 
the sample, sample period and definitions of financial deepening variables. Furthermore, 
the methodological arguments against econometric analysis of Kenny and Williams 
(2001) and (2002), that were discussed in Chapter 2, also apply to these studies.  
 
Marianne Bertrand who reviewed the finance and development research carried out by 
the World Bank for the ‘Deaton Report’ has also raised similar concerns. While 
recognizing that the World Bank research agenda in this area can be termed a success in 
terms of the number of publications accepted in top finance and economics journals she 
questions the over-reliance on cross country regressions. It is worth quoting her remarks 
in full in particular as the research agenda in SSA largely follows this same pattern: 
 
                                                 
58 They follow the model of Levine (1997).  
59 The four measures of financial deepening used are M2 to GDP, M2 minus currency to GDP, private 
sector credit to GDP, and credit issued to nonfinancial private firms to total domestic credit  
59 
“While (and maybe because) fundamental, these questions are also 
extremely difficult to answer convincingly. In particular, the cross-country 
approach that is adopted in much of the research I have reviewed suffers 
from serious limitations. While this research approach has established clear 
correlation patterns between many of the key variables of interest, the 
policy takeaways of this research are often quite limited due to obvious 
interpretational issues. Also, this research approach is often too “black-
boxy” to provide practical guidelines for those in charge of policy design 
and implementation. While I am certainly not advocating abandoning the 
cross-country research methodology, I was nevertheless surprised by how 
prevalent this research methodology was in the various projects I reviewed. 
In particular, I found detailed case studies, where one can delve deeper into 
the specific experiences of a given country (or a given financial institution 
within a country), remarkably scarce. My view prior to going into this 
evaluation is that Bank researchers had a strong comparative advantage in 
such case studies compared to researchers at academic institutions, not only 
given the huge amount of field experience within the Bank but also given 
the many contacts the Bank has with financial institutions and financial 
agencies around the world. I was surprised not to see this comparative 
advantage more strongly reflected in the Bank research”  
Deaton et al (2006  pp., 111)  
 
All five of the specific studies discussed above, are by mainstream economists. Even 
when the expected positive relationship between finance and growth is not found in the 
data, policy conclusions are drawn pointing towards increased liberalization.  Ndebbio 
(2004) argues “this apparently less than satisfactory performance of the financial 
intermediation variable is due basically to the shallow finance and the absence of well 
functioning capital markets in most SSA countries” (pp., 17). Akinboade (2000) attribute 
the mixed results to the “erstwhile socialist orientation” (pp., 948) of banking in 
Tanzania. Al-Zubi et al. (2006) state that “financial sectors are still underdeveloped and 
need more efforts to be able to exert its functions effectively in the Arab countries”. 
They are based on a closed system analysis with little recognition that there may be 
important factors affecting these relationships that cannot be captured by the available 
data.  
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3.3 Studies on the Impact of Financial Liberalization in Africa 
As discussed in Chapter 2, in the ‘financial repression’ literature, it is advocated that 
financial liberalization would end credit rationing by the state and allow other investors 
to borrow from financial intermediaries (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). This argument 
formed the rationale for financial liberalization - which was undertaken in most African 
countries in the 1980s and early 1990s as part of the structural adjustment policies 
advocated by the World Bank and the IMF. It was expected that that liberalization 
would increase financial deepening, private savings, investment and in turn growth.  
 
There is a general recognition in the literature that financial sector reforms did not 
generate the fruits expected in terms of an increase in savings and investment, 
improvement in financial sector intermediation and reduction in interest rate spreads 
(Brownbridge & Harvey, 1998; Mkandawire, 1999; Ndung'u & Ngugi, 1999; Ngugi & 
Kabubo, 1998; Nissanke & Aryeetey, 1998; Adedoyin Soyibo, 1997; World Bank, 1994). 
The main mechanism through which financial liberalization was going to impact 
resource mobilization was through impact on savings. In an early study on a cross 
section of African countries it was found that the effect of real interest rates on savings 
is weak or non-existent (Mwega 1990). 
 
There is also a recognition that financial liberalization was accompanied with increased 
instability and higher incidence of bank insolvencies (Brownbridge, 1998a; Brownbridge 
& Harvey, 1998; Soyibo & Adekanye, 1992). Experience from African countries 
suggests that credit to the private sector did not grow after liberalization and in fact 
banks shifted their portfolios towards government stocks (Nissanke & Aryeetey, 1998; 
Serieux, 2008).  Instead of lending long term banks maintained highly liquid portfolios 
and there was a high incidence of non-performing loans (Aryeetey, Hettice, Nissanke, & 
Steel, 1997; Chirwa, 2001; Nissanke & Aryeetey, 1998).  
 
However, there is still significant debate as to why the reforms did not bear fruit. At a 
theoretical level, working from within a new institutional framework, Joseph Stiglitz has 
emphasized that credit rationing in the credit markets is not merely the result of 
‘financial repression’, but is rather inherent to any financial market due to pervasive 
information asymmetries and incomplete markets (Stiglitz, 1993; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). 
Furthermore, the increase in interest rates following liberalization tends to worsen the 
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risk composition of banks’ loans portfolios, aggravating the problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard (Stiglitz, Helmann, & Murdoch, 2000).   
 
In general, mainstream authors have argued that liberalization failed due to the 
incompleteness of reforms, poor sequencing and lack of government will (Reinhart & 
Tokatlidis, 2003; World Bank, 1994). With specific reference to banks, it was observed 
that following liberalization, banks moved in two dramatically opposite directions – they 
either avoided all but the lowest risk lending or they exhibited a reckless expansion of 
lending even to insolvent clients (Caprio, Atiyas, & Hanson, 1994). Both these reactions 
can lead to an increase in fragility of banks’ balance sheets. Following this observation, it 
is argued that it is necessary that certain ‘initial conditions’ must be met before financial 
sector reform is embarked upon and these include – first, reasonably stable 
macroeconomic conditions; second, sound financial conditions of banks and their 
borrowers; third, attainment by bank personnel of basic minimum financial skills; and 
fourth checks and balances to minimize collusion amongst banks (Caprio et al., 1994). 
Therefore there is a firm acknowledgement of the need to build ‘institutional capacity’ 
before undertaking reforms (Caprio, 1994).  
 
“In designing reform programs, African governments and external donors 
have sometimes placed too much faith in quick fixes. Reform programs 
overestimated the benefits of restructuring balances sheets and 
recapitalizing banks – and underestimated the time its takes to improve 
financial infrastructure in an environment where the main borrowers (the 
government and the public enterprises) are financially distressed and 
institutionally weak’  
World Bank (1994 pp., 204). 
 
The recognition of the importance of institutional factors is useful; however, there is a 
methodological issue with this sort of analysis as it reduces historical development to a 
small set of ‘initial conditions.’ It is also hypocritical to talk about ‘poor sequencing’ 
after the World Bank had already pursued the reform process of liberalization in most 
SSA countries. Liberalization was based on the explicit principal that once the prices (in 
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this case interest rates) were set free, market forces would ensure that savings were 
mobilized.60 
 
At this stage it would be useful to remember Gerschekron who questioned the notion 
of prerequisites for industrial development “...there is not general set of prerequisites 
valid for all times and climes….each case must be studied independently” 
(Gerschenkron, 1962 pp.,46 ).61 
 
In carrying out a review of articles that attempt to understand why financial 
liberalization did not achieve the desired results in SSA, it is argued “A common theme 
that runs through the papers in this supplement is the peculiarity of African economies 
and institutions….A low quality of institutions appears to have constituted a primary 
culprit in this limited success” (Fosu, Kimenyi, & Ndung'u, 2003). 62 In methodological 
terms, the idea of institutions ‘peculiar’ to Africa implies a bias towards a monolithic 
idea of what ‘good’ institutions are. A review of institutional developments in Europe 
and Asia reveals great institutional diversity yet this is not reflected in work on African 
institutions. We concur with Olukoshi (2006) who charged that: 
 
“Contemporary processes on the African continent are frequently 
considered as being subject to a unilinear evolutionism, replicating an earlier 
epoch in the history of Europe and the solutions to the challenges 
associated with such processes also, naturally, replicating the ‘models’ that 
had been employed by Europe. Scholars ignore the fact that every facet of 
the development history of Europe and North America is under permanent 
debate, and revision makes it difficult to capture past experiences as 
historical truths that have been settled once and for all. Instead, in the 
culture of scholarship by analogy, many Africanists are tempted to present 
the histories of Europe and America in a frozen form that is bereft of all 
contradictions. In the worst cases, the result is an attempt by Africanists to 
                                                 
60 As a corollary, it should be remembered that in the application of liberalization reforms to ex-
Communist countries, there was an explicit argument and expectation by both Western experts and Soviet 
academics that market institutions would spring up as soon a central planning was abolished (Dow et al., 
2008).     
61 Gerschenkron was referring specifically to the notion of ‘original capital accumulation’ but the insight is 
useful to remember in this case.  
62 Emphasis added.  
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read Africa through a simplistic, one-sided, incomplete, and ill-digested 
history of Europe and America”  
Olukoshi (2006 pp., 541) 
 
Heterodox economists have emphasized that the reasons financial liberalization did not 
lead to the improvement expected are extremely complicated. In countries such as 
Ghana and Malawi, reform was more gradual, yet there have been few positive changes 
in financial indicators and outcomes are similar to countries where reform was much 
more rapid (Nissanke, 2001). They have emphasized the fragmentation and 
segmentation of markets and the fact that liberalization was carried out as a response to 
severe economic crises and acute macroeconomic instability (Aryeetey, Senbet, & Udy, 
1997; Brownbridge & Harvey, 1998; Nissanke & Aryeetey, 1998; A Soyibo, 1997). 
 
3.4 Studies on Market Structure and Competition in Banks in Africa 
Neoclassical economics begins with the assumption that increased competition will lead 
to lower costs and enhanced efficiency in the financial market. However there is now a 
growing recognition, even in the mainstream literature, that assuming “competition is 
unambiguously good in banking is naïve” (Claessens & Laeven, 2003 pp., 4). It is argued 
that the information intensive nature of banking implies that banking is naturally less 
competitive than other sectors (Caprio & Levine, 2002). Oligopolistic competition may 
lead to higher intermediation costs and higher spreads and inefficiency or may lead to 
more efficient market through the exploitation of economies of scale (Buchs & 
Mathisen, 2005). 
 
Not only are the links between competition and efficiency complex, the links between 
competition, efficiency and stability are just beginning to be explored (Allen & Gale, 
2004; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine, 2006). A certain degree of market power may be 
beneficial in banking as it can moderate banks’ risk taking incentives. A bank with more 
market power, franchise value and higher profits has more to lose if it takes an 
excessively risk policy (Vives, 2001). In the same vein other authors have argued that the 
reduction in franchise value and rents led to an increase in bank failures in the 1980s 
(Keeley, 1990; Stiglitz et al., 2000). 
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There is no doubt that the banking systems in SSA are highly concentrated as shown in 
Table 2.   
 
Table 2: Structural Features of Banking Systems in SSA 
 Kenya Ghana Nigeria South 
Africa 
Tz. Ug. Zambia SSA 
average 
Number of 
Banks 
53 17 51 60 9 15 16 -- 
Bank 
concentration 
(3 banks) 
45.663 55.0 86.5 77.0 45.8 70.0 81.9 81.0 
Source: Ncube (2007) 
 
Despite recent recognition in the literature that “different countries may have different 
optimal level of competition intensity” (Vives, 2001), empirical work done in Africa 
continues to follow a Structure-Conduct-Performance (S-C-P) paradigm where it is 
assumed that the low levels of competition is the main contributor of the poor 
performance of African banking. More crucially they all assume that high levels of 
concentration automatically result in lower competition.  
  
For example, in a survey of the financial sector in Africa, using data from 13 African 
countries, Ncube (2007) argues that the oligopolistic nature of the banking market is a 
key reason for the high interest rate spreads.  
 
Chirwa (2001), in an extensive study of the Malawian banking industry, also carries out 
an S-C-P hypothesis by analyzing the determinants of profitability. He finds that 
support for collusion in the Malawian banking industry as market concentration has a 
positive and significant impact on profitability.64 He argues that competition exists only 
on the fringes – with 9 banks competing for 25% of the market while 2 (government-
owned) banks control 75% of the market. This leads to a policy conclusion that there is 
a need to privatize government owned banks to encourage competition. Without going 
                                                 
63 This figure is based on the author’s own calculations. 
64 In the case of Malawi interest rates were controlled and the main source of profits was fee income 
(Chirwa 2001).  
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into the extensive debate on the merits of privatization here, it is useful to note that in 
other African countries privatization has not reduced the domination of a few strong 
banks (Ngugi & Kabubo, 1998).  
 
Industrial organization literature has developed to show that competition is not only 
determined by concentration and market structure indicators alone, but that 
contestability is important (Baumol, Panzar, & Willig, 1982; Besanko & Thakor, 1992).65 
Empirically there have been a lot of studies conducted to measure competition, now 
defined in terms of contestability generally following the seminal work by Panzar and 
Rosse (1987). 
 
Panzar and Rosse model investigates the extent to which a change in factor input prices 
is reflected in (equilibrium) revenues earned by a specific bank. The model provides a 
measure – the H statistic as a measure of the degree of competition. Table 3 below 
explains the interpretative value of the H statistic.  
 
Table 3: Interpretation of H Value 
Value of H Implied Market Structure 
H ≤ 0 Monopoly, colluding oligopoly 
0 < H < 1 Monopolistic competition 
H = 1 Perfect competition, natural monopoly in perfectly contestable market 
Source: Claessens and Laeven (2003) 
 
Claessens and Laeven (2003) use this model to estimate the degree of competitiveness in 
a cross section of 50 developed and developing countries for the period 1994 – 2001. 
Buchs and Mathisen (2005) also apply the Panzar and Rosse model to estimate the H 
statistic for Ghana for the same period. A selection of the results are summarized in the 
table below.  
                                                 
65 Competitive outcomes are possible in concentrated systems and collusive actions can be sustained even 
in the presence of many firms. Therefore, it is the threat of entry, contestability that is more important. 
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Table 4: H Statistic for Different Countries / Regions 
Country Period H  – Statistic 
Kenya 1994-2001 0.58 
Ghana 1998-2003 0.56 
Nigeria 1994-2001 0.67 
South Africa 1994-2001 0.85 
North America (median) 1994-2001 0.67 
South America (median) 1994-2001 0.73 
East Asia (median) 1994-2001 0.67 
South Asia (median) 1994-2001 0.53 
Western Europe (median) 1994-2001 0.67 
Eastern Europe (median) 1994-2001 0.68 
Source: Buchs and Mathisen (2005) and Claessens and Laeven (2003) 
 
It can be seen from the above table that an H statistic of between zero and one seems to 
be the ‘default’ result of applying this methodology and therefore the usefulness of this 
model to establish the level of competitiveness is highly questionable.66 In banking in 
particular, full monopoly or perfect competition are unlikely. Furthermore, the model is 
based on several restrictive assumptions including that banks are operating in (long run) 
equilibrium.  
 
Some authors who use this model do recognize this problem. For example Buchs and 
Mathisen (2005) state “what constitutes equilibrium in the banking sector remains 
elusive” (p 15) and “cross-country comparisons should be treated with caution”(p. 17).67 
                                                 
66 For example Buchs and Mathisen (2005) find that only significant result of their empirical work is that 
bank profits are highly correlated to the treasury bill rate and “banking sector and the government are 
trapped in a co-dependency scheme” (p 20) 
67 Buchs and Mathisen (2005) note that the H statistic implies Ghana is only slightly less competitive than 
Nigeria, yet it is known that Nigeria has significantly lower spreads than Ghana. Furthermore, H- statistic 
67 
Surprisingly, they justify continuing to use this model by stating that they are “following 
existing literature” (p 16).  
 
However, many authors do not seem to recognize the limitations of this methodology. 
Mugume (2006) uses the Panzar and Rosee methodology to analyze the competitiveness 
of the Ugandan banking sector from 1995 to 2005 and again finds H statistic with a 
value of 0.28 on average for the entire period, 0.40 for the 2000-2005 period and 0.31 
for the 1995-1999. He argues that this displays that the Ugandan banking sector is 
characterised by monopolistic competition with improved competition in the later 
period, due to “cleaning up of the sector” (Mugume, 2006 pp., 39). The H-statistic 
calculated is used as a measure of competition and regressed against concentration. The 
author argues that concentration negatively affects competition. However, 
concentration did not change dramatically in the period under consideration and there is 
little specific analysis as to why competition improved during the period.  
 
Musonda (2008) uses the Panzar and Rosee methodology to analyze the competitiveness 
of the Zambian banking sector from 1998 to 2006. Table 5 below summarizes his 
results.  
 
Table 5: Summary of H Statistic for Zambia from Musonda (2008) 
  H  – Statistic 
Total Revenue (all banks) 0.711 
Interest Revenue (all banks) 0.721 
Foreign Banks (total income) 0.678 
Local Banks (total income) 0.594 
Foreign Banks (interest income) 0.64 
Local Banks (interest income) 0.654 
Large Banks (total income) 0.592 
                                                                                                                                          
calculated by Claessens and Laeven (2005) for USA is 0.41 (p. 30 table 2) – the lowest in their sample. 
Their results contradict Shaffer (1989).  
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  H  – Statistic 
Small Banks (total income) 0.656 
Large Banks (interest income) 0.656 
Small Banks (interest income) 0.667 
 
As the 5 largest banks in Zambia control over 80% of the industry, concentration ratios 
would imply that the industry is oligopolistic (Musonda, 2008). However, using the 
Panzar-Rosse model, the author argues that “key findings of the study are that Zambian 
banks earned their income under conditions of monopolistic competition. The H-
statistic derived from the interest income specification is greater than that obtained with 
total income suggesting that commercial banks still regard traditional banking activities 
as important” (Musonda, 2008  pp., 42). The author’s bias towards foreign banks is also 
evident, as it is argued “Estimates for bank ownership indicate that foreign banks 
compete more intensely than domestic banks, supporting evidence from previous 
studies” (Musonda, 2008  pp., 42). This is despite the fact that the authors own data 
shows a rather mixed picture - while competition is higher amongst foreign banks for 
total income, it is lower when looking at interest income. In the introduction, the author 
highlights that the Bank of Zambia believes that the dominance of foreign banks is a 
problem for increasing credit in the market (Bank of Zambia, 2004). Yet, the author 
does not address this question in light of the results of his model. The author is also 
surprised that there is higher competition amongst small banks than large banks and 
argues that large banks have a higher regulatory burden.  
 
It can be argued that while this paper is sophisticated in its application of econometric 
and panel data analysis, it reflects a lack of interest in of the exact nature of competition 
in the Zambian banking market, in particular the social and historical factors that shape 
the reputation of banks and the impact of this on competition between banks.  
 
It is more useful to assess the exact nature of competition and whether an increase in 
competition is associated with improvements in performance or not. Maimbo (2002) 
carries out this sort of analysis in an interesting study that links competition issues to 
bank failures in Zambia. The author highlights that besides monitoring CAMELs 
financial ratios, the analysis of other factors such as the business strategies of local 
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banks - for example over reliance on cost-based competition would have revealed 
weakness in banks that later failed (Maimbo, 2002).68  
 
3.5 Studies on the Efficiency of Banks in Africa 
Another recent trend in the literature has been to estimate the efficiency of banks in 
SSA. This follows the trend in mainstream literature where there are innumerable 
studies that attempt to move beyond a simple comparison of financial ratios to 
econometric modeling measuring the efficiency of financial institutions using frontier 
analysis. In this section we will discuss briefly the theory of frontier analysis followed by 
the application of this type of analysis to banking in SSA. The main aim of this section is 
to show that this form of analysis is becoming dominant in the research on banking in 
SSA and is based on a false sense of rigor. Even if this sort of methodology is accepted, 
the papers discussed here can be criticized on their own terms. We will also discuss 
more serious methodological issues with this type of analysis and show that they do not 
generate a deeper understanding of the banking system in SSA.  
 
Frontier analysis involves the establishment of an efficient benchmark, or frontier, and 
then the distance of a firm from the frontier measures the extent of the firm’s 
inefficiency. The frontier is usually established in terms of technical or cost efficiency 
(maximum output for given input) or allocative efficiency (given output for minimum 
input). Hasan (2005) provides a good critical summary of the theoretical underpinnings 
of these studies and highlights that theoretically allocative and technical efficiency 
measure different concepts, even though they are used interchangeably in the empirical 
literature.   
 
The majority of empirical studies follow two stages. In the first stage, (in)efficiency from 
the frontier is measured.  The two most common methods of measuring efficiency are:- 
parametric stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) or a non-parametric development envelope 
analysis (DEA). The models of the output and input functions have become highly 
sophisticated deploying translog or flexible functional forms in preference to the more 
traditional Cobb-Douglass production function.  It should be noted, that this frontier 
analysis can be applied across a variety of industries. In studies of banking, there are no 
                                                 
68 CAMELs is an acronym that that stands for financial ratios of Capital, Assets, Management, Earnings 
and Liquidity. See brief discussion on CAMELs issues in Chapter 1.  
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consistent measures of input or output used to define the frontier.  Input measures used 
include labor costs, physical capital costs and costs of deposits or total value of deposits.  
Measures of output used include the total value of loans, total assets, income from loans 
or off balance sheet variables. Following Fare, Grosskopf et al (1994), the efficiency 
results are sometimes decomposed using a Malmquist decomposition into technical 
efficiency and technological change, with the former further decomposed into a pure 
efficiency change and scale efficiency change, to understand changes over time or 
between companies or between regions.  
 
In the second stage of the analysis the calculated measures of (in)efficiency are then 
used as a dependent variable in a model with selection of determinants of (in)efficiency 
as independent variables.  Berger and Humphrey (1997) provide a summary of 121 
studies in 21 countries based on these efficiency models, and though they are generally 
proponents of this method, they raise several limitations of the studies some of which 
will be discussed below.  
 
Here we discuss two such studies in SSA - Egesa (2006) who attempts to understand the 
efficiency of banks in Uganda and Aikaeli (2008) whose analysis looks at banks in 
Tanzania.  
 
Reforms of the financial sector in Uganda started in 1992 and Egesa (2006) measures 
the changes in efficiency or productivity from 1993 – 2005 for 11 banks.69 Productivity 
or efficiency is measured using non-parametric Malmquist Index. At an aggregate level, 
the author finds an overall decline in productivity from 1993 – 2005. However, the 
steep decline in productivity after 1993, is slightly reversed by the increase in 
productivity from 2002 (Egesa, 2006). Results for productivity change at an individual 
bank level are shown in Table 6.  
 
                                                 
69 The total number of commercial banks in Uganda was 15 in 1993, which increased post liberalization to 
20 banks in 2000 but then decreased to 15 in 2004 (Egesa, 2006) 
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Table 6: Bank and Ownership Efficiency Change Measures in Uganda 1993 – 
2005 
Bank Ownership Technical 
Efficiency 
change 
index 
Technological 
change index 
Pure 
efficiency 
change 
index 
Scale 
efficiency 
change 
index 
Total factor 
productivity 
change 
index 
1  Foreign  0.997  1.009  0.996  1.001  1.006  
2  Foreign  1.000  1.013  1.000  1.000  1.013  
3  Foreign  1.000  0.982  1.000  1.000  0.982  
4  Local  0.985  1.021  0.992  0.993  1.006  
5  Local  1.000  0.974  1.000  1.000  0.974  
6  Foreign  1.000  0.999  1.000  1.000  0.999  
7  Foreign  0.994  1.011  0.996  0.999  1.005  
8  Local  1.000  0.984  1.000  1.000  0.984  
9  Foreign  1.000  0.975  1.000  1.000  0.975  
10  Foreign  1.000  1.025  1.000  1.000  1.025  
11  Foreign  0.994  0.980  0.998  0.996  0.974  
Mean  0.997 0.997 0.998 0.999 0.995 
Source: Egesa (2006) 
 
The author argues that this shows “improvements among four foreign banks and one 
local bank over the entire period, explained entirely by technological improvements. 
There were no changes in pure and scale efficiency for the majority of banks. However, 
three foreign banks had a decline in pure efficiency compared to one local bank. The 
same local bank also had a decline in scale efficiency although the gains in technological 
efficiency were more than enough to offset the decline in efficiency change” (Egesa, 
2006 pp., 23). Besides giving an explanation of the results, this analysis does not give us 
any meaningful understanding of the changes in efficiency banking system in Uganda 
from 1993 – 2005, including what sort of technological improvements were taking place.  
 
In the second stage, the author then assesses the determinants of productivity using a 
two way error components model. The results are summarized in Table 7.70 
 
                                                 
70 The author gives results for 3 different estimates, a random period effects model, a fixed cross section 
and random period effects model and a fixed cross section and period effects. The results quoted here are 
for the third - fixed cross section and period effects model which has the highest adjusted R-squared.  
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Table 7: Regression Results of the Determinants of Productivity in Uganda  
Variable Measured By Expected 
Sign 
Hypothesis Empirical 
Results 
Size Assets of bank / 
Total assets of banks 
in industry 
+ve  Economies of scale, 
large size  high 
productivity 
-ve but not 
significant 
at 10% level 
Capital 
Adequacy 
Core Capital / Risk 
Weighted Assets 
+ve high capital  high 
productivity 
-ve 
Asset Quality Non-performing 
Loans / Total Loans 
-ve High non performing 
loans  low 
productivity 
+ve but not 
significant 
Shareholder 
Stake in Bank 
Equity / Total Assets +ve High shareholder stake, 
reduces agency 
problems  high 
productivity 
+ve 
Liquidity Total Assets / Total 
Deposits 
-ve High (excess) liquidity 
 low productivity 
+ve 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on Assets +ve  Higher profits lead to 
increased productivity 
+ve 
Adjusted R-
squared 
   0.0652 
Source: Egesa (2006 pp., 26) 
 
It should be noted that very little thought appears to have been put into deciding the 
independent variables in particular return on assets. It is tautological to use return on 
assets as an independent variable. This variable is an output that is used to calculate the 
efficiency frontier in the first stage.  Therefore, it is not surprising that the most 
significant variable in the model is return on assets. Furthermore, while econometric 
model is sophisticated, there is little analysis as to why the results of the analysis are in 
most cases opposite as to what would be expected. 71 
 
The second study by Aikaeli (2008) is based on the banking system in Tanzania using 
data from 1998 – 2004.72 The author carries out non-parametric DEA, non-parametric 
                                                 
71 With a t value of 4.09, it is significant even at the 0.1% level.  
72 This paper is based on research done by the author during his PhD thesis which was awarded in 2006 
by University of Dar-es-Salam and sponsored by the AERC’s Collaborative PhD Programme.   
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Malmquist indices of efficiency change and parametric SFA.73 The paper is useful as it 
makes some attempt to understand the segmentation in the market as the efficiency 
indexes are calculated for different segments.74 Results for productivity change using the 
non-parametric Malmquist index at the segment level are shown in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Bank and ownership efficiency change measures in Tanzania 1998 – 
2005 
Group Technical 
Efficiency 
change index 
Technological 
change index 
Pure 
efficiency 
change 
index  
Scale 
efficiency 
change 
index  
Total factor 
productivity 
change 
index  
Large 
Private 
Owned  
1.000 1.131 1.000 1.000 1.131 
Large 
Foreign 
Owned 
1.000 1.056 1.000 1.000 1.056 
Small 
Private 
Owned 
1.002 0.992 1.000 1.002 0.994 
Mean 1.001 1.058 1.000 1.001 1.059 
Source: Aikaeli (2008) 
 
The results indicate that the largest change in productivity occurred amongst the large 
private owned banks, and that overall productivity in the small private owned banks 
decreased. However, it should be noted that this finding contradicts the results of the 
other 2 models – in the DEA, the productivity of small banks increased and according 
to the SFA analysis, the efficiency of small banks increased. Again, the author makes no 
attempt to understand why the different models give differing results.  
 
                                                 
73 It is not clear from the study the number of banks that are included in the sample. 
74 It is not clear why for the non-parametric approaches the banks are divided into three groups – large 
banks, international banks and small banks, yet for the parametric they are divided only into two groups - 
large banks and small banks.  
74 
In the second part of the analysis, the indexes of inefficiency calculated through the 
parametric SFA model are regressed against possible determinants of inefficiency using 
a Tobit model. The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Regression Results of the Determinants of Bank (In)efficiency in 
Tanzania 
Variable Measured By Expected 
Sign 
Hypothesis Empirical 
Results 
Size Assets of bank / 
Total assets of 
banks in industry 
-ve Economies of scale - 
Small size  high 
inefficiency 
+ve and 
significant 
Capital 
Adequacy 
Spending on capital 
goods (fixed assets, 
office fittings)/non-
tax expenses 
- ve Low capital  high 
inefficiency 
-ve and 
significant  
Assets quality Non-performing 
Loans / Total Loans 
+ve Low asset quality  
high inefficiency 
Not 
significant 
Labour 
compensation 
Salaries and 
Remuneration / 
Other Non-Tax 
Expenses 
-ve  Low compensation  
high inefficiency 
-ve and 
significant 
Excess 
Liquidity 
Liquidity – Statutory 
Liquidity 
+ve High (excess) liquidity 
 high inefficiency 
+ve and 
significant 
Pseudo R 
squared 
   -0.1634 
Source: Aikaeli (2006  pp. 101, 135 ) 
 
The analysis has serious flaws even on its own terms. The use by Aikaeli of expenditure 
on capital goods as the measure of capital adequacy shows a clear lack of understanding 
of a bank’s balance sheet.  Capital in this context is the equity of the shareholders and 
clearly very different from expenditure on capital goods that is used for industry.75 Again 
there is no clear attempt to understand why the size variable gives the opposite result to 
the one expected, or why asset quality, which according to theory should be a significant 
determinant of efficiency, is not significant.  
 
                                                 
75 Refer to Chapter 2 for a summary discussion of a simplified version of a bank’s balance sheet.   
75 
Both these papers are from the mainstream, but it can be seen that they do not meet the 
standards set by good mainstream economists. They do not acknowledge some of the 
limitations of efficiency models highlighted by even the strongest proponents of this 
method of analysis. Berger, Hunter et al. (1993) highlight that the key difference 
between the parametric SFA and the non-parametric DEA is that they maintain 
different assumptions about the probability distribution of banking data. They caution 
that there is no simple rule for determining the true distribution of banking data, yet the 
choice of measurement method strongly affects the measurement of inefficiency and 
therefore extreme care needs to be taken when deciding the method that should be used 
(A Berger et al., 1993). Neither of the papers discussed above make any attempt to 
understand how this limitation would impact on their analysis. Egesa (2006) uses a non-
parametric model on the grounds that a parametric model requires large data sets which 
are not available for these countries. However, if the banking process in these specific 
countries is characterised largely by stochastic elements, then the non-parametric 
approach may not be appropriate (Hasan, 2005). Based on the discussions by Berger, 
Hunter et al. (1993) it should not come as a surprise that when Aikaeli (2006) carries out 
all three methods - non-parametric DEA, non-parametric Malmquist decomposition 
and a parametric SFA, he gets conflicting results (as discussed above).  What is 
surprising is there is no attempt made to understand why each of the method gives 
different results in this case.  
 
Therefore, even if we view these papers from a mainstream perspective, they can be 
criticized as they draw strong conclusions on extremely weak basis. Using the DEA 
model, the average efficiency of all banks during the period is Tanzania is 97.4% and 
therefore it is concluded that:  
 
“The remarkable comment from the findings of this study is that efficiency 
status of commercial banks in Tanzania is not disappointing to the financial 
sector reforms because the scores turned out to be fairly high”  
Aikaeli (2008 pp., 20).76  
 
This conclusion is based on a comparison with efficiency scores of twenty five other 
studies based on frontier models in various countries where even developed countries 
such as the UK scores 83.3 and Italy scores 80 (Aikaeli, 2006 , Appendix 9). This sort of 
                                                 
76 Emphasis added.  
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simple comparative analysis is not justified considering that each study or country will 
have had a different input / output combination used to measure the frontier. Even 
mainstream economists have recognized that cross country comparisons of even simple 
banking ratios is fraught with difficulties due to differences in product mix, capital 
structures, accounting conventions and inflation (Vittas, 1991). Aikaeli’s conclusion is 
also startling in light of all the problems of the Tanzanian banking system, including 
regionally low levels of credit to the private sector and high margins, that the author 
highlights in the introduction to his thesis (Aikaeli, 2006).  Based on the negative co-
efficient between size and productivity Egesa (2006) concludes:  
 
“…there is also a need to relax entry requirements by way of relaxing the 
capital requirements. The findings on the determinants of productivity 
suggest that there is room for increased productivity if rather than blocking 
entry by way of higher requirements; more pro-competition measures are 
pursued” 
Egesa (2006 pp., 29).  
 
It is astonishing how this conclusion can be reached when in all three model 
specifications, bank size is not a significantly associated with productivity.77  
 
In heterodox terms, six methodological criticisms can be raised against this type of 
frontier analysis.  First, in the second stage of analysis, there are innumerable factors 
that can influence efficiency: including agency problems; regulation issues; legal issues; 
organizational issues; scale and scope issues; and CAMELs issues. The tendency in the 
analysis is to use a ‘pick- and-mix’ approach to choose the independent variables as the 
determinants of efficiency.78  
 
Second, the link between bank efficiency and intermediation is not necessarily direct. It 
is argued: 
   
“If these institutions are becoming more efficient, then we might expect 
improved profitability, greater amounts of funds intermediated, better 
                                                 
77 Again there is a tendency to make simple conclusions on size and competition that were discussed 
above in Section 3.4.  
78 Refer to the general criticisms of this type of analysis in Chapter 2 with reference to growth equations.  
77 
prices and service quality for consumers, and greater safety and soundness if 
some efficiency savings are applied toward improving capital buffers…”  
Berger et al (1993).  
 
While efficiency may lead to more profitable institutions, it is a leap of faith to assume 
that technical or allocative efficiency will automatically lead to or lower prices for clients, 
or higher lending levels or increased safety of institutions.  
 
Third, due to specialization of banks, it is problematic to assume that all banks produce 
a homogenous output and operate on the same efficiency frontier (dos Santos, 2007). 
Therefore the comparability of efficiency of institutions with even one banking sector is 
problematic. Fourth, the nature of a lending decision means that there will be several 
cases in which a bank rejects applications that do not meet its criteria particularly in 
terms of repayment. This decision is likely to improve the efficiency of the bank and 
reduce future non-performing loans, yet in the above analysis this would imply use of an 
‘input’ without any corresponding increase in ‘output’ and therefore be measured as a 
reduction in efficiency (dos Santos, 2007). Fifth, this analysis does not capture non-price 
or social factors that are extremely important in the lending process in developing 
countries. Finally, and most crucially the analysis cannot account for the impact of 
segmentation of the market, which again means that it is unrealistic to assume that 
banks operate on a single efficiency frontier. 79  Therefore, these efficiency models 
cannot truly measure intermediation efficiency, which as discussed in Chapter 2, is the 
key function of banks.  
 
3.6 Studies on the Excess Liquidity of Banks in Africa 
One of the first studies to recognize and highlight the problem of excess liquidity of 
asset portfolios is Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998). From a regulatory point of view, 
excess liquidity is not a problem. 80  However in terms of the role of banks as 
                                                 
79 In Chapter 6 we discuss the importance of social factors and the impact of segmentation in the lending 
process for the banking sector in Kenya.  
80 The Central Bank of Kenya does not view excess liquidity as a problem. In fact, banks are rated 
according to their liquidity. Therefore successive reports state “overall liquidity was strong as in the 
previous year. Thirty six institutions with a combined market share of 77% were rated strongly with only 
one bank with a market share of 5% was rated unsatisfactory” (Central Bank of Kenya, 2003 p. 23).  
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intermediaries excess liquidity presents an inability of banks to lend long term and 
voluntary credit rationing (Kagira & Kirkpatrick, 2001; Nissanke & Aryeetey, 1998). 
Before liberalization, excess liquidity was attributed to the high level of reserve 
requirements, set at between 40-80% by central banks in SSA. However, it has been 
shown that, post-liberalization excess liquidity remains a problem in SSA (Nissanke & 
Aryeetey, 1998) .  
 
It has been suggested that the reasons for highly liquid asset portfolios are: the inability 
of banks to assess risks (Nissanke & Aryeetey, 1998), the high level of non-performing 
loans which make banks extremely cautious (Nissanke & Aryeetey, 1998), a ‘co-
dependency syndrome’ between government and banks where banks invest heavily in 
government securities (Buchs & Mathisen, 2005); and the lack of acceptable and 
“bankable” loans applications (Honohan & Beck, 2007). 
 
Aikaeli (2006) carries out an econometric study to understand the causes of excess 
liquidity in Tanzania from 1999 – 2004. In Tanzania, the statutory level of liquid assets 
is 20%, whereas during this period the average liquidity was 53% (Aikaeli, 2006). The 
results are summarized in Table 10.  
 
Table 10: Causes of Excess Liquidity in Tanzania 1999 – 2004  
Independent 
Variable 
Hypothesis Expected 
Sign of 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Results of 
Simple ADL 
model 
Results of 
Error 
Corrected 
ADL 
model 
Statutory reserve 
requirements  
Increase in statutory 
reserves would lead to a 
reduction in excess 
liquidity as banks move 
liquid assets to reserves 
-ve -ve  3rd and 4th 
order lags 
are +ve and 
significant 
Deposit holders’ 
cash preferences 
(measured as 
deviations from 
average cash held 
by banks) 
Higher volatility of 
demand of cash leads 
to higher excess 
liquidity 
+ve +ve  Not 
included in 
the model 
presented 
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Independent 
Variable 
Hypothesis Expected 
Sign of 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Results of 
Simple ADL 
model 
Results of 
Error 
Corrected 
ADL 
model 
Illiquidity cost 
(measured as banks’ 
borrowing rate) 
Higher cost of 
borrowing from market 
leads to higher excess 
liquidity 
+ve +ve and but 
not 
significant 
3rd order lag 
is +ve and 
significant 
Credit Risk 
(measured as 
deviation of returns 
of loans from 
average) 
More following income 
stream from loans lead 
to higher excess 
liquidity 
+ve +ve but not 
significant 
Unlagged 
variable is 
+ve and 
significant 
Past excess liquidity    -ve and 
significant 
Source: Aikaeli (2006) pp. 102, 151, 152 
 
Several criticisms of this analysis can be raised. First, the simple ADL model is found to 
be co-integrated and the coefficients are not significant and therefore one can question 
the validity of the conclusions that the author draws from the results. Second, there is 
also little explanation as to why deposit holders’ cash preferences is not included in the 
final ‘parsimonious’ specification of the ADL ECM model that is presented when 
theoretically this is thought to be a key determinant of excess liquidity. Third, the same 
author, when trying to understand the efficiency of the banking system, attempted to 
understand the difference between segments; yet this is not carried out for the analysis 
of liquidity. Fourth, it is not clear how from this analysis the author then concludes that 
high T-bill rates are leading to excess liquidity (pp. 167). Again, this has become typical 
of some of the work being carried out by young African economists where deeper 
understanding is clouded by a focus on the technicalities of econometric analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
80 
3.7 Studies on Bank Failures in Africa 
Authors that have specifically tackled the issue of bank failures in Africa are Daumont et 
al (2004), Kane and Rice (2001), Mpuga (2002) and Brownbridge (1998a). 
 
Daumont et al (2004) is a cross country analysis of bank crises in Africa  They attempt 
to  give overview of what went wrong with banking systems in SSA but, in their own 
words, “with a broad brush, illustrating major themes” (Daumont et al., 2004). They 
consider a list of factors that can contribute of financial system fragility and split them 
into three categories:-  
1) operating environment (macro environment, exogenous shocks, lack of 
diversification of economy) 
2) market structure (bank ownership, bank concentration, sources of bank funding) 
3) banks’ conduct (corporate governance and lending practices).81 
 
They then find evidence of the existence of these factors in different African countries. 
This thesis endeavours to understand how factors in the ‘third category’ - the real nature 
of banks’ conduct – internal governance and lending practices are affected by and in 
turn have an impact on the ‘second category’ – market structure and therefore overall 
fragility. However, as is ubiquitous in cross country analysis, Daumont et al (2004)’s   
understanding of banks’ conduct (the third category) is limited to a generalized 
commentary followed by a few examples, rather than analysis:  
 
“Credit appraisal was generally lax as a systematic examination of the 
character, financial and economic track record, and prospective cash flow of 
borrowers often went missing. Security accepted as collateral too often was 
not verified for adequacy and authenticity before loans were granted, 
borrowers’ valuations were taken at face value, and title deeds were not 
verified. Credit monitoring was hampered by inadequate loan supervision 
practices. Usually lacking was the capacity to identify problem loans at an 
early stage and take measures to protect the bank and depositor funds as 
soon as a loan became past due. To begin with, banks did not properly 
document their loans. For example, in Côte d’Ivoire, loan contracts 
sometimes were not signed with borrowers. In Uganda, at the UCB, 
                                                 
81 In Chapter 6 we discuss the lending practices of banks in Kenya and in Chapter 8 we discuss corporate 
governance of banks in Kenya.  
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securities taken for delinquent loans could not be readily traced because the 
bank failed to establish firm repayment schedules and to monitor 
borrowers’ performance against them”  
Daumont et al (2004 pp., 36).  
 
This ‘pick and mix’ analysis glosses over country specific complexities and the social and 
historical peculiarities that are essential to understanding the causes of bank failures.  
 
Kane and Rice (2001) suggest that the two main causes of financial distress in Africa are 
(a) depositors’ inability to monitor banks due to depositors’ inability to obtain 
information on bank’s condition and also act on this information (b) failure of 
regulation to counteract these weaknesses due to limited fiscal capacity and incentive 
conflicts.82 Both factors make it more likely for banks to experience runs based on false 
information. Therefore they form a testable hypothesis where the persistence of 
unresolved loan losses in a country’s banking system is directly related to press restraint 
(PR) (used as a measure for lack of information) and corruption (C) (used as a measure 
for regulatory failure). Kane and Rice (2001) run a regression with number of years that 
a country has experienced financial stress as a dependent variable with GDP, PR and C 
as the independent variables. They find that only C has a significant coefficient. Not 
only are the proxies used for PR and C highly questionable but again the same criticisms 
applied above to Daumont et al (2004) can be leveled against this approach.  
 
Mpuga (2002) analyzes the impact of new bank capital regulation that came into effect 
in December 1996 on local bank failures that occurred in 1998-99 in Uganda.83 The 
author finds that: 1) there was no significant break or change in trend after the new 
regulation came into place 2) foreign banks performed well after new regulation came 
into place however 3) local banks “suffered more in terms of reduction in capital and 
increased risk” (p. 236) 4) capital regulation did not lead to the failure of local banks but 
                                                 
82 As will be discussed in Chapter 6, in reality, the ability of depositors to monitor banks can be seriously 
questioned.  
83 The model used is based on simultaneous equations of between bank capital, portfolio risk, and risk-
based capital requirements using the two-stage least square (2LS) approach. Between 1998-99 four 
banks – International Credit Bank Ltd., Greenland Bank Ltd, The Co-operative Bank Ltd and Trust Bank 
Ltd were closed. The author classifies the first 3 as local banks and Trust Bank as a foreign bank. 
However Trust Bank was a subsidiary owned by the Kenyan Trust Bank, and therefore a local bank, if 
ownership is considered on an East African basis rather than solely Ugandan basis.  
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“failure seems to have been rooted more in internal problems” (p. 233). While this work 
is useful in highlighting that regulation can have differential impact on foreign and local 
banks, it does not go far enough in explaining why these differences occur. Furthermore, 
we argue that the author is asking the question from the wrong end. Instead of asking 
whether capital requirements led to bank failures, it would be more useful to ask – why 
did the introduction of capital requirements not prevent banks from failing?  
 
Brownbridge (1998a) is a detailed analysis of bank failures in Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda 
and Zambia up to 1995. It uses the principle-agent framework and highlights factors 
that led to bank owners taking excessive risk with depositors’ money. As a starting point 
it recognizes the segmentation in African financial markets and makes the useful 
distinction between foreign-owned banks (foreign banks), government-owned bank 
(government banks) and locally owned banks (local banks). The author concentrates on 
analysing the failures of local banks. Factors highlighted are “low level of bank 
capitalisation, access to public sector deposits through political connections of bank 
owners, excessive ownership concentration, and regulatory forbearance…and high costs 
of deposit mobilization” (Brownbridge 1998a p. 186). 84 The author concludes that 
regulatory policies need to enhance the incentives faced by banks to take lower levels of 
risk.  
 
3.8 Studies on the Ability of Banks to Mobilize Deposits in Africa 
In Chapter 1 we discussed that deposit mobilization, measured in terms of liquid 
liabilities to GDP ratios, is very low in SSA. As discussed in Chapter 2, it was argued by 
the proponents of financial liberalization that the deposit mobilization by banks would 
increase once ceilings on interest rates fixed by governments were removed (Fry, 1988; 
McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). However this prediction has not materialized with 
financial liberalization.  
 
                                                 
84 Interestingly they find that deposit insurance was prevalent but not a crucial factor in contributing to 
moral hazard as the level of deposit insurance was very low. However, there was a high level of liquidity 
support provided by the Central Banks for long periods before banks were closed. This regulatory 
forbearance was an important factor in increasing moral hazard of bank owners / managers (Brownbridge 
1998 p. 182).  
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It has been argued that the low deposit ratios in SSA are affected by capital flight as 
Africa has amongst the highest ratios of offshore deposits to domestic bank deposits 
(Honohan & Beck, 2007). There has also been recognition that amongst government 
owned banks and private politically connected banks, there is an over-reliance on 
government and parastatal deposits which can be unreliable if there is a change in 
government (Brownbridge, 1998b). Besides this, there is very little work done on the 
constraints that banks face when raising deposits. It can be argued that the 
overemphasis in the literature on the moral hazard issues surrounding deposit insurance 
schemes means that not enough attention has been placed on the actual ability of banks 
to raise deposits.  
 
Yet, as will be shown in Chapter 6, this remains a key constraint facing banks in Kenya 
and has a strong impact on competition amongst banks.  
 
3.9 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter reviews the literature on the financial sector in Sub-Saharan Africa. There 
is a general recognition in the literature that financial sector liberalization did not 
generate the fruits expected. In this area there is work from both the mainstream and 
heterodox schools attempting to understand the reasons for the failure of liberalization.  
 
Secondly, it shows that in contrast to the vast literature from both the mainstream and 
the heterodox schools on micro finance and informal finance in SSA, there is very little 
heterodox work done on the formal banking sector in SSA.85 The majority of studies on 
the formal banking sector are from the mainstream school. The first set of studies 
consists of large Africa wide, econometric cross-country studies that attempt to 
understand the links between finance and growth.  There are also cross-country studies 
that consider macro-economic factors and micro-economic bank level factors that can 
in theory explain the shallowness and fragility of the banking sectors in SSA.  These are 
weak, as they make no attempt to understand the individual country specific problems 
of different economies in SSA. Single country case studies consists of studies that follow 
                                                 
85 A review of heterodox African scholars who presented the Annual Conference on Development and 
Change in South Africa in 2007 shows that, there is some heterodox work in particular in the areas of 
growth, trade, poverty and environment (Jacobs, 2008). However, it is useful to highlight that this 
conference did not feature even one paper on finance or on banking in SSA.  
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a ‘Structure-Conduct-Performance’ paradigm where it is assumed that the poor 
performance of African banking, and in particular high interest rate spreads, can be 
attributed to high levels of concentration and low levels of competition. These are 
flawed in their very simplistic understanding of competition. There are also country case 
studies that attempt to understand the efficiency of banks in SSA. This chapter presents 
criticisms of these studies in terms of methodology. In particular, it has been shown that 
these papers, are misguided as they place mathematical and econometric rigor above 
theoretical and practical rigor and lead to extremely misguided conclusions in particular 
in the case of Aikaeli (2006, 2008). There are also single country case studies that 
attempt to understand bank failures in SSA. However, it has been shown that their 
application of the models is tautological. In attempting to explain bank failures, high 
non-performing loans or low profitability are used as dependent variables. There is little 
analysis of why the loans turned into non-performing loans that actually led to bank 
failures or low profitability.  
 
Mainstream economics is dominated by neo-classical economics and has been criticised 
as appearing to become more scientifically rigorous with an increased focus on 
econometrics but having less ability to explain economic phenomena (Hodgson, 2001; 
Lawson, 1997; Milonakis & Fine, 2008). This chapter has shown that the dominance of 
the mainstream is extremely overwhelming in the work done on SSA. In a tribute to the 
Cambridge economist Ajit Singh, it has been argued “To sum up, as an economic 
researcher, Ajit has been guided by the W.B. Reddaway dictum (paraphrased here) that it 
is better to be technically crude and relevant than to be technically sophisticated and irrelevant” (Arestis 
& Eatwell, 2008 pp., 5). 86   This chapter has demonstrated that there is a whole 
generation of African economists who are being trained to be technically sophisticated but 
irrelevant. This does not bode well for the future development of the continent. As has 
been argued by Mamdani, there can be no ‘African Renaissance’ without an African-
focused intelligentsia to drive it (Mamdani, 1999). In line with other pluralist economists, 
this chapter is also a plea by the author for African economists to follow heterodox and 
pluralist methodology and methods.87 
                                                 
86  Ajit Singh in turn, in a tribute to W.B Reddaway, analyzes the methods of this research and emphasizes 
that it is possible to carry out high quality research without using mathematical equations or formalistic 
modeling methods (Singh, 2009).    
87 See Appendix 6, which displays a copy of an advertisement which appeared in the American Economic 
Review of 1982 in which 44 eminent economists have called for more pluralism of method in economics. 
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CHAPTER 4 – THE KENYAN BANKING SECTOR  
“A sustainable economic recovery programme requires a vibrant and integrated financial 
sector that ensures mobilization of adequate financial resources to finance the required 
investment. Although the financial sector in Kenya is fairly diversified in terms of 
financial institutions, removal of those factors that have constrained effectiveness of the 
financial sector’s intermediation role is necessary. The Government will therefore carry out 
a comprehensive study of the financial sector to identify weaknesses that have impeded 
growth of the sector and reforms that are needed to strengthen its’ intermediation role.” 
Republic of Kenya (2003 pp., 41) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the historical evolution of the banking sector in Kenya up to the 
period of focus of this thesis (2000-2005). Section 4.2 provides a historical background 
from the colonial period to the post independence period and during the liberalization 
process which started in the 1990s. Section 4.3 analyzes the key trends in the banking 
sector during the post independence period.  Section 4.4. provides a critical review of 
the studies on the banking sector in Kenya. Section 4.5 introduces the concept of 
segmentation and analyzes the performance of banking sector during 2000-2005 using a 
segmentation approach. This analysis is based on financial statement data collected by 
the author.  This section forms the basis of the rest of the thesis where we attempt to 
understand the constraints faced by the banking sector in Kenya and the sources of this 
segmentation.  
 
4.2 Historical Overview of the Development of Banking in Kenya 
4.2.1 Banking in Colonial Kenya – Origins 1896 to 1950 
The establishment of the British Empire in East Africa began with the establishment of 
a trading frontier under the agency of Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) 
incorporated in United Kingdom in 1888. IBEAC sought to inherit the centuries old 
long-distance trade that linked the African interior to the African coast, and from the 
African Coast to the Indian sub-continent through the Indian Ocean. Colonial rule was 
formally established with the declaration of the East African Protectorate in 1895 under 
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the sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar. Construction of the Uganda Railway (later 
East African Railway) began in 1896 from the East African coast at Mombasa and 
reached the point that would become the capital of modern Kenya, Nairobi in May 
1898. The railway reached what was to become modern day Kisumu in western Kenya 
on the shores of Lake Victoria in 1902. The railway was constructed by over thirty 
thousand of labourers brought on contract from the provinces of Punjab and Gujarat in 
(undivided) British India. They formed the basis of the Asian community that settled in 
Kenya (Mangat, 1968; Seidenberg, 1996). The deliberate policy of European settlement 
began in 1902. In 1920, the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar was confined 
to a ten mile strip along the coast, which the British then rented from the Sultan. The 
country was renamed Colony and Protectorate of Kenya (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2000; 
Hazlewood, 1979).  
 
The origins of commercial banking in Kenya lay in these commercial connections 
between British East Africa and British India at the close of the 19th century. The first 
two British banks to be established were the National Bank of India in 1896 and the 
Standard Bank of South Africa in 1910. The former became National and Grindlays 
Bank and the later became Standard Bank. National Bank of South Africa was 
established in 1916 but was later merged with Colonial Bank and Anglo-Egyptian Bank 
to form Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas) in 1926 which was also 
based in London.  
 
The most important point to recognize is that while commercial banking become 
relatively well established in Kenya during the colonial period, the banks showed little 
interest in the indigenous African population. As branches of metropolitan banks they 
were designed to settle accounts of the colonial economy and therefore not interested in 
encouraging savings amongst Africans or financing African enterprise (Engberg, 1965; 
Mkandawire, 1999). It has been further argued that banks did little to help even their 
main customer base - the white settler community that was dominated by farmers: 
 
“….. these banks lent money to the farmers at [interest rates of] anything 
from 8 to 10 per cent. When crisis came [after the First World War] they 
operated their traditional policy and shut down on credit at the moment 
when it was most required. When European farmers were mortgaged to the 
hilt and the wages of Africans were at least halved, these banks remained 
woefully prosperous. Throughout the crisis the Standard Bank of South 
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Africa did not declare a dividend of no less than 10 per cent….. A good 
deal of property as well as money passed into their hands during these years. 
Organised to take money out of the colony, there is little evidence that the banks 
have proved adventurous in promoting industrial development in Kenya.”  
     Aaronovitch & Aaronovitch (1947 pp., 177)88  
 
Interestingly, the restriction of credit by the three banks led to pressure on the 
government to relieve the heavily indebted white farmers. The colonial government 
established The Land Bank in 1931 as a source of alternative credit. However, it has 
been observed that the private banks benefited more than farmers, as 39% of the funds 
of the Land Bank were used to discharge existing mortgages with the private bank and 
therefore not increase the total availability of credit (Aaronovitch & Aaronovitch, 1947). 
Furthermore, though the mandate of The Land Bank included provision of credit to 
‘native farms’, the skewed land tenure system where the lion’s share of African land was 
held under communal tenure, made it impossible to lend to ‘native farms’ and by 1945 
only one African farmer had benefited from The Land Bank (Aaronovitch & 
Aaronovitch, 1947; Maxon, 1992). 
 
4.2.2 Pre-Independence Growth – 1950 - 1963 
It was not until the 1950s that other banks began to be established. These banks were 
mainly single branch banks, headquartered in Nairobi with a focus on trade finance 
(Central Bank of Kenya, 1976; Engberg, 1965).  
 
There are other structural features that should be noted. First, there was no central bank 
fulfilling the function of lender of last resort. In its place was the East African Currency 
Board (EACB) with the limited function of maintaining a strict parity between the East 
African shilling and the British Pound.89 Therefore, the supply of credit was fully 
                                                 
88 Emphasis added.  
89 The establishment of the EACB in 1919 led to the introduction of East African florin in 1920 and the 
East African shilling in 1922. Prior to that, the currency of use in East Africa was the Indian Rupee due to 
centuries old trade connections between India and East Africa. However the fluctuations in value of the 
Indian Rupee in relation to sterling during the first world war led to the establishment of the EACB 
(Central Bank of Kenya, 1976). The Board operating through commercial banks issued shillings at a fixed 
exchange rate of East African Shillings 20 for every £1. The Board had all its assets in United Kingdom 
securities and all its currency issue had to be fully backed by foreign exchange (Hazlewood, 1979). 
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determined by the commercial banks. Commercial bank advances consisted of their 
own resources and funds borrowed from parent banks. Funds moved freely from parent 
bank to their branch as there were no capital account restrictions. Secondly, prudential 
regulation was very lenient with no statutory liquidity or cash requirement ratios (Central 
Bank of Kenya, 1976, 1986).90 Thirdly, there was very little effort amongst the banks to 
compete for deposits. Interest rates on deposits and loans were determined by collective  
(cartel-type) bank arrangements decided by the three major banks, and subscribed to by 
the other banks (Engberg, 1965).  
 
Table 11: Monetization, Assets and Deposits held by Banks in East Africa 1950 – 
1963 
Year Total 
Deposits 
Local 
Earning 
Assets 
Local Earning 
Assets As % 
Of  Total 
Deposits 
Loans And 
Advances 
Loans And 
Advances As % 
Of  Total 
Deposits 
 £m £m % £m % 
1950 64 22 34 17 27 
1960 87 78 90 69 80 
1963 121 105 87 93 77 
Source: Engberg (1965) 
Note:- 
1) It has not been possible to get a breakdown of these figures between the three 
East African countries (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania).  
 
Table 11 shows that between 1950 and 1963, the levels of deposits, assets and loans 
held by commercial banks in East Africa (and therefore Kenya) grew substantially.  
 
It has been documented that the banks tended to be very conservative applying credit 
standards set by their head offices and these were not realistic in the extremely under-
developed countries in which they were operating (Engberg, 1965). The unwillingness 
                                                 
90 The first three banks to be established during the colonial period were regulated by the Banking 
Ordinance of 1910. This Act was repealed and replaced by the Banking Ordinance of 1956 which 
specified for the first time, minimum capital requirements for banks and established a Registrar of Banks 
with power to license banks. The minimum capital was set at East African Shillings 2 million 
(approximately US $ 0.28 million).   
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of banks to extend credit led to a situation in the 1950s where there was an export of 
capital from the underdeveloped periphery to the developed metropole (Maxon, 1992).  
 
The second important point to note is that the safety of the deposits held by the 
branches of the main banks did not depend on the quality of assets of these banks in 
East Africa but were linked to the capital and reserves of the parent banks overseas. 
Therefore, when large withdrawals of deposits took place in 1955, 1960 and 1963, the 
banks were able to use the inter-bank borrowing facilities of their London Head Office 
(Abdi, 1977). This point is crucial to keep in mind for our discussion below on 
segmentation – foreign banks had already established a reputation as ‘safe banks’ before 
independence.  
 
On 30th June 1963, on the eve of independence, there were nine banks operating in 
Kenya.91 Table 12 lists these banks.   
 
Table 12: Banks Operating in Kenya in 1963 
Nationality (Place of 
Incorporation) 
Date of 
Incorporation 
Number of Offices 
in East Africa 
British 1896 70 
British 1910 65 
British 1916 119 
Dutch 1951 4 
Indian 1953 5 
Indian 1953 10 
Pakistani 1956 1 
Turkish 1958 8 
Tanzanian 1958 3 
Source: Engberg (1965) and Central Bank of Kenya (1986) 
Notes:- 
1) There are conflicting figures on the exact number of branches. Engberg (1965), 
quoted in the table above, states that total branches in East Africa (Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania) was 302  the ‘big three’ banks controlling 254 branches 
and total number of branches in Kenya was 161. However, Onyonka (1968) 
                                                 
91 In 1963, there were 13 banks operating in East Africa (Engberg, 1965). 
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quoted in Maxon (1992) states that by the middle of the 1960s the ‘big three’ 
banks held 147 of a total of 178 branches in Kenya.  
 
2) It has not been possible to establish the exact size of these banks in terms of 
asset base in 1963. However, Barclays D.C.O was also the largest in terms of 
asset size (Onyonka, 1968 quoted in Maxon 1992).  
 
The financial sector also included three private non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) - 
Diamond Jubilee Investment Trust established in 1946; Credit Finance Corporation in 
1955; and National Industrial Credit in 1959. In addition there were two private housing 
finance companies - Savings and Loans in 1949 and East African Building Society in 
1959 (Central Bank of Kenya, 1972, 1986). Though it has not been possible to find the 
exact figures for the asset base of these financial companies at independence, it would 
be reasonable to assume that they were very small compared to the banks. 92 
 
In summary, at independence in 1963, the first three banks to be established in Kenya 
continued to dominate the banking sector controlling about 85% of the total branch 
network (Engberg, 1965). It is also important to note that the data in Table 12 highlights 
that at independence all banks were foreign owned and there were no bank that could 
be termed ‘local’. Furthermore, all non-bank financial institutions were British owned 
except Diamond Jubilee Investment Trust, which is the only financial institution whose 
ownership can be termed ‘local’ at independence.93 Finally, all financial institutions 
primarily concerned themselves with trade finance with very little interest in lending.  
 
4.2.3 Harambee - Creation of Government Owned Banks – 1963 - 1980 
The post independence bank developments started with the establishment of the 
Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) in 1966 after the dissolution of the EACB. Kenya’s first 
national currency - the Kenya Shilling (KShs.) was introduced on 14th September 1966 at 
the rate of KShs. 20 to the pound (Central Bank of Kenya, 1976). At independence in 
1963, the prevalent understanding was that development entailed massive resource 
                                                 
92 These NBFIs were restricted from raising deposits and were also single branch institutions.  
93  Diamond Jubillee Investment Trust was set up by members of the Ismaili community (a sub-
community of the Asian-African community) to commemorate the Diamond Jubilee (60th anniversary) of 
leadership of His Highness Aga Khan III of the community. 
91 
mobilization and banks were seen as key instruments in this resource mobilization. 
However, in Kenya, unlike most African countries there was no wholesale 
nationalization of all banks. This can be seen as part of the broader strategy by Kenyan 
leaders at independence to accommodate colonial interests and prevent a wholesale 
migration of foreign capital (Leys, 1975). At independence, the first President Jomo 
Kenyatta assured the white settler community: 
 
“The Government of independent Kenya will not be a gangster 
Government. Those who have been panicky…can now rest assured that the 
future African Government…will not deprive them of their property rights 
of ownership. We will encourage investors…to come to Kenya… to bring 
prosperity to this country.” 
  Quoted in Ndege (2000 pp., 107) and Hazlewood (1979 pp., 13) 
 
Therefore international banks, now classified as foreign owned banks, including 
Barclays D.C.O. and Standard Bank, continued to operate in Kenya.94 Only the National 
& Grindlays Bank was bought out by the Government of Kenya (GoK) and became the 
Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) (Central Bank of Kenya, 1986). 95  In 1974, two 
American banks were established – the First National Bank of Chicago and the First 
National City Bank of New York (Nasibi, 1992).  
 
In the 1960s, Kenya experienced impressive economic growth mainly driven largely by 
commercialization of African smallholder agriculture. In the first decade of 
independence, GDP at constant prices grew at an annual rate of 7.1% (Hazlewood, 
1979).  The M2 to GDP ratio increased from 19% in 1963 to 30% in 1970 (Central 
                                                 
94 In the 1970s, Standard Bank became Standard Chartered Bank Ltd and Barclays Bank D.C.&O changed 
its name to Barclays Bank International Ltd., both becoming wholly owned subsidiaries of the parent 
banks in London (Central Bank of Kenya, 1976).  
95 This was part of the resource mobilization and Africanization strategy of the government discussed 
below. The purchase of National and Grindlays Bank was on a willing seller, willing buyer basis. In 1968 
the Ottoman Bank was taken over by National and Grindlays Bank. Then in 1970 an agreement was 
reached between National and Grindlays Bank and the Government. The bank was split into an 
international bank in which the Government took a 40% share, and the local branch system of the bank, 
renamed Kenya Commercial Bank, in which the Government took a 60% share. The remaining share 
were quoted on the London and Nairobi stock exchanges respectively (Hazlewood, 1979).  
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Bank of Kenya, 1986).96 However there was government dissatisfaction with the pace of 
adjustment, in particular with the very low loans to deposit ratio of 64.6%  in 1969 
(Repulic of Kenya, 1968).97  It was argued: 
 
“that the urgency of development is so great, that the need for specialized 
institutions for the collection of savings and investment cannot be left to 
the process of slow evolution.”  
Republic of Kenya Development Plan 1969-1974 (1968 pp., 558) 
 
Therefore there was an understanding that economic development entailed massive 
resource mobilization and that these resources could be raised through banks. There 
was also the political reality that needed to be addressed – the need for visible 
ownership in the Kenyan economy by African Kenyans and the government’s stated 
policy of Africanization was also pursued through the financial system. The government 
also established two new banks – Cooperative Bank and National Bank of Kenya in 
1968. Specialized credit institutions or Development Finance Institutions (DFIs)  
including the Industrial & Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC), the 
Industrial Development Bank (IBD), the Development Finance Corporation of Kenya 
(DFCK) and the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) were set up to give loans to 
Kenyans and also purchase shares in public corporations (Grosh, 1991). 98   
 
There was also growth of local financial institutions, termed ‘indigenous’ banks between 
1971 – 1980, one local private bank and nine local NBFIs were established (Kariuki, 
1993). These financial institutions were mainly owned by African (Kikuyu) businessman 
who had built up capital during the Coffee Boom of 1976 – 1979 due to their close links 
to President Kenyatta who was also from the Kikuyu ethnic group (Throup, 1987). The 
commercial banks and NBFIs were largely free from regulatory controls except the 
stipulation of lending and deposit interest rates (Brownbridge, 1998b). There was a 
                                                 
96 Refer to Chapter 1 for definitions of M0, M1, M2, M3 and other measures of financial development 
and also why liquid liabilities to GDP ratio has replaced M2 to GDP as one of the main indicators of 
financial deepening.  
97 Therefore, the loans to deposit ratio was even lower than the figure in 1963 of 77%.  
98 ICDC was originally incorporated in 1954 as Industrial Development Corporate (IDC) to assist and 
encourage medium-and large scale investment in the industrial sector. In 1973 IDB was set up as a 
subsidiary of ICDC. However, ICDC, DFCK and IDB had overlapping and duplicating roles (Grosh, 
1991).  
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condition that banks should extend credit to agriculture amounting to 17% of their 
deposits, but this was requirement was rarely enforced (Kariuki, 1993).  
 
The M2 to GDP ratio throughout the 1970s and 1980s remained at approximately 30%. 
However there was some financial deepening as the loans to deposits ratio grew from 
64.6% in 1969 to 80% by 1980. The level of financial institutions (banks and NBFIs) 
assets to GDP ratio grew from 28% in 1971 to 40% in 1980 (Ngugi, 2000).99  
 
4.2.4 Nyayo – The Rise of Indigenous and Political Banks – 1980 - 1990 
On the death of President Kenyatta in 1978, he was succeeded by President Moi who 
was from the Kalenjin community.  The watchword chosen by Moi for this Presidency 
was Nyayo, meaning footsteps; emphasizing continuity with the economic policies of the 
Kenyatta era by remaining committed to a capitalist economy with a focus on attracting 
foreign investment and maintaining policies of Africanization of the economy (Maxon 
& Ndege, 1995). 
 
The 1980s witnessed the growth of a large number of NBFIs which increased from 20 
in 1980 to 53 in 1990 (a rise of 165%) and the number of banks grew from 17 to 20 (a 
growth of 17%).100 The majority of these new financial institutions were owned by local 
entrepreneurs (Kariuki, 1993). These local banks fulfilled a very useful function as they 
catered for mainly small and medium sized enterprises, often from their own 
communities, that the foreign owned banks and the government owned banks did not 
serve (Nasibi, 1992).  
 
However the proliferation of local banks and NBFIs was also facilitated by several 
political and regulatory factors. Firstly, regulatory barriers including the minimum capital 
requirements and reserve ratios were very low compared to banks (Brownbridge, 1998b). 
In particular, the minimum capital requirements for NBFIs were extremely low even 
                                                 
99 It should be noted this ratio is different from the private credit to GDP ratio as it includes public as 
well as private lending and also includes liquid assets which are not lent out.  
100 Refer to Table 13. It should be noted that it has been difficult to get data on the exact number of 
banks that opened and closed each year. In particular it has been difficult to get the exact number of 
banks in 1983 before large number of bank failures in 1984. Therefore these trend figures do not capture 
the full details of the movements in the number of banks.  
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though they were allowed to take deposits. 101 There was a regulatory ‘arbitrage’ between 
banks and NBFIs and therefore most banks (including foreign owned and government 
owned banks) started a NBFI as a subsidiary to take advantage of this regulatory 
loophole.102 Secondly, political interference subverted prudential criteria in the awarding 
of licenses as Section 53 of the Banking Act gave the Minister of Finance authority to 
grant exemptions to the Act (Brownbridge, 1998b). 103  Thirdly, many banks had 
prominent politicians on their boards and were able to use these connections to obtain 
public sector deposits very cheaply (Brownbridge, 1998b; Ndii, 1994). Fourthly, the 
CBK has very little capacity to supervise the growth of financial institutions (World 
Bank, 1989). As will be seen below, these factors sowed the seeds of weakness in the 
banking system from the very establishment of these NBFIs.  
 
Furthermore, during the first decade of the Moi era, due to external and internal 
economic factors, Kenya experienced severe reduction in GDP growth and 
macroeconomic imbalances, including declining terms of trade and budget deficits, and 
was forced into undertaking structural adjustment policies recommended by the IMF 
and the World Bank (Ngugi, 2000).104   
 
The banking system was considered repressed in the McKinnon-Shaw context as 
interest rates up to the early 1980s were low and negative in real terms (Mwega, Ngola, 
& Mwangi, 1990). It was acknowledged that: 
 
“it had been official policy in Kenya since independence to follow a ‘low 
interest rate policy’ in order to encourage investment and to protect the 
small borrower” 
Central Bank of Kenya (1986 pp., 54) 
 
                                                 
101 From 1963 - 1980, minimum share capital for banks remained KShs. 2 million and the minimum share 
capital of NBFIs was KShs. 500,000/- (Brownbridge, 1998b). See Table 14 for a list of capital 
requirements of the Central Bank of Kenya from 1956 onwards.  
102 This policy was reversed in 1993 as will be discussed below.  
103 The Banking Act is Chapter 488 of the Laws of Kenya and The Central Bank of Kenya Act is Chapter 
491 of the Laws of Kenya. See www.centralbank.go.ke 
104 The main external factor was the oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979 and the key internal factor was the 
drought of 1979 and 1984 (Ngugi & Kabubo, 1998). From the average rate of 7.1% GDP growth 
(mentioned above), growth fell to 3.9% in 1980, to a low of 0.8% in 1984 but grew again to 5% by 1989. 
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The main structural adjustment policy relating to the financial sector was a gradual 
increase in interest rates and real lending rates of banks increased from -2.5% in 1980 to 
9% in 1990 (Brownbridge, 1998b). 
 
The rapid rise of financial institutions, very poor regulation, shifting political economy 
trends and also declining economic growth resulted in the failure of twelve banks 
between 1984 and 1989 (see Table 13). In December 1989, nine of these banks were 
taken over by the government to form the Consolidated Bank (Ngugi, 2000). 105 A more 
detailed discussion on the reasons for bank failures, in particular the political economy 
shifts, is discussed below. In 1989, there was a major amendment to the Banking Act 
and Central Bank of Kenya Act establishing stricter guidelines for licensing of 
institutions and establishing single borrower limits (Nasibi, 1992). 106  In 1989 the 
Deposit Protection Fund Board was also established to compensate small depositors in 
case of bank failures. This institution also assumed responsibility for liquidating failed 
banks (Nasibi, 1992).  
 
This section has shown that the banking sector in Kenya immediately prior to full scale 
liberalization in the 1990s was fragile. Despite the increase in the number of financial 
institutions to 94 in 1990, M2/GDP ratio and loans to deposit ratio of banks remained 
constant throughout the 1980s at about 30% and 80% respectively. Furthermore, the 
total financial institutions assets to GDP ratio rose only marginally from 40% in 1980 to 
41.6% in 1989 (Central Bank of Kenya, 1986; Ngugi, 2000).107  
 
                                                 
105 These are Union Bank, Jimba Credit Corporation, Estate Finance, Estate Building Society, Business 
Finance, Nationwide Finance, Kenya Savings and Mortgages, Home Savings and Mortgages, and Citizens 
Building Society (Brownbridge, 1998b; Nasibi, 1992).  
106 The Central Bank of Kenya Act was only tinkered with from 1969 to 1984. In 1985, it was overhauled. 
The key amendments were that first, applications for license of banks had to go through the CBK and not 
directly to the Minister of Finance; second, minimum capital requirements were increased to KShs. 15 
million; and third, single borrower limits were set at 100% of share capital (Central Bank of Kenya, 1986). 
See Table 14 for a list of changes in capital requirements through the years.  
107 Ngugi (2000) argues that this is because the M2/GDP figure does not take into account assets and 
liabilities of NBFIs. She shows that NBFI assets as a percentage of GDP grew from 12.1% in 1980 to 
22% in 1984 but dropped again to 14.5% in 1989, while bank assets as a percentage of GDP was constant 
at around 28% throughout the decade. However, she does not give a figure of the loan/deposit ratio of 
NBFIs. It estimated that M3 to GNP ratio increased from 38% in 1973 to 45% in 1985 (Mwega et al., 
1990).   
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4.2.5 Early Liberalization 1990 - 1994 
Following the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s, which were focused on debt 
and budget reform and only contained minor financial sector reforms, Kenya embarked 
on full-scale financial liberalization in the 1990s. Unlike other African countries the 
official reports of the Kenyan Government lauded the success of the structural 
adjustment programs of the 1980s (Nasibi, 1992).108 Liberalization of the financial sector 
was financed by the World Bank’s Financial Sector Adjustment Credit (FSAC) which 
was approved by the board of the World Bank in June 1989. The theoretical basis of 
financial liberalization was based on the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3, where government control of interest rates was seen as a key 
constraint to financial sector development.109  
 
The key step of full scale financial liberalization was the complete deregulation of 
interest rates in 1991 (Brownbridge, 1998b).  In 1992, commercial banks were 
authorized to deal in foreign exchange, and in 1993 a market-determined flexible 
exchange rate system was adopted for the Kenya Shilling (Brownbridge, 1998b). While 
liberalization was taking place, there were big political changes also taking place and in 
1992, Kenya had its first multi-party elections. President Moi was returned to power due 
to an extremely fractured opposition. However funding for the elections left the public 
finances in disarray. In particular, government borrowing jumped and this is reflected in 
the Treasury bill rates. In March 1993, the 91 one day Treasury bill rate was 25%. This 
jumped to 46% in April 1993, peaking at 85% in July 1993 and then dropping steadily 
but remaining still very high at 44% in December 1993.110    
                                                 
108 It should be noted that in Kenya the clamour for liberalization was not only external. Leaders of the 
private sector, including several chairmen of the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (the principal 
manufacturing and trade lobby group) were calling for a deregulation of interest rates and commodity 
prices (Nasibi, 1992). Though it should be noted that there were differences in positions between export 
oriented manufacturer such as textile manufacturers who opposed the liberalization and import oriented 
manufacturers who lobbied for the liberalization.  
109 The references to the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis are explicit. The objectives of financial liberalization 
were stated as “to encourage mobilisation of savings and contribute to the maintenance of financial 
stability...and to ensure that funds flow into those areas which are most productive, and that the biases 
which have existed against lending to small business are eliminated” Central Bank of Kenya (1988 pp., 18) 
quoted in Kariuki (1995 pp., 6).  
110 Data for Kenyan GDP growth rates, inflation rates, exchanges rates and T bill rates from 1990 – 2005 
are displayed in Appendix 7. 
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This liberalization of interest rates and exchange rates provided further avenues for local 
banks to compete with more established banks, and was an added stimulus for local 
bank entry (Brownbridge, 1998b; Ndung'u & Ngugi, 1999). While the 1980s witnessed 
the rise of African (mainly Kikuyu) banks, the late 1980s and 1990s witnessed the rise of 
several African (Kalenjin) and Asian-African banks.111 By the mid- 1990s, it is estimated 
that local banks controlled about a quarter of the market (Brownbridge, 1998b).112 Table 
13 below shows the growth in the total number of financial institutions from 1990 up to 
1993. The total number of banks grew by 67% and the total number of NBFIs grew by 
13%.  
 
Table 13: Number of Financial Institutions in Kenya  
 1963 1975 1980 1990 1993 1994 1997 1998 2000 2003 2005 
Banks 9 14 17 24 40 37 53 53 49 43 41 
NBFIs 3 8 20 53 60 44 19 15 5 3 3 
Building 
Societies 
2 2 2 17 11 6 6 4 4 6 1 
Total 14 22 39 94 111 87 78 72 58 52 45 
Source:  Engberg (1965), Brownbridge (1998b), Central Bank of Kenya (2000a, 2003, 
2005) 
 
However, as will be shown below, the experience with liberalization in terms of financial 
deepening was very unsatisfactory.  
 
 
                                                 
111 Asian-African community is a new label of identity being used by people of Indian origin who settled 
in Kenya (The Asian-African Heritage Trust, 2000). This community is often also referred to as Kenyan-
Asians, East African- Asians or South Asian-Kenyans.  
112 It has not been possible to get disaggregated data at segment level on banks assets for the periods 
before 2000.  
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4.2.6 Consolidation and Changes in Regulation 1994 - 2005 
After 1994, there has been a decline in the total number of institutions. This was partly 
due to the failure of fifteen financial institutions (see Table 17 below). Furthermore, in 
1993 the Central Bank of Kenya adopted a universal banking policy and reduced the 
regulatory advantages that were available to NBFIs. This led to several NBFIs 
converting to banks or merging with their parent bank and led to a consolidation of the 
banking sector (Ngugi, 2000).  
 
Throughout the late 1990s and up to 2005, the CBK Act and the Banking Act were 
amended to improve regulation and supervision of the banks.113 In October 1995, key 
amendments included the harmonisation of banks accounting financial year, the 
approval of bank auditors by the CBK and reduction of single borrower limit to core 
capital ratio from 100% to 25% (Central Bank of Kenya, 1995, 1996).114 In 1997, the 
responsibilities for appointing of the Governor and management of the CBK was 
transferred to a board of directors appointed by the President rather than directly by the 
Minister of Finance to reduce political interference in the CBK (Central Bank of Kenya, 
1997). In response to the spate of bank failures of 1998, several changes were brought 
into force in 1999.115 Detailed guidelines on provisioning for non-performing loans were 
set out and there was a requirement for banks to publish their accounts including details 
on their non-performing loans in the national press (Central Bank of Kenya, 1999).116  
Minimum capital was increased to KShs. 200 million by December 1999. In October 
2000, minimum capital requirements were increased to Kshs. 250 million. Table 14 
summarize the changes in the minimum capital requirements for banks in Kenya from 
1956 onwards.  
 
                                                 
113 President Moi did not contest the December 2002 elections and in 2003, President Mwai Kibai became 
the third President of Kenya as head of NARC – the Natioanal Rainbow Coalition – a coalition of parties 
of which the two largest parties were the NAK (National Alliance Party of Kenya) and LDP (Liberal 
Democratic Party of Kenya).  
114 The single borrower limit is aimed to reduce exposure to one borrower. The previous limit of 100% 
meant that a single non-performing loan to one borrower could wipe out the entire capital of a bank.  
115 A detailed discussion of bank failures is in Section 4.3.5 and Section 4.4.6 below.  
116 Refer to Chapter 6 for more specific details on the regulation in relation to lending. 
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Table 14 : Regulatory Minimum Capital Requirements for Banks in Kenya 
Year KShs. Million USD Million 
1956-68 2 0.28-0.28 
1968-80 2 0.28-0.27 
1980-82 5 0.67-0.46 
1982-85 10 0.92-0.61 
1985-92 15 0.91-0.41 
1992- 1999 75 2.07-1.37 
31/12/1999 200 2.74 
31/12/2000 250 3.20 
31/12/2005 250 3.45 
31/12/2009  350 4.61 
31/12/2010 (proposed) 500 6.2 
31/12/2011 (proposed) 700 8.7 
31/12/2012 (proposed) 1000 12.4 
Source:- Brownbridge (1998b), Central Bank of Kenya  (2000b, 2006b, 2008) 
 
Note:-  
1) The minimum capital requirements were stipulated in Kenya shillings and 
remained constant during each of the periods. The dollar value fluctuated 
depending on the exchange rate and the values quoted are for the beginning and 
end of the period.  
2) The proposed increases in the minimum capital requirements were presented in 
the Government of Kenya’s Budget Speech 2008/2009 and are recorded in the 
Banking Act, Schedule 2, version dated January 2009 (Anyanzwa, 2009).  
3) The USD figures for 2010, 2011 and 2012 are calculated based on the exchange 
rate of October 2010.  
 
In October 2000 guidelines were issued requiring banks to conform to the Basle Capital 
Accord in terms of the composition of capital and also new regulatory capital ratios 
were specified. These are listed in Table 15.   
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Table 15: Regulatory Capital Ratios of Banks in Kenya 
Ratio Minimum Requirement 
Core Capital/TRWA 8.00% 
Total Capital/TRWA 12.00% 
Core Capital/Total Deposits 8.00% 
 Source:- Central Bank of Kenya (Central Bank of Kenya, 2000b) 
 
Notes:- 
1) These guidelines were brought into force in October 2000 and meet the Basle 
Capital Accord (‘Basle 1) capital requirements.  
2) TRWA stands for total risk weighted assets. Guidelines for risk weighting of 
different asset classes is also specified in the Central Bank of Kenya Prudential 
Guidelines of 2000  
 
The October 2000 guidelines also reinforced the single borrower limits to 25% of core 
capital, restricted lending to insiders to 20% of core capital, defined a large exposure as 
10% of core capital and further restricting the lending to all large borrowers to five 
times the core capital (Central Bank of Kenya, 2000b). 
  
As will be seen below, following the introduction of these guidelines and the high levels 
of provisioning undertaken by banks, non-performing loans have fallen. However, there 
are still questions on the ability of the CBK to carry out its regulatory role 
comprehensively due to political interference and lack of capacity (Brownbridge 1998; 
Kagira & Kirkpatrick 2001; Brownbridge & Kirkpatrick 2002; Alawode 2003). Other 
financial deepening and financial efficiency indicators for this period are discussed 
below.  
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4.3 Trends in Key Banking Indicators 1990 - 2005 
It was advocated that financial liberalization would increase savings, deposits, credit and 
growth (Ngugi, 2000). This section shows that in line with the experience of other SSA 
countries (discussed in Chapters 1 and 3) the results of financial liberalization in Kenya 
were extremely disappointing. While the banking sector has seen some improvements 
from 2002, the banking sector in Kenya in 2005 remains shallow and fragile. 117  
 
4.3.1 Financial Deepening Ratios 
Figure 5 shows data on key financial ratios from 1990 to 2005.  
 
Figure 5 : Financial Deepening Ratios 1990 – 2005  
 
 
Source and Notes:- 
1) M2 to GDP  data from Central Bank of Kenya (Central Bank of Kenya, 2002b, 
2006c). Data is for banks only.  
2) Private credit to GDP ratio and deposits to GDP ratio data from World Bank 
Financial Structure Database (2000 - revised 2009). Data is for all financial 
institutions – banks and NBFIs. 
                                                 
117 As noted in Chapter 1, all the financial deepening and efficiency ratios for Kenya while favourable in 
terms of regional comparisons are poor in terms of international comparison. Refer to Table 1 in Chapter 
1.  
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The first indicator, the M2 to GDP ratio rose immediately post liberalization from 31% 
to about 41% in 1995. The rise in M2 to GDP ratio in 1996 and 1997 to 45% can be 
attributed to the conversion of many NBFIs to banks, rather than an actual increase in 
financial deepening (Ngugi, 2000).  Thereafter the M2/GDP ratio has hovered around 
the 40% mark till the end of 2005.  
 
The second indicator, the deposit to GDP ratio rose initially due to the liberalization of 
interest rates to a high of about 41% in 1995. However after that it has fallen, and from 
the mid 1990s – 2005 stagnated between 30-35%.  
 
The key failure of liberalization is shown by the third indicator - private credit to GDP. 
After a small increase in this ratio in 1991 and 1992, the ratio has fallen and stabilized at 
just above 25% from 2000. This is well below the rate of 30% at the start of 
liberalization.118 This is despite the fact that public credit as a proportion of total credit 
has fallen from 25.94% in 1997 to 19.67% in 2005 (Central Bank of Kenya, 2006c pp., 
21).  
 
                                                 
118 Due to data constraints on specific clients of banks, it is impossible to verify, but it can be reasonably 
argued that the small increase in lending in 1992 and 1997 were due to political lending associated with 
elections in Kenya during those years. Refer to the discussions below on bank failures linked to political 
lending.   
103 
 
4.3.2 Loan to Deposit Ratio 
Figure 6 shows that the loan to deposit ratio after liberalization fell dramatically to 
almost 60% immediately after liberalization. This can be attributed to the high interest 
rate spreads experienced during the period of liberalization. After that it has recovered 
and by 2005 stood just below the 80%.119  This figure is adequate by international 
standards but as will be shown below, it does not take into account the high levels of 
non-performing loans experienced by the sector.  
 
Figure 6: Loan to Deposit Ratio from 1990 - 2005 
 
Source:- World Bank Financial Structure Database (2000 - revised 2009)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
119 As the data source does not give full explanations on the movements to the data, it is difficult to 
explain why there is a steep rise in the loan/ deposit ratio from 79% in 1998 to 88% in 1999 and 87% in 
2000. The ratio then drops again to 80% in 2001.   
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4.3.3 Interest Rate Spreads 
Figure 7 shows the trend in interest rate spread after liberalization.120 Immediately after 
liberalization, the spreads jumped dramatically. Though they have fallen from the highs 
of 1993, they are still relatively high. Mainstream economists recognize that 
liberalization theory failed to predict the high interest rate spreads and these spreads are 
a key reason why lending and therefore the private credit to GDP ratio did not increase 
after liberalization.121   
 
Figure 7: Trend in Interest Rate Spread (%) in Kenya 1991 – 2005  
 
Source: Ngugi (2004) and Beck et al (2010)122 
 
                                                 
120 Interest rate spread measures the differences between the weighted average lending rate on loans and 
advances and weighted average deposit rate on savings deposits.  
121 A detailed discussion on interest rate spreads is in Section 4.4.4 below.  
122 Ngugi (2004) is used for the data points from 1991 - 2003 as she is the main author who has worked 
on interest rate spreads in Kenya as will be seen below. Beck et al (2010) was used for the data points for 
2004 and 2005. It should be noted that Beck et al (2010) provide data from 1998 to 2008. While the figure 
for 2003 is similar in both the papers, the figures for 1998 and 1999 are very different. The figure for 1998 
in Ngugi (2004) is 11.09% compared to 18% in Beck et al (2010). The figure for 1999 in Ngugi (2004) is 
12.83% compared to 19% in Beck et al (2010).This is despite both the original sources being quoted as 
CBK data. The author had requested the CBK to clarify these differences but was unable to get any 
conclusive answers. The differences may be due to differences in calculating averages.   
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4.3.4 Non Performing Loans 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in Kenya is high 
by regional standards.  Table 16 and Figure 8 show the trends in non-performing loans 
in Kenya. This problem has been acknowledged by the CBK and each year the CBK 
Annual Supervision Report repeats the line, “non-performing loans continue to pose a 
major challenge” (Central Bank of Kenya, 2001).   
 
Table 16: Trends in Loans, Non-performing Loans and Provisions for Banks and 
NBFIs in Kenya (KShs billion) 1994 – 2005  
  ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 
Total Loans 114 181 208 227 268 284 294 272 261 276 342 379 
Non-
performing 
loans 
(NPLs) 
25 32 38 69 83 97 112 109 78 70 72 68 
Provisions 
for NPLs 
0 16 17 23 41 54 67 64 35 36 41 42 
NPLs / 
Total 
loans (%) 
22% 18% 18% 30% 31% 34% 38% 40% 30% 25% 21% 18% 
Provisions/ 
NPLs (%) 
0% 50% 46% 33% 49% 56% 60% 59% 45% 51% 72% 75% 
Source: Central Bank of Kenya (2000a, 2001, 2002a, 2003, 2004, 2005) 
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Figure 8 : Non-performing Loans as a proportion of Total Loans (%) 1994 – 2005 
 
Source: Central Bank of Kenya (2000a, 2001, 2002a, 2003, 2004, 2005) 
 
The data shows that following liberalization and in particular after 1995, there was a 
dramatic increase in the non-performing loans in the banking sector to a high of 41% in 
2001. There has been a fall in non-performing loans ratio from 2001. This was not only 
due to an increase in total loans (the denominator in the ratio) but due to high levels of 
provisioning. Referring to Table 16, it can be seen that provisions as a proportion of 
non-performing loans are over 70% in 2004 and 2005. As said above in 2000 the CBK 
brought in strict guidelines on provisioning of loans.  Also Trust Bank was moved into 
liquidation and therefore the total non-performing loan figure declined as it was no 
longer considered within the banking sector.  
 
Furthermore, this aggregate figure masks the differences in performance in terms of 
non-performing loans between segments as discussed below.  
 
4.3.5 Bank Failures 
Table 17 lists the names of the banks that failed in Kenya from 1984 to 2005. Four main 
periods of bank failures can be defined – 1984 – 1989, 1993 – 1995, 1998, 2000-2005. 
Brownbridge (1998b) distinguishes between three categories of local banks in Kenya: 
political banks (which have included prominent politicians amongst their shareholders) 
both African and Asian-African, independent (of politicians) Asian-African owned 
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financial institutions and independent (of politicians) African owned financial 
institutions.  
 
While this is not the conventional distinction used for defining ownership, it is useful to 
keep in mind as most of the banks in the first two periods – late 1980s and early 1990s 
were in the first category – political banks. Though it is difficult to state categorically, 
the table attempts to define which banks can be considered political banks in the next 
two periods based on information from interviews and newspaper articles.  
 
Table 17: Failure of Banks and NBFIs  in Kenya 1984 – 2005 
Period Institution 
1984-9 • Rural Urban Credit Finance (African) 
• Continental Bank, Continental 
Finance (African) 
• Union Bank, Jimba Credit 
Corporation (African) 
• Estate Finance, Estate Building 
Society (African) 
• Business Finance (African) 
• Nationwide Finance (African) 
• Kenya Savings and Mortgages 
(African) 
• Home Savings and Mortgages 
(African) 
• Citizens Building Society (African) 
 
 
1993-5 
• International Finance Company 
(African) 
• Trade Bank, Trade Finance, Diners 
Finance (Asian-African and African) 
• Pan African Bank, Pan African 
Credit Finance (Asian-African and 
African) 
• Exchange Bank (Asian-African and 
African) 
• Post Bank Credit (Government 
owend) 
• Thabiti Finance (African) 
• Export Bank (African) 
• Allied Credit (African) 
• United Trustee Finance (African) 
• Inter-African Credit Finance 
(African) 
• Middle Africa Finance (African) 
• Nairobi Finance Corporation 
(African) 
• Central Finance Kenya (African) 
• United Bank (African) 
• Heritage Bank (African) 
• Meridien BIAO Kenya (Foreign 
owned) 
1998 
 
• Bullion Bank, Fortune Finance 
(independent Asian-African) 
• Trust Bank (political Asian-African) 
• City Finance Bank (political Asian-
African) 
• Reliance Bank (independent Asian-
African) 
• Prudential Bank (political African) 
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Period Institution 
2000-5 • Glad-Ak Finance (independent Asian-African) 
• Delphis Bank (political Asian-
African) 
• Euro Bank (political African) 
• Daima Bank (political African) 
• Prudential Building Society (political 
African) 
 
Source: Brownbridge (1998b) and newspaper articles (various) and interviews 
 
Notes:-  
1) Includes banks and NBFIs and building societies placed under statutory 
management by the CBK.  
2) Financial institutions listed on the same line share common ownership.  
3) Central Bank of Kenya Annual Reports in the section on banking structure 
developments do not give the name of the financial institutions that have been 
placed under statutory management and liquidation but just the number of 
institutions. Therefore the author had to rely on newspaper articles to establish the 
names of failed banks.  
4) Glad-Ak Finance was not put under statutory management but undertook voluntary 
liquidation. 
 
Technically there are two stages of ‘failure’. First is when the CBK imposes ‘statutory 
management’ on a bank. This should be done when banks are illiquid but still solvent. 
Deposits are frozen allowing the bank time to recapitalize. If recapitalization is not 
possible the bank is then put under ‘liquidation’. Liquidation is carried out in Kenya 
under the Deposit Protection Fund Board (DPFB) which is an independent body but 
housed and staffed by the CBK.  The CBK is not consistent in its reports and in some 
cases refers the first stage as ‘failure’ and in others, the second stage as failure. For 
example, both Euro Bank and Daima Bank were placed under statutory management in 
2003.  However, in the Central Bank of Kenya Supervision Report of 2004, Daima Bank 
is still listed as an operating bank. In practice, banks are not put under statutory 
management until they are almost insolvent.  Therefore, in the table above, a bank is 
listed as failed when it is placed under statutory management.  
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Of the banks placed under statutory management in Kenya, very few have been 
restructured successfully. Most of the banks have then been placed under liquidation. 
The exceptions to this are Trust Bank, City Finance Bank, Bullion Bank (all placed 
under statutory management in 1998) and Delphis Bank (placed under statutory 
management in 2001. Trust Bank reopened in August 1999, Bullion Bank in January 
2000 while City Finance Bank reopened in April 2000 and Delphis Bank reopened in 
December 2002. The restructuring model used entailed capitalising the banks by 
conversion of deposits to equity which enabled the depositors to become major 
shareholders and control the new banks. Unfortunately the non-performing loan 
portfolio of Trust Bank was so large that it was not able to survive on re-opening and 
was put under liquidation by the CBK in 2001.  
 
As said in Chapter 1, we had highlighted the costs of bank failures in SSA.123 There is no 
doubt that bank failures in Kenya have been very costly to the economy. An addendum 
to the CBK’s 1992/3 Annual Report indicated that the CBK was owed almost KShs. 
17.8 bn (around 17% of the total liabilities of the commercial banks) from the 
overdrawn accounts of three of the commercial banks that were later placed under 
liquidation. The CBK’s provision of overdrafts to the political banks was a major cause 
of the loss of monetary control and consequent inflation which occurred in 1992/3 
(Brownbridge, 1998b). With specific reference to depositors, it has been estimated that 
the banks that closed in 1993/4 are likely to have accounted for 10% of total deposits in 
the banking system (Brownbridge and Harvey 1998). When Trust Bank closed in 1998, 
it was the sixth largest bank in Kenya with total deposits of KShs. 9.1bn (KPMG, 1999). 
The five banks that closed in 1998 had estimated total deposits of KShs. 25bn (Kyendo, 
1999). We have estimated that this represents approximately 9% of total deposits in the 
banking system in 1997.124 Euro Bank, which closed in 2003, had large parastatal 
deposits and the loss of these deposits was particularly costly to the government and in 
turn taxpayers.125  
                                                 
123 Refer to Chapter 1 and Appendix 1 for an estimate of the cost of bank failures in Kenya in terms of 
fiscal cost of recapitalization.  
124 As discussed in Chapter 1, Central Bank of Kenya supervision reports were only published after the 
year 2000. The total figure for loans in 1997 is KShs. 206bn (Ndii, 1998). From Figure 2 above, the loan/ 
deposit ratio in 1997 is 75%. Therefore we can estimate that total deposits in  in 1997 were KShs. 274bn.  
125 It is estimated that two parastalals that are in providing a social safety net for the poor in Kenya – the 
National Hospital Insurance Fund and the National Social Security Fund had deposited KShs. 490 million 
and KShs. 250 million in Euro Bank respectively (Kumba, 2008). 
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As said above, financial liberalization was supposed to increase savings, deposits, credit 
and in turn economic growth.  The main purpose of this section was to show that 
despite the experience with financial liberalization and changes in regulation, the 
banking sector in Kenya remains shallow and fragile.  
 
4.4 Studies of the Banking Sector in Kenya 
Having considered the historical and structural features of the banking system in Kenya, 
we now critically assess the studies that have attempted to understand these features.  
 
4.4.1 Studies on the Link between Finance and Growth in Kenya 
With reference to the debate on the link between finance and growth, empirical studies 
similar to the Africa wide studies discussed in Chapter 3 have also been carried out on a 
country specific basis for Kenya. These studies test the McKinon-Shaw hypothesis and 
measure the impact of an increase in real interest rates on savings. Three early studies on 
Kenya, examining the period 1967 to the end of the 1980s, found that savings were not 
responsive to real interest rate increases and therefore concluded that financial 
development did not have a direct impact on growth (Kariuki, 1995; Mwega et al., 1990; 
Oshikoya, 1992).126  
 
The Kariuki (1995) paper is useful as it highlights that there are several social factors that 
also influence savings including size and structure of the family, dependency ratios, life 
expectancy, education and the presence of the large informal financial sector, as we will 
show in Chapter 6 social factors are key in understanding the sources of segmentation 
of the banking sector in Kenya.  
 
Though there is a dissenter: Azam (1996) argues that if savings are measured in terms of 
national saving and not private saving, and if one controls for external shocks and uses 
the square of the real interest rate as a proxy of level of financial repression, then there 
                                                 
126 All the studies estimate a money demand model. Mwega et al. (1990) focuses on the period 1966-1985 
and uses data for both M2 and M3. Oshikoya (1992) focuses on a longer period 1970 – 1989 but only 
uses data for M2. Kariuki (1995) estimates the regression using  data from 1968-1990 for M2 and 1973-
1990 for M3.  
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is a positive and significant relationship between the real interest rate and national 
savings in Kenya during the period 1967-1990. There is however a theoretical 
contradiction in Azam’s argument - one of the key propositions of the McKinnon-Shaw 
model is that an increase in interest rates should lead to better resource allocation due to 
an increase private sector participation in the financial sector and reduction in 
government involvement.127 Therefore the logic of using increases in national savings 
rather private savings as a measure of the effectiveness of interest rate increases is not 
clear.  
 
Studies on the link between finance and growth using data of the 1990s are similarly 
non-conclusive. Odhiambo (2008) uses a tri-variate causality model to understand the 
links between financial development and growth using savings as an intermitting 
variable for the period 1991 - 2005. This case can be seen as a genuine improvement on 
studies that simply measure the impact of financial development on growth. The paper 
uses a Granger causality error-correction model where financial deepening is measured 
in terms of M2/GDP.128  The paper finds: 
  
“the empirical results of this study reveal that there is a distinct uni-directional 
causal flow from economic growth to financial development. The results 
also reveal that economic growth Granger causes savings, while savings 
drive the development of the financial sector in Kenya. The study, therefore, 
warns that any argument that financial development unambiguously leads to 
economic growth should be treated with extreme caution." 
       Odhiambo (2008 pp., 302) 
 
Odhiambo (2009) uses a bi-variate causality model to understand the links between 
financial development and growth, therefore compared to Odhiambo (2008), savings is 
not used as an intermitting variable. The period under consideration is longer – from 
1968 to 2004, but like Odhiambo (2008), it still uses a Granger causality error-correction 
model where financial deepening is measured in terms of M2/GDP. 
Odhiambo (2009) provides a conclusion that is opposite to that of Odhiambo (2008) 
and argues: 
                                                 
127 Refer to discussions on the McKinnon-Shaw model discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.  
128 Though not explicit in the paper the figure used for savings ratio is 24% in 2005, and therefore the 
total savings ratio, not just the private savings ratio.  
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“that by and large the finance-led growth causality predominates in Kenya. 
Although there is evidence of weak bi-directional relationship between 
financial depth and economic growth, the causal link from finance to 
growth seems to override the causal link from growth to finance.” 
      Odhiambo (2009 pp., 311)                                                                                                                                                     
 
The various criticisms discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 of similar studies, in particular their 
inability to explicitly consider the changes in the structure of the economy as it passes 
through different stages of development and also the closed system nature of the studies, 
also apply to these Kenya specific studies.  
 
However the two papers by Odhiambo also reinforce the other core argument of 
Chapter 3 - the domination and misuse of mainstream methods in the work on finance 
in SSA. Both studies are by the same author, reach completely contrasting conclusions, 
and yet make no attempt to reconcile these conflicting results.129  
 
Methodologically, these studies highlight the need to move away from econometric 
studies that attempt to prove or disprove the link between finance and growth – either 
view is simple to prove or disprove. There is a need for studies that attempt to 
understand the constraints faced by the banking sector when carrying out its functions 
at a country specific level and this thesis attempts to fill this gap.  
 
4.4.2 Studies on the Impact of Financial Liberalization in Kenya 
Even mainstream economists accept that liberalization did not achieve its stated 
objectives particularly in terms of resource mobilization. However, in line with other 
mainstream economists in SSA, Ngugi (2000) views this failure of liberalization purely in 
terms of poor sequencing. It is argued: 
 
“The sequencing of events in the financial sector, however, seemed to miss 
the set of preconditions – for example, interest rate liberalization was 
                                                 
129 The papers are not working papers and both papers are published in separate peer-reviewed journals. 
The 2009 paper does not quote the 2008 paper but the corresponding address of the author on both 
papers is exactly the same.  
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accomplished before a sound and credible banking system was achieved. Credit 
controls were relaxed and open market operations initiated when the 
financial sector was facing excess liquidity…” 
Ngugi (2000 pp., 70)130 
 
As said in Chapter 3, it is only post liberalization that mainstream literature has begun to 
emphasize the importance of ‘preconditions’. As the quote above highlights, there is 
little acknowledgement that liberalization of interest rates was seen as the key to 
establish a sound and credible banking system.  As discussed above the banking system prior 
to liberalization was very fragile and even a casual observer could have recognized this. 
The paper concludes that there is a need to ‘strengthen the institutional base’ but there 
is little discussion on what is meant by this in the specific context of the Kenyan 
banking sector.  
 
4.4.3 Studies on the Market Structure and Competition in Banks in Kenya 
In line with other studies discussed in Chapter 3, there are also studies based on the 
Kenyan banking sector that attempt to measure concentration using somewhat more 
sophisticated measures. Kamau et al (2004) construct the Hirschman-Herfindall Index 
(HHI) to measure contestability and concentration ratios and conclude that the Kenyan 
banking sector is characterized by oligopolistic market structure. This leads to a policy 
conclusion that minimum capital standards should be reduced to a “reasonable” level to 
increase competition (A. Kamau, Karingi, Ndung'u, & Mwaura, 2004 pp., 36).131 They 
reach this conclusion despite acknowledging that capital requirements are necessary for 
the stability of the banking system and that: 
  
“..most banks that fall under the category of under-capitalisation are the 
ones that eventually collapse”  
Kamau et al. (2004 pp., 34) 
 
                                                 
130 Emphasis added.  
131 They argue that “since banks that had initially met the capital requirements had effective increase in 
capital [after regulation was put in place to increase minimum], it is a fair assumption that reduction in 
capital requirements would lead to effective increase in capital and a more competitive banking system” 
(A. Kamau et al., 2004 pp., 36). We would like to contend that this is not a consistent argument.  
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Similarly, Kirkpatrick and Kagira (2001) argue that the CBK policy from 1999 onwards 
of encouraging bank mergers and consolidation while useful in preventing bank failures 
is leading to an oligopolistic market structure that will in turn exacerbate the problem of 
access to finance.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, these studies on the banking sector in Kenya apply the S-C-P 
paradigm in a very deficient way by simply assuming that high concentration leads to 
lower competition. It is also very simplistic to assume that the only barriers to 
competition are minimum capital requirements. As stated earlier and discussed towards 
the end of this chapter and throughout this thesis, unless studies take into account the 
segmentation in the market, they cannot truly address why these concentration ratios 
persist. Furthermore, there needs to be an acknowledgement that the instability caused 
by segmentation has an impact on competition that cannot be captured by 
concentration ratios or contestability indices. Barriers to entry need to be viewed in an 
extremely nuanced way including barriers to entry cause by social factors and the 
reputation of banks.  
 
4.4.4 Studies on Interest Rate Spreads in Kenya 
There have been several econometric papers attempting to understand the causes of the 
increased interest rate spread in Kenya (Ndung'u & Ngugi, 2000; Ngugi, 2001, 2004; 
Ngugi & Kabubo, 1998). For the purposes of this thesis we discuss the last of these 
papers - Ngugi (2004) - which builds on the other papers, and uses national level time 
series data from 1991-1999 and bank level panel data from 1998-2002.  Several 
independent variables are posited to have an impact on interest rate spreads and are 
used as independent variables in the regression analysis. These are default risk 
(measured as non-performing loans ratio), capital ratio (total equity to total assets), 
liquidity risk (short term assets to total deposits), cost ratio (operating costs to total 
loans cost), bank size (total fixed assets to total assets), market concentration, 
diversification ratio (loans over total assets), management quality (measured as non-
interest earning assets over total assets), interest rate volatility, treasury bill rate and 
inflation.  
 
Several general criticisms can be raised here and the methodological points raised in 
Chapter 3 in particular the ‘pick and mix approach’ of using several explanatory 
variables applies to this study as well.  
115 
 
More specifically, it is not surprising the only variable that is significant in all the 
regression specifications is non-performing loans. It is argued: 
 
 “wide interest spread is sustained by inefficiency in the credit market. For 
example, high non-performing loans signal high credit risk to which the 
banks respond by charging a premium, and this keeps the lending rates 
high” 
Ngugi (2004 pp., 27) 
 
However, it has to be recognized that theoretically it is very difficult to specify the 
direction of causality between interest rate spreads and non-performing loans or specify 
irrefutably which one should be the independent variable and which one should be the 
explanatory variable. The two factors are very inter-linked – non-performing loans may 
cause high interest rate spreads as banks build the higher default rates into their costs, but 
non-performing loans can also be the result of high spreads interest rate volatility as 
borrowers may not have anticipated the increased costs of servicing loans. Therefore 
these results may merely be capturing the correlation observed – high spreads and high 
non-performing loans rather than the direction of causality. Yet, there is no 
acknowledgement of this in the paper. 
 
Secondly, it is surprising that the extremely high and volatile treasury bill rates post 
liberalization, which are widely believed to have led to increased spreads and to 
crowding out of lending to the private sector (Buchs & Mathisen, 2005), are found to be 
either insignificant or negative in regression results.132 There is no clear discussion or 
explanation for this unlikely result in this paper. Elsewhere it has been argued that the 
fall in spreads from 2003 onwards was due to a reduction in the volume of borrowing 
by the government, the subsequent reduction in the treasury bill rate and the reduction 
in the regulatory cash reserve ratio to be maintained by banks with the CBK from 10% 
to 8% (Cull et al., 2008).  
 
Thirdly, in some specifications of the regression, the capital ratio is found to be a 
significant determinant of interest rate spreads. The paper argues that the reason for this 
is that higher capital ratio leads to higher spreads as it is an implicit cost for the bank. 
                                                 
132 As said above, high and volatile interest rates can cause higher rates of default.  
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Again, theoretical basis of this explanation is not clear. It can equally be argued that well 
capitalized banks can be reasonably assumed to be more cautious lenders and therefore 
have lower non-performing loans and in turn spreads. The correlation between capital 
ratio and non-performing loans is not given in the paper to allow the reader to make a 
judgement on this.  
 
Fourthly, the paper measures management quality in terms of non-interest earning 
assets to total assets. However, as discussed in the criticisms of development envelope 
analysis models in Chapter 3, it is not clear that this is an appropriate measure. The 
decision not to give a loan may also be a good decision for the bank if the loan turns out 
to be non-performing. Therefore levels of non-interest earning assets are not good 
indicators of poor performance.  
 
Finally, the paper concludes by highlighting the need improve inefficiency in the credit 
market through: 
 
“ensuring enforcement of financial contracts and also by individual banks 
building information capital and enhancing management quality”   
       Ngugi (2004 pp., 27) 
 
However, besides pointing to the unfavourable legal environment that makes contract 
enforcement difficult, there is very little analysis as to why loans go bad in the first place 
or what is meant by ‘information capital’ in the context of the banking sector in Kenya. 
This thesis in Chapter 6 attempts to understand how banks in the different segments get 
and use information and how they are attempting to improve their lending capacity in 
practice.  
 
4.4.5 Studies on Non-Performing Loans in Kenya 
Besides Ngugi (2000) discussed above, there are very few studies that attempt to 
understand the causes of NPLs in detail. Furthermore, this gross figure masks the 
differences in NPLs between the segments of the banking sector. The high levels of 
NPLs in the government owned banks and government owned development finance 
institutions due to political pressure to extend loans to politically connected figures has 
been widely discussed in the literature (Brownbridge, 1998b; Njenga, Ngugi, & Mwaura, 
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2006). 133 However, there is little discussion on the reasons for NPLs in local privately 
owned banks and this thesis aims to fill this gap. Trust Bank, a LPOB, which closed in 
1998 had total loan portfolio of KShs. 10 billion of which non-performing loans formed 
KShs. 5.2 billion, that is about 50% (KPMG, 1999). 
 
4.4.6 Studies on Bank Failures in Kenya 
Studies on bank failures have mainly focussed on the first two periods – the 1980s and 
early 1990s. As said above banks that failed in the first two periods can be categorized as 
political banks. There was an overlay between the ability of political banks to source 
public sector deposits cheaply and their ability to circumvent regulations in particular on 
capital regulations (Brownbridge, 1998b; Kagira & Kirkpatrick, 2001).134 This in turn 
influenced the lending decisions of political banks and there was a high prevalence of 
insider lending to directors which resulted in high levels of non-performing loans 
(Brownbridge, 1998b; Kagira & Kirkpatrick, 2001). For example: 
 
“In one case of a grossly undercapitalized bank, the total share capital was 
KShs. 20.4 million, but the actual paid up capital was only KShs. 2.5 million. 
The balance of equity contribution was in the form of revaluation of 
assets....particularly significant was that a good proportion of the bad loans 
were made to directors, shareholders and their relatives...in one glaring 
incident, the loans to directors accounted for 30% of the institutions 
deposits”  
Nasibi (1992 pp., 451)135 
 
Loopholes in the regulatory framework, including the ability of banks to continue 
accruing interest on non-performing loans, and the revaluation of assets to hide capital 
shortfalls have also been identified as causes of bank failures (Kagira & Kirkpatrick, 
2001). Though many of these loopholes have now been closed, there still remain doubts 
on supervisory capacity of the CBK and lack of clarity on the circumstances in which 
the CBK should intervene in the case of a failing bank (Alawode, 2003).  
                                                 
133 See discussion below on the NPLs levels for government owned banks from 2000-2005.  
134 As said above, Section 53 of the Banking Act allowed the Minister of Finance to grant exemptions to 
the Banking Act.   
135 Unfortunately, the author does not specify which bank is being discussed.  
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The failure of Meridien-BIAO Kenya can be traced to the collapse of its parent bank, 
Meridien International Bank Ltd, a Pan-African bank. Meridien-BIAO was formed 
when a Zambian banker bought Banque de l’Afrique Occidentale (BAO) a francophone 
West African bank originally set by the French colonial authorities in 1901. Its collapse 
can be attributed to extremely aggressive lending and mismanagement (Honohan & 
Beck, 2007). The operations of Meridien-BIAO were relatively small compared to the 
size of the Kenyan banking market. However the collapse led to systemic crises in 
Zambia, Cameroon, Swaziland and Central African Republic (Lindgren, 2007; Maimbo, 
2002).  
 
One of the key reasons for failure of banks in the 1980s was the shift of parastatal 
deposits away from NBFIs. It has been shown that in 1982, NBFIs captured 80% of all 
new parastatal deposits, but by 1986, parastatals had shifted all their deposits away from 
NBFIs (Ndii, 1998). Brownbridge (1998b) hints on ethno-political dimension of bank 
failures in the 1980s: 
   
“there is a belief among some members of the banking community in 
Kenya that some of the locally owned financial institutions that failed in the 
1980s (especially those owned by Kikuyu politicians) were deliberately 
undermined for political reasons through withdrawal of their parastatal 
deposits” 136 
     Brownbridge (1998b pp., 94) 
 
There have been no papers by economists that have commented on this but some 
political commentators have recently elaborated on this theme: 
 
“It was not an accident that in 1984 African domestic capital was Kikuyu. 
Kenyatta’s regime had funneled every opportunity that way, and its backlash 
was the equally wrong programme to break it, pursued by the Moi 
regime...specifically between 1984-1989 the pillar of private African Kenya 
capital was broken…All this was done by our own Government, because 
this government considered 1) the creation and possession of wealth by 
                                                 
136 As said above, the first President of Kenya was President Kenyatta who was from the Kikuyu ethnic 
group. On his death in 1978, he was succeeded by President Moi who was from the Kalenjin community.   
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other African Kenyans was a threat to its own political control; and 2) 
because the new domestic capital was Kikuyu”  
Nowrojee (2001 pp., 2-5)137 
 
We would also like to draw attention to parts of the report on the Goldenberg Affair 
which shed light on the involvement of political and government figures in the banks 
that failed between 1993 – 1995 (Bosire Commission Report, 2004). The Goldenberg 
Affair was a political scandal where the Kenyan government was found to have falsely 
subsidised exports of gold during the 1990s. 138 Trade Bank (and its affiliates), Pan 
African Bank, Exchange Bank and Post Bank Credit were all used as conduits for the 
transfer of funds in the Goldenberg Affair (Bosire Commission Report, 2004). The 
Goldenberg Affair was finally uncovered in 1992. The scandal is estimated to have cost 
Kenya between $600 million to $1 billion, some 9 to 16 percent of GDP in 1994 
(Warutere, 2005).  
 
There are no academic studies that have attempted to understand the causes of bank 
failures in the second two periods – 1998 and 2000-2005. Due to data constraints, this 
thesis does not attempt to understand the causes of banks failures from 1998 - 2005. 139 
However, we can make some initial observations. Banks that failed during this period 
had both Asian-African and African ownership. Newspaper reports have linked some of 
the failed banks for example Euro Bank to politicians (Muiruri, 2003). Therefore the 
reasons for failure can be assumed to be similar to those of other political banks that 
failed in previous periods including excessive reliance on parastatal deposits. However, 
                                                 
137 Nowrojee is a Kenyan lawyer. 
138 Goldenberg International was set up in 1990 by a business man named Kamlesh Pattni to export gold 
and diamond jewellery from Kenya in return for a 35% premium on the exchange rate in contrast to the 
normal premium of 20 percent for exporters. Little or no gold was actually exported; indeed Kenya lacks 
in the availability of these natural resources. It was a scheme established to round-trip the sale of export 
dollars to the Central Bank of Kenya (essentially, buy dollars at the official exchange rate, sell them back 
at a 35 percent premium as “gold exports” and then repeat the process). A Commission of Inquiry into 
the affair was set up by President Mwai Kibaki in 2003, under the Chairmanship of Justice Bosire, and is 
commonly known as the ‘Bosire Commission”. The report of the Commission highlighted that the 
scheme involved political figures at the highest level in the Moi government (Bosire Commission Report, 
2004). These figures remain powerful in the both the 2002 and the 2007 Kibaki governments and by 2009, 
no prosecutions had been made. 
139 As said in Chapter 1, this author was particularly keen on understanding causes of bank failures in 
these two periods but was not able to get data on this from the DPFB.  
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several of the banks that failed for example Bullion Bank and Reliance Bank had no 
obvious political connections. In these cases, CBK reports indicate that these banks 
failed due to high levels of non-performing loans and excessive insider lending (Central 
Bank of Kenya, 1998).  
 
The discussion above on the political and ethno-political dimensions of bank failures 
highlights banking relations are embedded in social and political relations and this is a 
core concept which is used throughout this thesis. In Chapter 5 we discuss the 
embeddedness of banking relations in social relations from a theoretical perspective. In 
Chapter 6 we discuss the interview data which provides evidence for and discusses the 
impact of this embeddedness on segmentation of the banking sector. Furthermore, in 
Chapter 6, this thesis attempts to understand the constraints faced by local private 
owned banks (which are independent of politicians) in making lending decisions. In 
Chapter 8, this thesis considers the likely impact of corporate governance guidelines in 
reducing insider lending and improving the general performance of the banking sector 
in Kenya.  
 
4.4.7 Studies on Ability of Banks to Mobilize Deposits in Kenya 
There have been very few studies that attempt to understand the constraints faced by 
banks when trying to mobilize deposits in Kenya. The only study that mentions that the 
reputation of owners is a problem for local banks when raising deposits is Brownbridge 
(1998b): 
 
“Because of the perception that they are less secure than larger foreign and 
government-owned banks, the local financial institutions face much higher 
deposit costs…The chairman of one the local banks estimated that his 
average cost of deposits was around 10 percentage points higher than those 
of Barclays or Standard Chartered. Competition for deposits among the 
local financial institutions is strong…”  
Brownbridge (1998b pp., 90) 
 
This thesis takes a deeper look at this issue by assessing the impact of segmentation on 
deposit mobilization. In particular in Chapter 6, it analyzes in depth the constraints 
faced by local private owned banks when raising deposits.   
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4.4.8 Studies Considering the Segmentation of the Banking Sector 
Understanding segmentation within the formal financial sector has not been the primary 
focus of any prior study.140 There are only two studies on the Kenyan banking sector 
that acknowledge the importance of segmentation in their analysis.    
 
The first study, Brownbridge (1998b), focussed on the impact of government policies 
on the development of banking in Kenya. In this study it was noted that the Kenyan 
banking system remains largely oligopolistic with the three large banks – Barclays Bank, 
Standard Chartered Bank and Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) operating an informal 
cartel in setting interest rates and charges. It was recognized that their size, their 
reputations for deposit safety, their extensive local branch networks and their 
international links protect these top banks. It is further acknowledged that there was a 
tendency for local financial institutions to lend to customers who were rejected by more 
established banks and therefore the borrowers of the local privately owned institutions 
were less creditworthy and more like to default.141 
 
The same study also recognized many of the strengths of local privately owned banks: 
 
“…many local financial institutions represent genuine i.e. (non-fraudulent) 
attempts to provide financial services, despite a variety of difficulties related 
to the adverse selection of their borrowers, the high costs of their deposits 
because of their lack of sound reputation with depositors, and, in some 
cases, shortages of skilled and experienced personnel. The local financial 
institutions that have survived have introduced an element of much needed 
competition into urban deposit markets…and have also provided much 
more flexible and quicker services for their customers, especially with regard 
to decisions on loan applications, than the established banks” 
Brownbridge (1998b pp., 91) 
 
                                                 
140 As stated in Chapter 1, segmentation between formal and informal finance is well documented 
(Johnson, 2005; Nissanke & Aryeetey, 1998, 2006). However, very few authors have attempted to 
understand the segmentation within the formal financial sector.  
141  Recently KCB has experienced severe level of non-performing loans but has survived due to 
government support.  
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The second study is from the mainstream - a World Bank working paper  by T. Beck 
and M. Fuchs looked at structural issues affecting competition and access in the Kenyan 
financial system (Beck & Fuchs, 2004). It use data collected during the IMF - World 
Bank Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) of Kenya.142 The paper defines 
and analyzes three segments in the banking sector in Kenya – foreign owned banks, 
government owned banks and local private owned banks. They decompose the interest 
rate spread and analyze the structural factors underlying the high spreads and margins 
for each of the segments.143 The methodology of the decomposition is summarized in 
Appendix 8. The results are displayed in Table 18.  
 
Table 18: Decomposition of Interest Rate Spreads in Kenya (%) 2002 
 All 
Banks 
Government 
owned banks 
Local  private 
owned banks 
Foreign 
owned banks 
Overhead cost 5.6 4.4 5.3 6.6 
Loan loss provisions 2.5 4.9 1.5 1.8 
Reserve requirement 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 
Tax 1.9 2.2 1.6 2.1 
Profit margin 4.5 5.2 3.7 4.9 
Total spread 14.9 16.9 12.5 15.5 
Source: Beck and Fuchs (2004) 
 
This methodology has several weaknesses in particular it assumes that spread has only 
five components – overhead cost, loan loss provisions, reserve requirements, tax and 
profit margin. Interest rate spread could be driven by other components including 
factors such as macroeconomic instability or social factors. In particular the profit 
                                                 
142 The IMF - World Bank FSAP’s involve detailed analysis of individual country’s financial systems with 
the aim of initiating programmes financed by the IMF & World Bank to resolve the weaknesses identified 
during the FSAP. The IMF & World Bank encourage countries to release the findings of FSAPs and the 
country reports for some countries are available though their web page 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/fsap.asp. However, the results for Kenya are not in public domain. 
T. Beck and M. Fuchs were both part of the World Bank team that carried out the FSAP in Kenya. 
Therefore this working paper provides extremely interesting results using data that is not widely available.  
143 As said above, interest rate spread is the difference between the average deposit and lending rates. The 
overhead cost includes all interest costs related to lending (Beck & Fuchs, 2004).   
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margin component of the spread is calculated as a residual and therefore may capture 
other factors.144   
 
It should be recognized that foreign bank entry was a key component of structural 
adjustment and financial liberalization policies advocated by the Bretton-Wood 
institutions. These arguments are reflected in the Beck and Fuchs paper, and they begin 
their discussion with the statement: 
 
“Cross-country comparisons have shown the benefits of foreign bank 
ownership for developing countries…they impose competitive pressure on 
domestic banks, increasing efficiency of financial intermediation”  
Beck and Fuchs (2004 pp., 4)145  
 
As noted above, Kenya was one of the few African countries that did not nationalize all 
foreign owned banks at the time of independence. Therefore, the Kenyan banking 
system provides a useful contrast to most other African countries that have undergone 
financial liberalization. Foreign owned banks have continued to operate at all times in 
post-independence Kenya and yet the banking sector faces many of structural problems 
prevalent in banking sectors across Africa. From the decomposition of interest rates 
exercise detailed in Table 18, it is implicitly acknowledged, that foreign banks cannot be 
termed the most efficient as the spread they charge and their profit margin, while lower 
than government banks is much higher than local banks (Beck & Fuchs, 2004).146 There 
is an acknowledgement that foreign bank entry is not a panacea for all the structural 
problems facing the banking sector (Beck & Fuchs, 2004). This study also adds to the 
body of research emphasizing the poor record of government owned banks in particular 
                                                 
144 Though not explicitly clarified in the paper, it should be recognized that this ‘profit margin’ is not 
equivalent to the return on assets calculated as profits divided by net assets. The return on assets for 2002 
was 3% for foreign owned banks, 1 % for local private owned banks and -0.4% for government owned 
banks (Beck & Fuchs, 2004).  
145 There remains a huge debate on the impact of FOB on credit creation in developing countries (Cull & 
Martinez Peria, 2007; Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2001; dos Santos, 2007; Haas & Naaborg, 2005; Haber, 
2004; Martinez Peria & Mody, 2004).  
146 While mainstream economics generally views high profits as a sign that there is low competition in the 
industry, in banking it has been recognized that very low profits and low franchise value (Stiglitz et al., 
2000) can encourage banks to take excessive risks.  
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the high level of non-performing loans and loan loss provisions of government owned 
banks.147 
 
Overhead costs and loan loss provision form the bulk of the interest spread and the 
authors argue that these are because of high wage costs and a deficient legal framework 
(Beck & Fuchs, 2004).  
 
The most important conclusion of the study for this thesis is an explicit 
acknowledgement that segmentation leads to a higher profit margin for foreign and 
government banks and that this segmentation is based on reputation: 
 
“the limited number of large and strong banks constrains the 
competitiveness of the Kenyan banking system and has resulted in market 
segmentation due to the limited movement of funds and clients across 
different subsectors…. There is a reputational bias against small banks, since 
many small banks are fragile and weak. Depositors therefore prefer large 
foreign or state-owned banks”  
       Beck & Fuchs (2004 pp., 13)148 
 
However, there is no further discussion on how local banks can build reputation, or a 
recognition that reputation is social and non-price factor and therefore methodologically 
research need to use qualitative data and social and historical analysis to understand it.  
 
4.5 A Deeper Look at Segmentation 
This section analyzes the performance of each of the segments of the banking sector in 
Kenya, and forms the basis of the detailed analysis in Chapter 6 and Chapter 8.  
 
The four segments that are analyzed in this thesis are foreign-owned banks (FOB), the 
government-owned banks (GOB), large private locally owned banks (LPOB), small & 
medium private locally owned banks (SPOB). Private owned banks are classified as 
LPOB (large private owned banks) and SPOB (small private owned banks), on an 
                                                 
147 For other research emphasizing the poor record of government owned banks throughout SSA see 
Caprio & Klingebiel (1996), Brownbridge & Harvey (1998) and Honohan & Beck (2007) 
148 Emphasis added.  
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economic measure – the capital base of the banks. Banks with capital base of KShs. 1 
billion (approximately USD 13.8 million) or more are classified as LPOB.149  
 
The data set used for this analysis is individual bank balance sheets from 2000 to 
2005.150 This section first looks at the structure of the banking sector in Kenya in 2005. 
It then discusses the performance of each of the segments and the key structural 
features.  
 
4.5.1 Structure of the Banking Sector 2005 
Table 19 below shows the structure of the Kenyan banking sector in 2005 in terms of 
asset size of each bank and also ownership.  
 
Table 19 : Summary Structure of Banking Industry in 2005 
 Bank Segment 
Total 
Assets 
2005 
Kshs. 
Million 
Market 
Share Shareholder Details 
Ethnicity Of 
Ownership 
        
1 
Barclays Bank 
of Kenya FOB 104,522 16.5% 
Barclays Bank Plc Ltd 
(majority) 
Not relevant 
2 
Standard 
Chartered Bank FOB 72,842 11.5% 
Standard Chartered 
Bank Plc (majority) 
Not relevant 
3 Citibank N.A. FOB 30,928 4.9% 
branch of Citibank 
N.A.  
Not relevant 
4 Stanbic Bank FOB 14,994 2.4% 
Standard Bank South 
Africa 
Not relevant 
5 Bank of Baroda FOB 9,265 1.5% 
Bank of Baroda India 
(owned by 
Government of 
India) 
Indian  
6 Bank of India FOB 7,206 1.1% 
branch of Bank of 
India (owned by 
Government of 
India) 
Indian 
7 Bank of Africa FOB 5,349 0.8% Bank of Africa Benin, Not relevant 
                                                 
149 This definition is based on convention used by bankers in Kenya. There is no firm rationale for why 
this has become convention. Capital base refers to total capital (shareholder funds) and not only core 
capital. Most of the LPOBs have an asset base of more than KShs. 10 billion (approximately USD 139 
million at end of 2005 exchange rate) with the exception of Imperial Bank and Trans-National Bank.  
150 While it was possible to get financial data for a few banks before 2000 the data set was very incomplete. 
Also before 2000 each bank followed different reporting standards and therefore the balance sheets were 
not comparable. Refer again to discussion on constrains in data collection process in Chapter 1.  
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 Bank Segment 
Total 
Assets 
2005 
Kshs. 
Million 
Market 
Share Shareholder Details 
Ethnicity Of 
Ownership 
Kenya Bank of Africa 
Madagascar and 
Netherlands, 
Development 
Finance Company 
8 
Habib A.G. 
Zurich  FOB 4,743 0.7% 
branch of Habib 
Bank A.G. Zurich 
Pakistani 
9 K-Rep Bank FOB 3,781 0.6% 
IFC, NGOs  and K-
Rep group 
Not relevant 
10 Habib Bank Ltd FOB 2,890 0.5% 
Aga Khan Fund for 
Economic 
Development and 
Government of 
Pakistan 
Pakistani 
11 
Kenya 
Commercial 
Bank GOB 78,315 12.3% 
Government of 
Kenya, National 
Social Security Fund 
Not relevant 
12 
National Bank 
of Kenya GOB 32,584 5.1% 
 Government of 
Kenya 
Not relevant 
13 
Consolidated 
Bank GOB 2,909 0.5% 
 Government of 
Kenya 
Not relevant 
14 
Development 
Bank of Kenya  GOB 2,718 0.4% 
 Government of 
Kenya 
Not relevant 
15 
Co-operative 
Bank of Kenya LPOB 51,830 8.2% 
Over 3000 Co-
operative Societies 
Not relevant 
16 CFC Bank LPOB 33,112 5.2% 
Mr. Jani, Mr. Njonjo, 
Mr. Kirenie, Mr. 
Kulei (through 
holding companies) 
Asian-African 
and African 
(Kikuyu and 
Kalenjin) 
17 
Commercial 
Bank of Africa LPOB 29,539 4.7% 
Kenyatta family, Rai 
family and Naushad 
Merali family 
Asian-African 
and African 
(Kikuyu) 
18 NIC Bank LPOB 20,585 3.2%  Ndegwa family 
African 
(Kikuyu) 
19 I&M Bank LPOB 18,046 2.8% S. Raja family Asian-African 
20 Diamond Trust LPOB 16,384 2.6% 
Aga Khan Fund for 
Economic 
Development, Allied 
Irish Bank 
Asian-African 
21 Equity Bank LPOB 11,457 1.8% 
Britac Insurance Co, 
IFC, James Mwangi 
African 
(Kikuyu) 
22 EABS Bank SPOB 8,856 1.4% Pandit Family Asian-African 
23 Fina Bank SPOB 8,615 1.4% 
D. Chandaria family, 
Patel (‘Sparrow’) 
family 
Asian-African 
24 Imperial Bank SPOB 7,773 1.2% 
Popat Family, Shah 
(Rex Motors) family, 
Somji (Freight 
Forwarders family) 
Asian-African 
25 Prime Bank SPOB 7,154 1.1% A. Kantaria family Asian-African 
26 ABC Bank SPOB 5,145 0.8% A. Savani family Asian-African 
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 Bank Segment 
Total 
Assets 
2005 
Kshs. 
Million 
Market 
Share Shareholder Details 
Ethnicity Of 
Ownership 
27 
Giro 
Commercial 
Bank SPOB 4,905 0.8% P. Gidoomal family 
Asian-African 
28 Guardian Bank  SPOB 4,451 0.7% M. Chandaria family Asian-African 
29 
Southern Credit 
Bank  SPOB 4,221 0.7% 
A. Kurji family and 
several minority 
shareholders from 
merger with Bullion 
Bank 
Asian-African 
30 
Charterhouse 
Bank Ltd. SPOB 4,221 0.7% 
 Shah (Kingsway) 
family, Ehsani family, 
Shah (Nakumatt) 
family, Harun Mwau  
Asian-African 
and African 
(Kamba) 
31 
Victoria 
Commercial 
Bank SPOB 4,212 0.7% Y. Pattni Family 
Asian-African 
32 
Middle East 
Bank SPOB 4,051 0.6% 
Esmail family, Biwott 
family, Banque 
Belgolaise  
Asian-African 
and African 
(Kalenjin) 
33 
Equatorial 
Commercial 
Bank SPOB 3,671 0.6% 
Naushad Merali 
family and Gideon 
Moi family 
Asian-African 
and African 
(Kalenjin) 
34 Credit Bank SPOB 2,798 0.4% 
Simeon Nyachae 
family 
African 
(Kisii) 
35 Chase Bank SPOB 2,601 0.4% 
Alibhai Shariff family, 
Azim Virjee family, 
Vohra family 
Asian-African 
36 
Trans-National 
Bank LPOB 2,024 0.3% 
Mr. Gideon Moi, Mr. 
Kulei, Mr. Biwott 
African 
(Kalenjin) 
37 
Fidelity 
Commercial 
Bank SPOB 1,666 0.3% 
Sultan Khimji, Murli 
Sadwani, Bharat 
Thakrar, Equity 
Investments, Firoz 
Manji and N. P. 
Sheth and 21 other 
shareholders 
Asian-African 
38 
Paramount 
Universal Bank SPOB 1,491 0.2% 
Merali and Dodhia 
families.  
Asian-African 
39 
Oriental 
Commercial 
Bank (formerly 
Delphis Bank) SPOB 1,376 0.2% 
depositors became 
owners after 
restructuring 
Asian-African 
40 
Dubai Bank 
(formerly 
Mashreq Bank) SPOB 1,153 0.2% 
Zubedi family Arab 
(Swahili)  
41 
City Finance 
Bank SPOB 510 0.1% 
depositors became 
owners after 
restructuring 
Asian-African 
   634,893 100%   
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Notes:- 
1) Data in this table is from personal knowledge of the banking sector and 
interviews with key players in the banking sector.  
2) Some details of ownership of banks by political elites have been garnered from 
the ‘Kroll Report’ (Kroll Associates, 2007).151  
3) The CMA guidelines on corporate governance published in 2002, section 2.1.3 
recommend that the top ten shareholders of publicly listed company should be 
published in the annual report (Capital Markets Authority, 2002) and therefore 
details on publicly quoted banks was obtained from their annual reports. 152 
4) However, this rule is not part of the Central Bank of Kenya Corporate 
Guidelines of 2006 and in general, privately held banks do not publish 
shareholder information in their annual report.153  
 
The table raises several interesting features of ownership banking sector in Kenya. The 
table shows that the first three banks to be established in Kenya – Barclays Bank, 
Standard Chartered and Kenya Commercial Bank (formed from National Grindlays 
Bank) remain the three largest banks by asset size in Kenya in 2005 controlling 40.3% of 
total assets. In Chapter 6 we discuss the segmentation of the banking sector and in 
particular social factors, which influence the reputation of banks. This segmentation is 
key to understanding the dominance of these three banks. Figure 9 shows the stark 
contrast in terms of market share and number of the banks in the different segments. In 
the FOB segment, there are ten banks controlling 40.4% of the market share. Even 
within the FOB segment there are differences with the three main banks – Barclays 
Bank, Standard Chartered Bank and Citibank – controlling 32.9% of the total market.154 
Whereas in the SPOB segment, there are eighteen banks controlling 11.2% of the 
market. This stark difference means that simple S-C-P analysis described above reveals 
                                                 
151 This is a report that was prepared by a special investigations company – Kroll Associates and 
commissioned by the former Permanent Secretary for Transparency in Kenya, John Githongo in 2002. 
The report has not been officially disseminated but is available on the web and was released unofficially 
through the Kenyan press in 2007.  
152 CMA is the Capital Markets Authority. It regulates that capital markets in Kenya and has issued 
corporate governance guidelines for publicly listed companies. Therefore publicly quoted banks follow 
both the CMA guidelines and the CBK guidelines.  
153 The exception is Imperial Bank which also published ownership details in its annual report.  
154 The other FOBs are smaller banks serving niche clients.  
129 
little about the true nature of competition in the banking sector. We now describe some 
of they structural features and financial performance of each of the segments.   
 
4.5.2 Financial Data by Segments 2000 - 2005 
Figure 9: Market Share by Segment (2005) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Table 20 shows the change in share of segments between 2000 and 2005.  
 
Table 20: Change in Share of Assets by Segments 2000 - 2005 
 Share of Segments 
2000 
Share of Segments 
2005 
Total No of 
Banks in 
Segment 2005 
FOB 43.6% 40.4% 10 
GOB 25.5% 18.4% 4 
LPOB 19.7% 30.0% 9 
SPOB 11.2% 11.2% 18 
TOTAL  100% 100.00% 41 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Table 20 shows that the most significant change between 2000 and 2005, is that LPOB 
have been able to increase their share of the market by over 10%. The FOB and GOB 
segment have lost market share. Meanwhile, the SPOB have been able to just maintain 
their market share.  Therefore LPOB can be considered to relatively effective in terms 
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of their competition strategies. 155  Chapter 6 will discuss how some LPOB are 
successfully overcoming the constraints faced in lending and deposit mobilization.  
 
In Appendix 9 to Appendix 15 we present the data on the financial performance and 
portfolio characteristics of the different segments of the banking sector in Kenya from 
2000 – 2005. The data that is presented is the return on assets, ratio of capital to risk 
weighted assets, ratio of loans to total assets, ratio of government securities to total 
loans, total loans on total deposits, non-performing loans and cost of funds.156 Table 21 
provides a summary of the tables in the appendix. Appendix 16 lists the number of 
branches per bank in 2005 and Appendix 17 the average number of branches per 
segment. This data is then discussed in relation to each segment below.  
 
Table 21: Financial Performance and Portfolio Characteristics of Segments 
(Average 2000-2005) 
Segment FOB GOB LPOB SPOB Total 
            
Return on Assets 3% 1% 3% 0% 1% 
Core Capital / Total Risk Weighted 
Assets 27% 23% 25% 30% 28% 
Loans/ Total Assets 40% 53% 50% 52% 49% 
Government Securities / Total Loans 117% 26% 38% 31% 53% 
Total Loans/ Total Deposits 58% 153% 82% 158% 116% 
Total NPL/ Total Loans 9% 46% 16% 28% 22% 
Cost of Funds 3% 4% 5% 6% 5% 
Source:- Author’s calculations 
 
4.5.3 Foreign Owned Banks (FOB) Segment 
The origins of the foreign owned banks were discussed above. The three largest banks 
in the FOB segment are Anglo-American banks. Barclays Bank and Standard Chartered 
Bank are subsidiaries of banks quoted on the London Stock Exchange. Citibank N.A. 
operates as a branch of the American global banking giant Citicorp. Stanbic Bank is 
owned by the South African Banking group Standard Bank. Bank of India and Bank of 
Baroda are largely owned by Government of India. Habib Bank Ltd is partly owned by 
                                                 
155 Changes in the market shares of liabilities also follow a similar pattern.  
156 Cost of funds is calculated as interest on customer deposits plus interest on borrowed funds divided by 
total deposits plus borrowed funds.  
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the government of Pakistan.157 Bank of Africa is owned by the Bank of Africa group 
which is a west-African banking group. K-Rep bank is a micro-finance bank mainly 
owned by multilateral financial organizations. Barclays Bank and Standard Chartered 
Bank have amongst the largest branch networks with 49 and 31 branches respectively. 
They have also been the first to introduce Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) in Kenya.  
A key measure of profitability of banks is the return on assets (ROA). Generally ROA in 
Kenya is high compared to other regions. ROA from 2000 – 2004 was 0.6% in the rest 
of the world (Honohan & Beck, 2007). The table above shows that at 3%, the ROA of 
the FOB segment is the highest. Within the FOB the three largest banks - Barclays Bank, 
Standard Chartered Bank Citibank N.A. has extremely high ROA of 5.17%, 4.82%, 
4.15%, respectively in 2005. This corroborates the data in Table 18 which showed that 
the interest rate spreads and profit margins of FOB are the highest. Part of the high 
profit margin can be explained by the low NPL. In Chapter 6, we discuss the 
information production mechanisms of FOB to understand this low NPL ratio.  While 
it is difficult to get concrete data on this, it is generally acknowledged that part of the 
reason for this low NPL ratio is the FOB are able to ‘cream skim’ and get the most 
credit worth clients in particular large publicly quoted corporations and multinational 
corporations. They are also conservative with a low loan to deposit ratio and high 
investment in Treasury Bills. It should be noted that this figure for investment in 
government securities over total loans is skewed by the extremely high figures for small 
foreign owned banks – Habib Bank’s ratio in 2005 is 222% and Bank of India’s is 173%. 
Barclays Bank and Stanbic Bank are less conservative with ratios of 22% and 17% 
respectively.  
 
A key statistic that is rarely discussed in the literature is the cost of funds. The table 
above shows that the average cost of funds for FOB segment at 3% is the lowest in the 
sector. Furthermore the cost of funds for Barclays Bank and Standard Chartered are 
only 1.03% and 1.67%. In Chapter 6 we show that social factors are essential to 
understanding the reason for this extremely low cost of funds.  
 
                                                 
157 Habib Bank A.G. Zurich was formed by a Pakistani family after the original Habib Bank was 
nationalized in Pakistan. 
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4.5.4 Government Owned Banks (GOB) Segment 
In Section 4.2.3 we described the establishment of the banks in GOB segment. The two 
largest government owned banks are Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) and National 
Bank of Kenya (NBK) with branch networks of 113 and 24 branches respectively. The 
poor performance of government owned banks in developing countries due to political 
loans has been well documented (Beck, Cull, & Jerome, 2005; Brown & Sedar, 2005). 
The table above corroborates this evidence. The government owned banks have high 
non-performing loans and very low return on assets. In 2000, the NPL ratio for KCB 
was 42%, for NBK 70% and for Consolidated Bank 72%. Due to the size of NBK, in 
2000, over a third of the total non-performing loans of the entire sector of KShs. 112 
billion were held by the National Bank of Kenya (Omondi, 2007b). In an extraordinary 
move, on 27th November 1998, NBK published the names of their largest borrowers in 
the national newspapers. It showed that the majority of these non-performing loans 
were political loans to individual politicians and parastatals. While KCB has been able to 
reduce the level of NPL to 25% for both NBK and Consolidated Bank the ratio in 2005 
is around 45%.  
 
However, the figure which is rarely discussed is that despite these problems, the cost of 
funds for government owned banks remains much lower than that of the Large and 
Small Private Owned Banks. In 2005, KCB had a cost of funds of only 0.92%. This is a 
key source of segmentation in the banking sector and in Chapter 6 we attempt to 
understand this.  
 
4.5.5 Large Private Owned Banks (LPOB) Segment 
Members of two communities in Kenya – the Kikuyu and the Asian-African community 
own the majority of the privately owned banks. Key political leaders since independence 
own several banks in the LPOB segment. The Kenyatta family is a shareholder in CBA 
Bank; the Ndegwa family is a shareholder in NIC Bank; Mr. Njonjo, Mr. Moi and Mr. 
Kulei are shareholders in CFC Bank; and Mr. Moi, Mr. Kulei and Mr. Biwott are 
shareholders in Transnational Bank respectively.158 In terms of innovation each of these 
                                                 
158 Jomo Kenyatta was the first President of Kenya; Duncan Ndegwa was the first governor of the Central 
Bank of Kenya; Mr. Njonjo was the first attorney-general of Kenya; Mr. Moi was the second President of 
Kenya;  Mr. Biwott was one of the most powerful minsters in the Moi government; and Mr. Kulei was the 
personal assistant to Mr. Moi.  
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banks serves different niches with CBA bank focusing on high net worth individuals, 
while NIC Bank and CFC Bank focus mainly on asset finance. Equity Bank focuses on 
micro finance while Co-operative Bank mainly lend Co-operative societies and their 
members. I&M Bank, Diamond Trust Bank and Imperial Bank are traditionally Asian-
African banks which have traditionally focused on trade financing. The LPOBs do not 
have their own ATM networks but are members of two national ATM networks – 
Kenswitch and Pesapoint.  
 
The tables show that the LPOBs are able to successfully compete with the FOBs. They 
have high ROA and fairly low NPL. Furthermore, in terms of intermediation ratios they 
appear to have struck the right balance between being conservative with a loan/ deposit 
ratio of 82% but also extending credit with very low investment in Treasury Bills – 38%. 
 
4.5.6 Small Private Owned Banks (SPOB) Segment 
The majority of SPOBs are owned by the Asian-African community. They mainly cater 
to lending to small and medium enterprises from within the community and focus on 
trade finance and overdraft lending. The other crucial point to note is all the SPOBs 
meet the basic Basel ratio. The core capital to total risk weighted ratio for this segment 
is the highest. Yet, the financial ratios show that the performance of this segment is very 
weak with low ROA and high NPL. It is imperative to note that the cost of funds for 
this segment is also very high.  
 
We would also like to highlight that table Table 17 above shows that the majority of 
banks that failed are from the SPOB segment. This is besides Post Bank Credit (which 
was government-owned) and Meridien BIAO (which was foreign-owned) and Trust 
Bank which had a capital base of KShs. 1 billion at time of closure and therefore can be 
classified as a LPOB.  
 
Understanding the constraints that face this segment is key to understanding the sources 
of segmentation and in Chapter 6 we explain the reasons for these features of the SPOB 
segment.  
 
134 
4.5.7 Race Relations and Ethnicity in Kenya 
Before concluding we would like to discuss briefly the history of race relations in Kenya.  
Table 19 also lists the ethnicity of the owners of the banks. As we will discuss in 
Chapter 6, LPOBs and SPOBs where the ownership is Asian-African consider the 
ethnicity of ownership as a constraint to getting more clients. To understand this 
perceived negative reputation we now discuss the briefly the context of race relations 
between Africans and Asian-Africans in Kenya.159  
 
Above, we discussed the basis settlement of the Asian community in Kenya. It should 
be recognized that race relations in pre-Independence Kenya were extremely fraught 
and the colonial government practiced racial discrimination of many forms including the 
reservation of the best land for Europeans (Patel, 2009; Vandenberg, 2006). The Asian-
African community in Kenya in 2005 is a minority with a population of approximately 
100,000 individuals within the total population of Kenya estimated at about thirty 
million. 45 years after independence, most members of the Asian-African community 
are fourth or fifth generation Kenyans. Yet, members of this community continue to be 
viewed as outsiders and lived in an atmosphere of partial non-acceptance (Pandurang, 
2009). Ali Mazuri has described this negative attitude towards people of Indian origin as 
‘Indophobia’. He has suggested that this can be examined in two contexts – ‘cultural 
Indophobia’ and ‘economic Indophobia’ (Mazuri, 1976). The first refers to a reaction 
against Indian cultural habits including food and other social issues including the very 
low incidence of marriage between Africans and Asian-Africans (Balachandran, 1981; 
Cable, 1969; Mazuri, 1976).  ‘Economic Indophobia’ refers to the reaction against the 
economic success of the community (Balachandran, 1981; Mazuri, 1976). Though the 
economic domination of the Asian-African community has declined considerably since 
Independence they still remain a very wealthy minority (Vandenberg, 2003).160  
                                                 
159 It has to be acknowledged that this short section cannot realistically capture all the complexity and 
nuances of this deeply emotive topic. Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that the author is a 
member of the Asian-African community, who has experienced both the prejudice towards Asian-
Africans by Africans; the divisions within the Asian-African community that prevents it from presenting a 
single voice on racial issues; and as secretary of the Asian-African Heritage Exhibition at the National 
Museums from 2000-2005, has been part of the recent attempts by the community to take stock of the 
shared past and address hostilities between African and Asian-Africans. However, the author has ensured 
that the discussion here is based on secondary sources and therefore objective and unbiased.  
160 There was an extremely lively debate, called the ‘second Kenya Capital Debate’ between Himbara 
(Himbara, 1994) and Chege (Chege, 1997). This debate attempted to understand level of domination of 
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On the other side of the equation, the Asian-African community often views itself as 
‘embattled’ and lives with the fear that citizenship does not guarantee security 
(Balachandran, 1981). The post Independence history of Kenya has included incidents 
of overt anti-Asian sentiment and actions. This includes the ‘Africanization’ of trade 
through the Trade Licensing Act in the 1960s and 1970s when several Kenyans of Asian 
origin were asked to wind up their business (Balachandran, 1981) and, being referred to 
as ‘paper citizens’ and being subjected to a debate entitled ‘The Asian Question’ by 
populist politicians during the multi-party elections in 1992 and 1997 (Maganda, 
2009).161 In 2002, unhappy with the draft constitution prepared by Constitution of 
Kenya Review Commission, the then Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi denounced its 
chairperson Yash Pal Ghai, a Kenyan citizen and an Asian-African, as an ‘alien’ and 
called for his replacement (Maganda, 2009). Finally, the memory of the overnight 
expulsion of Asians from Uganda in 1972 remains etched in the collective memory of all 
Asian-African families.   
 
More recently, there has been a perceptive reduction in anti-Asian rhetoric by politicians 
during the 2002 and 2007 elections. This can be attributed partly to the more open and 
democratic nature of these elections; to the increased and more visible participation of 
members of the Asian-African community in political affairs; and possibly to other 
efforts by members of the Asian-African community to reflect on their past with 
scrutiny and to present their heritage in public forums.  
 
As early as 1969, it was acknowledged that the negative attitudes towards Asian-Africans 
was partly based on the high levels of inequality and poverty in Kenya: 
  
                                                                                                                                          
the Kenyan economy by Asian-Africans and the sources of this domination. An excellent summary of this 
debated is given in Vandenberg (2003)While this is not the main theme of this thesis, we concur with 
Vandenberg’s conclusions. These are that first there is not enough data to firmly assess the level of 
domination by Asian-Africans of the Kenyan economy as there is not enough data on who controls the 
services and agriculture sector. More importantly, to the extent that there is domination by Asian-Africans 
in large scale industry, it can be attributed to three main factors – the tradition of family business and 
inter-generational transfer of knowledge amongst Asian-Africans, the greater tendency to own businesses 
as partnerships and higher levels of starting capital (Vandenberg, 2003)  
161 The ‘Asian Question?’ refers to a wide range of remarks by politicians, mainly during campaign 
speeches before elections, questioning the right of the Asian-African community to remain in Kenya.  
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“Closer examination would reveal that these accusations are not only unfair 
and exaggerated but, worse, that they conceal one of the fundamental 
problems of East African Society, namely stark inequalities….Differences in 
income and wealth are enormous and conspicuous. There are high, and 
largely unfulfilled, expectations amongst the vast majority of the educated 
or semi-educated poor who form the bulk of Kenya’s population”  
Cable (1969 pp., 219) 
 
Inequalities in modern day Kenya are based on a variety of complex factors including 
tribal affiliations and the ethnic based process of capital accumulation, and not only race 
(Kanyinga, 2000b).162 But the extremely high levels of inequality and poverty in Kenya 
means that complete racial harmony between Africans and Asian-Africans remains a 
distant goal.  
 
The crucial point to draw from this potted history of race relations, in reference to the 
banking sector in Kenya, is that trust between Africans and Asian-Africans cannot be 
assumed to simply exist and has an extremely complex and often contradictory social 
basis.  
 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
The chapter outlined the historical development of banking in Kenya. It has shown that 
despite policy changes over the years, the banking sector in Kenya remains fragile and 
shallow. The chapter has shown that in line with other studies on finance in SSA, 
studies on the Kenyan banking sector are deficient due to their reliance on mainstream 
methods and methodology.  
 
The chapter showed that the first three banks to be established in Kenya remain 
dominant even in 2005. Explaining this dominance is key to explaining the fragility and 
shallowness of the banking sector. Yet, we reject as simplistic the interpretation from S-
C-P studies that attribute the poor performance of the Kenyan banking sector to low 
competition measured using high concentration ratios.  
                                                 
162 The brief discussion in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.6 on the ethno-political dimensions of bank failures also 
gives a brief insight into the extremely ethno-political nature of capital accumulation in Kenya since 
independence.  
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We argue that understanding the nature of segmentation of the banking sector is key to 
understanding the performance of the banking sector in Kenya. The chapter provided 
evidence of the difference in performance between the four segments of the banking 
sector in Kenya in terms of margins, non-performing loans, ROA and cost of funds. 
The rest of this thesis analyzes qualitative interview data on lending decisions, deposit 
raising and governance of banks in Kenya, in an attempt to understand the differences 
in performance of the segments. It compares the constraints faced by different 
segments of the banking sector – foreign owned banks, government owned banks, local 
large private owned bank and local small private owned banks - and shows how this 
segmentation is embedded in social relations and non-price factors in particular the 
perceived reputation of banks.  
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CHAPTER 5 – THEORETICAL CONCEPTS ON 
LENDING AND DEPOSIT MOBILIZATION 
RELATIONSHIPS 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the theoretical concepts that are useful in trying to 
understand the lending relationship and deposit mobilization relationship. This is to set 
the background for the empirical discussion of lending and deposit mobilization in the 
banking sector in Kenya in Chapter 6.  
 
In Section 5.2, this chapter discusses theoretical concepts that underpin mainstream 
analysis of the lending relationship including transaction costs and information 
asymmetry. Criticisms of these concepts are then discussed. Following a pluralist 
methodology, in Section 5.3 and Section 5.4, this chapter discusses several theoretical 
concepts from Post-Keynesian, Marxist and Institutional schools that we regard as more 
useful in understanding the lending relationship. They are grouped broadly in two 
categories - knowledge creation and the role of social factors and trust. Section 5.5 goes 
on to review the rather limited literature on deposit mobilization with Section 5.6 
providing the concluding remarks to this chapter.  
 
This chapter provides the theoretical backdrop for Chapter 6, in which we carry out an 
empirical analysis of lending and deposit mobilization in the banking sector in Kenya.  
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5.2 The Lending Relationship - Information Asymmetry and 
Transaction Costs 
As said in Chapter 2, contemporary, banking theory has focused on the role of banks 
based on the functions they fulfill in reducing frictions or transaction costs (Freixas & 
Rochet, 1997). 163  Information asymmetry is the key transaction cost that a bank 
overcomes when fulfilling the intermediation function, and information production is a 
key function of banks (Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993).164 
 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), in their seminal work, put information asymmetry at the heart 
of the lending relationship and incorporated interest rates and default rates into the 
model. In their model, banks try to maximise their profit by obtaining a margin between 
the deposit and loan rate. Borrowers try to maximise their profits by their choice of 
project. Due to information asymmetry, banks are unable to distinguish good borrowers 
from bad borrowers.  Furthermore, due to adverse selection and moral hazard, the 
normal market clearing system – raising prices, in this case interest rates, does not 
work.165 It simply encourages riskier borrowers to apply for loans. Therefore banks 
operate a rule of thumb keeping interest rates lower than market conditions warrant. 
The main conclusion from the model is: 
 
 “there are no competitive forces leading supply to equal demand, and 
credit is rationed”  
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981 pp., 206) 
 
Caprio et al (1994) and Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998) have extended the Stiglitz and 
Weiss model and conceptualised a bank’s lending decision making process in a risk-
return space where there are two assets that a bank can invest in – risky loans and 
virtually riskless government treasury bills. The level of loans is determined at the point 
where the bank’s loan risk-return frontier is tangential to the indifference curve of the 
bank’s risk preferences. The loan risk-return frontier reflects a bank’s perception of the 
risks of private sector loans and the indifference curve reflects the risk averseness of the 
                                                 
163 Refer to discussions on the Arrow-Debreu model in Chapter 2. Also as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, 
financial liberalization theory is based on the view that government controls and financial repression are 
the main friction and source of transaction costs in financial markets.  
164 Refer to Chapter 2 for a discussion on the function of banks as information gatherers and monitors.  
165 Refer to Chapter 2 for definitions of adverse selection and moral hazard.  
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bank (Nissanke & Aryeetey, 1998).166 It is hypothesised that several factors that can 
affect these two curves include net worth of the bank, asset quality, bank’s risk 
assessment ability, loan administration cots, endowment of information capital and 
policy uncertainty (Nissanke & Aryeetey, 1998). The main insight of the model is its 
ability to explain why credit did not increase after financial liberalization. After 
liberalization banks shifted their portfolios towards riskless government securities 
despite the high rates available on loans leading to a reduction in supply of loans to the 
private sector (Caprio, 1994; Nissanke & Aryeetey, 1998).  
 
We would like to argue that while these models are useful in explaining why credit 
rationing can occur, there is still a need to understand the actual process of information 
production and how banks bridge information asymmetry in a country specific 
context.167 Furthermore, viewing the lending relationship as based solely on information 
asymmetry is too simplistic as will be discussed below.  
 
5.3 The Lending Relationship - Knowledge Creation 
An alternative approach to understanding the lending relationship is the concept of 
knowledge creation during the process of credit creation as discussed by Dow (1998, 
2002). Dow, drawing on the works of organization theory, Minsky, Keynes and Shackle, 
criticizes the extremely simplistic way in which information is understood in the Stiglitz 
and Weiss model.  
 
Dow argues that the major flaw with the Stiglitz and Weiss model is that its key result is 
not based on information asymmetry between a bank and a borrower, but two much 
stronger assumptions. These assumptions are that borrowers have perfect information on 
the risk level of the projects and secondly that borrowers conceal from banks the actual 
risk attached to the project from (Dow, 1998, 2002).168 These assumptions interact to 
                                                 
166 Bank’s risk is measured in terms of standard deviation that is deviation from the mean. However, in 
practice most banks are only concerned about negative risk – that is the risk of loss. 
167 Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998) compare loan administration costs between Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria and 
Tanzania. The loan administration costs are measured using survey data on time spent by loan officers on 
screening and monitoring.  In Chapter 6, we do not try quantify loan administration costs but discuss in 
depth the specific constraints faced by bankers in the lending process.  
168 Though Greenwald & Stiglitz (1993) recognize that production is a risky process, this is not translated 
to the formal models where it is assumed that borrowers face quantifiable measurable risk (Dow, 1998).  
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minimize the importance of borrower’s risk and provides an explanation for credit 
rationing (Dow, 1998). However, organizational theory indicates that borrowers also 
face uncertainty about project outcomes. Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis 
(Minsky, 1982) has shown the importance of the role of expectations leading to 
excessive credit growth during an upswing in the business cycle and credit rationing 
during a downswing. Therefore, both borrowers and lenders can be both over or under 
optimistic (Dow, 2002).  
 
In the specific context of developing countries, we would like to argue that by 
disregarding the relevance of borrower’s risk, the Stiglitz and Weiss model ignores 
studies by other mainstream economists who emphasize the high level of systemic risk 
in developing countries. It is argued that systemic risks arise from externally driven 
shocks (often due to commodity price fluctuations) and high level of political instability 
(Adam & O'Connell, 1999; Collier, 2004). We would like to argue that the focus on 
shocks and in particular, shocks as external factors, provides only a limited understanding 
of the link between finance and development in SSA.169 However, what we can draw 
from the mainstream studies that emphasize external shocks is the fact that due to their 
stage of economic development, developing countries are subject to high levels of 
volatility and therefore borrowers in developing countries are also unable to make 
investments with a high level of certainty.  
 
Furthermore, in the Stiglitz and Weiss model it is assumed that risk is reducible once the 
information asymmetry between borrower and lender is bridged. Dow (1998) following 
Shackle (1972) and Keynes’s Treatise on Probability (1921 [1973]) argues that most 
knowledge is subject to uncertainty in terms of unquantifiable risk.170 Therefore according to 
Dow the lending process should be seen as one in which both parties attempt to acquire 
or create knowledge in an uncertain world (Dow, 1998, 2002).  
 
                                                 
169 As discussed in Chapter 3, external shocks are only one factor in a broad range of macro-economic 
factors that affect the link between finance and development.  
170 Shackle (1972) criticized the probabilistic approach to decision making theory, emphasized that firms 
investments projects are experimental and therefore, there is no ‘correct’ frequency distribution with 
which to measure risk. Keynes Treatise on Probability (1921 [1973]) emphasized that the range of 
information captured by frequency distributions is small. In simple terms, the use of probability relies on 
past events and therefore by its nature, methods that rely on probability cannot capture the future 
adequately.  
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Application of this concept of knowledge creation to the context of credit market 
implies: 
 
“...that it is in the nature of the banks’ and borrowers’ risk assessment 
processes that a strong element of judgement be employed. This is not the 
result of borrowers’ intentionally concealing information in an opportunistic 
manner, but rather the nature of the process of knowledge acquisition in an 
uncertain world.” 
Dow (1998 pp., 222) 
 
It should be recognized that some Marxists, without explicitly using the term knowledge 
creation, acknowledge that the term knowledge is more useful than information 
asymmetry in understanding the financial system. For example in criticizing mainstream 
understanding of financial systems it is argued: 
 
‘…information [is treated] as an absolute material fact in possession of 
market agents, rather than as a state of knowledge among market 
participants that is conditional upon social, political and historical factors’ 
Aybar and Lapavitsas (2001 pp., 29) 
 
Chapter 6 provides empirical support for the concept of knowledge creation in its 
discussion on information production and monitoring by banks. It links the risks faced 
by borrowers to differences in borrower types in each of the segments of the banking 
sector in Kenya.171   
 
5.4 The Lending Relationship – Social Factors and Trust 
The next concept that is useful in understanding lending relationships is the importance 
of social factors. Sociological theory builds on financial theory and argues that access to 
credit is not based purely on the net present value of a project and transaction costs 
(Uzzi, 1999). Rather banking transactions are embedded in social relations. Embeddedness, 
in turn, leads to the development of trust between the borrower and lender and 
therefore affects access to and the price of the credit (Johnson, 2003; Uzzi, 1999).  
                                                 
171 The concept of knowledge creation to understand the lending relationship also influenced the design 
of the interview questions.   
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In this section we discuss several inter-related concepts – the meaning of embeddedness 
of social relations in lending relations, how embeddeness helps to build trust between 
the lender and the borrower, the differences between arm’s length and embedded 
relationships, the link between type of relationship and type of information. We also 
discuss the briefly the debates on the ‘radiuses of trust’ and also the role of ethnicity as a 
social factor.   
 
It should be noted that even economists who focus primarily on transaction cost 
analysis recognize the importance of social factors. Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998) while 
focussing on transaction costs, are explicit that the residual variation in their results (that 
is not accounted for transaction, information and default costs) might be explained by 
social factors. Caprio (1994) highlights that banks in developing countries need to 
develop ‘long term relationships’ with their borrowers. However, there is little empirical 
analysis of what ‘long term relationships’ mean in practice and how these change over 
time.  
 
It is also problematic that mainstream theory, because of its grounding in 
methodological individualism, assumes that the role of social factors will disappear over 
time as financial markets develop and that arm’s length relationships are the ideal form 
of relationship. Below we discuss in detail the differences between arm’s length 
relationships and embedded relationships and argue that embedded relations also offer 
significant benefits to both banks and borrowers. Furthermore, as we will show in 
Chapter 6, the role of social factors in lending relationships remains pervasive, even 
though the character of embeddedness changes over time. In methodological terms, 
there is little recognition in mainstream studies that an acknowledgement that banking 
relations are embedded in social relations necessitates research methodology that 
enables an understanding of specific historical and social factors affecting a country. 
Therefore, large cross country studies or simplistic S-C-P or DEA analysis, all of which 
were discussed in Chapter 3, are inadequate.   
 
The embeddedness argument is based on the work of Granovetter (1985) who argues 
that: 
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“the embeddedness argument stresses…the role of concrete personal 
relations and structures of such relations [social relations] in generating trust 
and discouraging malfeasance”  
Granovetter (1985 pp., 490) 
 
Uzzi defines social embeddedness as: 
 
“the degree to which commercial transactions take place through social 
relations and networks of relations that use the exchange protocols 
associated with social, non-commercial attachments to govern business 
dealings” 
Uzzi (1999 pp., 482) 
 
Therefore, in the specific context of lending relationships, social relations allow 
exchange of knowledge and information and the development of trust between the 
lender and the borrower.172 This encourages the lender to disburse the loan to the 
borrower on a basis that cannot simply be captured by price factors and transaction 
costs.  
 
The embeddedness approach has been combined with the ‘Real Markets’ approach to 
understand rural financial markets in Kenya (Johnson, 2003, 2004b, 2004c). ‘Real 
Markets’ approach views exchange as embedded in social and non-price factors rejecting 
the methodological individualism of neo-classical economics. It is based on the 
theoretical insights of ‘old’ institutional economics and treats institutions as central to 
economic analysis (Johnson, 2003).173 This approach is based on the view that a range of 
                                                 
172 It should be acknowledged that when we use the term trust here we use it in a very narrow context of 
the relationship between the bank and the borrower. In the specific context of finance, we do not look at 
the development of trust between banks which is also essential for the smooth functioning of the 
payment system. Furthermore, while it is not the main focus of this thesis is important to recognize the 
definition, meaning and the social basis of trust is still a highly debated issue amongst sociologists, 
anthropologists and political scientists. For a summary of these debates see good summary of the 
different debates on trust mainly conducted by anthropologists Harriss (2003) and Neve (2005). 
173 Markets are defined as “a set of social institutions in which a large number of commodity exchanges of 
a specific type regularly take place and to some extent are facilitated and structured by those institutions” 
(Hodgson, 1988pp., 176 quoted in Johnson 2003). 
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institutions from the state to social and economic relations of class, gender, age and 
ethnicity are important (Johnson, 2003).174 
 
Johnson (2003) shows that the embeddedness approach combines the transaction cost 
approach where high interest rates are viewed solely in terms of high transaction costs 
and political economy analysis of interest rates which emphasizes class relations.175 
Johnson shows that borrowers in the rural parts of central Kenya prefer to borrow from 
mutually organised financial institutions (savings co-operatives) rather than banks 
mainly due to a wide range of social, political and cultural reasons (Johnson, 2003, 2004c, 
2005). In particular Johnson shows that because land cannot be offered as collateral due 
to political and cultural reasons, borrowers prefer mutually organised financial 
institutions (savings co-operatives) that do not demand collateral (Johnson, 2005).176 
The author also shows that gender relations make it more difficult for women to access 
financial services than men (Johnson, 2005). More generally with reference to rural 
financial markets and micro-finance in Kenya, it has been shown that a wide range of 
institutions including social and cultural norms affect economic behaviour and can help 
to explain the persistence of particular sets of financial arrangements over time even if 
they do not reduce transaction costs (Johnson, 2003 pp., 300).  
 
The Johnson (2003, 2004c, 2005) studies are part of an increasingly accepted body of 
knowledge that attempts to understand the impact of social factors on informal and 
rural markets. Furthermore it is recognized that social and cultural institutions do not 
only affect the ‘informal’ sector and stop at the door of the ‘formal’ financial sector. 
Formal financial institutions are equally subject to the influence of social and cultural 
                                                 
174 It should be noted that the ‘old institutional economics’ can be distinguished from ‘new institutional 
economics’ as popularised by Douglass North (North, 1989). The key difference is that while new 
institutional economics emphasizes the importance of institutions for economic growth, it still focuses on 
the emergence of institutions out of the interaction of individuals assuming an initial institution free stage 
(Hodgson, 1998). On the other hand, old institutional economics recognizes that while individuals 
interact to form institutions, they are also moulded by socio-economic conditions (Hodgson, 1998). ‘Old’ 
institutionalists emphasize that assuming that ‘direction of causality’ is from individuals to institutions is 
misplaced.  
175 Class and power relations have been used to explain how money lenders are able to charge labourers 
usurious interest rates in rural agricultural economies (Bhaduri, 1977, 1981). 
176 Cultural norms and sanctions that prevent the collateralization of land in Kenya include norms of land 
inheritance, burial and the gendered incidence of shame (Johnson, 2003). Political factors that prevent the 
collateralization of land in Kenya are discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  
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institutions” (Johnson, 2003 pp., 39). Yet, there are very few studies that try to 
understand how formal markets may also be affected by social factors and this thesis 
attempts to fill this gap.  
 
An interesting study of the application of the embeddedness approach to formal 
banking is Uzzi (1999). Using a combination of methods – interviews of bank managers 
and survey data of 2,400 midmarket firms in the United States – the author tests the 
impact of arm’s length versus embedded ties between banks and borrowers.177 Arm’s 
length ties are defined as ties that are characterized by lean and irregular transactions 
which function without prolonged human or social contact between parties. The author 
finds that firms that have embedded social relations rather than arm’s length ties with 
banks are more likely to get financing at a cheaper interest rate.178    
 
The channels and reasons for this result are discerned from interviews conducted of 
relationship managers of banks. The study finds that embedded social ties help to build 
trust between banks and the borrowers.  Not only do the ties help to bridge the basic 
information asymmetry between the bank and the borrower in terms of the net present 
value of a project, but they allow bankers to access what Uzzi terms ‘private 
information’. The paper elaborates: 
 
“Private information…may include, for example, unpublished capabilities in 
products, the need to source particular material, the strategic blueprints for 
an executive succession, investment plans, failed solutions, the rollout date 
of a new product, or critical resource dependencies”  
Uzzi (1999 pp., 483) 
 
                                                 
177 Midmarket firms are defined as firms with fewer than 500 employees or less than $500 million in 
annual sales (Uzzi, 1999) 
178 In the statistical analysis from survey data embedded ties were measured using the duration of the 
relationship and the multiplexity of the relationship in terms of number of the bank’s services used by the 
firm (Uzzi, 1999). We would like to argue that while these quantitative measures cannot capture the 
complexity of social relations, the fact that this study also uses qualitative data to understand the channels 
through which social relations affect access and price to credit, this study overcomes many of the 
problems of purely quantitative studies discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.  
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The key point to note here is, that by its very nature this ‘private information’, or what is 
usually referred to as ‘soft information’ in the economics literature, it is usually not 
shared in arm’s length relationships but only in embedded relationships (Uzzi, 1999).  
 
It is also useful at this stage to highlight the link between types of relationship (arm’s 
length and embedded) to the distinction between ‘hard’ information and ‘soft’ 
information. We distinguish between hard and soft information based on the 
terminology used by economists.179 Hard information consists of firm or project specific 
financial data from borrowers’ balance sheets and also industrial data. It is already in 
numerical form therefore easy to quantify, verify and transfer. It is generally cheaper to 
collect hard information and also compare it. Soft information is qualitative and based 
on ‘words’ including ideas, opinions and comments. Therefore by its nature it is difficult 
to quantify and is generated in the specific context of the bank-borrower relationship 
and its use relies on some level of judgment (C. Chang, Liao, Yu, & Ni, 2009; 
Godbillon-Camus & Godlewski, 2005). Therefore, impersonal arm’s length relationships 
rely on hard information to make decisions on lending. Embedded relationships, built 
through social networks, have access to, and rely more on soft information to make 
lending decisions.  
 
Furthermore, we would like to emphasize that Uzzi’s argument is more nuanced than 
simply showing the importance of social relations in lending relations. The paper shows 
that arm’s length relationships and embedded relationships are complementary rather than 
mutually exclusive and one type of tie helps overcome the limitations of the other type 
of tie. Therefore a firm that has embedded relationships with a bank is more likely to get 
funding, but, if it is also able to meet most of the financial criteria, it is also more likely 
to put in effort to repay the loan (Uzzi, 1999). The corollary is that banks that rely on a 
mix of arm’s length and embedded ties are likely to have better information production 
and monitoring of their borrowers.  
 
Furthermore, while the embeddedness thesis emphasizes that social relations are necessary 
to build trust between a bank and a borrower, the thesis explicitly recognizes that social 
relations are not necessarily sufficient to ensure that neither party breaks this trust 
(Johnson, 2003). As Granovetter highlights: 
                                                 
179 We found it interesting that during the interview process, bankers do not make a strong distinction 
between hard and soft information. This is discussed further in Chapter 6.  
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“since networks of social relations penetrate irregularly and in differing 
degrees in different sectors of economic life, thus allowing for what we 
already know: distrust, opportunism and disorder are by no means absent”  
Granovetter (1992 pp., 62) 
 
In Chapter 6, we provide empirical support the importance of social factors in the 
lending relationship and, more importantly, we also show that social factors can have 
both positive and negative impact on the quality of the lending relationship.   
 
At this stage it is also useful to discuss briefly the literature that considers the changes in 
social basis of trust from personal and familial level to an institutional level. Francis 
Fukuyama, though not an academic, has been one of the most influential writers who 
has argued that a society in which trust has spread beyond the narrow circles of family 
and kin, to more generalized trust in other institutions, economic development has 
taken off (Fukuyama, 1995). Fukuyma’s core argument which links different ‘radiuses of 
trust’ to economic development has been widely debated and criticized and it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis of discuss this debate here.180 However, there are several 
anthropological studies that show shifts in business transactions from away from 
personalized trust. For example, in a historical and ethnographic study of merchant 
castes in Chennai (Madras), it has been argued that: 
 
‘the high level of trust that went with a community organized and 
constrained by personalized face-to-face relationships has disappeared. To a 
considerable extent the need to establish trust through enduring personal 
ties has been replaced by impersonal contractual relationships, law and 
governmental bureaucracy’  
Mines (1994 pp., 79) 
 
There are two points from this discussion that our relevant for our empirical analysis. 
First, it is important to recognize that the social basis of trust is constantly changing. In 
Chapter 6 we find empirical support for the changes in reliance on social factors in the 
lending relationship. Second, and linked to the segmentation of the banking sector, is to 
                                                 
180 There term ‘radiuses of trust’ captures Fukuyama’s argument and is used by Harriss (2003) in his 
discussion on Indian business.  
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recognize that even within one system, there may be different ‘radiuses of trust’.  
Therefore while foreign owned banks and government owned banks rely on more 
formal mechanisms both ex-ante to make credit decisions and ex-post to monitor the 
loans, private owned banks still rely on personal or social relations.  
 
Finally, it is useful to discuss the role of ethnicity as a social factor on which trust can be 
based. Harriss (2003) presents a typology used by anthropologists on the social basis of 
trust that is useful to discuss here. It is suggested that trust can be based on ‘character 
assessment’ (A trusts B because of who he or she is) or ‘incentive assessment’ (A trusts 
B because of her assessment of the incentives acting upon the other).181 Character 
assessment may be ‘specific’, relying on experience of the other or on third-party 
assessment of her, or ‘generic’, relying on the general reputation of those with her 
characteristics, or on characteristics that are shared by A and B (for example, they are of 
the same ethnicity). Therefore, shared ethnicity can form a basis of general reputation and 
trust between two parties.  
 
Brownbridge (1998b) conjectured that banks owned by members of the Asian-African 
community in Kenya, served mainly members of their own community, and therefore 
could use community pressure to bear on loan defaulters. In Chapter 6 we discuss the 
role of ethnicity in building trust between bank and borrower, interrogate how this 
relationship is different for different segments, consider the impact on the performance 
of loans when banks rely on ethnic ties to monitor borrowers and finally describe how 
these relationships are changing over time.  
 
We now discuss the theoretical literature on the relationship between the bank and the 
depositor.  
 
5.5 The Deposit Mobilization Relationship 
Mainstream contemporary banking theory focuses primarily on the relationships 
between banks and their borrowers, that is, the asset side of a bank’s balance sheet with 
a focus on information asymmetry as a key transaction cost. The liability side of the 
                                                 
181 Incentives could be non-formal social incentives such as cultural norms of reputation or more formal 
incentives such as legal institutions.  
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balance sheet, that is, the relationships between banks and their depositors, has not been 
analyzed in depth.  
 
There is little guidance from contemporary banking theory on how depositors choose 
which bank to deposit with. The only significant mainstream theory on deposit 
mobilization comes from the financial repression school where it is argued that the 
deposit mobilization by banks would increase once ceilings on interest rates fixed by 
governments were removed (Fry, 1988).182  
 
Banks are viewed as delegated monitors (on behalf of depositors) and it is recognized 
that the stability of the claims of the depositors depends on the banks ability of monitor 
borrowers and ensure that their asset portfolio remains sound (Diamond, 1984). 
Depositors can and should play a role in monitoring of banks, by moving their deposits 
from banks they consider unsound, but there is little guidance on whether depositors 
have the capacity to monitor banks and if so how effectively they monitor banks in 
practice. It has been recognized depositors are prone to cause bank runs due to rumours 
and panic this may lead to failure of even healthy banks due to a shortage of liquidity 
(Diamond & Dybvig, 1983).   
 
In general it is assumed that central bank in its capacity as regulator and lender of last 
resort and some form of deposit insurance, provides the basis for this stability in the 
relationship between the bank and the depositor (Freixas & Rochet, 1997). It should be 
recognized there is a huge mainstream literature on deposit insurance. This literature 
tends to emphasize the negative aspects of deposit insurance in particular the moral 
hazard issues surrounding deposit insurance. It is argued that the presence of deposit 
insurance encourages banks to take excessive risk and reduces the incentives of 
depositors to monitor banks (Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 1997, 2000). Furthermore, 
it is argued that deposit insurance schemes only works in countries where there is a 
‘strong’ institutional environment and therefore should only be considered by 
developing countries once they have stronger institutions (Demirguc-Kunt, Kane, & 
Laeven, 2008). We would like to argue that there needs to be a move in the research 
                                                 
182 Refer to Chapter 2 and 3 for the criticisms of the financial repression school.  
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agenda from understanding the impact of deposit insurance to understanding the reality 
of how banks mobilize deposits and in Chapter 6 we attempt to understand this.183  
 
We now discuss alternative theoretical concepts from heterodox schools that are more 
useful in understanding the relationship between the bank and the depositor.  These 
concepts form the background of the empirical work on deposit mobilization discussed 
in Chapter 6.  
 
First, Chick and Dow’s Post-Keynesian framework of stages of banking development 
(Chick, 1992, 1997; Dow et al., 2008) highlights that ability of banks to move from pure 
intermediation to credit creation requires the ability of banks to win the confidence of the 
public (stage 2 in their framework) and for the central bank to take full responsibility of 
lender of last resort (stage 4 in their framework) (Ruziev, 2006).184  Therefore the 
perceived safety of deposits is key stage in financial development and it underpins the 
ability of a bank to extend loans.  
 
Second, Lapavitsas, working in a Marxist framework has highlighted the centrality of 
trust between a bank and a depositor.  It is argued that by construction, a bank is unable 
to meet all its deposit liabilities at once and therefore, trust between a bank and 
depositor is essential (Lapavitsas, 2007). More importantly Lapavitsas highlights the 
inter-linkage between the liability and asset side of a banks balance sheet. It is argued 
that: 
 
“A bank’s profits and ability to honour its promises to pay depend 
overwhelmingly on the validity and prompt repayment of the banks’ 
assets – i.e. on other capitalists’ promises to pay. In short, trust in a bank’s 
liabilities derives from the composition and quality of the assets on its 
balance sheet, which are mostly debts of others”  
Lapavitsas (2003) 
 
                                                 
183 Furthermore, while it is the not the main subject of this thesis, we would like to argue that there needs 
to be research into understanding the reasons how depositors make the decision to deposit their savings 
in a particular bank. 
184 See Chapter 2, Appendix 5 for detailed summary of stages of banking development framework of 
Chick and Dow.  
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Therefore, not only are lending relations embedded in social relations as described 
above, but the ability of banks to raise deposits is also underpinned by social relations.  
 
Third, and following on from the discussion above, it has been recognized by 
institutional economists, that in practice, the quality of a bank’s assets is private 
information and it is not easy for a depositor to judge between a good bank and a bad 
bank (Johnson, 2004c; Ndii, 1994). The average deposit rate does not contain enough 
information about the quality of the banks’ assets (Johnson, 2004c). In this context 
banks resort to other techniques to signal the quality of their asset base such as highly 
liquid asset portfolios and large banking halls and big buildings (Johnson, 2004c). In 
Chapter 6 we discuss how the social factors including the ethnicity of the owners of 
banks influence the trust between banks and depositors.  
 
The final concept that is seen to be useful in understanding the relationship between a 
bank and depositor is from business management literature. This is the concept of the 
bargaining power of customers as a key force in influencing the nature and degree of 
competition (Porter, 1979).185 
 
In Chapter 6, keeping these theoretical concepts in mind, we attempt to show the 
extremely complex nature of the relationship between a bank and the depositor and 
how different segments of the banking sector develop the trust of their depositors. 
These theoretical concepts are extremely useful to understand the banking system in 
Kenya where the central bank is unable to fully guarantee financial stability and 
therefore even within ‘one’ banking system, there can be different ‘radiuses of trust’ in 
banks by depositors. Chapter 6 also shows that the bargaining power of customers, in 
particular depositors, varies across the segments of the banking sector in Kenya.  
 
                                                 
185 Porter (1979) stipulated that the nature and degree of competition in an industry hinges primarily on 
five forces: the threat of new entrants, the bargaining power of customers, the bargaining power of 
suppliers, the threat of substitute products, and the level of competitive rivalry. As said in Chapter 3, 
Maimbo (2002) also uses Porter’s five forces framework in the context of the banking sector in Zambia 
and emphasized that excessive price based competition revealed fragility in banking sector before the 
traditional financial ratios began deteriorating.  
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5.6 Concluding Remarks 
Following a pluralist approach, this chapter discusses several theoretical concepts from 
heterodox schools that are relevant to understanding the lending and the deposit 
mobilization process.  
 
In summary, they are, first, Post Keynesian concept of knowledge creation is more 
useful than information asymmetry to understand the lending process. Second, the 
process of credit creation is based on trust and credit relations are embedded in social 
relations. The importance of social factors means that information asymmetry between 
lenders and borrowers is not based solely on transaction costs but also on historical and 
social factors means but social factors can have both positive and negative impact on 
the quality of a banks loan portfolio.  
 
We also discussed the significance of trust between banks and depositors in deposit 
mobilization. We argued that this depends on the level of economic development and 
therefore it cannot be simply assumed to exist for developing financial sectors.  
 
These concepts form the background for the empirical discussion of lending and 
deposit mobilization that are discussed in Chapter 6. These concepts help us get a 
deeper understanding of the constraints faced by banks in the Kenyan banking sector. 
In particular Chapter 6 attempts to understand how banks develop trust between 
themselves and their borrowers and depositors, how social factors affect the 
development of this trust, and also how the character of this trust is different for 
different segments of the banking industry.  
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CHAPTER 6 – BANK LENDING AND DEPOSIT 
MOBILIZATION: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 
BANKING SECTOR IN KENYA  
“Small local banks are the best entities for providing financial services to the enterprises 
and households that are most important in terms of comparative advantage – be they 
asparagus farmers in Peru, cut-flower companies in Kenya or garment factories in 
Bangladesh” 
Justin Lin, Chief Economist, The World Bank (2009) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
It is simple to state that the functions of banks are lending and deposit mobilization. But, 
when banks do not fulfill these functions effectively, what are the constraints that they 
face? This chapter discusses the experience of banks in Kenya in carrying out their 
lending and deposit mobilization functions.186 It uses the theoretical concepts on lending 
and deposit mobilization discussed in Chapter 5. The main aim of this chapter is to give 
a deeper understanding of the structural problems of the banking sector in Kenya and in 
particular the segmented nature of the banking sector that was highlighted in Chapter 4. 
This chapter analyzes the data from qualitative semi-structured interviews of banks 
carried out by the author. The chapter explores the similarities and differences between 
the four segments that we have identified – Foreign Owned Banks (FOBs), 
Government Owned Banks (GOBs), local Large Private Owned Banks (LPOBs) and 
local Small Private Owned Banks (SPOBs) in terms of the lending relationship and the 
deposit mobilization relationship.  
 
In Section 6.2 we provide a summary of the constraints to lending that were gleaned 
from the interview data.  Section 6.3 discusses the constraints that are well discussed in 
the literature – that is the economic and legal environment.  Section 6.4 discusses 
constraints to lending that are not discussed in detail in the literature - these are - fluid 
social factors and the intricacies of inadequate information production and monitoring. 
                                                 
186 As noted in Chapter 1, this thesis focuses on three relationships in banking – lending, deposit 
mobilization and corporate governance. This chapter discusses the first two relationships. Refer to the 
research questions stated in Chapter 1, Section 1.1.3 and 1.1.4.  
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Section 6.5 discusses the constraints to deposit mobilization faced by different segments 
of the banking sector. Section 6.6 provides from concluding comments in particular on 
the implications of our analysis for finance and development. 	  
 
6.2 Constraints to Lending - Summary 
To recap, in Chapter 4 we showed the development of the banking sector in Kenya. We 
showed that the banking sector as a whole is characterized, by high levels of spreads, 
high non-performing loans and several bank failures. We highlighted that the top three 
banks (Barclays Bank, Kenya Commercial Bank and Standard Chartered Bank) control 
40.3% of the market in terms of assets. Therefore, in line with mainstream analysis, we 
do recognize that the market is highly concentrated. However we argued that it is 
simplistic to link the poor performance of the banking sector to high concentration 
levels. This thesis argues that to understand the performance of the banking sector in 
Kenya it is imperative to analyze each of the segments in the banking sector.  
 
In Chapter 4, we showed that there are significant differences between the four 
segments – FOB, GOB, LPOB and SPOB in terms of performance. FOBs and GOBs 
banks enjoy higher margins than the LPOB and SPOB. Furthermore, there are 
significant differences in the NPL ratio of different segments. While high levels of 
NPLs in GOBs have been well documented in the literature, we showed that SPOBs 
also had high levels of NPLs. We also showed the cost of funds of SPOB is relatively 
high. We also showed that LPOBs have been relatively successful in increasing their 
market share. 
 
Table 22 below summarize the qualitative data gathered in the semi-structured 
interviews on the constraints on lending and reasons for high NPLs across different 
segments. 187  The main constraints that were reported in the interviews can be 
categorized in two groups:  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
187 Refer to Chapter 1 for the limitations of data collection and data analysis.  
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1) Economic and Legal environment: These include  
a. Conditions in the real economy and changes in the economic 
environment. 
b. Poor legal system and the inability of banks to recover their collateral. 
  
2) Fluid social relations and inadequacy in the information production and 
monitoring procedures. These include:  
a. Lack of Credit Registry  
b. Over reliance on collateral lending 
c. Over reliance on name lending 
d. Unreliability of financial accounts   
e. Lapses in internal control 
f. Constrained by image as ethnic bank 
 
It should be noted that the existing literature, mainly focuses on the first group of 
constraints (Beck & Fuchs, 2004; Daumont et al., 2004).188  The second group of 
constraint – information production and the impact of social relations on building trust 
between a bank and borrower – is usually discussed in the literature in very general 
terms. 
 
The ethnicity of bank ownership is also highlighted in Table 22 as it has a key impact on 
the lending and deposit mobilization relationships, as will be discussed below. In 
particular, keeping in mind the discussion on race relations in Chapter 4, the ethnicity of 
the ownership of the bank has an impact in developing trust between the bank and the 
borrower and the bank and the depositor.  
 
The interviews revealed that the first group of constraints affect the lending practices 
and performance of the banks in every segment though with slightly differential impact 
across segments. The second group of constraints, however, affect mainly the LPOB 
and SPOB segment and therefore there are significant differences in impact across 
segments. 
 
 
 
                                                 
188 See Section 3.7 in Chapter 3 and Sections 4.4.5 and 4.4.6 in Chapter 4.  
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Table 22: Constraints to Lending and Reasons for High NPLs 
 Segment FOB GOB LPOB SPOB 
 No of Banks 
Interviewed in 
Segment 
1  
(Bank 1) 
1  
(Bank 2) 
3 
 (Bank 3, Bank 
4, Bank 5) 
2  
(Bank 6, 
Bank 7) 
Ethnicity of 
Ownership 
of Bank  
 Not 
relevant 
(Foreign 
Owned) 
Not 
relevant 
(Governm
ent 
Owned) 
 1)Kikuyu and 
Asian-African 
2)Kikuyu, 
Kalenjin and 
Asian- African  
3)Asian-African 
Both 
Asian-
African 
1 Change in 
Economic 
Environment 
YES YES YES YES 
2 Poor Legal 
System, 
Unreliability of 
collateral 
YES YES YES YES 
3 Unreliability of 
Financial 
Accounts (hard 
info) 
NO NO YES YES 
4 Over-reliance on 
Security Based 
(Collateral) 
Lending 
NO NO YES YES 
5 Over-reliance on 
Social Factors and 
‘Name Lending’ 
NO NO YES YES 
6 Unreliability of 
(change in) Social 
Factors 
NO NO YES YES 
7 Lack of Credit 
Registry 
only for 
retails 
clients 
only for 
retail 
clients 
only for retails 
clients 
YES 
8 Lack of Reference 
from other Bank 
NO, silent 
network 
NO, silent 
network 
YES YES 
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 Segment FOB GOB LPOB SPOB 
 No of Banks 
Interviewed in 
Segment 
1  
(Bank 1) 
1  
(Bank 2) 
3 
 (Bank 3, Bank 
4, Bank 5) 
2  
(Bank 6, 
Bank 7) 
9 Lapse in Internal 
Control  
YES YES YES YES, lack 
of proper 
control 
10 
 
Restricted by 
Ethnic Group 
NO NO NO for Bank 3 
and Bank 4. YES 
for Bank 5 
YES 
 
6.3 Constraints to Lending - Economic and Legal Environment 
6.3.1 Conditions in the Real Economy and Changes in the Economic 
Environment 
The interviews reveal that conditions in the real economy and changes in economic 
environment affect lending practices of banks in every segment. There was general 
agreement that the majority of NPLs occurred from 1997 to 2002 when interest rates in 
Kenya were very high and economic growth was low and unstable.189 Furthermore, 
political instability, which affected certain sectors of the economy such as tourism, also 
led to high NPLs. A complete loss of market for a clients’ product due to structural 
change in the economy also leads to NPLs.  
 
“Economic downturn was mainly due to fall in tourism, drought and 
perception of Kenya as a pariah state. 8 years ago we had a large exposure 
to tourism. The political problems and clashes had a huge negative impact 
on our portfolio” - Interview Bank 3, LPOB 
 
“For example tourism went through a bad patch” – Interview Bank 6, 
SPOB 
 
“However in cases where there is a fundamental problem e.g. there is no 
market for the clients product, then, it is hard to restructure. For example, 
                                                 
189 Refer to Section 4.2.6 and Section 4.4 in Chapter 4 for details on the economic environment and 
trends during this period.  
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one of our clients, a bookstore that had KShs. 40million of stock became 
worthless when the syllabus changed” Interview Bank 5 – LPOB 
 
“From the point of view of the borrower the main reason for NPLs is lack 
of structured growth in the economy. Often their growth projections do not 
materialize, as the political environment is so unstable, that economic growth 
is also unstable. Furthermore our clients often complain about the high and 
fluctuating interest rates” – Interview Bank 7, SPOB 
 
In summary, conditions in the real economy and changes in these conditions affect all 
segments of the banking sector. However, it is also important to note that changes in 
the real economy affect the SPOB segment disproportionately due to the nature of their 
client - the small and medium sized enterprise and in particular, family owned 
businesses – that are less productive and more fragile.190 The size of loan is different for 
each of the segments with the average minimum corporate loan for FOB and GOB 
being KShs. 20 million, the average for LPOB being KShs. 10 million and for SPOB 
being KShs. 5 million. While the main corporate client for FOB and GOB are very large 
corporations including multinationals and companies quoted on the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange the clients of LPOB and SPOB are small and medium sized enterprises. The 
SPOBs interviewed stated that the majority of their clients are family owned businesses. 
It has been shown small and medium sized enterprises in Kenya have much lower 
labour and total factor productivity rates than larger firms and also much higher failure 
rates than large firms (Söderbom, 2001). 
 
Furthermore, the responses also highlight that banks recognize that information 
asymmetry between banks and borrowers does not mainly arise because the borrowers 
consistently hide information from the bank. Referring again to the quote above there is 
an appreciation that in some cases borrowers “growth projections do not materialise” and that 
the borrowers themselves operate in an uncertain environment. This discussion 
highlights that the concept of knowledge creation, is a more useful than simply 
information asymmetry to understand the lending relationship. Interviews confirm that 
the lending relationship involves a strong element of judgment on part of the bank 
                                                 
190 Using mean exchange rate in mid 2005 of KShs. 72.93 to the $, this is equivalent to approximately 
$274,200 for FOB and GOB, $137,100 for LPOB and $68,500 for SPOB. 
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about projections of economic and sectoral growth, as well as the validity of individual 
borrowers’ projections.  
 
6.3.2 Impact of Poor Legal System and Unreliability of Collateral 
The main reason for high non-performing loans that has been discussed widely in the 
mainstream literature is the poor legal system in SSA with insufficient enforcement of 
contracts and the inability of banks to recover against their collateral in case of default 
by the borrower (Daumont et al., 2004).191 The interviews confirmed that banks across 
all segments viewed this as a significant problem: 
 
“This is a really serious problem. In particular when judgements are given 
against us on really flimsy grounds. For example, you must have read in the 
newspaper that in the ruling of XXX we lost the case as the debenture 
document did not state the name of the lawyer who had prepared it on the 
top page as is convention” - Interview Bank 1, FOB 
 
“Legal problems are rampant even when disbursing the loan. Last year the 
government introduced new rules about land transfer. Now a land surveyor 
appointed by the Government has to go to property to confirm that the 
correct stamp duty is being paid. This has slowed down the process of 
putting a charge on a property dramatically. It takes over 6 months to get a 
security registered. Companies’ registry is also disorganised. There is also a 
lot of fraud. For example we recently perfected the security for a staff loan 
and yet later found out that the land belonged to someone else” – Interview 
Bank 2 - GOB192 
 
“However, even if the judgement has come in our favour, the client often 
appeals and wins in the appeal. On average cases take 4-5 years. However in 
some cases we have had cases going on for 7 years without resolution” 
Interview Bank 5 - LPOB 
                                                 
191 Also refer to the discussion in Chapter 2 on the law and finance school, which emphasizes the 
importance of protection of property rights for financial development.  
192 ‘Perfecting a security’ means the process of completing all legal documentation involved in the 
pledging of collateral by a borrower to the bank.  
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In line with existing literature, this study found that banks complained about 
administrative delays in the courts, problems at both the lands and companies’ registries, 
and corruption.  
 
It has been argued in the mainstream literature that: 
  
“Strengthening the legal framework will be crucial to improving the lending 
environment and reducing interest rate spreads. Legal reforms should 
include (i) reform of the Companies Registry to simplify registry procedures 
and allow for speedy and accurate information sharing of corporate 
information and data, (ii) reform and consolidation of the land registration 
framework to allow speedier searches as well as establishing more efficient 
mechanisms for registering and enforcing security interests over land and 
other real estate, (iii) strengthening and simplifying debt collection processes, 
including the introduction of procedures such as small claims procedures, 
summary procedures for uncontested debt, and alternative dispute 
resolution procedures, and (iv) institutional reform and training of judges. 
The combined effect of these measures would be to reduce credit risk for 
banks” 
Beck & Fuchs (2004) 
 
The crucial point to note here is that the issue of land in Kenya is extremely emotive 
and complex; highly intertwined in the process of capital accumulation and used by the 
state as a tool of political patronage (Johnson, 2003; Kanyinga, 2000a; Klopp, 2000). 
Therefore there are social, cultural and political reasons why foreclosure by banks is 
difficult (Shipton, 1992). “So touchy is the question of land auctions, that on more than 
one instance, they have been discontinued nationwide” (Shipton, 1992). While this 
point has been well recognized in the literature on micro-finance and rural agricultural 
land, it has been less recognized in relation to the formal banking sector.193 However, as 
we now discuss, the social and emotional aspects of the land issue affects the formal 
                                                 
193 For example, the World Bank’s “Doing Business Surveys” simply reduce the problem to one of 
‘number of days taken to register a property’ and ‘number of procedures’ necessary to register a property’. 
See http://www.doingbusiness.org/EconomyRankings/ and therefore ignores the social and emotional 
aspects of the land issue.  
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banking sector as well. In particular it is difficult for banks to sell land that has been 
pledged as collateral, in case of default by the borrower.  
 
In 1991, there was a Presidential Standing Order that prevented financial institutions 
from auctioning land first having this cleared with the provincial administration 
(Shipton, 1992). Similarly in 2003, the new NARC government introduced new 
processes on land transfers.194 The two specific processes affected banks significantly - 
first, the need to get a government valuer to verify the actual value of the land and 
assess the stamp duty and second block on transferring undeveloped plots of land. Both 
processes had laudable aims. The block on transfer of undeveloped land was a measure 
to reduce speculative acquisition of land and also quick transfer of public land that had 
been allocated illegally. However, in many cases undeveloped plots of land had already 
been pledged by borrowers as collateral for loans. The verification by a government 
valuer was aimed at ensuring that the government received stamp duty at a fair price. 
Before that, the properties were often sold at an official price that is below the actual 
price paid to reduce stamp duty payable to the government. However, the banks 
complained that the government valuers often inflated the price and would only reduce 
it after they had received a bribe. There was no formal appeal process to object to the 
valuation of the government valuer. These two processes have significantly increased 
the time for registration of properties. Furthermore, it has made it impossible for banks 
to recover against their collateral in case of default by the borrower in the cases where 
the collateral is an undeveloped plot of land.195  
 
In December 2004, the Government of Kenya released the findings of Commission of 
Inquiry into the Illegal / Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndungu Land 
Commission Report, 2004).196 It catalogues in extensive detail the illegal land awards 
made to the families of previous Presidents Kenyatta and Moi and other politically 
connected individuals. It highlights how the extensive illegal appropriation of public 
land was central to the formation and consolidation of Kenya’s political elite often on 
                                                 
194 NARC stands for National Rainbow Coalition - which was a coalition of parties that won the election 
in December 2002.   
195 Conversations with a prominent lawyer revealed that some banks had resorted to building a wall 
around the plot to indicate it was ‘under development’ before being able to sell it to recover on a non-
performing loan.  
196 This report has become popularly known as the “Ndungu Commission Report” after the Chairman of 
the Commission, lawyer Paul Ndungu. 
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tribal grounds (Ndungu, 2006; Southall, 2005). The Commission made several 
recommendations including the computerisation of land records, the setting up of a 
tribunal to review the illegal allocation of title deeds and if necessary the revocation of 
title deeds and the establishment of just land policy (Ndungu, 2006; Southall, 2005). All 
these actions are extremely difficult in light of the fragile political situation in Kenya, 
following the post election violence in early 2008. A recent report by a Kenyan think 
tank recognized that by mid 2008, very little action had been taken by the government 
on implementing the recommendations of Ndungu Report (African Centre for Open 
Governance (AFRICOG), 2008). Banks interviewed during this research reported that 
they had begun checking the Ndungu Report, and properties mentioned adversely in the 
report was no longer considered as suitable for use as collateral.  
 
The Commission also gives a historical perspective on the development of land law in 
Kenya that is worth reflecting on here. The land system in Kenya that developed under 
colonialism was based upon the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915 and in this the 
authority to allocate Crown lands was vested in the Monarch while direct power of 
allocation given to the Commissioner of Lands (Ndungu Land Commission Report, 
2004). At Independence, these colonial laws were adopted with only superficial 
amendments which meant that the powers vested in the British Monarch were 
transferred to the President of Independent Kenya (Ndungu, 2006). The aim of direct 
grant from the commissioner was to restrict access by African populations to the 
“White Highlands”. Therefore the system fulfilled the goals of the colonial 
administration, but had extremely detrimental effects on land allocation in independent 
Kenya: 
 
“[one of the] greatest ironies in the history of land allocation in Kenya, what 
appears to have succeeded in the colonial period (i.e. allocation by direct 
grant) is what later facilitated the massive illegal and irregular abandonment 
of public land by the Government after independence, for it was to be the 
very officials and institutions charged with being the custodians of public 
land who were to become the facilitators of illegal allocations”  
Ndungu Land Commission Report (2004 pp., 6-7) 
 
In line with mainstream literature therefore, this study found that poor legal systems 
affect all segments of the banking sector. However, the problem is much more complex 
than simply an issue of unstable property rights, or English vs. French origin legal 
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systems as characterised by the mainstream literature in particular the law and finance 
school.197 Kenya is one of the few African countries that at independence enacted 
individual title for tracts of indigenous land and also redistribution of parts of the ‘White 
Highlands’ (Southall, 2005), and yet significant problems remain.  
 
The Ndungu Report highlights the complexity and non-linear nature of institutional 
development and inter-linkages with the process of capital accumulation. Therefore, the 
policy suggestions of Beck and Fuchs stated above, which if put in place would 
undoubtedly lower the levels of non-performing loans, are contingent on the broader 
institutional development of the country.  
 
Furthermore, the unreliability of collateral means that social factors are extremely 
important in developing trust between banks and borrowers as will be described below. 
All banks interviewed stated that they only did unsecured lending to the very top clients. 
However even collateral based lending involves a reliance on social ties between bank 
and borrower for the bank to make a judgement on the likelihood of default and the 
reliability of collateral.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the literature on lending and non-performing loans in SSA 
focuses on macroeconomic problems, poor legal systems and poor regulation of banks 
across African countries and then moves into S-C-P analysis for single country 
studies.198 There is no empirical analysis on the reality of lending practices in the banking 
sector.  
 
6.4 Constraints to Lending – Fluid Social Factors and Inadequacies 
in Information Production and Monitoring 
The remainder of this chapter shows that the different segments of the banking sector 
face different constraints, in terms of the lending process and information collection. 
Many of these constraints are based on social factors and these explain the differences 
in non-performing loans between the segments. It should be noted that all banks in all 
                                                 
197 Refer to Chapter 2 for criticisms of the law and finance school.  
198 S-C-P stands for the structure-conduct-performance analysis discussed in Chapter 3. In summary, 
these studies argue that the poor performance of the banking system in Kenya can be attributed to low 
competition as a result of the high concentrated banking structure.   
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segments develop long-term relationships with their clients. In terms of length of 
relationship, there is no significant difference across segments, with all banks stating 
that they had long-term (more than five years) relationships with their clients. Therefore 
this cannot explain the differences in performance of loans between the segments. 
 
6.4.1 Information Production by FOB – The Benchmark 
The section begins by looking at the information production process used by FOBs. As 
shown in Chapter 4, FOBs have the lowest NPLs and are therefore used as the 
benchmark for information production.199 Furthermore, apart from FOBs, banks in all 
other segments expressed that credit manuals and procedures were inadequate ‘in the 
past’ and that the weak and in many cases undefined processes was a key reason for the 
high levels of non-performing loans. The FOB interviewed shared a copy of their credit 
appraisal of a client.200 The information contained in the credit appraisal is summarized 
in Table 23.  
 
Table 23: Information Collected by FOB - Benchmark 
Hard Information Soft Information  
Name of Client  
Total financing limit  
Introduction to the client  
General Economic Conditions  
Review of the Industry – Growth and Threats  
Market position  Strategy (the target market of the 
client, expansion plans, new 
products, investment plans) 
                                                 
199 Interviews also revealed that banks in other segments viewed the FOBs as having the best practice 
procedures in terms of information. While the information production practices of FOB are used as a 
benchmark, as emphasized in Chapter 4, we recognize that the experience of the Kenyan banking sector 
shows that the simple presence of foreign owned banks will not lead to improved credit allocation 
outcomes by other segments of the market.   
200 From the interviews the credit appraisal of this FOB can be viewed as representative of practice in the 
FOB segment.  
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Hard Information Soft Information  
Operating and Financial Performance (each of these 
was given a score in a model).  
Analysis of asset size, Capitalization, Liquidity, Cash 
flow analysis, Asset Quality including quality of 
debtors and creditors using age wise analysis, Types 
and diversity of Income, Review of Management 
Accounts 
Understanding any ‘tax management’ 
of financial accounts.   
Names of Shareholders  Ultimate beneficiary of the 
shareholding (because shareholding is 
often held in company name) 
Directors of the client and their qualifications Other directorships of the directors 
and whether they are ‘well regarded’ 
in the local business community  
Company Registration Check at companies registry to 
confirm registration of company 
Management structure  Previous experience of the 
management structure 
Auditors Reliability of the auditors 
Facilities with Other Banks Reference from other bank 
Collateral (Security) Check with land registry on collateral 
 
The main aim of the Table 23 is to show that even FOB, which have the most arm’s 
length relationships with their clients, rely heavily on soft information during the credit 
appraisal.201 In particular the reputation of borrowers or reputation of auditors can only 
be understood by the bank through embedded social networks. Furthermore, in a 
developing country where the company registry and land registry are not functioning 
well, checking the ultimate shareholder of a company or the validity of a title also 
requires, is not merely a mechanical process but a process that requires social knowledge.  
This table emphasizes the argument of Uzzi discussed in Chapter 5 that hard 
information and soft information are complementary. Furthermore, arm’s length ties 
                                                 
201 To reiterate the distinction between hard information and soft information that was discussed in 
Chapter 4 - Hard information consists of firm or project specific financial data from borrowers’ balance 
sheets and also industrial data. It is already in numerical form therefore easy to quantify, verify and 
transfer. Soft information is qualitative and based on ‘words’ including ideas, opinions and comments. 
Therefore by its nature it is difficult to quantify and is generated in the specific context of the bank-
borrower relationship and its use relies on some level of judgment. 
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and embedded ties are also complementary. This is in contrast to mainstream literature 
that emphasizes the superiority of hard information over soft information.  
 
Once credit analysis is done, the FOB had set approval levels given to each credit 
officer. The very largest loans had to be approved by the Regional Head Office jointly 
with the Board Credit Committee. The FOB also had in place monitoring guidelines 
including early warning triggers for NPLs.  
 
The process outlined above might seem a fairly ‘standard’ credit appraisal process by 
international banking standards. However banks in other segments (particularly LPOBs 
and SPOBs) are unable to follow this benchmark credit appraisal process due to several 
constraints, which are mainly social in nature, which we now discuss in detail.  
 
6.4.2 Lack of Credit Registry and References from Other Banks 
Theoretically, it has been argued that information sharing between banks will reduce the 
problems of asymmetric information and poor enforcement leading to higher lending 
and lower interest rates (Jappelli & Pagano, 1993). The interviews revealed that 
information sharing between banks is Kenya was very weak and banks from all 
segments found this a constraint. The banks complained that references from other 
banks were either unreliable or too vague to make any meaningful decision. The 
managers of FOB and GOB said that they were often able to get information through a 
‘silent network’ of staff in other banks that had worked for the FOB or GOB before. 
However, all LPOB and SPOB found this a big constraint.  
 
 “This is a major problem. Banks are self-centred and don’t want to share 
information. NPLs are a big problem and banks don’t want to go through 
process of selling a security etc. So they won’t mind if they can get another 
bank to send them a cheque. The official bank opinion hardly says anything 
substantial and comes with a big disclaimer. Banks hardly share information 
on an informal basis.” – Interview, Bank 3, LPOB 
 
The establishment of credit reference bureaus is a key policy tool pursued by the World 
Bank and the IMF to enforce the sharing of information and therefore improve the 
ability of banks to appraise credit (Honohan & Beck, 2007). This is based on cross-
country studies which show that access to credit is improved in markets where credit 
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registries are present (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002; Love & Mylenko, 2003). In Kenya, 
legislation for the establishment of credit reference bureau was part of the World Bank 
FSAP recommendations (Central Bank of Kenya, 2006a; Lumiti, 2008). The legislation 
was tabled in parliament in 2006 and passed as a bill 2008.  In 2009 the first company - 
CRB-Africa - was licensed to operate a credit reference bureau and it began operations 
in July 2010. As the credit reference bureau came into effect after the period of the data 
and interviews in this thesis it is very difficult to judge empirically the impact of the 
bureaus on access to credit. One unique study on retail lending discussing the impact of 
the introduction of credit registries in China finds that the registry did not reduce credit 
rationing on average but changed the way the bank used information. Borrowers who 
had both positive internal information (held with the bank) and positive external 
information (held with the credit registry) received higher credit card lines (Cheng & 
Degryse, 2010).202 
 
The interviews indicated that a credit reference bureau would be mainly helpful for retail 
and individual lending and less helpful for corporate lending. Banks in Kenya through 
the Kenya Bankers Association had also been lobbying the government to establish the 
legal framework to establish credit registries. Therefore, the author found this more 
nuanced view on credit registries very interesting. We have not seen any studies that 
attempt to understand the differential impact of credit registries on retail lending vs. 
corporate lending. However, we can conjecture that the reasons for the cautionary 
response to credit registries in the interviews are two fold. First, according the Kenyan 
Banking (Credit Reference Bureau) Act 2008, it is mandatory for banks to share negative 
information, for example default by a borrower, but optional for banks to share positive 
information. However, positive information for example on projected growth rates is 
essential for a successful corporate lending. Secondly, as said above, corporate lending 
requires a high level of ‘soft information’ that is extremely difficult to capture in 
numerical data in a form that is easy to transfer. This also enforces the theoretical 
concept discussed in Chapter 5 that hard information and soft information are 
complementary and that arm’s length ties and embedded ties are also complementary.  
 
                                                 
202 Emphasis added.  
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6.4.3 Over-reliance on Security Based (Collateral) Lending 
LPOBs and SPOBs recognized that in ‘the past’ there had been excessive reliance on 
security based (collateral) lending. Therefore a valuation of the collateral was carried out 
and then a loan based on a certain percentage - for example 60% to 80% - of the value 
of the collateral was given. There was not sufficient attention given to the expected cash 
flow from lending and the ability of the project to generate repayments and this 
contributed to the high level of NPLs. Refer to Table 22, Line 4.   
  
“Generally security is very important and in the past we relied on it a lot.” 
Interview Bank 6, SPOB  
 
“We also do cash flow analysis which we did not do in past.” Interview – 
Bank 7, SPOB 
 
Bank 6, SPOB shared two different credit appraisals with the author – an old credit 
appraisal which was used up to 2004 and a new credit appraisal which was used from 
2004 (refer to Appendix 18 and Appendix 19). Both credit appraisals refer to the same 
company but reveal stark differences. The old one carried out a simple ratio analysis and 
a list of the securities used for collateral. The new credit appraisal undertakes an explicit 
analysis of several risk factors including business risk, financial risk, management risk 
(including an analysis of ownership), structural risk (including an analysis of the business 
plan), security risk and account performance risk. Other key changes included asking 
clients for management accounts and not just audited accounts and being more diligent 
about visiting clients’ premises.  
 
6.4.4 Overreliance on ‘Name Lending’ and Change in Social Factors 
Table 22 also lists the ethnicity of the ownership of banks interviewed.203 There was 
recognition amongst LPOB and SPOB where the ownership was Asian-African, that ‘in 
the past’ there was an over-reliance on social factors or ‘name lending’ during the credit 
allocation process. Name lending refers to the process whereby the owners of the bank 
know the ‘name’ of the borrower as they were from the same community, and a loan is 
given purely on the perceived reputation of the borrower. This perceived reputation is 
                                                 
203 Refer to Chapter 4 for a detailed analysis of the ownership of banks in terms of ethnicity.    
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based purely on social factors. This was not seen a constraint amongst FOB, GOB or in 
LPOB where ownership was mixed.204 (Refer to Lines 5 and 6). There was an explicit 
recognition that community links that were used to get information on and monitor 
borrowers in the past had broken down over time and could no longer be relied on.  In 
general bank managers referred to communities becoming less tightly knit and therefore 
they were either unable to get information on borrowers or monitor borrowers using 
social networks: 
 
“There was also a generational change both among the bank owners and 
the borrowers. With new wealth people became less conservative and more 
aggressive.” Bank 5, LPOB 
 
“The way of lending has also changed. Name lending was possible in the 
past. In the past you could also do name lending very successfully. The 
market was very small; communities were very tightly knit; and whatever 
there was to know about a person you knew it. People valued their 
reputation above all else. Now due to expansion you cannot know everyone 
and also more than personal reputation, it is the company reputation that is 
important. The honesty of the olden days is not there. As late as 2003 we 
did some name lending to a very old customer who had been with our bank 
for many years. They borrowed 30 million and then absconded to the UK. 
It is hard to do lending based on trust now.” Interview - Bank 7, SPOB 
 
“We at that time had not stringent procedures. Certain groups were given 
loans out of trust. But some people abused this trust. We were sometime 
wrong in our evaluation of the family as the second generation was not as 
trustworthy as the first generation that we knew well. ” Interview - Bank 6, 
SPOB 
 
The reliance by Asian-African SPOB interviewed on clients from within the Asian-
African community also had a negative impact on non-performing loans when four 
Asian-African banks closed in 1998.205 Members of the Asian-African community lost 
                                                 
204 That is both African and Asian-African.  
205 These were Trust Bank, Reliance Bank, Bullion Bank and City Finance Bank.  
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their deposits in the closed banks and this had a knock on effect in terms of their ability 
of repay loans taken in other Asian-African banks.  
 
“There was also the impact of the closure of banks on several Asian-African 
families. Many Asian-African families lost their entire savings in Trust 
Bank.” Interview – Bank 5, LPOB 
 
The implication of this for economic theory is complex. It shows that credit relations 
are embedded in social relations and that the information asymmetry between borrower 
and lender cannot be captured solely through transaction costs. However, it also shows 
that within one system, social relations have differential impacts. As discussed above, 
this constraint was not a problem for FOB or GOB. Furthermore, with specific 
reference to the SPOB segment it shows that social relations change over time and in 
this specific case, the change in social relations had a negative impact on the asset 
quality of loans held by banks. It is useful to recall the discussion in Chapter 5 on 
embeddeness of social relations and the emphasis by Granovetter that when systems are 
based on trust created by social relations, distrust and opportunism are not absent.  
 
Though this thesis does not attempt to understand why these social relations changed 
for the SPOB segment, it points to the need for inter-disciplinary research.206 From the 
discussion above, it can be seen that relationship between Asian-African banks and their 
predominantly Asian-African clients reached a situation where informal social 
monitoring mechanisms broke down without formal monitoring mechanisms 
developing adequately to replace them. Anthropological and sociological research would 
be necessary to understand the reasons why social relations broke down. For example, 
theoretical concepts developed in sociology such as Giddens’ concept of modern risk 
societies would be useful to incorporate in future research. Modern risk societies 
necessitates increased level of trust in institutions away from personal trust; but are 
societies where traditional norms that allowed trust at personal levels are no longer 
relevant but have not been replaced with fully modern norms (Giddens, 1991). It would 
also be useful to carry out research similar to empirical studies from economic history. 
                                                 
206 Due to the hegemony of mainstream neo-classical economics, inter-disciplinary research has declined 
considerably in economics (Fullbrook, 2004). Also refer to discussions on the hegemony of mainstream 
economic methods in SSA research in Chapter 3.  
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For example as Grief(1993) which describes the existence of ‘multilateral punishment 
systems’ in 11th century Maghreb trade (Greif, 1993).207  
 
6.4.5 Unreliability of Financial Accounts (‘Hard’ Information) 
A key constraint faced by LPOBs and SPOBs was the reliability and accuracy of their 
clients’ financial accounts as these are usually ‘tax managed’ as depicted in Table 22, 
Line 3. ‘Tax managed’ is a euphemism for double accounting standards – where two sets 
of books are kept – one for reflecting the true position of the company and another, 
which is audited and used for tax purposes. The banks will only have access to the 
audited accounts and not the parallel set of true accounts. They generally use rules of 
thumb to assess to adjust to the accounts to get a ‘true’ picture. These adjustments are 
based on their knowledge of the client. While it is generally assumed that true position 
of the company is more profitable than the audited accounts, this assumption may not 
be true and makes credit assessment extremely difficult.   
 
 “All financial statements are tax managed so it is very difficult to get an 
accurate picture.” Interview – Bank 5, LPOB 
 
“Audited accounts are next to worthless but help to identify trends.” 
Interview – Bank 6, SPOB 
 
“50% of the times we are not comfortable. Most clients have 2 sets of 
books. They are very honest with us and say that they do not like paying 
taxes when the government is not delivering.” Interview – Bank 7, SPOB 
 
Due to the size of the clients of LPOB and SPOB, and the fact that the majority of 
these clients are family owned businesses, the problem of inaccurate financial statements 
is more acute. It should be noted that as ‘tax management’ will involve a large part of 
                                                 
207 Grief studies 11th-century Maghreb traders and the institutions used by them to employ overseas 
agents despite the information problems inherent in these relations. He shows that this system stable due 
to the existence of a ‘multilateral punishment system’ where failure to honour a contract with one 
member of a community is punished multilaterally due to loss of reputation and future restriction of 
business links with all other members of the community. It is possible only in very small tightly knit 
communities and furthermore this punishment system is seen as more effective than a purely bilateral 
punishment system in terms of reducing agency costs (Greif, 1993).  
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the company’s business being carried out in cash terms it is usually only possible in 
smaller, owner-managed companies. As said above the majority of clients of FOB and 
GOB are large corporations and the interviews stated that they did not consider this a 
problem.  
 
“Most of our clients are at top end of the market so generally we get good 
financial statements.” Interview – Bank 2, GOB 
 
Therefore even as banks in LPOB and SPOB segments make changes to their credit 
appraisal processes, the size and ownership pattern of their clients and in particular the 
fact that their audited accounts do not reflect the true picture, makes it difficult to rely 
purely on hard information to make credit decisions.  
 
However, banks in all segments supplemented the analysis of hard financial information 
from financial statements with other soft information to get a better understanding of 
financial statements and also improve their reliability. As said in Chapter 5, by its nature, 
soft information can only be accessed through embedded relationships or social 
networks. The most important soft information criterion was an explicit review of the 
reputation of the auditor. Bankers spoke of an unwritten list that set out in hierarchical 
terms the perceived reputation of the auditors. Again, it has to be recognized that this 
list is made purely on the judgment of bankers based on their personal and social 
networks with auditors. In Appendix 19 which is the new credit analysis template for 
SPOB, attachment no 3 entitled financial risk, has an explicit discussion on the name of 
the auditor and reputation of the auditor. Other soft information criteria included 
reviewing the conduct of the bank account, supplier checks, debtor checks and 
reputation of the borrower. This shows that soft information is still extremely important 
when making a credit decision and that hard and soft information are complementary. 
This is line with the work of Uzzi discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
Therefore, amongst Bank 6, SPOB and Bank 7, SPOB there was a transition from the 
non-formal ‘name lending’ based on social factors to the explicit use of soft information 
based on social factors in the credit appraisal process.   
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6.4.6 Lapses in Internal Control  
Across the segments, even amongst the FOB and LPOB that had good credit policies, 
lapses in internal controls were seen a source of non-performing loans: 
 
“Yes we have had cases of negligence on part of the relationship manager 
when it comes to monitoring. The main problem is that relationship 
manager becomes too close to client and even when there is no direct fraud, 
RMs tend to downplay downward trends. And not pay attention to obvious 
dangers” Interview – Bank 3, LPOB 
 
 “Of 12 big bad loans..[in]..about 8 or 9 there was misjudgement on part of 
the managers or a ‘willing suspension of disbelief’. Often it is not that the 
manager was colluding with the borrower but just that they have had such a 
long relationship that the manager just does not see what is happening. We 
have done a review of the bad loans and the main reason is always the same 
- the manager did not want to cut the losses. Just not willing to accept the 
clients are lying as you have had a long relationship with them.  They are 
scared of letting go of business.” Interview – Bank 4 - LPOB 
 
Again however, the reason for these lapses is social in nature – the Relationship 
Manager (RM) becoming too close to the client and being scared to let go of business. 
However, these problems are compounded for SPOBs due to the large overlap between 
borrowers and depositors in the SPOB segment (as will be discussed below). In SPOB 
there is usually one relationship manager dealing with both the borrowing and lending 
side of the relationship: 
 
“There is also the small bank mentality that we face. Small banks are averse 
to sending customers away. Because of the size of our bank we are often 
intimidated by our customers. Also because of strong relations it sometimes 
becomes tricky. It then becomes hard for the relationship manager to 
decline the demands of the client.” Interview – Bank 7, SPOB 
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6.4.7 Constrained by Image as Ethnic Bank 
There was a strong recognition amongst LPOB and SPOB, where the ownership was 
Asian-African that they were restricted by their image as an ‘ethnic’ or ‘community’ 
bank and also restricted within their client base which was not growing. Refer to Table 
22, Line 10: 
 
“Our strategy has been to move out of our image as a community bank. We 
are now a professional bank and therefore our image has changed within 
the market. Our growth strategy could not have been met by the traditional 
ethnic base and therefore we had to change our strategy.” – Interview – 
Bank 5, LPOB 
 
 “The average middle class African will always go for a big brand and 
therefore the international banks have a big advantage. However we are 
automatically branded with other Asian banks. We are trying to change our 
profile but it is difficult to overcome. We are not walking away from our 
traditional Asian client but broadening our client base.” Interview – Bank 6, 
SPOB 
 
Therefore, banks are not considering their traditional client base as their sole niche. 
However, in trying to diversify from it, banks are facing significant barriers in terms of 
perceived reputation based on their owners’ ethnicity. It should be noted that we are 
not arguing that the structural problems of the Kenyan banking system are because of 
poor race relations in Kenya. We arguing that social factors are key in building trust 
between banks and borrowers, and due to the colonial and post independence history 
of Kenya, ethnicity is a key factor on which perceived reputation is based.  
 
6.4.8 The Need to Educate Clients 
One of the most interesting results from the interviews was the recognition by LPOB 
and SPOB for the need to educate their clients who were small and medium sized, 
overwhelmingly family-owned enterprises: 
 
“Our customers also need to be educated. They think that when they come 
to us they will not have any problems. Of course that is true but we also 
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cannot tolerate everything. For example we have to educate them to call us 
before writing a cheque for which they don’t have funds but expect us not 
to bounce it.” – Interview, Bank 6, SPOB 
 
SPOBs also indicated that they had to educate clients on the importance of preparing 
management accounts, as it was not common practice amongst their clients. Bank 5, 
LPOB and Bank 6, SPOB, also indicated that it worked with clients on succession 
planning issues surrounding family businesses and Bank 7, SPOB also indicated that 
they attempted to help resolve disputes between family members as these made family 
businesses particularly prone to failure. Again, this highlights that the concept of 
knowledge creation is more useful than information asymmetry to understand the 
complexity of the lending relationship as it recognizes that both borrowers and banks 
are coping with uncertainties. It also highlights that different segments of the banking 
sector face clients of significantly different size and type.  
 
6.4.9 Regulation on Lending 
As stated in Chapter 1, this thesis does not go into depth on the role of regulation on 
bank performance and fragility. However, it is useful to briefly discuss the changes that 
have taken place in regulation with specific reference to lending. 208  It should be 
recognized that before 2000 there were very few prudential regulations in relation to 
lending and in particular provisioning for non-performing loans. For example, Trust 
Bank, which closed in 1998, had a non-performing portfolio of over 50%. It had a loan 
portfolio of approximately KShs. 10 billion and it was reported that 5.2 billion of this 
was non-performing (KPMG, 1999). However, the annual report of 1997 does not 
reflect this very weak position of the bank. The total provisioning in the annual report 
of 1997 is only KShs. 374 million (Trust Bank Ltd, 1997). This lack of regulations is part 
of the regulatory failure that has been recognized to contribute to the bank failures 
(Brownbridge et al., 2005).  
 
In 2000, the CBK issued Prudential Guidelines. The specific guidelines on lending are 
called “risk classification of loans and advances and provisioning for bad and doubtful 
loans and advances” circular no CBK/RG/10 (Central Bank of Kenya, 2000b). These 
give specific guidelines and when a non-performing loan must be classified as watch, 
                                                 
208 In Chapter 4 we discussed regulation in relation to capital requirements. 
177 
sub-standard, doubtful and loss; provisions for different categories of loans; guidelines 
on valuation of securities; the necessity of a tripartite meeting between the CBK, the 
bank and auditors before audited accounts are finalised; and the regular submission by 
banks to CBK of forms on the status of non-performing loans and insider loans 
(Central Bank of Kenya, 2000b pp., 134-154). It further states that provisions have to be 
charged through the profit and loss statement and not the reserves. It also provides 
strict guidelines on valuation of securities (Central Bank of Kenya, 2000b pp., 134-154). 
The new guidelines in 2006, updated the 2000 guidelines to specify that risk assessment 
by banks should be undertaken for all assets and not just loans (Central Bank of Kenya, 
2006b).  
 
Therefore, while these regulations will be useful to ensure that banks provide for non-
performing loans adequately and on time, the efficacy of the regulation depends on the 
ability of the CBK to supervise banks. The regulations do not resolve the constraints 
faced by banks highlighted above and do not necessarily improve the capacity of banks 
to make good lending decisions. Furthermore, regulations do not address the segmented 
nature of the market and the social factors that constrain banks in lending as discussed 
above. Therefore while stricter enforced regulation is necessary to prevent the 
accumulation of non-performing loans, it is not sufficient, as it cannot address many of 
the social factors that are the source of segmentation and fragility.  
 
6.5 Deposit Mobilization 
In Chapter 4 we showed that Brownbridge (1998b) briefly discusses the problems faced 
by privately owned local banks in mobilizing deposits due to adverse reputation. Besides 
this there is very little empirical work on the constraints faced by banks in raising 
deposits in a developing country context. For the remainder of the chapter we focus 
specifically on interview data on the constraints banks face in mobilizing deposits 
linking these to the theoretical concepts that we had developed in chapter 5.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the cost of funds for privately owned banks, in particular, 
SPOB are significantly higher than other segments.209 The aim of this short section is to 
understand the reason for this difference in cost of funds.  
 
                                                 
209 Refer to Chapter 4 - Table 21 and Appendix 15. 
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Privately owned banks, in particular, SPOBs face several economic problems when 
mobilizing deposits including the high cost of opening new branches and the high cost 
of introducing technology such as ATMs.210 However, they also face several social and 
non-price hurdles when raising deposits.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, perceived safety of deposits, and the trust of depositors in 
banks, is a key stage in financial development and it underpins the ability of a bank to 
extend loans (Dow et al., 2008; Lapavitsas, 2007).  
 
The lack of trust of depositors in all banks was highlighted in a recent article in a 
Kenyan newspaper: 
 
At a building along Nairobi’s Tom Mboya Street, all that remains of the 
former Rural Urban Credit Finance is a dusty signboard that doesn’t 
illuminate any more. More than 20 years after Kenya witnessed a wave of 
bank collapses; the safety of depositors’ money has always haunted the 
industry — as customers ask: How safe is our money in the bank?  
Irugu (2007) 
 
The banking system in Kenya is at a stage where the central bank is unable to fully 
guarantee financial stability of all banks. The maximum amount insured by the Deposit 
Protection Board Fund (DPBF) is KShs. 100,000 and in 2005 the coverage was 16% of 
all deposits.211 Therefore there are different levels (radiuses) of trust within ‘one’ banking 
system. This means that social factors have an even stronger impact on the ability of 
banks to raise deposits. FOBs are viewed as strong and safe as they have the backing of 
their foreign partner. Similarly GOBs are viewed as safe as they are invariably bailed out 
by the government in case of insolvency due to high levels of non-performing loans. In 
fact the GOBs stated that they had no constraints in mobilizing deposits.  
 
The interviews also reflected the change in social relations that was discussed in relation 
to lending above. In the past LPOB and SPOB relied on their community networks to 
raise deposits. Similarly, depositors felt comfortable with the owners of the banks as 
they often shared a long history of doing business with owners. This is reflected in the 
                                                 
210 Refer to Chapter 4 for details on number of branches for different banks.  
211 Author’s calculation from Central Bank of Kenya (2005). 
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view of a SPOB founder who describes how the initial deposits for starting the bank 
were received from people who trusted him and his family: 
 
“Initially it was easy to get money from people who trusted the family. 
These people have still maintained good deposits” (Bank 6, SPOB) 
 
“Our main strength was our family’s name. Just by calling people we were 
able to raise deposits” (Bank 6, SPOB) 
 
An article written in the national newspaper by an anonymous depositor of Reliance 
Bank after its failure also highlights how trust in the owners was key to securing 
depositors: 
 
“Their family had a long and trusted history in the Asian business community. 
When the two original directors opened their finance house, Lake Credit 
Finance, they had a good reputation and won over many depositors. After 
some time United Bank was in problems and two of the directors managed 
to pull out of this institution, making sure that the depositors did not loose 
their funds. This earned the two directors more respect within the Asian 
community. Then Reliance Bank came into being. The core directors 
continued visiting the above mentioned towns and secured more funds 
from depositors.” 
Anonymous Depositor (1999 pp., 9) 
 
 
However over time the close community links have broken down and both depositors 
and banks have had to form new strategies. Asian-African LPOB and SPOB view their 
reputation as ‘ethnic banks’ as barriers to growth.212  
 
“It is our reputation as an ethnic bank which makes it difficult to raise funds 
from the wider public” (Bank 7, SPOB) 
 
This perceived negative ethnic reputation is also reflected in articles in the Kenyan 
press: 
                                                 
212 This is also relevant for the discussion on lending as discussed above in Section 6.4.7.  
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“The managing partner of Ernst and Young, Mr. Waweru, said that there 
were multiple potential benefits to banks from merging…The small market 
in Kenya with banks providing traditional products with little innovation he 
said called for mergers. Further mergers could be used to dilute negative 
attributes like being identified with a group of people.” 
Nzioka (1999 pp., 11) 
 
It is also interesting to note that Asian-African banks are taking deliberate actions to 
reduce the effect of ethnicity on their reputation. Bank 5 LPOB, and Bank 6 and 7 both 
SPOB have recently hired British and African CEOs or Branch managers: 
 
“Yes, we are known as an Asian bank therefore it is hard to get African 
clients. The recent move to appoint an African as an MD when the former 
Asian MD resigned was a deliberate move to change the image of the bank” 
Interview – Bank 7, SPOB 
 
“Our Karen branch which is in a non-Asian area is now our best 
performing branch. We hired relationship managers who knew the market 
in that area – particularly non-governmental organizations and churches – 
and offered products that matched the customer profile in that area” (Bank 
5, LPOB). 
 
Referring to the discussion in Chapter 5, by institutional economists, these strategies can 
be viewed as non-price attempts by banks to signal their safety to depositors.  
 
It should be noted that LPOB that had a broader ownership base (Bank 3, LPOB and 
Bank 4, LPOB) did not express ethnicity as a constraint when mobilizing deposits. 
However, they did express that they were not perceived by the public to be as safe as 
FOBs. A senior staff member of Bank 4, a LPOB (both African and Asian-African 
ownership) commented that he still kept his personal account with a FOB even though 
the service was poor and interest rates very low, because he perceived them to be safe: 
  
“As a staff of Bank 4 I also bank with a large foreign owned bank. I know 
its crazy but personally I still have an account with them as they are seen as 
trust worthy. They give bad customer service, they are expensive and as a 
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banker I know I am giving them free money and yet I do it. At least I can sleep 
soundly”- Interview, Bank 4 – LPOB 
 
The interview also highlights that in terms of customer service the commonly held 
perception is that FOB and GOB provide comparatively poorer customer service than 
privately owned banks. LPOB and SPOB are perceived to provide more personalized 
and quicker service. However, their reputation for safety is much lower than FOB or 
GOB.  
 
In Chapter 1 we had discussed the costs of bank failures. We would like to argue that a 
key cost of bank failures that has largely been ignored by the existing literature is the 
reputation effect on surviving local banks. Failures of local banks have a knock on 
negative effect on other local banks as depositors move to larger foreign-owned or 
government-owned banks assuming that local banks are generally unsafe. Local banks 
suffer a reputational bias even if they are sound, further deepening the segmentation 
between FOB and GOB and local banks. There is evidence for this in other SSA 
countries - for example after Zambia experienced bank failures in 1995, the proportion 
of deposits controlled by the five largest banks (which were government owned and 
international banks) increased from 65% in December 1994 to 80% in December 1995 
(Maimbo, 2002). In Kenya, early accounts by a think tank indicated that the banking 
crisis of early 1980s led to a loss of confidence in locally owned private banks and a shift 
in deposits to longer established banks (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1986).  
 
Our interviews revealed that the closure of four Asian-African and several small African 
banks in 1998 led to a flight to safety by depositors to FOB and GOB. The closure of 
these banks had negative impact on the reputation of all private banks, in particular, small 
private banks and their ability to raise deposits.213  
 
“Failures of other small banks means all banks are perceived as fragile” 
Interview – Bank 6, SPOB 
 
“Our main constraints are misinformation and prejudice” Interview – Bank 7, 
SPOB 
                                                 
213The negative impact of the failure of other private banks on the ability of private banks to get good 
borrowers was discussed above.  
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Interestingly Bank of Baroda and Bank of India, which are subsidiaries of banks owned 
by the Government of India, have been the main beneficiaries of this flight to safety 
from Asian-African banks. These banks traditionally served Asian-African clients before 
the rise of Asian-African private banks in the 1990s. These banks were perceived to 
provide very poor customer service compared to Asian-African LPOB and SPOB but 
after the closure of Asian-African banks they were perceived to be safer. Figure 10 
shows that the growth rate of deposits of Bank of Baroda grew dramatically after 1997.  
 
Figure 10: Growth of Deposits of Bank of Baroda 
 
Source: Calculated by the author from financial statements of Bank of Baroda 
 
These interviews highlight that SPOB feel constrained in raising deposits by 
preconceptions of their reputation. These preconceptions are not based on a neutral 
financial analysis of an individual bank’s financial statements but based on a general 
view that depositors have of the segment in which the bank located. Asian-African 
SPOB banks interviewed felt that these preconceptions were unfounded as their capital 
ratios and liquidity ratios were well above the statutory norm.214  
 
                                                 
214 As discussed in Chapter 4, the capital and liquidity ratios of SPOB segment are above statutory norms.  
183 
In the mainstream literature it is argued that market discipline in particular monitoring 
by depositors is weak due to the opacity of financial statements.215 In this regard the 
CBK has introduced a regulation that makes it mandatory for banks to publish their 
annual and quarterly accounts in the newspaper with the aim of increasing transparency 
and knowledge among depositors.216 Analyzing the interview data, across the segments, 
FOB, GOB, LPOB, SPOB, there was consensus that quarterly publishing of financial 
data had not improved knowledge amongst depositors, shareholders or the general 
public.  
 
 “Even if people read them, they do not understand them. Really we have 
40 banks so market discipline should work as customers can vote with their 
feet. But in reality even in western countries, there is very little attrition as it 
is difficult to move banks.” Bank 3, LPOB 
 
“Only other banks look at these figures. General public don't look financial 
statements and even when they do, they don't really understand. People 
look international banks to seek for comfort. The depositors of smaller 
banks are mainly relying on the integrity of the owners.” Bank 6, SPOB 
 
“Only other banks read the reports. How many people would even 
understand one bank’s financial statement? How many would read 43?” 
Bank 9, SPOB 
 
This point emphasizes the extreme complexity of regulating financial institutions. As 
discussed in Chapter 1 it has been shown that supervisory bodies in SSA are extremely 
weak due to a combination of poor capacity and tendency for capture (Alawode, 2003; 
Barth et al., 2006; Brownbridge & Kirkpatrick, 2002; Brownbridge et al., 2005; Kagira & 
Kirkpatrick, 2001; Lleewllyn, 2005). Yet, there is evidence that regulation by the market 
                                                 
215 Market discipline is the 3rd pillar of the Basel II after minimum capital standards (pillar 1) and 
supervisory review process (pillar 2). Market discipline can be defined as “the influence that “outsiders” 
(that is stakeholders with no executive decision making power) exert on “insiders” (that is, the decision 
makers in the economic unit) that encourages value enhancing behaviour of the latter (Tsatsaronis, 2004). 
216 One of the instruments of market discipline is imposing more transparency, that is forcing forcing 
bank managers to disclose more information so market participants can make better judgements on the 
bank’s position (Rochet, 2004). 
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or market discipline has very little impact (Levy-Yeyati, Martinez Peria, & Schmukler, 
2004; Llewellyn, 2004). 217   
 
Finally, another important reason for the high cost of funds for privately owned banks 
is the large overlap between borrowers and depositors. The interviews revealed that one 
of the key differences between FOB, GOB and LPOB and SPOB is that the later have 
high overlap between borrowers and depositors. FOB and GOB stated that the overlap 
between depositors and borrowers is 2% and 5% respectively. LPOBs stated that the 
overlap was between 30-50% and for SPOB the overlap was 70-80%.  
 
In general, FOB and GOB raise deposits from all their clients including very small 
depositors, mostly middle class salaried individuals. However the bulk of their lending is 
to large corporate clients of LPOB and SPOB depositors are high net-worth individuals 
acting in their personal capacity. Their borrowers are the small and medium sized 
companies in which the depositor (or high-net worth individual) is usually the chief 
executive or main shareholder. This has significant implication for competition in the 
segment. As said in Chapter 5, scholars of business management including Porter (1979) 
recognize that the bargaining power of customers has a strong impact on the  nature 
and degree of competition in an industry. This concept is usually neglected when 
looking at competition in the banking sector where barriers to entry are simply viewed 
in terms of capital requirements or legislative restrictions on foreign ownership. The 
large overlap between borrowers and depositors in LPOB and SPOB segment means 
that their customers have much stronger bargaining power than customers of FOB and 
GOB. This is a strong institutional constraint is one of the key factors in understanding 
why FOB and GOB are able to enjoy much higher interest margins.  
 
In the case of Asian-African SPOB the overlay between their traditional reliance on 
depositors from within their ethnic group (discussed above) combined with the reliance 
on a few large depositors has led to them feeling extremely restricted. For example at 
the end of 2005, Bank 7, SPOB had a deposit based of approximately KShs. 3.5bn. 
However they had 10 to 15 depositors who each had KShs. 30 million or more in the 
bank. That is, approximately 8 – 12 per cent of their deposits were held with only 10 to 
15 depositors.  Asian-African SPOBs interviewed complained of being ‘held to ransom’ 
                                                 
217 This point is also useful in the context of shareholder monitoring and market discipline that will be 
discussed in Chapter 8.  
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by their clients who would shift large deposits to other banks very quickly if the SPOB 
was unable to match the deposit rate requested by the depositor.   
 
Interviews revealed the LPOB had taken distinct action to move above from this large 
overlap between depositors and borrowers.  
 
 “We have a fairly large overlap but it is reducing. In past we had a lot of 
back to back arrangements but now they form less than 15% of our 
lending” Bank 5, LPOB 
 
Banks in the SPOB segment were just beginning to move away from relying a few large 
depositors to several smaller depositors. Asian-African SPOB had also experienced that 
whereas in the past they could rely on liquidating individual depositors if that 
depositors’ company had defaulted on their borrowing, they could no longer do this. 
There were cases where the depositor had claimed in court that legally the company and 
his personal deposits were two separate entities.  
 
The discussion above shows the ability of banks to compete depends on the bargaining 
power of customers, as highlighted in Chapter 5, but more importantly this bargaining 
power is markedly different for different segments of the banking sector. Therefore in 
the case of FOB and GOB, the bank is the price (interest rate) setter and the depositor 
is the price taker. For LPOB and SPOB, it is often the depositor that is the price setter.  
 
The language used in the interviews in particular by SPOBs including terms like 
‘prejudice’, ‘intimidated’ and ‘held to ransom’ are extremely emotive and highlight that 
non-price and social factors have a very strong impact on the ability of banks to raise 
deposits and also monitor borrowers. 218 
 
It should be noted that small banks also pay punitive interest rates when borrowing 
from the CBK to cover gaps in daily transactions. It was reported in the press that a 
SPOB (which not named) had paid 6.75% interest to the CBK to cover a gap in daily 
                                                 
218 Mainstream economists would be extremely uncomfortable with this analysis as it draws conclusions 
from subjective feelings of the subject being observed. However, this thesis follows the methodology of 
realists who argue that stereotypes and subjective feelings of what is appropriate, deserved or in this case 
not deserved, even though malleable, are social and real and therefore have powerful explanatory powers 
(Olsen, 2008). In this case, both banks and depositors act on conceived stereotypes.  
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transaction of KShs. 63 million when the interbank market rate was 1.73% (Irungu, 
2010). 
 
The discussion in this section also highlights the inter-linkages between fragility and 
segmentation in the banking sector. Fragility of a few banks leads to negative reputation 
of all banks in the segment, which leads to higher cost of funding, which in turn makes 
them more fragile. Therefore, segmentation is both the cause of and a result of fragility 
in the banking sector in Kenya.  
 
6.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter analyzes qualitative interview data on the lending practices of seven banks 
in Kenya and endeavors to understand the main constraints faced by banks in lending 
and deposit mobilization. As stated in the introduction we had shown in Chapter 4 that 
banks in SPOB segment face relatively high cost of funds, low spreads, high NPLs and 
low ROA. This chapter has shown the intricacies of information production and social 
factors that explain this differential performance.  
 
The table below summarizes the previous chapters and compares the discussion in the 
current literature vs. the discussion in thesis in terms of theoretical concepts, reasons for 
high non-performing loans and reasons for high spreads. The table also summarizes the 
problems with the current literature.  
 
 Current Literature This Thesis 
Theoretical 
Concepts – 
Lending  
• Information 
Asymmetry 
• Structure-Conduct-
Performance  
• Development 
Envelope Analysis 
 
• Knowledge creation – bank and 
borrower creating knowledge in 
an uncertain world 
• Embedded relationships and 
social factors help develop trust 
• Arm’s length ties and 
embedded ties complimentary 
• Hard information and soft 
information complimentary 
• Social factors necessary to build 
trust but not sufficient to 
prevent breakdown in trust 
 
Theoretical 
Concepts –  
• Financial repression  
(low price) leads to low 
deposit mobilization 
• Stages of banking development 
- perceived safety of deposits is 
key stage in financial 
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 Current Literature This Thesis 
Deposit 
Mobilization 
development 
• Trust in a bank’s liabilities 
derives from the composition 
and quality of the assets 
• Difficult for depositors to judge 
quality of assets therefore rely 
on other signals from banks 
• Bargaining power of customers 
is important 
Reasons for Non-
performing loans 
• Summed up as ‘high 
transaction costs’ 
• Conditions in the real 
economy but viewed as 
‘external shocks’ 
• Poor legal systems 
viewed in simplistic 
way as stable property 
rights and English 
origin law vs. French 
origin law 
• Inadequate information 
production and 
monitoring by banks 
• Inefficiency due to 
highly concentration 
banking structure and 
lack of competition 
• NPLs  are different for 
different segments of the 
economy.  
• Different segments have 
different client type and size. 
• Conditions in the real economy 
and borrowers risk particularly 
important as developing 
country – affects all segments 
• Poor legal systems affects all 
segments, but complex story 
when collateral, in particular, 
land is emotive issue 
• Lack of information sharing 
and lack of credit registry 
affects all segments 
• Constraints on information 
production and monitoring 
specifically for LPOB and 
SPOB  
o Over reliance on collateral 
lending 
o Over reliance on name 
lending 
o Unreliability of financial 
accounts   
o Lapses in internal control 
o Constrained by image as 
ethnic bank 
Reasons for High 
Spreads 
• Inefficiency due to high 
concentration and low 
competition  
• Spreads different for different 
segments 
• Spreads linked to deposit 
mobilization ability of banks 
and not only efficiency 
• High spreads for FOB and 
GOB not because of 
inefficiency but because they 
have lower cost of funds as they 
are trusted by depositors 
• Lower spreads for SPOB not 
because of efficiency but higher 
cost of funds because they are 
not trusted by all depositors 
188 
 Current Literature This Thesis 
Problems With 
Analysis 
• Minimizes the role of 
borrowers’ risk 
• Only explains credit 
rationing and not 
excessive credit 
• Hard information and 
arms’ length 
relationships 
considered superior to 
soft information and 
embedded relationships 
• Very little empirical 
analysis of the reality of 
information production  
• Cannot explain 
differences within one 
banking system and 
segmentation  
• Barriers to entry viewed 
in very simplistic way in 
terms of minimum 
regulatory requirements 
• Very little focus on 
deposit mobilization  
• Difficulty in generalizing results 
for other banking systems 
 
So what does this mean for finance and development as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2? 
The key measures proposed by the current literature to improve the performance of the 
financial sector are:  
• Need to establish credit registries to encourage information sharing; 
• Need to improve legal infrastructure and develop creditor friendly environments; 
• Need to increase transparency to encourage market discipline; and 
• Need to increase competition through reduction in barriers to entry (often 
interpreted as reduction in minimum capital requirements) and spill-over effects of 
foreign bank entry.  
 
However, our discussion above shows that the story is much more complex. We have 
shown that: 
• Heterodox theoretical concepts such as of knowledge creation, importance of social 
relations in building trust, and stages of banking development are more useful than 
pure information asymmetry.   
• Within ‘one’ banking system there can be different radiuses of trust leading to 
segmentation of the system. 
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• Changing social factors have a pervasive effect on the quality of asset portfolio of 
banks and this impact is complex and not unidirectional. 
• To be able to effectively monitor clients, banks need to develop a mix of arm’s 
length and embedded relationships. Embedded relationships should not be 
discouraged by regulation.  
• Credit registries are useful but do not replace the need for banks to really 
understand their clients.  
• Hard information and soft information gathered by banks in the credit creation 
process are not substitutes but complementary. 
• The importance of the complimentarity of hard and soft information for banks’ 
credit application process reinforces the relevance of our methodological approach 
in which we use both quantitative and qualitative data.  
• Reputation is a key barrier for private banks to mobilize deposits.  
• There is little evidence that increasing financial information about banks in the 
public domain leads to an increase in monitoring by depositors.  
• Competition within segments is very high but it is very difficult for clients or banks 
to move between segments.  
• Segmentation is the result of fragmentation rather than specialization.  
• Segmentation implies that barriers to entry cannot be viewed simply in terms of 
concentration ratios but one needs to view the social barriers to entry.  
• Segmentation also implies that there are few positive spill-over effects of 
competition.  
 
The key point of this chapter is that segmentation is both a cause and consequence of 
the shallowness and fragility. In order to improve integration within the formal financial 
sector and reduce segmentation, there needs to be institutional arrangements for LPOB 
and SPOB to improve their reputation to allow them to compete with the FOB and 
GOB. Improvements in corporate governance are viewed as one way to improve the 
reputation of banks and this is the focus of the next two chapters.  
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CHAPTER 7 – THEORETICAL CONCEPTS ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RELATIONSHIPS 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter and in Chapter 8 we discuss the third important relationship in banking – 
the corporate governance relationship – that is the relationship between the bank and its 
shareholders.219 As a starting point, it is assumed that better corporate governance, 
through better monitoring of management, will translate into better company 
performance (Bruno & Claessens, 2007).  
 
In this chapter, we develop the theoretical background and discuss the debates in the 
corporate governance literature. In Section 7.2 we discuss general concepts and issues in 
corporate governance in particular the two models of corporate governance – the Anglo 
American and the Eurasian models. The debates on the links between ownership 
structure and corporate governance are discussed in Section 7.3. Specific board reforms 
and their impact on performance are discussed in Section 7.4. In Section 7.5 we engage 
with other studies on corporate governance in SSA. Corporate governance of banks 
with a special focus on the problems of insider lending are discussed in Section 7.6 and 
Section 7.7 provides concluding remarks.  
 
The main aim of this chapter is to show that there is very little empirical consensus on 
what constitutes ‘best’ corporate governance practice. It is precisely because of this lack 
of consensus that studies in corporate governance are critical to understand the 
domestic factors shaping increasingly liberalized financial markets (Singh, 2005).  This 
chapter forms the background to Chapter 8, where the ownership structures and board 
structures of the banking system in Kenya are analyzed and the impact of corporate 
governance regulation on actual practice is discussed.  
 
                                                 
219 Refer to research questions in Chapter 1, Section 1.1.5.  
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7.2 Corporate Governance: Concepts and Issues 
There has been increased interest in corporate governance after the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997 and the collapse of US energy giant Enron in 2002.220  Overall there has been a 
shift from looking at the macro-economic triggers for crisis to the microeconomic 
factors for crisis and the interest in corporate governance has been part of this shift 
(Glen & Singh, 2005).  
 
Corporate governance remains difficult to define. A narrow definition of corporate 
governance is that it is the mechanism through which shareholders are assured that 
managers will act in their interests. This narrow view is based on the now seminal work 
on managerial agency reflecting the potential for conflict between owners and managers 
(Berle & Means, 1932; M. C. Jensen & Meckling, 1976). A broader definition is that 
corporate governance is the mechanism by which suppliers of finance control managers 
in order to ensure that their capital is not expropriated (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). This 
view recognizes the debt and equity suppliers of finance have, differing order of claims 
on a firm in case of default and therefore differing appetites for risk and ultimately 
differing objectives for the firm. Furthermore, majority and minority shareholders may 
have different interests and therefore a wider definition of corporate governance should 
includes mechanisms through which agency problems amongst shareholders are 
reduced (Bruno & Claessens, 2007). Therefore, this definition of corporate governance 
incorporates legal mechanisms for investor protection of small shareholders.  
 
However, the high level of economy wide costs associated with large corporate failures 
has led to a vital debate - in whose interests firms should be run? (Becht, Jenkinson, & 
Mayer, 2005). It has been argued that there is a need for an even broader definition of 
corporate governance to include all stakeholders (Allen, 2005; John & Senbet, 1998).221 
This view, often referred to as ‘the broadest’ view, argues that corporate governance of 
                                                 
220 Before the Asian financial crisis of 1997 there were only a handful of studies on corporate governance. 
One of the most influential early studies was the Cadbury Committee Report on corporate governance in 
the UK which was published in 1992.  
221 The essential argument is that narrow definitions of corporate governance are based on the Arrow-
Debreu models and fundamental theorems of welfare economics. As described in all major 
microeconomic textbooks, in a perfectly competitive economy, profit maximization by firms will lead to 
pareto optimum allocation of resources. However, in reality the strong assumptions of these models are 
rarely met even in developed markets. Therefore corporate governance should be concerned with 
mechanisms whereby firms are run to ensure that society’s resources are used efficiently (Allen, 2005). 
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firms should be judged in terms of responsibility to society and not solely in the 
interests of the providers of finance (Allen, 2005). Following this broadest view, 
corporate governance can be defined as the design of institutions to ensure that the 
managements of companies act in interest of all stakeholders (Ayogu, 2001).  In the case 
of banks, where bank managers also have a fiduciary duty to depositors, and particularly 
when there is full or partial depositor protection by the state, this broadest view of 
corporate governance is the most appropriate. 222 
 
Studies of comparative corporate governance have highlighted that there are two basic 
systems of corporate governance – the Anglo-American shareholder-oriented model 
and the Eurasian stakeholder-oriented model (La Porta et al., 1998). Table 24 shows the 
differences between these two models.  
 
Table 24 : Comparison between Anglo-American and Eurasian Corporate 
Governance Models 
Indicators Anglo-American Corporate 
Governance Model 
Eurasian Corporate 
Governance Model 
Countries USA, UK, Canada and Australia Continental Europe, Japan and 
East Asia 
Market Capitalization High in relation of GDP Low in relation to GDP 
Sources of financing Mainly, stock market – ‘Market 
based system’ 
Mainly, reinvestment of earnings 
and bank credits - ‘Bank based’  
Character of Corporate 
Ownership 
Diversified ownership Concentrated ownership 
Main shareowners Individuals and institutional 
investors 
Families, companies, the state, 
banks and other institutional 
investors 
Structure of Board One-tier structure consisting of 
board of directors 
Two-tier structure consisting of 
supervisory board and executive 
board 
Composition of the 
board 
Board directors composed of 
executive and non-executive 
directors, at usual proportion of 
1:3 
Multi-interest supervisory board 
composed of representative 
shareholders, employees, banks, 
business partners, local 
                                                 
222 Concepts for corporate governance of banks are just beginning to be discussed in the literature and 
they are discussed in more detail below.  
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Indicators Anglo-American Corporate 
Governance Model 
Eurasian Corporate 
Governance Model 
government 
Committees by the 
board of directors 
Presence of several committees 
such as  nominating, 
compensation and audit 
committees  
None 
Other forms of control 
over the company 
External control – exercised by 
the stock market (market for 
corporate control and hostile 
takeovers) 
Internal Control – exercised by 
the company’s stakeholders 
Legal Protection of 
Minority Shareholder 
Rights 
Strong Weak 
Disclosure requirements Very Strict Not very strict 
Source: adapted from Dankova (2006) 
 
 This table is only schematic but highlights the link between different ownership 
structures and governance structures.223 Significant debates remain as to which type of 
ownership and control structures lead to improved management performance and it is 
to these debates that we now turn. 224   
 
7.3 Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance 
Ownership structure is seen as a significant determinant of corporate governance and 
performance. The literature that focuses on the relationship between ownership and 
performance of firms is extensive in the context of the East Asian financial crisis. 
Literature particularly from the World Bank and the IMF has argued that the East Asian 
                                                 
223 There are significant differences within each of these models, and each of these models have also 
evolved over time. In fact, this bimodal classification has been rejected by authors who argue that it 
hampers a true understanding of governance mechanisms (Heugens & Otten, 2007). However, their 
attempt to have a more fine grained classification based on five corporate governance logics – include 
organization design, ownership concentration, dispersed ownership, managerial empowerment and 
esteem responsiveness - still draws on the corporate governance concepts captured in the table above.  
224 The table also highlights the links between ownership structures and sources of financing – bank based 
vs. market based. It should be recalled from Chapter 2 that this debate is also unresolved in terms of 
which system is better for economic growth. 
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crisis arose from the nature of the ownership structure of East Asian businesses. The 
literature attempts to show that wide share ownership associated with the Anglo-
American corporate governance model should be considered as ‘best practice’. It is 
argued that highly concentrated ownership led to the development of ‘crony capitalism’ 
- where businesses are owned by a few large families with strong network of ties to 
between each other, politicians and bankers (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000).225  This 
‘crony capitalism’ led to large scale systematic failure: 
 
“The main lesson from the East Asian crisis is that it is important to take an 
integrated approach to the issue of corporate governance and financing. 
The poor system of corporate governance has contributed to the present 
financial crisis by shielding the banks, financial companies, and corporations 
from market discipline. Rather than ensuring internal oversight and allowing 
external monitoring, corporate governance has been characterized by 
ineffective boards of directors, weak internal control, unreliable financial 
reporting, lack of adequate disclosure, lax enforcement to ensure 
compliance and poor audits. These problems are evidenced by unreported 
losses and understated liabilities”  
      World Bank(1998, pp. 57) 
 
The ‘crony capitalism’ school of thought bases its arguments on corporate governance 
datasets that have been developed. One dataset examines the separation of ownership 
and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries. It is argued that 
concentration as a proportion of market value in the crisis affected countries of 
Indonesia, Korea and Thailand  (61.7 per cent, 38.4 per cent, 53.3 per cent, respectively) 
is higher than in the non-crisis countries of Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore and Taiwan 
(34.4 per cent, 2.8 per cent, 29.9 per cent and 20.1 per cent, respectively) (Claessens et 
al., 2000). This high level of concentration of wealth is compared to the United States 
where in 1998 the top 15 families controlled only 2.9 per cent of GDP. Though even 
here, there remains a debate – another paper uses a different measure of concentration - 
                                                 
225 “The concentration of corporate control in the hands of a few families creates powerful incentives and 
abilities to ‘lobby’ government agencies and public officials for preferential treatment, whether through 
trade barriers, non-market-based financing, preferential public contracts or other means. Concentration of 
control might also have been a detriment to the evolution of the countries’ legal systems. While we cannot 
document whether and through what channels crony capitalism has developed in East Asia, the large 
ownership concentration certainly raises the likelihood of it” (Claessens et al., 2000 pp., 109).  
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the cumulative ownership of the three largest shareholders among the top ten publicly 
traded firms world-wide and finds the ratio in USA as 20 per cent (La Porta et al., 1998) 
and concludes that, ‘dispersed ownership in large public companies is simply a myth’ (La 
Porta et al., 1998 pp., 1146). 226 
 
Glen and Singh (2005) raise several empirical weaknesses of this type of studies. With 
specific reference to the methodology of Claessens et al. (2000), they show that the 
robust association between concentration and crisis no longer holds when GDP rather 
than total listed corporation assets is used as the normalizing variable  (Glen & Singh, 
2005). Iskander & Chamlou (2000) have developed another data set based on the 
ownership structure of 20 largest firms by capitalization in 27 countries using 20 per 
cent threshold for control by  and not just East Asia as done in the Claessens et al. 
(2000) paper. Appendix 20 summarizes the findings of Iskander & Chamlou (2000). 
Using these findings Glen & Singh (2005) persuasively show that ownership structure 
throughout the world is extremely diverse and the Anglo-American model of diffused 
ownership are quite uncommon outside the UK and US. There exist several examples of 
countries such as Sweden where ownership of assets is highly concentrated but there is 
no hint of cronyism in the economy (Glen & Singh, 2005).227 
 
Furthermore, the ‘crony capitalism’ school of thought has been heavily criticized for its 
inability to reconcile the explanations for the rise and fall of East Asian economies. 
There is no clear explanation of why identical corporate governance practices were 
associated with both the rise and failure of East Asian economies (H.-J. Chang, Park, & 
Yoo, 1998; Glen & Singh, 2005; Singh & Weisse, 1999).228 Methodologically there is also 
a problem with the type of argument represented by the ‘crony capitalism’ school as 
‘crony capitalism’ is assumed to be negative and by definition ‘crony capitalism’ is 
prevalent when there are high levels of concentration. Therefore this school assumes 
rather than proves that concentrated shareholding leads to cronyism and failure.  
 
                                                 
226  The terms diffused ownership, dispersed ownership and widely held ownership are used 
interchangeably.  
227 In Sweden, the Wallenbergs, are believed to control 60 per cent of the country’s industrial assets (Glen 
and Singh 2005).  
228 As said above there are several contrasting views on the cause of the East Asian financial crisis but the 
main critics of the ‘crony capitalism’ school view the roots of the crisis in excessive and hasty and badly 
designed liberalization which led private sector firms to take on excessive debt (H.-J. Chang et al., 1998). 
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Therefore it can be argued that ‘crony capitalism’ arose from complex historical social 
and economic processes and is not necessarily linked to concentrated or dispersed 
ownership (Glen & Singh, 2005). It should be noted that the East Asian model of 
governance is similar in many respects to the European model of governance.  The 
European model is also seen to arise out of the historical process of European social 
consciousness and tradition of co-operation between society, entrepreneurs and the 
state (Dankova, 2006). The ‘traditional’ Japanese corporate governance model has its 
roots in ‘corporate hegemony’ that evolved in Japan after the second World War, 
whereby management and labor each implicitly deferred their individual advantage for 
the benefit of the firm (Gordon, 1998). The Anglo-American model also arises from 
historical process and is underpinned by the notion, prevalent in the US in particular, 
that pursuit of individual interest will lead to optimum outcomes for society, and a 
general suspicion of the concentration of power (Dankova, 2006).   
 
Country specific studies highlight the extremely complex nature of the relationship 
between ownership and the performance of a company. In a study of quoted companies 
in Thailand from 1996 – 2000, performance is measured in terms of debt/ equity ratio, 
return on assets and return on equity. 229 The study shows that post crisis, family owned 
firms performed the best.230 This leads the author to argue that: 
 
 “..contrary to the traditional argument in favor of the model of good 
corporate governance, the group of corporations with no ultimate owners 
has always shown the worst business record among surveyed listed 
companies in Thailand.”   
   Suehiro (2001 pp., 12) 
 
The lack of consensus on the impact of ownership on performance should not come as 
a surprise, as even theoretically it is very difficult to make a priori judgements as to 
which ownership structures lead to better resolution of agency problems between 
ownership and management, and therefore to better outcomes in terms of performance 
of the firm. This is shown in the Table 25 below which is drawn from Levine (2004). It 
                                                 
229 In the study, a debt/ equity ratio of 1 is seen as desirable (Suehiro, 2001). 
230 The study uses five categories of firms - family owned firms, semi-family owned firms, Thai private 
widely owned firms, foreign owned  firms and Thai state owned firms (Suehiro, 2001). 
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shows that each corporate governance mechanism to resolve agency problems has 
strengths and weaknesses.   
 
Table 25 : Theoretical Links between Ownership Structure, Governance 
Mechanisms and Weaknesses in Mechanisms 
Ownership 
Structure 
Corporate Governance Mechanism Weakness in Mechanism 
Diffused 
Shareholding (many 
small shareholders). 
Control through voting rights and 
election of board of directors. External 
control through threat of takeover.  
Lack of expertise, high cost of 
monitoring directors and 
managers and ‘free-rider’ 
problems 
Weak legal codes protecting 
minority rights  
Concentrated 
Shareholding (few 
large shareholders).                                                                               
Have high incentives to collect 
information and monitor management 
and higher likelihood of electing
directors who serve shareholders 
interests 
Have incentive to maximize 
private benefit relative to 
minority shareholders 
Source: Adapted from Levine (2004) 
 
Therefore, while the resolution of the agency problem between owners and managers 
remains a critical factor in the performance of a company, it is difficult to specify, a 
priori, which ownership structures lead to improved performance.  
 
It is also important to recall that the Anglo-American model of corporate governance 
emphasizes first, the role of the stock market and hostile takeovers as an external 
monitoring mechanism on management (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) and second, the ‘law 
and finance school’ emphasis of the need for strong property rights and rule of law to 
protect minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1998, 2000). Putting aside the significant 
arguments that are critical of both these arguments (Armour et al., 2008; Singh, 1992; 
Singh & Zammit, 2006), it has to be recognized that countries that attempt to establish 
codes of best practice based on the Anglo-American model of governance may not have 
a well developed market for corporate control or strong protection of minority 
shareholder rights.231   
 
                                                 
231 Refer to Chapter 2 for these debates.  
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7.4 Board Structure and Corporate Governance 
The other major area of research in the corporate governance literature is concerned 
with board reform. The board is the key decision making body in a corporation and 
recently there have been an increased number of regulations related to the structure and 
conduct of boards and guidelines for directors (Becht et al., 2005). Board reforms can 
be categorized into three main areas: (i) reforms that constrain board discretion, by 
making boards more responsive to shareholder power and also giving gatekeepers such 
as external auditors more responsibility and influence; (ii) reforms to strengthen board 
independence including giving more responsibility to external directors; (iii) reforms that 
change directors’ incentives that increase personal reputation and liability risk.232 
 
It should be noted that the reforms are based on perceived best practice, yet there is 
little consensus on the link between board reform and firm value. We now consider 
some of this empirical work. This empirical work is largely related to the second 
category above, that is, reforms to give boards more independence from management. 
These studies can be grouped into four main aspects:- (i) reduction on board size, (ii) 
board independence and (iii) board committee structures and (iv) CEO duality.   
 
7.4.1 Board Size 
The large size of boards is seen as a limit on board effectiveness. The two main causes 
for this is that large size prevents meaningful dialogue amongst directors (Lipton & 
Lorsch, 1992) and large size boards are easier for the CEO to control (M. Jensen, 1993).  
Smaller boards are seen to provide stronger incentive for lower CEO compensation and 
stronger threat of CEO dismissal (Yermack, 1996). Some empirical studies have found 
evidence that smaller boards lead to better firm performance. For example, in a study of 
452 US corporations between 1984 and 1991 it was found that the market valuation as 
measured by Tobin’s Q had an inverse relationship with board size when the board size 
was between 4 – 10 members (Yermack, 1996). 233  However, the study does not 
                                                 
232 These reforms are meant to increase personal risk for the directors in case of company failure to 
ensure that they take their responsibilities as a director seriously.  
233 A ratio devised by the economic analyst James Tobin of Yale University to measure the impact of 
intangible assets on business value. It is the ratio of the market value of a business to the replacement cost 
of its assets (Smullen & Hand, 2005). It is measured by year-end capitalization divided by the book value 
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explicitly show that the mechanism for poor performance of big boards is higher CEO 
compensation or lower threat of CEO dismissal.  
 
A recent attempt at modeling the optimum board size uses a game theory framework 
(Raheja, 2005). The optimum board size is one that is most likely to reject ‘a bad project’ 
proposed by the CEO. This is a limiting assumption as in the real world, a CEO is 
unlikely to offer two starkly different choices to the board - good project or bad project, 
but rather to offer projects that may for example, be good in the short run but bad in 
the long run or not be fully cognisant of best strategy for the firm.234 Nonetheless, the 
model by Raheja (2005) is interesting as it recognizes that the optimum size of the board 
can vary with firm and industry specific characteristics.235  
 
The lack of conclusive empirical or theoretical evidence from these studies point to the 
need for research to move away from empirical studies that simply attempt to link 
smaller board size with improved overall performance to studies that focus on how 
boards work and how they actually motivate and discipline CEOs.    
 
7.4.2 Board Independence 
It has been argued the ‘outside’ or ‘non-executive’ or ‘independent’ directors are more 
likely to act in shareholders’ interests compared to ‘inside’ or executive directors as they 
do not have incentives to collude with internal managers to expropriate shareholders 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Monks & Nell, 2004). This argument is based on the view that 
outside directors often work as directors of several organizations therefore they would 
like to build their reputation as experts (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This view has proved 
extremely popular in American boardrooms and the ratio of inside directors has fallen 
from 38 per cent in 1973 to 25 per cent in 1993 (Monks & Nell, 2004). 
                                                                                                                                          
of assets. And the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt divided by the book 
value of total assets. 
234 Drawing on the arguments in Chapter 5 which emphasized that the information asymmetry between 
lender and borrower should not be understood in terms of the borrower having perfect information 
which is purposely hidden from the lender(Dow, 1998), it can be argued that it is false to assume that the 
CEO always has perfect information which he is trying to hide from the board.  
235 In the model competitive industries and firms with highly concentrated ownership, require smaller 
boards as the incentives of management, CEO and executive directors are more closely aligned to 
shareholders (Raheja, 2005). 
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This view of outside directors as acting more closely in line with shareholders’ interests 
has been questioned on several grounds. First, it is observed that non-executive 
directors rarely blow the whistle on mismanagement by executives (Morck, 2007). By 
using work in social psychology, it is argued that humans have an innate predisposition 
to obey authority and therefore do not always act in a optimal way even though they do 
not personally gain by supporting an errant CEO (Morck, 2007). Very often 
independence can also mean indifference and in general boards are more reactive than 
proactive (Monks & Nell, 2004). Secondly, while non-executive directors are 
independent of the CEO, it is the executive or inside directors that have more 
information and therefore their exclusion from the board can be detrimental to the 
performance of the company (Raheja, 2005). Therefore it is argued that in industries 
where it is easy for the shareholder to verify information such as grocery chain stores, a 
higher proportion for outside directors may be appropriate. However in industries 
where it is difficult to verify information such as in high tech firms, a higher number of 
inside directors may be optimal (Raheja, 2005).236   Thirdly it can also be questioned 
whether non-executive directors are truly independent as they many have hidden 
financial and personal ties to the CEO (Morck, 2007). 
 
Empirical studies on the relationship between firm performance and the proportion of 
non-executive directors on the board also give mixed results. One of the main reasons 
for this is that it is very hard to separate the impact of executive directors and non-
executive directors in firm performance.  The studies discussed here are all based on US 
firms. There is some evidence that independent directors perform better in certain 
specific tasks such as replacing the CEO. It is found that in firms with a higher 
proportion of outside directors there is a strong correlation between poor performance 
and CEO turnover but that this correlation is not observed in firms with higher 
proportion of inside directors (Weisbach, 1988). Also the presence of outside directors 
is seen to be helpful during takeover bids. It is found in a study of 128 takeover bids 
from 1980-1987, that bidding firms stock returns are higher when there are at least 50 
per cent independent directors on the board (Byrd & Hickman, 1992). However, even 
                                                 
236 This paper is very interesting as it highlights that different types of boards may be suitable for different 
industries. However, the model itself is based on very limiting assumptions such as the only reason why 
insider board members would reveal information to outside board members is to gain favour for future 
CEO positions.  
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studies that find positive relationships between independent directors and performance 
state that the relationship is not linear and there can be situations with ‘too many’ 
outside directors (Byrd & Hickman, 1992). The study by Yermack discussed in the 
previous section on board size finds a negative correlation between independent 
directors and firm performance when Tobin’s Q is used as a measure of performance, 
but no correlation when other measures of performance are used (Yermack, 1996). One 
study which focuses on the overall performance of 934 large firms from 1985-1995 
finds no correlation between independence of boards and profitability (Bhagat & Black, 
2002). They also find that while poorly performing boards often change strategy and 
adopt more independent directors, this strategy does not lead to improved profitability 
(Bhagat & Black, 2002).  
 
Interestingly, reforms of corporate governance in Japan which have attempted to force 
companies to adopt outside directors have been rejected by some of the most profitable 
Japanese companies such as Canon (Buchanan & Deakin, 2007). As we will discuss in 
Chapter 8, reforms of corporate governance that do not take into account country 
specific ownership structures and practices may not achieve the intended consequences.  
 
In summary, the evidence on the impact of outside directors on firm performance is 
very mixed and likely to depend on a variety of company, industry and country specific 
characteristics and also the skill levels and integrity of directors.  
 
7.4.3 CEO / Chairman Duality 
As discussed above the board is the device through which shareholders control 
management. The questions of whether the Chairman of the board and the CEO should 
be one person, or whether the role should be separated is another debate in the 
corporate governance literature. It has been argued that the role of the Chairman and 
CEO should be separate with the CEO having control of overall day-to-day 
management and the Chairman playing a non-executive role as head of the board. It is 
argued that giving these two powerful positions to one individual is detrimental to 
company performance due the domination of a single individual over the company and 
also a lack of separation of decision management and decision control (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). Furthermore as a key function of the Chairman is to oversee the evaluation of 
and compensation for the CEO, if the position is vested in one person the CEO will 
202 
always act in his personal interest or will have excessive power over the committee that 
sets compensation (M. Jensen, 1993).  
 
However, empirical studies on the actual value to the firm of separating the role of the 
CEO and Chairman are again mixed.  The separation of the role of chairman and chief 
executive was one of the key recommendations of The Cadbury Committee Report 
which was published in the UK in 1992. Studies looking at the impact of compliance to 
the Cadbury report found that between 1988 and 1993 the number of quoted 
companies that had separation of the role of the Chairman and the CEO had increased 
from 58 per cent to 77 per cent (Dedman, 2002). The paper showed that separation of 
the CEO and Chairman role increased board oversight with respect to the manipulation 
of accounting numbers but there was no empirical evidence of an association between 
separation of the roles and overall firm value (Dedman, 2002). Furthermore, even 
companies that had a dual CEO/Chairman role, there was a failure to dismiss CEO’s 
for poor performance particularly when CEO’s were entrenched in the company with 
high levels of share ownership (Dedman, 2002). However, the study mentioned above 
on the US, showed a positive correlation between Chair/ CEO separation and firm 
value (Yermack, 1996).  
 
7.4.4 Committee Structure of Boards 
Codes of best practice of corporate governance stress the need for board committees as 
formal structures to ensure governance. Therefore boards are now required to have 
audit, nomination and compensation committees. It is recommended that these 
committees have at least one non-executive director to ensure independence. However, 
empirical studies on whether such a committee structure leads to improved performance 
are scarce. A recent study of 23 countries finds that existence and independence of 
board committees is positively and significantly associated with performance of firms 
(Bruno & Claessens, 2007). Though the same study highlights that the benefits of 
corporate governance measures are more valuable for large companies that rely on 
external finance (Bruno & Claessens, 2007).237 In summary, again it is difficult to specify 
a priori that committee structures will lead to improved performance of firms.  
                                                 
237 The study uses data on 5300 US companies and 2400 other companies from 22 advanced economies 
for the period 2003-2005. Performance is measured by Tobin’s Q and return on assets. All the criticisms 
of large cross-country studies discussed in Chapter 2 also apply to this study.  
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In summary board reform has involved four main aspects - (i) reduction of board size, 
(ii) board independence and (iii) CEO / Chairman duality and (iv) board committee 
structures.  This section has shown that theoretically the argument for reducing board 
size is mixed but the theoretical arguments for the other three reforms are fairly strong. 
However, empirically there is very little consensus on the impacts of each of these 
measures on firm value.   
 
7.5 Corporate Governance in Africa 
We now discuss studies that attempt to understand corporate governance practices in 
SSA. There are only a handful of studies of corporate governance in Africa. This section 
discusses in detail 4 papers – Ayogu (2001), Sanda et al. (2005), Kyereboah-Coleman 
(2007) and Sanda et al. (2007).  
 
One of the earliest studies Ayogu (2001), is important as it recognizes the conceptual 
developments in governance theory. It discusses in detail the importance of change in 
focus from pure shareholder theory to stakeholder theory. In terms of empirical 
analysis, it focuses on 2 key measures – average board size and separation of the roles of 
CEO and chairperson. Table 26 summarizes the empirical analysis of  Ayogu (2001).  
 
Table 26 : Average Board Size and Separation of CEO / Chairperson Role in SSA  
 Botswana Ghana Kenya Mauritius Nigeria South 
Africa 
Zambia 
National 
Average 
Board Size 
10 9 10 10 9 8 9 
Modal 
Board Size 
12 7 7 9 10 4 8 
CEO as 
chairperson 
NA 5 (23) 5 (54) 2 (43) NA  NA NA 
Source: Ayogu (2001) 
 
Notes:- 
1) NA means not available 
2) 5 (23) means that 5 of 23 firms combine the positions. 
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The analysis by Ayogu of data presented in Table 26 is then based on the study 
mentioned above - Yermack (1996) - which found an inverse correlation between board 
size and market valuation and that market valuation is higher for firms that separate the 
role of the CEO and chairperson.238  It is therefore argued that in terms of board size, 
“South Africa is the only country with a good record on this criterion” (Ayogu, 2001), as 
it has a modal board size of 4. This inference is highly problematic as the ‘ideal’ board 
size is based on a study of 452 large U.S. industrial corporations between 1984 and 1991 
(Yermack, 1996) and therefore not comparable to African companies. There is no 
attempt to understand the link between board size and firm performance for the African 
countries that are being studied. In reference to data on separation of the position of 
CEO and chairperson the study recognizes that in Nigeria and South Africa, the 
position is combined in some of the largest corporations. In particular Anglo and Old 
Mutual - which formed 34 per cent of the valuation of all companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 1997 - combined the position of CEO and chairman. 
Therefore, the author presents evidence that shows that corporate governance practices 
in SSA diverge from the Anglo-American model but does not explain whether this 
divergence leads to positive or negative effects on firm performance.  
 
The second study by Sanda et al. (2005) considers the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on performance of firms in the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The mechanisms 
of corporate governance considered by the paper are:- insiders’ or directors 
shareholding; the presence of outside directors; size of the board; ownership 
concentration; debt levels; separation of Chairperson and CEO and the presence of an 
expatriate CEO. Table 27 summarizes the main theoretical explanations, measurement 
used and conclusions of this paper. It is interesting to note that contrary to views of the 
Anglo-American model of governance, in this paper ownership concentration is 
assumed to be positively related to firm performance.  
 
                                                 
238 The paper quoted John & Senbet (1998) but that paper relies on findings from Yermack (1996).  
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Table 27 : Impact of Corporate Governance Measure on Firm Performance in 
Nigeria from 1996 - 1999 
Variable Theoretical 
Explanation 
Measurement Expected 
Relationship 
With Firm 
Performance 
Relationship Found 
Insider 
Shareholding 
To motivate 
directors to act 
in shareholders’ 
interest.  
Total number of 
shares owned by 
directors of a 
given firm a 
percentage of the 
outstanding shares 
of the firm 
Positive or U 
shaped 
U shaped relationship 
Outside 
directors 
To monitor 
management 
Proportion of 
outside directors 
on the board 
Positive Not significant 
Size of board Need to keep 
small 
Number of 
directors on the 
board 
Negative Mixed results. Some 
equations show 
positive relationship 
and some show U 
shaped relationship 
(10 person ideal) 
Ownership 
Concentration 
To encourage 
monitoring by 
shareholders 
The proportion of 
shares owned by 
the largest 
shareholders 
divided by the 
number of largest 
shareholders 
Positive U shaped  
Leverage To encourage 
monitoring by 
debt holders 
Ratio of debt to 
share capital 
Positive Positive and 
significant 
Separation of 
CEO and 
chairman 
To encourage 
monitoring of 
CEO 
Role of CEO if 
separate from 
chair 
Positive if 
separate 
Positive and 
significant 
Expatriate 
CEO 
Reason not 
explicit  
A firm that has 
foreign CEO 
Not stated Positive and 
significant 
Source: Sanda et al. (2005) 
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The study has several weaknesses.  Firstly, the study uses pooled OLS regression with 
data from 1996 – 1999 rather than panel data analysis.239 Pooled OLS regression is 
generally used when one is trying to look for the impact of change between two periods 
(Wooldridge, 2006). Therefore, panel data estimators would have been more 
appropriate. Secondly, while the study uses 4 different ratios of firm performance – 
return on assets, return on equity, Tobin’s Q and the price/equity ratio (Sanda et al., 
2005), the results are generally only meaningful for the Tobin’s Q measure. 240 The 
authors argues that this is due to other measures being subject to ‘accounting artefacts’ 
(Sanda et al., 2005 pp., 30). This is not entirely convincing as Tobin’s Q would also be 
subject the same accounting issues as it includes a measure of the total book value of 
assets and debt. It also raises the question of what is the best measure of firm 
performance when a company is not quoted and therefore Tobin’s Q cannot be 
calculated. Furthermore, the study does not acknowledge that this is quite a common 
problem with econometric studies on firm performance including the one discussed 
above by Yermack (1996). Thirdly, data on ownership concentration is not available and 
a crude estimate was made by dividing the proportion of shareholding owned by the 
largest shareholders, divided by the number of the largest shareholders.  
 
Notwithstanding these issues, the authors draw some interesting conclusions. The 
authors find the ideal board size in Nigeria to be 10 - which is relatively large compared 
to the studies on US firms.241 This emphasizes the point made above that board size is 
dependent on industry and country specific factors. One of the surprising results for the 
authors is that independent directors do not have a significant impact on performance. 
The authors argue that this is because the outside directors are not independent enough. 
They suggest that there is therefore a “need for regulatory authorities to reassess the 
procedures for the appointment of outside directors in order to remove the influence of 
CEOs from the appointment process” (Sanda et al., 2005  pp., 30). However this may 
be an indication of lack of skills of outside directors. The study also finds that 
companies run by expatriate CEOs perform better than firms run by Nigerian CEOs. 
They attribute this to the tendency for foreign CEOs to have better skills than local 
                                                 
239 This weakness has been recognized by the authors though it is not clear why they have not addressed it.  
240 See definition of Tobin’s Q above.  
241 They find the optimal board size by including a term for square of board size and taking partial 
derivatives and solving for optimal values.  
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CEOs. This area would have greatly benefited from qualitative research that have shed 
light on the independence and skill level of outside directors.  
 
The third paper, Sanda et al.  (2007), is by the same authors, who carry out another study 
focusing solely on board independence and firm performance in Nigeria with updated 
data from 1996 to 2004. 242  
 
Table 28 summarizes the results of this study.  
 
Table 28 : Impact of Board Independence on Firm Performance in Nigeria from 
1996 – 2004 
Variable Measurement Expected 
Relationship With 
Firm Performance 
Relationship 
With Firm 
Performance 
Measured As 
RoA 
Board Size Number of directors  Control variable  
Board Size 
Squared 
Variable created by the square of 
number of directors 
Control Variable  
Firm Size Asset Size Control Variable  
Family 
Affiliation 
Dummy created with value of 1 if 
owners or family members are 
directors of the board and 0 if 
otherwise 
Negative Not Significant 
CEO Tenure Dummy created which takes value 
of 1 if CEO tenure more than 
average and 0 if CEO tenure less 
than average in the sample 
Postive – as poorly 
performing CEOs 
should be fired 
Negative 
CEO foreign Dummy variable value 1 if CEO is 
foreign national and 0 if CEO is 
citizen 
Positive Positive and 
Significant 
                                                 
242 The number of firms in 1996 – 1999 study was 139 while in the 1996 - 2004 study the sample was 204 
firms.  
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Variable Measurement Expected 
Relationship With 
Firm Performance 
Relationship 
With Firm 
Performance 
Measured As 
RoA 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Measured by proportion of shares 
held by controlling shareholders 
divided by number of shareholder. 
Dummy created with value of 1 if 
this ratio is above average and 0 if 
this ratio is below average 
Negative, as interests 
of minority 
shareholders ignored 
No relationship 
CEO Audit 
membership 
Dummy 
A dummy variable taking a value 
of 1 if CEO is member of audit 
committee and 0 otherwise 
Negative - hinders 
independence of the 
board, information 
being passed on to 
the board 
Negative 
Outside 
Directors 
Proportion of outside directors as 
a proportion of board size 
Positive  Positive and 
significant 
Source: Sanda et al.  (2007) 
 
Note:- For ease of presentation, this table summarizes the results for performance 
measured in terms of return on assets (ROA), though the authors use four measures of 
firm performance: return on assets, return on equity, PE Ratio and Stock return. As will 
be discussed below, the results vary depending on the measure used.  
 
The paper is interesting as the authors have collected a vast new data set, and the 
descriptive statistics presented are very interesting. In particular, the data set on 
interlocking directorships, which shows that about 10 per cent of all directors serve on 
two or more boards of quoted companies. However this data is not explored further.  
 
However, the study has several weaknesses. Firstly, the study highlights the authors’ bias 
towards the Anglo-American model of governance as it hypothesizes that family owned 
and managed firms will have poor performance. Though the results of the regression 
are not significant, the authors do not discuss this result. Secondly, there is an extensive 
reliance on regression analysis without questioning the robustness of results. The 
authors do not acknowledge that there is not a single independent variable that is 
significant in all the four specifications of the regression. When ROA is used as a 
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dependent variable, the only significant independent variables are the foreign dummy 
and outside directors variable. Explanatory power of independent variables is taken to 
be high depending on the number of specifications that the variables are significant for. 
For example it is argued “..a control variable (dummy variable for foreign CEOs) has 
the expected positive sign in 2 of the 4 specifications…consistent with prior 
expectations, board composition (outside directors as a proportion of board size) turns 
out with a positive sign in each of the four alternative specifications but is significant in 
only two of them…contrary to expectations, CEO tenure is positive and significant in 
two out of four specifications (Sanda et al., 2007 pp., 29). The authors then go on to 
argue “clearly the results are consistent with theoretical expectations, but with some 
notable exceptions, such as the unexpected finding that CEO tenure encourages 
performance” (Sanda et al., 2007). Drawing such a strong conclusion from such 
inconsistent and insignificant results is a leap of faith.243  
 
This study again highlights the problem of over reliance on regression analysis that is 
not based on a consistent overall theory but a ‘pick and mix’ combination of different 
variables that we had discussed extensively in Chapter 3. Furthermore, it highlights the 
value of qualitative analysis that would have greatly enhanced the understanding of the 
impact of different governance structures on actually firm performance. For example, 
qualitative and interview data would have shed light on skill levels of CEOs and 
explained why long CEO tenure leads to positive performance.  
 
The fourth paper, by Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) looks at the impact of corporate 
governance on shareholder value maximization in 4 African countries – South Africa, 
Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria, 103 companies for the period 1997 – 2001 (Kyereboah-
Coleman, 2007). The study focuses on three corporate governance measures – size of 
the board, board independence and CEO duality. The key weakness of the study is that 
it uses earnings per share and dividend per share to measure performance. These are not  
the best measure of comparative performance as different companies may have 
different capital structures and very different numbers of shares. 244 
                                                 
243 At a minimum it would have been useful to have some discussion on how closely correlated the 
performance of firms as measured by the four different variables actually was.  
244 Dividend per share and Earnings per share is an indicator to an individual shareholder of firm 
performance only when compared with the price earnings ratio of the company and the price paid to 
acquire each share of the company.  
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The results are summarized in Table 29.  
 
Table 29: Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value in Four African 
Countries 1997 - 2001 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Expected 
Relationship 
Actual 
Relationship 
Board Size 9.22 3 23 Negative Positive 
Board 
Independence 
0.41 0.05 0.85 Positive Inconclusive 
CEO duality 0.19 0 1 Positive Inconclusive 
Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) 
 
The descriptive statistics show that:- first, the size of the boards in the sample (South 
Africa, Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria) is highly diverse with the smallest boards being of 
three members and the largest of 23 members, second independence of boards is also 
very diverse though generally most boards are not independent. The average board has 
42 per cent non-executive directors and 58 per cent executive directors. Finally it shows 
that only about 19 per cent of firms in this sample of quoted companies in SSA have 
separated the position of CEO and Chairman. The regression results of the impact of 
board independence and CEO duality on performance are inconclusive. Contrary to 
expectations, board size is positively correlated to performance. The author suggests 
that this may be because boards members in Africa are not as well remunerated 
compared to western standards and therefore companies can afford to have larger 
boards (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). However, this argument needs to be backed up 
with either qualitative or quantitative analysis.  
 
From the overview of the studies of corporate governance in SSA, two main summary 
points can be raised. Firstly, there is very little evidence for the impact of corporate 
governance reform on firm performance. Secondly and more importantly, the studies 
have not engaged critically with the mainstream literature on corporate governance.245 
The expected results of hypotheses are based on econometric studies done mainly in the 
US without an attempt to understand why the results should be the same or different in 
specific SSA countries. In particular, there is little attempt made to understand how 
ownership patterns have evolved over time and how, even within a country, different 
                                                 
245 This is in line with the arguments in Chapter 3 which showed the dominance of mainstream 
methodology and methods in work done on SSA.  
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firms can have different governance structures. Finally there are not studies that focus 
on the corporate governance of banks in SSA.  
 
7.6 Corporate Governance of Banks with Focus on Insider Lending 
Banks have several peculiar characteristics that make them different from other firms, 
but there is little guidance as to what conceptual framework is appropriate for analyzing 
the governance of banks (Caprio & Levine, 2002; Ciancanelli & Reyes-Gonzalez, 2000). 
Concepts in corporate governance of banks for developed countries have been 
discussed by Macey and O’Hara (2003) and for developing countries by Arun and 
Turner (2004). Both papers argue that the peculiar contract form of banking means that 
it is more appropriate to take a broader view of corporate governance to include 
depositors as suppliers of finance and extend the fiduciary duties of directors to not 
only shareholders but also depositors (Arun & Turner, 2004; Macey & O'Hara, 2001). 
The highly leveraged nature of bank balance sheets, the inherent mismatch between 
asset liability structures and the state funded deposit insurance schemes in most 
countries, means that bank directors need to be held to a broader standard of corporate 
governance (Macey & O'Hara, 2001). Furthermore, as bank failures are costly to the 
entire economy, we would like to argue that the broadest view of corporate governance 
is most appropriate. 246 
 
All the concepts discussed earlier on ownership structure and corporate governance 
apply to bank as well. However, in addition it has been argued that the agency problem 
is even more acute in government owned banks where there is a soft budget constraint 
(Arun and Turner 2004, Shleifer and Vishny 1997) and owner-managed banks where the 
incentive for insider lending is high as the profits from the project are fully internalized 
(Brownbridge, 1998a).  
 
Recalling the discussion on government owned banks in Chapter 4, it was shown that 
due to political interference, the government owned banks in Kenya have a poor record 
in terms of non-performing loans. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, due to 
segmentation of the banking sector, the simple presence or entry of foreign owned 
banks will not improve the corporate governance practices of government owned banks.  
 
                                                 
246 Refer to the discussion on definitions of corporate governance in the introduction to this chapter.  
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There is broad consensus that banks in developing countries engage in insider lending 
or related lending.247 However, there is no consensus on whether insider lending leads to 
positive or negative economic growth (Cull, Haber, & Imai, 2006; Maurer & Haber, 
2007a). There are two contrasting views. The first is the ‘information view’ associated 
with Naomi Lamoreaux (1994) which argues that related lending is economically 
efficient in particular when costs of obtaining information are high. The second view, 
‘the looting view’, associated with La Porta et al. (2003) argues that insider lending 
allows bankers to loot their own banks and therefore has a negative impact on growth. 
We now consider each of these arguments. 248 
 
Lamoreaux (1994) argues that insider lending is the key to understanding New 
England’s early- nineteenth century banking system. An in-depth study of the evolving 
patterns of bank functions, ownership and loan policies finds that not only was insider 
lending highly prevalent, it was beneficial to both investors and economic development 
(Lamoreaux, 1994). Insider lending reduced the costs of information collection for bank 
(Lamoreaux, 1994). Due to limited capital, families pooled funds and founded banks 
based on kinship networks and these kinship networks were strong enough to provide 
stability of the bank (Lamoreaux, 1994).  
 
It should be recognized that insider lending was not the model of lending throughout 
pre-civil war America. Early commercial banks in New York and Pennsylvania did not 
follow the insider lending model but practiced ‘outsider lending’. It is argued that 
though these banks used a different lending model, they were as effective as New 
England banks in inducing economic development. Outsider lending practices 
developed in part because shares of banks were widely held but also because credit 
information about borrowers was available to the banks (R. Wright, 1998).249 
 
                                                 
247 The terms insider lending and related lending are used interchangeably in this section. The terms refer 
to lending by banks primarily to firms controlled by their own directors or their directors’ close friends 
and family. 
248 The debate on related lending is linked to the broader debate on models of corporate governance 
(discussed above) as related lending is more common in the Eurasian model of governance where there 
are close ties between banks and borrowers.  
249 The comparison of these two studies further emphasize the point stated above that ownership patterns 
arise from complex historical social and economic processes.  
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The study of related lending in Mexico in different periods also provides evidence for 
both the views. Using data from the Mexico bank crisis of 1995-1998 it has been shown 
that loans to insiders were given on more favorable terms than outsiders.250 Furthermore, 
default rates on related party loans were 35% higher and recovery on related party loans 
30% lower than unrelated party loans (La Porta et al., 2003). They argue this is evidence 
that related lending is a form of looting by bank directors and that related lending was 
one of the key reasons for the banking crisis in Mexico (La Porta et al., 2003). In 
contrast a study of Mexican banks from 1888-1913 shows that related lending was 
highly prevalent during this time as well, but that the effects of this related lending were 
not pernicious as banks were highly profitable and the number of bank failures was 
insignificant (Maurer & Haber, 2007a). 251 More interestingly, it is shown that banks did 
attempt to practice arms length lending in 1884 but due to high defaults they were 
forced to change strategy and lend to insiders (Maurer & Haber, 2007a). Therefore in 
line with Lamoreaux they argue that: 
 
“Related lending, in effect, provided an informal means to assess risk ex ante 
and enforce contracts ex post”  
Maurer & Haber (2007a pp., 554) 
 
It should be recognized that a key assumption of La Porta et al. (2003) is that bankers 
follow the short term strategy of looting their own banks as the share of their profits in 
their own borrowing is more than the share of profits in their own banks. Yet this 
assumption is not borne out any specific evidence. As will be discussed below there are 
certain conditions under which looting is more or less likely.    
 
Studies on insider lending in SSA are scant. One study from Uganda finds support for 
both the looting and the information view (Habyarimana, 2005). The author considers 
data on 219 Ugandan firms and matches it with local knowledge about ownership links 
between these firms and two banks that failed – Greenland Bank and Co-operative 
                                                 
250 After controlling for loan and borrower characteristics it is found that loans to related parties benefited 
from lower interest rates of between 415-420 basis points, longer maturities and lower collateral levels 
than outsiders (La Porta et al. 2003).  
251 Examples of the extent of insider lending include data from Banco Mercantil de Veracruz which 
indicate that 86 per cent of loans to individuals from 1898 to 1906 went to the bank’s own directors 
(Maurer & Haber, 2007a). 
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Bank.252 Firms are categorized as ‘affected firms’ if they lost a banking relationship and 
‘unaffected’ if they did not have a relationship with the bank. ‘Affected’ firms are further 
divided into ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’ if they had ownership connections with the banks. 
He finds evidence for the looting view as insider firms experienced the sharpest decline 
in employment relative to all affected firms. Interestingly however, he also finds 
evidence for the information view, as even within ‘outsider’ firms, older firms and firms 
that did not submit audited accounts to the bank but relied on ‘soft information’ held 
with banks also experienced the largest declines in employment (Habyarimana, 2005).253  
 
All these studies point to the need to recognize two points. First, looting is not a 
necessary outcome of insider lending but further research is needed to understand the 
conditions under which insider lending is destructive and the conditions in which it is 
not (Maurer & Haber, 2007b). From the case of New England the deeper question that 
arises is: under what conditions are kinship ties stable or unstable? From the Mexican 
example it has been postulated that a system with high capital adequacy ratios and 
ownership structures where all directors own significant equity stakes are some of the 
conditions under which insider lending may not be pernicious. Second, with specific 
reference to the discussion on corporate governance reform, it points to the need to 
recognize that not all owner-managed or family owned banks are prone to looting.  
 
                                                 
252 Data is from the World Bank’s 2002 / 2003 RPED survey. Greenland Bank was a private, locally 
owned bank and in 1998 the fifth largest bank in Uganda. In September 1998, it signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding with the Central Bank – Bank of Uganda (BOU) to inject more capital and reduce the 
level of insider lending. However, in December 1998 the BOU discovered that the privatization of 
Uganda Commercial Bank, the largest commercial bank, had misfired. Greenland Bank had illegally 
acquired control of Uganda Commercial Bank. The BOU took over management of Greeland Bank and 
closed it four months later. Co-operative Bank the second largest bank in Uganda was recapitalized in 
1997 / 1998 using aid from the United States Agency for  International Development (USAID). Citing 
large losses and poor management, USAID withdrew support for the bank in May 1999 and it was 
promptly closed (Habyarimana, 2005).  
253 Habyarimana uses the same definition of soft vs. hard information that we used in Chapter 6. 
Therefore, ‘soft information’ includes information cannot be reduced to a set of numbers and therefore 
this information is lost when a client loses a banking relationship (Habyarimana, 2005). It should be noted 
that his definition of the ‘information view’ is slightly different from that of Lamoreaux (1994). In this 
case it is providing evidence for the function of banks as repositories of information in particular soft 
information. The Lamoreaux (1994) definition is more specifically linked to insider lending where it is 
argued that banks engage in insider lending as the costs of obtaining information on outsiders is too 
expensive.  
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As discussed in Chapter 1, it was impossible for the author of this thesis to get 
information on insider lending practices of banks in Kenya. Therefore the next chapter, 
which looks at corporate governance practices of banks in Kenya, does not specifically 
discuss insider lending. However drawing from the literature above, the discussion in 
Chapter 8 is based on the view that owner-managed banks should not be viewed purely 
as vehicles of looting.  
 
7.7 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter provided a conceptual background and synthesis of the corporate 
governance literature. It emphasized that there are several unresolved debates both at 
the theoretical and empirical level. It emphasized that ownership structures and 
corporate governance practices are products of complex historical social and economic 
practices and that it is impossible to specify a priori which structures are optimal for firm 
or bank performance. The arguments echo recent heterodox research that has 
confirmed the existence of a wide variety of ownership and control structures 
throughout the world and warns against a discussion of corporate governance in terms 
of absolutes (Sun, 2003; Tobin & Singh, 2008). Therefore it is imperative to understand 
country specific and time specific institutional and social structures before imposing 
‘best practices.’ 
 
The chapter also considered studies on the impact of specific board practices on firm 
performance, and again showed that there is very little empirical consensus on ‘best 
practice’.  At this stage, it is also useful to recall the methodological arguments discussed 
in Chapter 1 and 2 on open systems analysis versus closed system analysis. It is not 
surprising that many of these studies do not give conclusive results as each measure – 
for example CEO/Chair separation – will be just one variable affecting firm 
performance and there are many other variables, including some that are very difficult to 
quantify, that also affect firm performance.    
 
The chapter also highlighted that due to the special nature, of banks in particular the 
fiduciary duty of directors to depositors, and corporate governance of banks is 
extremely important to understand. The chapter also discussed the debates regarding 
insider lending in banks and showed that owner-managed banks should not be viewed 
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solely as agents of looting and that well capitalized owner-managed banks are less prone 
to looting.  
 
Methodologically, the studies point to the need to combine qualitative and quantitative 
data to truly understand the nature and evolution of corporate governance. 
Furthermore, through a critical analysis of studies on corporate governance in SSA, this 
chapter showed that the data on corporate governance in SSA is limited, of very short 
time scale and focused on quoted companies with very little effort made to collect data 
for unquoted companies or banks.  Therefore, there is value in collecting new and 
detailed data sets on corporate governance of both quoted and unquoted companies and 
this thesis has collected data on the corporate governance of banks in Kenya. This data 
is discussed in the next chapter. It is hoped that the detailed analysis of corporate 
governance of banks in Kenya with its attempt to use both qualitative and quantitative 
data and its focus on the segmentation of the market will move the literature forward. 
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CHAPTER 8 – CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE 
EXPERIENCE OF THE BANKING SECTOR IN KENYA 
8.1 Introduction 
While the objectives of good corporate governance are relatively clear – it is hard to 
argue against better-run firms or banks - the means of achieving these objectives is still 
unclear. This chapter focuses on the experience of Kenyan banks with corporate 
governance reform. 254 Section 8.2 outlines the ownership and management structure of 
the banking system in Kenya with a focus the concentration of ownership (which as 
discussed in Chapter 7 is seen as a key determinant of agency problems). In Section 8.3, 
the regulation for corporate governance of banks in Kenya is analyzed – particularly the 
similarities and differences with international codes. Using qualitative and quantitative 
data, Section 8.4, gauges the extent to which there is compliance to corporate 
governance regulation among the difference segments and assess the possible reasons 
for non-compliance. Section 8.5 also discusses international corporate governance 
principles that have not been adopted by the Central Bank of Kenya and whether it 
would be useful to adopt these. In Section 8.6, the chapter draws conclusions on the 
impact of corporate governance regulation on the performance of banks in different 
segments of the banking sector in Kenya.  
 
8.2 Ownership and Management Structure of Banks in Kenya 
In Chapter 4 we had discussed the ownership structure of the banking sector in terms of 
the different segments – FOB, GOB, LPOB and SPOB, and also by ethnicity of 
ownership. We showed that the structure is a result of complex historical social and 
economic processes. Table 30 extends the data in Chapter 4 by highlighting the 
concentration levels of ownership of banks in Kenya. As discussed in Chapter 7 while 
ownership concentration is seen to be a key variable determining corporate governance 
of firms, it is still highly debated whether concentrated share ownership or diffused 
share ownership is better for firm performance. Table 30 shows that concentrated share 
                                                 
254 As noted in Chapter 1, this thesis focuses on three relationships in banking – lending, deposit 
mobilization and corporate governance. This chapter discusses the last of these relationships. Refer to the 
research questions stated in Chapter 1, Section 1.1.5.  
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ownership is the predominant form of share ownership even amongst foreign owned 
banks and large private owned banks. Concentrated share ownership is the predominant 
feature even amongst banks that are quoted on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. Diffused 
shareholding is quite rare. The only LPOB with diffused shareholding is the Co-
operative Bank of Kenya, which is a very unique institution whose shareholders consist 
of the all the Co-operative societies in Kenya. In the case of SPOB, there are two banks 
with diffused shareholding - Oriental Commercial Bank and City Finance Bank. The 
current shareholders were formerly depositors who converted their deposits to equity to 
ensure the reopening of the bank once it had been placed under statutory management. 
Therefore the current diffused share ownership was not a strategic choice made by the 
shareholders.  
 
Furthermore, minority shareholding (less than 10% shareholding) is also rare among 
banks in Kenya. The banks quoted on the stock exchange, do have minority 
shareholders.255 These are individual private investors that have purchased shares on the 
stock exchange.256 Amongst the private banks, minority shareholders have come into 
existence almost by accident. I&M Bank and Southern Credit Bank have minority 
shareholders due to the mergers with Biashara Bank and Bullion Bank respectively. 257  
 
In summary, the ownership structure of banks in Kenya is therefore more closely 
aligned to the Eurasian model of ownership rather than the Anglo-American model of 
ownership.  The implication of the data in the table is that any corporate governance 
regulation that is adopted in Kenya has to take into account this ownership structure. As 
will be discussed below some of corporate governance regulation attempts to enforce 
regulation that is not appropriate for this ownership structure.  
 
                                                 
255 The banks quoted on the stock exchange are Barclays Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, Kenya 
Commercial Bank, National Bank of Kenya, NIC Bank, CFC Bank. 
256 However, ownership is still highly concentrated. In the case of FOB the majority shareholder is the 
parent foreign bank, for GOB the Government of Kenya and for LPOB a group of individuals or an 
institution.  
257 Biashara Bank had been started by the Oshwal Community and for all its community members and 
had a diffused shareholding. After the merger with I&M, this block of diffused shareholders have become 
a minority in the shareholding. Bullion Bank also had diffused shareholders after depositors converted 
their deposits to equity in 2000, to revive the bank, after it had been placed under CBK statutory 
management in 1998. After the merger with Southern Credit Banking Corporation in 2002, this block of 
diffused shareholders became minority shareholders.   
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Table 30 : Ownership Structure of Bank in Kenya 2005 including Details on 
Ownership Concentration 
 Bank Segment Shareholder 
Details 
Ethnicity 
Of 
Owners 
Quoted 
on NSE 
Concentrated 
or Diffused 
Share 
Ownership 
Ownership Owner - 
Managed  
1 Barclays Bank 
of Kenya 
FOB Barclays Bank 
Plc Ltd 
(majority) 
Not 
relevant 
Yes Concentrated Institutional NO 
2 Standard 
Chartered 
Bank 
FOB Standard 
Chartered 
Bank Plc 
(majority) 
Not 
relevant 
Yes Concentrated Institutional NO 
3 Citibank N.A. FOB branch of 
Citibank N.A.  
Not 
relevant 
  Na Institutional NO 
4 Stanbic Bank FOB Standard Bank 
South Africa  
Not 
relevant 
  Concentrated Institutional NO 
5 Bank of 
Baroda 
FOB Bank of 
Baroda India 
(owned by 
Government 
of India) 
(majority) 
Indian    Concentrated Institutional NO 
6 Bank of India FOB branch of 
Bank of India 
(owned by 
Government 
of India) 
Indian   Na Institutional NO 
7 Bank of Africa 
Kenya 
FOB Bank of Africa 
Benin, Bank of 
Africa 
Madagascar 
and 
Netherlands, 
Development 
Finance 
Company 
Not 
relevant 
  Concentrated Institutional NO 
8 Habib A.G. 
Zurich  
FOB branch of 
Habib Bank 
A.G. Zurich 
Pakistani   Concentrated Single 
Family 
Owned 
YES 
9 K-Rep Bank FOB IFC, NGOs  
and K-Rep 
group 
Not 
relevant 
  Concentrated Institutional NO 
10 Habib Bank 
Ltd 
FOB Aga Khan 
Fund for 
Economic 
Development 
and 
Government 
of Pakistan 
Pakistani   Concentrated Institutional NO 
11 Kenya 
Commercial 
Bank 
GOB Government 
of Kenya, 
National Social 
Security Fund 
Not 
relevant 
Yes Concentrated GoK NO 
12 National Bank 
of Kenya 
GOB  Government 
of Kenya 
Not 
relevant 
Yes Concentrated GoK NO 
13 Consolidated 
Bank 
GOB  Government 
of Kenya 
Not 
relevant 
  Concentrated GoK NO 
14 Development 
Bank of Kenya  
GOB  Government 
of Kenya 
Not 
relevant 
  Concentrated GoK NO 
15 Co-operative 
Bank of Kenya 
LPOB Over 3,000 
Co-operative 
Societies  
Not 
relevant 
  Diffused Institutional NO 
16 CFC Bank LPOB Mr. Jani, Mr. 
Njonjo, Mr. 
Kirenie, Mr. 
Kulei (through 
Asian-
African 
and 
African 
 Yes Concentrated Individuals YES 
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 Bank Segment Shareholder 
Details 
Ethnicity 
Of 
Owners 
Quoted 
on NSE 
Concentrated 
or Diffused 
Share 
Ownership 
Ownership Owner - 
Managed  
holding 
companies) 
17 Commercial 
Bank of Africa 
LPOB Kenyatta 
family, Rai 
family and 
Naushad 
Merali family 
Asian-
African 
and 
African 
  Concentrated Individuals YES 
18 NIC Bank LPOB  Ndegwa 
family 
African Yes Concentrated Individuals YES 
19 I&M LPOB S. Raja family Asian-
African 
  Concentrated Family 
Owned 
YES 
20 Diamond 
Trust 
LPOB Aga Khan 
Fund for 
Economic 
Development, 
Allied Irish 
Bank 
Asian-
African 
Yes Concentrated Institutional NO 
21 Equity Bank LPOB Britac 
Insurance Co, 
IFC, James 
Mwangi 
African Yes Concentrated Institutions 
& 
Individuals 
YES 
22 Imperial Bank LPOB Popat Family, 
Shah (Rex 
Motors) 
family, Somji 
(Freight 
Forwarders 
family) 
Asian-
African 
  Concentrated Individuals YES 
23 Trans-
National Bank 
LPOB Mr. Gideon 
Moi, Mr. Kulei 
African   Concentrated Individuals NO 
24 EABS Bank SPOB Pandit Family Asian-
African 
  Concentrated Family 
Owned 
YES 
25 Fina Bank SPOB D. Chandaria 
family, Patel 
(‘Sparrow’) 
family 
Asian-
African 
  Concentrated Individuals YES 
26 Prime Bank SPOB A. Kantaria 
family 
Asian-
African 
  Concentrated Family 
Owned 
YES 
27 ABC Bank SPOB A. Savani 
family 
Asian-
African 
  Concentrated Family 
Owned 
YES 
28 Giro 
Commercial 
Bank 
SPOB P. Gidoomal 
family 
Asian-
African 
  Concentrated Family 
Owned 
YES 
29 Guardian 
Bank  
SPOB M. Chandaria 
family 
Asian-
African 
  Concentrated Family 
Owned 
YES 
30 Southern 
Credit Bank  
SPOB A. Kurji family 
and several 
minority 
shareholders 
Asian-
African 
  Concentrated Family 
Owned 
YES 
31 Charterhouse 
Bank Ltd. 
SPOB  Shah 
(Kingsway) 
family, Ehsani 
family, Shah 
(Nakumatt) 
family, Harun 
Mwau  
Asian-
African 
and 
African 
  Concentrated Individuals NO 
32 Victoria 
Commercial 
Bank 
SPOB Y. Pattni 
Family 
Asian-
African 
  Concentrated Individuals YES 
33 Middle East 
Bank 
SPOB Esmail family, 
Biwott family, 
Banque 
Belgolaise  
Asian-
African 
and 
African 
  Concentrated Individuals NO 
34 Equatorial 
Commercial 
SPOB Naushad 
Merali family 
Asian-
African 
  Concentrated Individuals NO 
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 Bank Segment Shareholder 
Details 
Ethnicity 
Of 
Owners 
Quoted 
on NSE 
Concentrated 
or Diffused 
Share 
Ownership 
Ownership Owner - 
Managed  
Bank and Gideon 
Moi family 
and 
African 
35 Credit Bank SPOB S. Nyachae 
family 
African 
(Kisii) 
  Concentrated Individuals NO 
36 Chase Bank SPOB Alibhai Shariff 
family, Azim 
Virjee family, 
Vohra family 
Asian-
African 
  Diffused  Individuals YES 
37 Fidelity 
Commercial 
Bank 
SPOB Sultan Khimji, 
Murli Sadwani, 
Bharat 
Thakrar, 
Equity 
Investments, 
Firoz Manji 
and N. P. 
Sheth and 21 
other 
shareholders 
Asian-
African 
  Diffused Individuals YES 
38 Paramount 
Universal 
Bank 
SPOB Merali and 
Dodhia 
families.  
Asian-
African 
  Concentrated Individuals YES 
39 Oriental 
Commercial 
Bank 
SPOB depositors 
became 
owners after 
restructuring 
Asian-
African 
  Diffused Individuals NO 
40 Dubai Bank 
(formerly 
Mashreq 
Bank) 
SPOB Zubedi family Arab 
(Swahili)  
  Concentrated Family 
Owned 
YES 
41 City Finance 
Bank 
SPOB depositors 
became 
owners after 
restructuring 
Asian-
African 
  Diffused Individuals NO 
Source: Corporate Governance Database collected by the Author 
Note: Na stands for not applicable as the bank is a branch of the parent bank 
8.3 Regulation of Corporate Governance of Banks in Kenya 
We now turn to the regulation of corporate governance of banks in Kenya. First, we 
discuss two international corporate governance codes – The OECD Corporate 
Governance Principles and the Basel Principles. Then we discuss the corporate 
governance regulations in Kenya.  
 
8.3.1 OECD and Basel Principles 
The OECD Corporate Governance Principles consist of six principles that help 
governments put in place regulations to enhance corporate governance of companies. 
The principles are:- 
• OECD Principle 1 - Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance 
framework - The corporate governance framework should promote transparent 
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and efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the 
division of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and 
enforcement authorities. 
• OECD Principle 2 - Rights and duties of shareholders - The corporate 
governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ 
rights. 
• OECD Principle 3 - The equitable treatment of shareholders - The corporate 
governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all 
shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders 
should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their 
rights. 
• OECD Principle 4 - Establish a role for stakeholders in corporate governance - 
The corporate governance framework should recognize the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage 
active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, 
jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises. 
• OECD Principle 5 - Ensure suitable levels of disclosure and transparency - The 
corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate 
disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including 
the financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the 
company. 
• OECD Principle 6 - The fulfillment of responsibility of the board of directors - 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of 
the company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the 
board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders. 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2004).258 
 
The OECD principles are amongst the broadest that have been developed throughout 
the world. It is important to recognize that the OECD principles represent a 
compromise between the Anglo-American and the Eurasian models on what constitutes 
best practice (Baker, 2008; Tobin & Singh, 2008). The Preamble of the OECD 
Principles states that they “do not aim at detailed prescriptions for national legislation. 
                                                 
258  The first version of the Principles was endorsed by OECD ministers and published in 1999 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004).  
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Rather, they seek to identify objectives and suggest various means for achieving them” 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004).  
 
The second bank specific guidelines have come from the Basel Committee. As part of 
the Basel II process, Basel Core Principles on Effective Supervision also specify 
corporate governance measures There are 25 principles but the specific ones that related 
to corporate governance are:- 
• Basel Principle 3 - Licensing criteria – The licensing authority must have the 
power to set criteria and reject applications for establishments that do not meet 
the standards set. The licensing process, at a minimum, should consist of an 
assessment of the ownership structure and governance of the bank and its wider 
group, including the fitness and propriety of Board members and senior 
management, its strategic and operating plan, internal controls and risk 
management, and its projected financial condition, including its capital base. 
Where the proposed owner or parent organization is a foreign bank, the prior 
consent of its home country supervisor should be obtained 
• Basel Principle 4 – Transfer of ownership - The supervisor has the power to 
review and reject any proposals to transfer significant ownership or controlling 
interests held directly or indirectly in existing banks to other parties. 
• Basel Principle 11 – Exposures to related parties - In order to prevent abuses 
arising from exposures (both on balance sheet and off balance sheet) to related 
parties and to address conflict of interest, supervisors must have in place 
requirements that banks extend exposures to related companies and individuals 
on an arm’s length basis; these exposures are effectively monitored; appropriate 
steps are taken to control or mitigate the risks; and write-offs of such exposures 
are made according to standard policies and processes. 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (2006).259 
 
Like the OECD principles, these Basel principles are broad and can be applicable to 
either the Anglo-American or Eurasian corporate governance frameworks.  
 
As part of the Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs), the World Bank and 
IMF have begun since 1999 to produce Reports on the Observance of Standards and 
                                                 
259 The Core Principles for Effective Supervision were first published in 1997 and the revised version in 
2006.  
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Codes (ROSCs) and therefore compliance by governments to these codes is strongly 
encouraged. 260  This has been referred to as the ‘standard-surveillance-compliance’ 
system of the Post Washington Consensus (Wade, 2007). In response to these 
developments, the CBK has introduced corporate governance guidelines for banks in 
Kenya.  
 
8.3.2 Central Bank of Kenya Guidelines 
The CBK corporate governance guidelines were first introduced in 2000. It is referred 
to as CBK/RG/08 and forms pages 112 to 123 of the Prudential Guidelines for 2000 
(henceforth referred to as the ‘2000 CBK Guidelines’). The 2000 CBK Guidelines were 
relatively simple and focused on the duties of directors. The latest set of guidelines is 
extremely extensive and was issued in 2006 to replace the 2000 CBK Guidelines. It is 
referred to as CBK/PG/02 and it forms pages 27 – 47 of the Prudential Guidelines for 
2006. Henceforth it will be referred to as the ‘2006 CBK Guidelines.’ The CBK states 
that the rationale for the introduction of the regulation is to establish ‘best practice’ in 
corporate governance (Central Bank of Kenya, 2005). As we had discussed in Chapter 7, 
it is very difficult to specify, a priori, what corporate governance ‘best’ practices are. 
However, it will be shown below that the Central Bank of Kenya corporate governance 
regulations do not take this debate into account.  
 
The Capital Markets Authority (CMA) in Kenya has also issued guidelines for all 
companies quoted on the NSE. The guidelines were issued in 2002 and been given legal 
status through an amendment of the Capital Markets Act section 485A. Therefore banks 
that are quoted on the NSE follow both the CBK and the CMA corporate governance 
guidelines. In general, there is concurrence with the CMA and the CBK guidelines.261  
 
                                                 
260 The foreword to OECD Principles of Corporate Governance states “The Financial Stability Forum 
has designated the Principles as one of the 12 key standards for sound financial systems. The Principles also 
provide the basis for an extensive programme of cooperation between OECD and non-OECD countries 
and underpin the corporate governance component of World Bank/IMF Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSCs)” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004). 
261 One of the main points of difference is that the CMA guidelines require companies to state the top ten 
shareholders in their annual report and the CBK guidelines do not require this. Refer to section on 
disclosure and transparency for discussion on this anomaly. 
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It is also interesting to note that New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 
in response to international developments have focused on corporate governance as 
part of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). In 2005 and 2006, Kenya 
participated in the as part of the APRM and the NEPAD report contains an assessment 
of the standards of corporate governance practices in Kenya in comparison to 
international benchmarks.  
 
Table 31: Corporate Governance Requirements by the CBK 2006 
OECD Principle / BIS (Basel) 
Principle for Supervision 
Related Requirement in CBK 2006 CBK Guidelines 
Separation of Ownership and 
Control (not based on any specific 
OECD / Basel Principle) 
A shareholder with more than 5% of shareholding 
cannot be in management or hold an executive 
directorship 
OECD Principle 1 - Effective basis 
for corporate governance framework 
No specific regulation 
OECD Principle 2 - The Rights and 
Duties of Shareholders 
 
Shareholders should appoint competent board, monitor 
board activities and use AGM to remove directors who 
are not performing. 
OECD Principle 3 - The Equitable 
Treatment of Shareholders 
No specific guideline 
OECD Principle 4 - The Role of 
Stakeholders in Corporate 
governance 
No specific guideline 
OECD Principle 5 - Suitable levels 
of Disclosure and Transparency 
Quarterly publishing of annual reports in national 
newspapers 
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OECD Principle / BIS (Basel) 
Principle for Supervision 
Related Requirement in CBK 2006 CBK Guidelines 
OECD Principle 6 - Fulfilment of 
Responsibility by the Board of 
Directors 
• Long list of duties of directors given including 
participating in and chairing board committees (See 
Appendix 21)  
• Board Independence -executive Directors should be 
less than 30% of the board. The majority of non-
executive directors should be independent 
• CEO duality - Separation of position of CEO and 
chairman of the board. Chair must be a non-
executive director 
• Necessity to set and defined roles of several 
committees including:- Board Audit Committee, 
Board Credit Committee, Asset and Liability 
Committee (ALCO), Risk Management Committee, 
Executive Committee  
• Board Audit Committee and Board Credit 
Committee should be chaired by a non-executive 
director 
• Annual review of board done through peer and self 
evaluation and guidelines specified and sent to CBK 
by 31st March of the following year 
Basel Principle 3 – Licensing Criteria Shareholders and Directors vetted by the CBK 
Basel Principle 4 – Transfer of 
Ownership 
Change in more than 5% of an institutions share capital 
requires permission of the CBK, and vetting of the 
shareholders by CBK 
Basel Principle 11 - Exposures to 
related parties (Insider Lending) 
• No unsecured lending to directors or employees 
• Any secured lending must be approved by the whole 
board and also given on same terms as other clients  
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8.4 Compliance with Central Bank of Kenya Guidelines 
This section discusses the behaviour and responses of banks to the corporate 
governance guidelines and assesses whether the guidelines will have the desired impact 
of improving the performance of the banking sector in Kenya.262  The main data 
analyzed here are qualitative data collected from semi-structured interviews of 7 banks 
and also quantitative data collected from the financial statements of all banks in Kenya 
in 2005.263. This section discusses compliance with the following regulations: - 
• Separation of ownership and management 
• Responsibility of Board of Directors  
• Independence of Board of Directors 
• CEO duality and Committee Structures 
• Vetting of Directors 
• Transparency and disclosure 
• Insider Lending 
 
Table 32 summarizes the qualitative data on the constraints faced by different segments 
of the banking sector in Kenya in complying with these regulations.  
 
Table 32: Corporate Governance Characteristics and Constraints in Complying 
with Regulations by Segments 
 Segment FOB GOB LPOB SPOB 
 No of Banks 
Interviewed in 
Segment 
1  
(Bank 1) 
1  
(Bank 2) 
3  
(Bank 3, Bank 4, 
Bank 5) 
2  
(Bank 6, 
Bank 7) 
 Quoted on Stock 
Exchange 
Bank 1 - 
YES 
Bank 2 - 
YES 
Bank 3 - NO 
Bank 4 - YES 
Bank 5 - YES 
Bank 6 - 
NO 
Bank 7 – 
NO 
                                                 
262 The effective date for these guidelines was 1st January 2006 and therefore several banks took these 
guidelines into account when publishing the accounts for end of year 2005 in early 2006. Furthermore, as 
stated in Chapter 1, interviews were conducted in summer of 2006, and the guidelines were fresh in the 
minds of persons interviewed.  
263 There are several limitations of both the qualitative and quantitative data in the particular the inability 
to get any reliable information on insider lending. Refer to Chapter 1 for the details on data limitations.  
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 Segment FOB GOB LPOB SPOB 
 No of Banks 
Interviewed in 
Segment 
1  
(Bank 1) 
1  
(Bank 2) 
3  
(Bank 3, Bank 4, 
Bank 5) 
2  
(Bank 6, 
Bank 7) 
1 Concentrated 
Shareholding 
YES YES YES YES 
2 Separation of 
Ownership and 
Management 
YES YES NO NO 
3 Presence of Minority 
Shareholders 
YES YES Bank 3 - NO 
Bank 4 - NO 
Bank 5 - YES 
Bank 6 - 
NO 
Bank 7 - 
YES 
4 Changes in Board 
Structure to Comply 
with Rule on 
Separating 
Ownership and 
Management 
N/A N/A YES, but also 
evidence of 
symbolic 
compliance 
YES, but 
also 
evidence of 
symbolic 
compliance 
5 Human resource 
constraint in getting 
directors 
NO NO YES YES 
6 Effectiveness of 
publishing financial 
data in the 
newspapers 
NO NO NO NO 
 
8.4.1 Separation of Ownership and Management 
This regulation specifies that a shareholder with more than a 5% shareholding in a bank 
cannot hold an executive position in that bank. As it was also noted in Table 31, this 
regulation does not have its roots in either the OECD or Basel principles.264 It can be 
discerned that it is implicitly based on the Anglo-American governance model, which 
emphasizes the separation of ownership and management. As discussed in Chapter 7, 
                                                 
264 However, the CBK enforces this regulation based on Basle Core Principle 4, in which transfer of 
ownership requires the permission of CBK.  
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the ‘crony capitalism’ school links high ownership concentration to the Asian financial 
crash of 1997. It is also implicitly based on the looting view of owner managed banks of 
La Porta et al. (2003) and therefore attempting to control the behavior of owner-
managed banks.265    
 
As shown in Table 30 the ownership structure of the banking sector in Kenya is highly 
concentrated and therefore closer to the Eurasian model of governance discussed in 
Chapter 7.266 Furthermore, family ownership and owner-management is a common 
feature of most privately owned banks. 
 
Therefore it is not surprising that this regulation has proven to be extremely 
controversial for banks in LPOB and SPOB segment. This regulation had no effect on 
FOB and GOB banks. Among the banks interviewed there was a consensus that this 
guideline was largely targeted at owner-managed banks. The respondents noted that 
contrary to perception no all owner-managed banks were badly run.  
 
“But the tribute for where our bank is today must go to our founding 
shareholder, the late Mr. XXX. Even though Mr. XXX was a 25% 
shareholder he ran the bank better than other organizations are run. He was 
a proper banker, therefore even though Mr. YYY, a politician was also a 
shareholder, there were no political loans given by our Bank” Bank 4, 
LPOB, quoted  
 
Furthermore the respondents indicated that it was not clear that the existence of such a 
guideline - enforcing separation of ownership and management - could have prevented 
the failure of banks prior to 2005. Contrarily they argued that it was essential that 
owners remain involved in the operations of the bank to ensure good performance: 
  
“We are trying to meet international best practices so we already have in 
place new recommendations by CBK. But sometimes the corporate 
governance rules can go too far. If the owners do not keep a track of the 
                                                 
265 Refer to discussions in Chapter 7, Section 7.3 and Section 7.6.   
266 Referring to Chapter 7, Table 1, the Kenyan banking system is also closer to the Eurasian model of 
corporate governance in terms of other indicators, including, low stock market capitalization to GDP 
ratio and banks being the major source of financing.  
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bank operations, then it will go down. Just because some owners looted 
their banks does not mean all owners will loot” Bank 5, LPOB 
 
Interview data indicated that particularly amongst the SPOB segment, changes in 
shareholding have been taking place by banks to ensure compliance with the guidelines. 
For example, a shareholder who wanted to remain in an executive position transferred 
part of his shareholding to his brother to stay within the 5% threshold.  
 
“Mr. XX himself had to reduce his shareholding from 10% to 5% to remain 
executive director as per CBK guidelines” Bank 7, SPOB 
 
This is an example of ‘symbolic’ compliance. Therefore this regulation may not have the 
impact it was intended to have, as executive directors may still have an indirect 
controlling interest in a bank.  
 
Furthermore, there have also been notable exceptions to the enforcement of this 
regulation by CBK. For example, Equity Bank’s managing director Mr. James Mwangi 
owns a 7.3% in the bank with a further beneficial shareholding of 0.74% based on his 
ownership of an investment company which is also a shareholder in the bank (Gikunju, 
2007).267 Therefore, he is above the 5% threshold. In August 2006, when Equity Bank 
was listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange the managing director was given a one year 
exemption from this rule (Gikunju, 2007). This exemption again highlights the problem 
of enforcing regulation that is attempting to enforce separation of ownership and 
management onto a system where ownership is highly concentrated. Furthermore, other 
banks may also apply for exemption on the grounds of fairness and the ability of the 
CBK to uphold this particular section of the 2006 CBK Guidelines is seriously 
questionable.  
 
In summary, this regulation does not take into consideration the reality of the ownership 
structure of banks in Kenya. Enforcing this separation of ownership and management 
when the ownership is highly concentrated will lead to non-compliance or symbolic 
compliance and will not necessarily lead to improved performance of banks.  
                                                 
267 Equity Bank was not part of the interview sample and the discussion above is based on public sources. 
Therefore the name of the bank is stated instead of referring to it as Bank1, Bank 2 etc. 
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8.4.2 Responsibility of Board of Directors 
The 2000 CBK Guidelines contains very general guidelines for directors, chief 
executives and management.268 The most significant part of the guidelines is that it 
specifies that the board should constitute an Audit Committee with a written charter, a 
non-executive director as its chairman (CEO duality) and regular reporting to the board 
(Central Bank of Kenya, 2000b).269 The 2006 CBK Guidelines are extensive and laid out 
in Table 31 and Appendix 21. 
 
This guideline is linked to OECD Principle 6 which recognizes the diversity of board 
structures around the world and states “…do not advocate any particular board 
structure and the term ‘board’ as used in this document is meant to embrace the 
different national models of board structures found in OECD and non-OECD 
countries” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004 pp., 15). 
However the 2006 CBK Guidelines have emphasized a more Anglo-American approach, 
with focus on independence of non-executive directors, CEO duality and the setting up 
of board committees. It should be noted that while the ownership structure of banks in 
Kenya is highly concentrated and can be said to be similar to the Eurasian ownership 
structure, board structures in Kenya historically follow English common law and 
therefore are similar to the system of single boards of the Anglo-American governance 
mechanisms. The directors are representatives of the shareholders and not all 
stakeholders. Chapter 7 showed that the empirical evidence of the impact of board 
reforms on performance from other countries is very mixed. As board reforms in the 
Kenyan banking sector were introduced just before the fieldwork was carried out, it is 
difficult to judge the impact of the latest reforms on performance, but an initial analysis 
is carried out.  
 
Table 33 shows the total number of directors of each bank in Kenya and also the total 
number of executive directors, and the ratio of executive directors to total directors. 
The analysis shows that the average size of bank boards in Kenya is 8. For GOB the 
average is the highest at 10 and for SPOB it is smallest at 6. For FOB and LOPB the 
                                                 
268 The 2000 CBK Guidelines for directors include a list of responsibilities such as regulate manner in 
which business is conducted, corporate planning, avoid self-serving practices and maintain adequate 
capital base amongst others. 
269 In the cases of banks where there is no local board, the internal audit function is required to report 
directly to chief appointee from the head office (Central Bank of Kenya, 2000b). 
232 
average board size is 9. This can be compared to the average board size for quoted 
companies in Kenya of 10 quoted in the study of Ayogu (2001). As discussed in Chapter 
7, there is very little conclusive empirical evidence linking board size to performance. 
We had argued that studies that simply link small board size to positive performance are 
misguided. Therefore, the 2006 CBK Guidelines are enlightened, as they do not try to 
specify a standard board size for all bank boards in Kenya.270  
 
Table 33: The Structure of Boards of Banks in Kenya 
  Bank  Segment No Of 
Total 
Directors  
No Of 
Executive 
Directors  
Exec 
Director As 
% Of Total 
Directors 
1 Barclays Bank of Kenya FOB 10 3 30% 
2 Standard Chartered Bank FOB 11 5 45% 
3 Citibank N.A. FOB NA NA   
4 Stanbic Bank FOB 9 6 67% 
5 Bank of Baroda FOB 10 4 40% 
6 Bank of India FOB NA NA   
7 Bank of Africa Kenya FOB 5 1 20% 
8 Habib A.G. Zurich  FOB NA NA   
9 K-Rep Bank FOB 11 1 9% 
10 Habib Bank Ltd FOB NA NA   
11 Kenya Commercial Bank GOB 11 2 18% 
12 National Bank of Kenya GOB 13 3 23% 
13 Consolidated Bank GOB 7 1 14% 
14 Development Bank of Kenya  GOB 9 1 11% 
15 Co-operative Bank of Kenya LPOB 16 1 6% 
16 CFC Bank LPOB 11 3 27% 
17 Commercial Bank of Africa LPOB 6 2 33% 
18 NIC Bank LPOB 9 2 22% 
19 I&M LPOB 6 1 17% 
20 Diamond Trust LPOB 10 1 10% 
21 Equity Bank LPOB 12 1 8% 
22 Imperial Bank LPOB 7 1 14% 
                                                 
270 However, they state that the minimum board size should be 5 directors (Central Bank of Kenya, 
2006b). 
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  Bank  Segment No Of 
Total 
Directors  
No Of 
Executive 
Directors  
Exec 
Director As 
% Of Total 
Directors 
23 Trans-National Bank LPOB 8 1 13% 
24 EABS Bank SPOB 8 4 50% 
25 Fina Bank SPOB 5 1 20% 
26 Prime Bank SPOB 8 0 13% 
27 ABC Bank SPOB 5 2 40% 
28 Giro Commercial Bank SPOB 5 1 20% 
29 Guardian Bank  SPOB 5 1 20% 
30 Southern Credit Bank (Merged 
with Bullion Bank) 
SPOB 7 3 43% 
31 Charterhouse Bank Ltd. SPOB no annual 
report 
no annual 
report 
  
32 Victoria Commercial Bank SPOB 5 1 20% 
33 Middle East Bank SPOB 7 1 14% 
34 Equatorial Commercial Bank SPOB 6 2 33% 
35 Credit Bank SPOB 7 1 14% 
36 Chase Bank SPOB 6 3 50% 
37 Fidelity Commercial Bank SPOB 6 1 17% 
38 Paramount Universal Bank SPOB 4 1 25% 
39 Oriental Commercial Bank 
(formerly Delphis Bank) 
SPOB 6 1 17% 
40 Dubai Bank (formerly Mashreq 
Bank) 
SPOB 6 1 17% 
41 City Finance Bank SPOB 5 1 20% 
            
  Average   8 2 24% 
Source: - Author’s calculations 
Notes: - NA – These banks are branches of their parent banks therefore do not have a 
board of directors 
 
In general FOB are viewed as having the ‘best’ corporate governance practices as they 
are already following international benchmarks. The analysis revealed that within the 
FOB segment in Kenya, there are governance differences. Some of the FOB are 
structured as branches of the parent bank and therefore do not have a board in Kenya. 
This includes Citibank and Bank of India. Others are incorporated in Kenya with the 
majority of shares owned by the foreign bank for example Barclays Bank and Standard 
Chartered Bank and have a local board in Kenya. The Kenyan board members of FOB 
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are recognized as highly qualified and the extremely well respected professionals and 
entrepreneurs. However, fieldwork revealed that even FOB with local boards operate 
more like branches of the parent bank and therefore do not meet the 2006 CBK 
corporate governance guidelines in particular that the board should take ultimate 
responsibility for the bank: 
  
“In most cases our compliance and our internal guidelines are more 
onerous than CBK. If there is a clash between the board and the internal 
guidelines on a credit, it is normally the internal guidelines that will ‘win’ as 
the credit has to be approved by head office. Yes, you could say that the 
board credit committee operates more as a rubber- stamping tool. But that 
does not mean we don’t have good governance. If a credit has met the 
approval of our internal guidelines, it has gone through a rigorous process. 
A board member sometimes just questions the credit based on rumour 
about the party.” Bank 1, FOB, quoted 
 
This section highlights that there may be non-compliance with the CBK regulations 
which state that the board credit committee has to bear ultimate responsibility for the 
credit decisions. While a system where the final credit decision lies with the head office 
may not lead to poor performance of the bank, the interview highlights the need for 
CBK regulations to be revised to take into account these differences.  
 
8.4.3 Independence of Board of Directors 
The 2006 CBK Guidelines state that executive directors should not form more than 
30% of the board. As discussed in Chapter 7, the logic for this guideline is that ‘non-
executive’ or ‘independent’ directors are viewed as more likely to act in shareholders’ 
interests compared to ‘inside’ or executive directors as they do not have incentives to 
collude with internal managers to expropriate shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Monks & Nell, 2004). However, as discussed in Chapter 7, the empirical evidence on 
the benefits of non-executive is very mixed.271 The two studies on African (Nigerian) 
firms get differing results. Sanda et al. (2005) finds that outside directors variable is not 
significant, while Sanda et al.  (2007) finds the variable is positive and significant.272  
                                                 
271 Refer to Chapter 7, Section 7.2.4.  
272 Refer to Chapter 7, Section 7.6.  
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As shown in Table 33, there are eight banks that do not meet this criterion and will have 
to make adjustments to comply. These banks are from all the four segments of the 
banking sector, therefore, one cannot argue that the proportion of executive directors is 
higher in any one segment. However, as will be discussed below, banks in the SPOB 
segment are finding it harder to comply with these regulations than banks in other 
segments.   
 
Furthermore, the 2006 CBK Guidelines state that majority of non-executive directors 
have to be independent. Non-executive directors are defined as those who are not 
involved in the day-to-day management of the company. While ‘independent’ non-
executive directors are defined as those that have not been employed by the institution 
in an executive position for the last five years, and not linked through family 
relationships or other business relationships with the institution or its affiliates (Central 
Bank of Kenya, 2006b). Two points can be made in reference to this: Firstly, while it is 
easy to count the number of non-executive directors, it is quite difficult to determine the 
independence of directors. Therefore, the enforcement of this rule leaves considerable 
discretion to the CBK regulators and higher likelihood of differential enforcement 
amongst banks. Secondly, in a developing country where the skill base is weak, the skill 
of the board member is likely to be more useful than independence.  For example, NIC 
Bank, a LPOB is largely held by the Ndegwa family.273 The non-executive Chairman of 
the company is Mr. James Ndegwa and his brother Andrew Ndegwa is another non-
executive director and therefore clearly not independent. However, both brothers have 
extremely high academic and professional qualifications that are stated in the annual 
report. Therefore, a strict enforcement of this regulation by the CBK, on independence 
of directors, may lead to detrimental outcomes for the bank if these loose skilled 
directors which are hard to replace.  
 
8.4.4 CEO Duality and Committee Structures 
The 2000 CBK Guidelines did not state any requirement for CEO duality. However, in 
2003, it was found that 80% of boards of banks had a non-executive chairman (Centre 
for Corporate Governance Kenya, 2004). By end of 2005, all banks were compliant with 
the 2006 CBK guidelines, which stipulated CEO duality, and there was no bank that had 
                                                 
273 NIC Bank is not part of the interview sample and it is quoted on the Nairobi Stock Exchange.  
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an executive chairman. The interviews indicated that banks in all segments found this 
guideline useful and did not find it difficult to meet this guideline.  
 
The 2006 CBK Guideline states that is necessary for the board to set up and define the 
roles of several committees including: - Board Audit Committee, Board Credit 
Committee, Asset and Liability Committee (ALCO), Risk Management Committee, 
Executive Committee. Furthermore it states that a non-executive director should chair 
the Board Audit Committee and Board Credit Committee (Central Bank of Kenya, 
2006b). In 2005, all banks had in place an audit committee and a credit committee 
headed by non-executive directors. Therefore there was complete compliance with this 
guideline.  For comparative purposes, in 2000 only 3 banks indicated in their financial 
reports that their audit committee and credit committee was headed by a non-executive 
director. However, the interviews revealed the SPOB found these guidelines costly to 
implement in terms of time taken for committees to make decisions: 
  
“Sometimes CBK is trying to impose all international practices on banks 
and this will lead to a stifling of innovation in the bank and banks getting 
bogged down in cost of numerous committees. Also, as the guidelines place 
a lot of duties on the directors, to an extent they become part of management.. 
Cost will be justified if CBK actually ensures implementation by all banks” 
Bank 6, SPOB 
 
The interviews revealed that the regulations are likely to have contradictory effects. 
While they are aimed at increasing the independence of the board directors, the 
requirements for non-executive directors to be involved in several committees, may lead 
to them becoming closer to management. Therefore, while it is too early to judge the 
impact of these reforms on firm performance, the interviews revealed that the impact is 
likely to be mixed and highly dependent on individual directors’ skills and integrity. The 
Sarbanes Oxley regulation on governance brought in the US after the Enron scandals 
has been criticized for focusing too much on the monitoring role of directors and not 
enough on the strategic role of directors (Hertig, 2005). Similar criticisms can be raised 
about the regulation of boards of banks in Kenya 
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8.4.5 Vetting of Directors 
Following also the Basel Core Principle 3, the CBK 2006 regulations also stipulate that 
all directors have to be vetted by the CBK. The vetting is based on a form called CBK/ 
IF1-2 entitled ‘Criteria for determining professional and moral suitability of persons in 
control of institutions licensed under the Banking Act’ (Central Bank of Kenya, 2006b). 
The form requires a wide range of data including: - personal information, employment 
& business record, details of all shareholding, details of all directorships and all 
borrowing. The form also attempts to judge the integrity of the director and requires 
information on the criminal records, censure by regulatory authorities, disciplinary 
proceedings by employers, and record of involvement in bankruptcy or fraud.  
 
This guideline has not been a constraint for FOB and GOB. However, it has had an 
impact on LPOB and SPOB and has led to significant changes in boards especially 
amongst SPOB.274  
 
 “In the past non-executive directors were chosen in terms of their 
reputation in the market rather than their actual knowledge of banking. 
Now, with the emergence of stringent and onerous regulation from CBK, 
management felt it was necessary to get a more diverse and professional 
board. Some of the main shareholders are on the board, but we are 
professional bankers” Bank 7, SPOB 
 
This regulation is likely to have a positive impact on the performance of banks. 
However, for all SPOB and some LPOB the key constraint in complying with this 
guideline was the difficulty in getting qualified non-executive directors with the right 
skill base and the high cost of these non-executive directors: 
 
“There is a big human resource constraint. The regulations are in terms of 
international best practice but the resources do not exist. We don’t have 
directors who really understand the regulations and also the skill base is just 
not there. CBK can specify that we need a risk director but as there are so 
few risk specialists in the market you get a half-baked person” Bank 4, 
LPOB, quoted 
                                                 
274 It should be recalled from Chapter 6 that several Asian-African SPOBs were already making changes at 
board level to change their image as ethnic banks.  
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“It is difficult to get professional management overnight” Bank 5, LPOB 
 
“It’s not easy to get board members. If CBK moves with an iron fist to 
ensure compliance amongst small banks, then they may not be able to cope. 
However, in the long run the costs are justified” Bank 7, SPOB 
 
“For a small bank, having so many board committees can be very expensive. 
Therefore the main constraint is a human resource problem – attracting the 
right directors, remunerating them and retaining them” Bank 6, SPOB 
 
Therefore, there remains the risk that there will be symbolic compliance with this 
regulation.  
 
8.4.6 Disclosure and Transparency 
Improvement of information disclosure systems is seen as key to improve corporate 
governance mechanisms and also to increase market discipline.275 This is linked to 
OECD Principle 5. In this respect the CBK and CMA guidelines specify several 
measures.  
 
The CMA corporate governance guidelines are more enlightened, as they require the 
company to publish the list of the top ten shareholders. The CBK guidelines do not 
state this as a requirement.276 As discussed in Chapter 6, the perceived reputation of the 
owners is a key factor determining the ability of banks to mobilize deposits. Therefore it 
would be very useful if banks also published the ownership structure to allow depositors 
to know the true ownership rather than making judgments based on perceived 
reputation of perceived owners.   
 
                                                 
275 This is also seen a key precondition of effective supervision in the Basel Guidelines. “Effective market 
discipline depends, in part, on adequate flows of information to market participants, appropriate financial 
incentives to reward well managed institutions, and arrangements that ensure that investors are not 
insulated from the consequences of their decisions. Among the issues to be addressed are corporate 
governance and ensuring that accurate, meaningful, transparent and timely information is provided by 
borrowers to investors and creditors” (Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 2006).  
276 Therefore, Table 30 above had to be constructed from interview data.  
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One of the key CBK requirements to improve transparency and disclosure is the 
requirement that banks adopt international accounting standards. It has been shown 
that adoption of international accounting standards have led to improved disclosure 
levels and comparability of financial statements (Nganga, Jain, & Artivor, 2003). By 
extension, it can be argued that this improved the ability of the regulator to performs its 
supervisory role.  
 
Another key requirement is that all banks have to publish financial statements on a 
quarterly basis in the national newspapers. The implicit logic of this requirement is that 
increased transparency and disclosure will increase market discipline (Rochet, 2004). 
However, as discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.5, the interviews revealed that banks in all 
segments agreed that the publication of financial statements has not led to improved 
understanding by minority shareholders, depositors or the general public. Furthermore, 
as will be discussed below in the section on minority shareholders, there is evidence for 
shareholder apathy in Kenya. Therefore this information disclosure system cannot be 
relied on as a mechanism to increase market discipline.  
 
While it is outside the scope of this chapter and thesis, we would like to highlight a key 
concern regarding the concept of market discipline. As discussed in Chapter 6, it has 
become a very popular concept and has been enshrined as the third pillar of Basel II. 
However its theoretical foundations are still largely unexplored (Llewellyn, 2004; Rochet, 
2004; Tsatsaronis, 2004). There are serious questions as to whether market 
participants – depositors or shareholders - have the ability to monitor banks particularly 
in developing countries (Caprio & Honohan, 2004; Levy-Yeyati et al., 2004). 277 
Furthermore, studies that emphasize the role of psychology and herd behaviour in 
finance raise serious questions as to whether market discipline can be relied on as a 
regulatory force in finance. Therefore, there needs to be a serious debate on whether 
this market discipline should form a core basis of financial regulation. We would like to 
argue that in cases where this principle leads to a reduction in oversight by the regulator, 
it is likely to have detrimental effects on the overall performance of the financial sector.  
 
                                                 
277 Referring to the definition of market discipline of Tsatsaronis (2004) quoted earlier in Chapter 6, while 
shareholders can generally not be considered “outsiders”, we would like to highlight that minority 
shareholders can be considered “outsiders.” 
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8.4.7 Insider Lending 
As discussed in Chapter 7, the literature shows that insider lending can have both 
positive and negative effects on bank performance. As discussed in Chapter 1, the 
interviews revealed very little on insider lending with most banks just saying that they do 
not practice it. The little evidence we have on the banking sector in Kenya show that 
insider lending is ruinous to bank performance. For example Trust Bank, which closed 
in 1998, had total loan portfolio of KShs. 10.1 billion. Of this 5.2 billion (52%) was non-
performing. In addition there was another 2.6 billion (25%) of non-performing insider 
loans (KPMG, 1999). As shown in the table above the CBK guidelines now control 
insider lending. In particular the guidelines forbid unsecured insider lending. Table 34 
below shows that between 2001 – 2005 insider lending has decreased.278 
 
Table 34: Insider Lending in Kenyan Banks 2000 - 2005  
Directors Insider Lending / Total Loans 
              
Segment 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average 
FOB 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
GOB 9% 10% 7% 6% 7% 8% 
LPOB 6% 9% 8% 7% 5% 6% 
SPOB 10% 11% 8% 5% 4% 8% 
Total 6% 8% 6% 5% 4% 6% 
 
One of the possible reasons for the regulation for separation of ownership and 
management discussed above would be to reduce levels of insider lending. We would 
like to argue that control of insider lending through strict supervision or regulations that 
require high levels of capital commitment by shareholders are more likely to be a more 
effective tool than forced separation of ownership and management. As discussed in 
Chapter 7, the comparative study of different periods in Mexican banking showed that a 
system with very high capital ratios is one of the conditions under which insider lending 
is not pernicious (Maurer & Haber, 2007a, 2007b).   
                                                 
278 There is no consolidated data showing the levels of insider lending in the Kenyan banking sector 
before 2000. 
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8.5 Corporate Governance Areas without CBK Guidelines  
This section discusses some areas covered by OECD principles for which there are no 
corresponding CBK guidelines and assesses whether it may be appropriate to have such 
guidelines in Kenya. These areas are:- 
• Overall Corporate Governance Framework 
• Rights of stakeholders 
• Legal protection for minority shareholders 
• Corporate control of banks 
 
8.5.1 Overall Corporate Governance Framework 
The OECD principles state “The corporate governance framework should promote 
transparent and efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate 
the division of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement 
authorities”(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004 pp., 17). 
With reference to banks there is a general emphasis on the necessity of a sound legal 
sector and healthy corporate sector (Tobin & Singh, 2008). These institutional 
‘prerequisites’ for sound corporate governance are not prevalent in Kenya or most 
developing countries. Therefore, they should not be viewed as a prerequisite but a key 
challenge.279 It is difficult for the CBK to legislate for such a broad principle. However, 
it would be useful if there was recognition, by CBK and CMA, that corporate 
governance codes alone will not resolve all the problems of banks and corporations. 
There needs also to be recognition that these codes cannot replace the need for strong 
prudential regulation by the CBK.  
 
8.5.2 Rights of Shareholders and Stakeholders 
As the ownership structure of banks in Kenya is concentrated, the free rider problems 
of diffused share ownership do not arise and in general the owners are active in 
controlling management. However, the question still remains whether there are any 
mechanisms to protect and empower other stakeholders in particular depositors. As we 
had discussed in Chapter 7 the broadest view of corporate governance, which 
                                                 
279 Refer to the discussion on finance and institutions in Chapter 3 in particularly the criticisms of studies 
that refer to the percularity of African institutions.    
242 
emphasizes that governance mechanisms should be in the interest of all stakeholders, is 
extremely relevant. With reference to quoted companies in Kenya it has been argued 
that the corporate governance codes give very little protection to other stakeholders 
such as employees or customers (Musikali, 2008). We would like to argue that this is an 
important missing element in the corporate governance regulation of banks in Kenya. It 
would be extremely useful if the CBK codes emphasized the fiduciary duty of directors 
to depositors. Furthermore, instead of relying on publishing financial data in national 
newspapers in the vain hope that all depositors will read it and monitor banks, the CBK 
regulation should create a position for a director on the board who is elected by 
depositors. To date, the author is not aware of any country where such a regulation has 
been passed but we strongly believe it is an innovative way to increase market discipline.  
 
8.5.3 Legal Protection for Minority Shareholders in Kenya 
OECD principle 3 emphasizes equitable treatment of shareholders and in particular, 
legal protection for minority shareholders. It is argued, “While the presence of a 
controlling shareholder can reduce the agency problem by closer monitoring of 
management, weaknesses in the legal and regulatory framework may lead to the abuse of 
other shareholders in the company…. Such abuse may be carried out in various ways, 
including the extraction of direct private benefits via high pay and bonuses for 
employed family members and associates, inappropriate related party transactions, 
systematic bias in business decisions and changes in the capital structure through special 
issuance of shares favouring the controlling shareholder ” (Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 2004 pp., 42).  
 
The 2006 CBK Guidelines do not have any regulation relating to the protection of 
minority shareholders. However, the Companies Act in Kenya (Chapter 486 of the Laws 
of Kenya) does provide protection of minority shareholders (Kiboi, 2006). The main 
remedies available to minority shareholders through the Companies Act are in Section 
22 which allows minority shareholders to sue directors, under Section 219 which allows 
minority shareholders to go to court to demand winding up of the company and under 
Section 211 which allows for other remedies such as injunctions (Kiboi, 2006). However, 
overall the protection is deficient as firstly, there are no specific provisions for 
proportional representation of minorities on the boards (Nganga et al., 2003). Secondly, 
due to the concentration of ownership, even in quoted companies, minority 
shareholders do not have any other option but to ‘sell or sue’ (Nganga et al., 2003). 
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Thirdly, even though legal remedies are available for minority shareholders, there is 
limited awareness about these remedies (Kiboi, 2006). It has been shown that there is 
still a long way to go before shareholders in Kenya are educated on their rights the 
current training being provided is mainly targeted at company directors (Musikali, 2008).  
 
We would like to argue that adoption of this OECD guideline by the CBK would not 
necessarily improve the performance of banks for three main reasons. Firstly, as 
discussed above there are very few banks in Kenya that have minority shareholders. 
Secondly, it is important to make a distinction between corporate governance 
mechanisms that increase the participation of individuals in capital markets and 
therefore the availability of capital, and mechanisms that reduce agency problems 
between owners and management and ensure better performance. The NEPAD report 
bemoans the level of shareholder apathy and shareholder ignorance. 280  It argues 
“Decisions are often made by majority shareholders and the AGM often appears as a 
forum simply to endorse decisions” (New Partnership for Africa's Development 
(NEPAD), 2006 pp., 159). Interviews of banks across the segments concurred with this 
view and revealed that the minority shareholders were generally not concerned about 
the long-term future of the bank but only in the short-term annual dividend: 
 
“To date we have not had a single motion that has been proposed by the 
board that has been rejected at the AGM. Shareholders only express anger 
when we decide to reduce the levels of our dividends.” Bank 1, FOB 
 
“We have about 1100 small shareholders from our merger with XX Bank. 
During the AGM, they rarely ask any questions from the accounts except 
‘why have you not declared a dividend?’ Bank 5, LPOB 
 
“The small shareholders we have from our merger with XX Bank are more 
concerned about short term dividend policy than long term strategy of the 
bank.” Bank 7, SPOB 
 
Another interesting point revealed in the interviews was that even in cases where 
shareholders were also depositors, they played contradicting roles at the same time. 
                                                 
280 It should be noted that even in developed countries there is limited activism by minority shareholders 
(Glen & Singh, 2005; Singh, 1992).  
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They demand higher interest rates for their deposits, and, at the same time demand 
higher dividends. Therefore adoption of this guideline by the CBK will not necessarily 
improve the stability of the banking sector.  
 
8.5.4 Corporate Control of Banks 
The OECD Principle 2 - the rights of shareholders, also highlight the importance of the 
market for corporate control. “Markets for corporate control should be allowed to 
function in an efficient and transparent manner. The rules and procedures governing the 
acquisition of corporate control in the capital markets, and extraordinary transactions 
such as mergers, and sales of substantial portions of corporate assets, should be clearly 
articulated and disclosed so that investors understand their rights and recourse” 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004 pp., 19). The market 
for corporate control or takeovers is a crucial mechanism of disciplining management in 
the Anglo-American model of governance (La Porta et al., 2000).  
 
In the Kenyan context, even though the CBK guidelines do not have any specific 
regulations, the legal framework for mergers does exist. However, primarily because of 
ownership concentration, such a guideline does not seem to be important for any of the 
four segments. Interviews of banks across the segments indicated that the threat of 
takeover was not seen as significant even amongst quoted companies: 
  
 “No as a bank of our asset size we are underperforming, yet there is not 
threat of takeover as the ownership structure is tightly knit” Bank 4, LPOB, 
quoted 
 
“Not relevant at all in Kenya, unless global parent of foreign bank is taken 
over. Only the state owned or publicly quoted banks have slightly wider 
shareholding. But even in these, individuals are minority shareholders. If 
someone tried to buy incremental shares to get a larger stake it would just 
push up the price. In private banks the shareholding are closely held. 
Shareholders do not see the value of consolidation partly because it will be 
difficult to find similar shareholders with similar views.” Bank 3, LPOB 
 
245 
 “Not really with most of local small and medium sized banks controlled by 
family of small group of shareholders, there is not much threat of a take 
over.” Bank 7, SPOB 
 
“There is no threat of takeovers. The main constraint to merger is a 
generation issue and a mindset issue. There is also a practical issue. If you 
are not making a loss why take the risk of merging with another party when 
there is a risk of losing control” Bank 6, SPOB 
 
We would like to argue that when shareholding is highly concentrated, the threat of 
takeover cannot be seen as a reliable governance mechanism even when the laws that 
permit takeovers are clear. Furthermore, when the ownership structure is dominated by 
family ownerships, mergers and takeovers are also unlikely due to very specific social 
issues that are very hard to measure – including pride and reputation of the owners and 
the unwillingness of bank owners to give up control of their banks.  
 
8.6 Concluding Remarks 
In Chapter 7 we had shown that theoretically, ownership concentration is a product of 
social and historical factors and it cannot be stated a priori that either concentrated or 
diversified ownership is good for performance. Furthermore, we had shown that the 
separation of ownership and management is more common in the Anglo-American 
model of diffused ownership but in this corporate governance model raises several 
agency problems. The key contribution of this chapter is to show that the CBK’s 
regulation to enforce separation of ownership and management, only affects banks in 
LPOB and SPOB segment. However due to the high level of ownership concentration 
this regulation will only be complied to symbolically. We argued that if the aim of this 
regulation is to reduce insider lending (that has led to bank failures in Kenya in the past 
amongst owner-managed banks), it will fail in this objective due to symbolic compliance. 
Therefore, we have argued that strict control of insider lending by the regulator is 
essential to prevent abuse by directors and rather than this artificial separation of 
ownership and management.  
 
In Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 we had shown that the key constraint facing GOBs is high 
level of NPLS due to political interference. As these regulations cannot address this 
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issue, it is envisaged that the impact of these regulations on NPLS in this segment will 
be marginal.  
 
Finally we would like to argue that while some of the regulations, in particular, increased 
board oversight in credit committees are likely to have a positive impact on reducing 
NPLs in the LPOB and SPOB segment they do not address the key source of 
segmentation in the market. That is, they cannot increase the level of trust that clients of 
LPOB and SPOB have in the banks. Therefore their overall impact on the shallowness 
and fragility of the banking system in Kenya will be at best marginal.  
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CHAPTER 9 – CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY  
9.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we bring together the analysis in the preceding eight chapters and set out 
the research and policy implications of this thesis. Section 9.2 discusses the research 
summary and Section 9.3 summarizes key developments in the banking sector after the 
fieldwork of this thesis. Section 9.4 outlines the research and policy implications of this 
thesis.  
 
9.2 Research Summary 
9.2.1 Background, History and Segmentation 
In Chapter 1, we began by discussing the background and context of this study by 
presenting data on the shallowness, inefficiency and fragility of the banking sectors in 
SSA and Kenya. We also introduced the four segments of the Kenyan banking sector 
that we investigated – foreign owned banks, government owned banks, large private 
owned banks and small private owned banks. We went on to define the three key 
relationships in banking - lending, deposit mobilization and corporate governance and 
the research questions in reference of each of these. The research questions were:- 
 
Lending Relat ionship:  
• How is information collected, what type of information is collected, how is this 
information processed before a credit allocation decision is made? 
• What are the differences in credit allocation processes and monitoring that lead 
to differential outcomes in terms of good loans or bad loans? 
• What are the differences in the credit allocation process between different 
segments? 
• How do social relations affect credit relationships and how are these different 
amongst different segments?  
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Deposi t  Mobi l izat ion 
• What are the main constraints faced by banks when raising deposits? 
• What are the differences in constraints between different segments in the 
banking sector in Kenya? 
 
Corporate Governance  
• What is the structure of ownership and management of the banking sector and 
how is this different across different segments of the banking sector? 
• What is the impact of international codes of corporate governance on the 
development of regulations on corporate governance in Kenya? 
• What is the impact of changes in regulations on corporate governance on the 
corporate governance practices of banks?  Is the impact of these regulations 
different for different segments? 
 
In Chapter 1, we also discussed methodological basis for our work and emphasized the 
rationale for using semi-structured interviews during fieldwork. The chapter provided a 
summary of the data we had collected, the methods of data analysis and problems we 
had faced in data collection.  
 
We reviewed the main schools of thought on the links between finance and 
development in Chapter 2. The chapter discussed the debates on whether finance leads 
to growth, the debates surrounding the design of the financial system and the sources of 
financial fragility. The chapter showed that there is consensus on how finance can lead 
to growth and the functions that finance and banks should fulfill including encouraging 
saving, efficient allocation of resources, agglomerating capital and pooling of risk. 
However, we also saw that there is very little consensus on the circumstances and 
institutional characteristics that assist or impede finance to fulfill its functions. This 
thesis aims to fill this gap by bringing to light the specific institutional characteristics of 
the banking system in Kenya and explaining how these have driven the shallowness and 
fragility of the banking sector.  
 
In Chapter 3 we critically engaged with the literature on the financial sector in SSA. We 
showed that in contrast to the work on financial liberalization and micro finance there is 
a dearth of studies on the formal financial sector in SSA. More significantly we showed 
that because of the reliance on mainstream methodology and methods - including large 
cross country regressions, single country case studies based on the flawed assumption 
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that high concentration leads to inefficiency and an increasing use of development 
envelope analysis to calculate efficiency – these studies do little to increase our 
understanding of the constraints facing banks in SSA.  
 
In Chapter 4, we began by discussing the historical evolution of the banking sector in 
Kenya up to the period of focus of this thesis (2000-2005). In the chapter we presented 
data on overall performance of the banking sector including indicators on private credit 
to GDP, interest rate spreads and bank failures. We showed that despite policy changes 
from state control to liberalized financial systems the banking sector in Kenya remains 
shallow, fragile and inefficient. We argued that in line with other studies on finance in 
SSA, discussed in Chapter 3, studies on the Kenyan banking sector are deficient, in 
particular due to their reliance on mainstream methods and methodology. In line with 
mainstream papers we showed the banking sector is highly concentrated but more 
importantly that the first three banks to be established in Kenya remain dominant even 
in 2005. We rejected as simplistic the explanation that this high concentration is the 
cause of inefficiency.  
 
In Chapter 4 we further argued that understanding the nature of segmentation of the 
banking sector is key to understanding this dominance and more generally the poor 
performance of the banking sector in Kenya. Using data from banks’ financial 
statements we calculated key performance indicators of the four segments of the 
banking sector in Kenya – FOB, GOB, LPOB and SPOB. We showed that there was 
not much difference between the segments in terms of capital adequacy – but in terms 
of lending and deposit mobilization, there were significant differences between the 
segments. Foreign and government owned banks enjoy higher margins than large and 
small private owned banks. While high levels of NPLs in GOB have been well 
documented in the literature, we showed that SPOB also had high levels of NPLs. We 
also showed the cost of funds of SPOB is relatively high and that bank failures are 
concentrated in the SPOB segment. Finally we showed that LPOBs have been relatively 
successful in increasing their market share. The rest of the thesis attempted to 
understand the sources of these differences. Why do FOBs and GOBs earn higher 
margins? And how have LPOBs managed to expand their presence in the market, while 
SPOB have suffered not only low margins and lack of growth but also high share of 
NPLs? 
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9.2.2 Lending and Deposit Mobilization 
We found that there was no single theoretical framework that would help us analyze 
these questions and in Chapter 5 we brought together several theoretical concepts from 
heterodox schools that are relevant to understanding the lending and the deposit 
mobilization process and therefore the differences in performance of the different types 
of banks. We argued that the Post Keynesian concept of knowledge creation has much 
to contribute to our understanding of the lending process above and beyond the 
concept of information asymmetry that is usually employed. This is because the concept 
of knowledge creation emphasizes that both borrower and lender are operating in an 
uncertain world and with both parties need to employ judgment in the risk assessment 
process. We also highlighted the Marxist concept that of credit creation is based on trust 
and credit relations are embedded in social relations. We also discussed the significance 
of trust between banks and depositors in deposit mobilization. We argued that this 
depends on the level of economic development and therefore it cannot be simply 
assumed to exist for developing financial sectors and emphasized that social factors are 
also important in determining this trust. The theoretical concepts brought together in 
this chapter emphasize that social and trust factors are more important in driving 
banking sector behavior than is typically recognized in mainstream literature.  
 
In Chapter 6 we described the constraints to lending that were revealed in the interview 
data. In particular we showed that the constraints that are well discussed in the literature 
- that is - the economic and legal environment – affect all segments though they affect 
the SPOB segment disproportionately.  The key aim of Chapter 6 was to highlight the 
social constraints to lending that are not discussed in the literature. In particular 
consistent with our argument in Chapter 5, the interviews confirmed the importance of 
fluid social factors and the intricacies of inadequate information production and 
monitoring. We showed that each of the segments faces clients of different size and 
type and this is the basis of segmentation. In particular social factors affect the SPOB 
segment disproportionately, explaining the low margins and high NPLs of SPOB. 
Moreover, the data indicated that the impact of social factors is complex and not uni-
directional. We also argued that to be able to effectively monitor clients, banks need to 
develop a mix of arm’s length and embedded relationships and that embedded 
relationships should not be discouraged by regulation. Several LPOB have been able to 
do this, and this improvement in performance is consistent with their success in 
increasing their market share. We also showed that due to the importance of social 
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factors, banks see the soft information they gather as extremely useful in making lending 
decisions. Therefore we argued that while credit registries are useful, they are not a 
replacement for the need for banks to really understand their clients. It is also 
interesting to draw a parallel between this finding and the debates on methodology by 
heterodox economists that we discussed in Chapter 1. Just as bankers value both hard 
and soft information, economist should value both quantitative and qualitative data.  
 
In Chapter 6 we further explained that the key constraint faced by SPOB and LPOB in 
raising deposits is their reputation. We argued that this reputation bias explains why they 
face a higher cost of funds. This reputation bias is linked to the stage of banking 
development of the Kenyan banking sector where depositors do not trust all banks 
equally, that is, there are different radiuses of trust within one banking system. Overall 
we showed that segmentation is the result of fragmentation rather than specialization as 
banks in LPOB and SPOB segment are trying to move away from their traditional client 
base but facing significant constraints in doing so. Segmentation also implies that there 
are few positive spill-over effects of competition. We also argued that segmentation is 
both a cause and consequence of shallowness and fragility.  
 
9.2.3 Corporate Governance 
In Chapter 7 we provided a synthesis of the corporate governance literature focussing 
on the two main schools of corporate governance – the Anglo-American and the 
Eurasian Schools. We showed that ownership patterns and corporate governance are 
the product of social and historical factors and therefore it is impossible to say a priori 
that certain structures are optimal for firm or bank performance. The chapter also 
considered studies on the impact of specific board reform on firm performance 
including - Board Size, Board Independence, CEO / Chairman Duality and Committee 
Structure of Boards - and again showed that there is very little empirical consensus on 
what should be considered as ‘best practice’. Despite the inconclusive nature of these 
studies, we showed that studies on corporate governance in SSA were mainly 
econometric studies that assume the certain firm characteristics will have impact on firm 
performance. We argued that there was little attempt to understand how ownership 
patterns have evolved over time and how even within a country, different firms can 
have different governance structures. Chapter 7 then discussed the specific problem of 
insider lending which is a key corporate governance issue of owner-managed banks. 
Again we showed that it should not be assumed a priori that all owner-managed banks 
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are vehicles for looting and that there is a need to understand the circumstances in 
which looting is not pernicious.  
 
In Chapter 8 we applied this framework to the Kenyan case by reviewing quantitative 
and qualitative data on corporate governance of banks in Kenya. Continuing the 
discussion on the historical development of the banking sector in Chapter 4, this 
chapter analyzed the data on the ownership structure of the banking sector and showed 
that most of the banks had a concentrated ownership structure. We then discussed the 
regulation on corporate governance introduced by the CBK linking these regulations to 
the OECD and Basel corporate governance principles. We argued that the CBK’s 
regulation to enforce separation of ownership and management was not based on either 
OECD or Basel principles but implicitly based on the assumption that the Anglo-
American model of governance (which separates ownership and control) should be 
considered as ‘best practice’. We argued that due to the highly concentrated ownership 
structure of the banking sector and the high prevalence of owner-managed banks, 
within the LPOB and SPOB segments, this regulation would only be complied with 
symbolically. We argued that strict control of insider lending through supervision and 
regulations that require higher levels of capital commitment by shareholders are 
essential to prevent abuse by directors that has led to bank failures in the past.  
 
We argued that some corporate governance regulations in particular the involvement of 
directors in credit committees is likely to improve the asset quality of banks in particular 
SPOB. However, as these corporate governance measures do not address the reputation 
bias against SPOB and cannot change the client base of SPOB they will do little to 
impact the nature of segmentation of the banking sector. Therefore their impact on 
overall shallowness and fragility of the sector will be marginal.  
 
253 
 
9.3 Developments in the Banking Sector Post Fieldwork 
9.3.1 Performance of the Banking Sector  
The fieldwork for this thesis was carried out in 2006 and the majority of data discussed 
in Chapter 4 is from 2000 – 2005. Of course the Kenyan banking sector has continued 
to develop since 2005.  
 
Table 35: Kenyan Banking System Indicators 2004 and 2008 
 2004  2008 
Liquid Liabilities to GDP 40% 36% 
Private Sector Credit to GDP 25% 24% 
Net Interest Margin 7% 7% 
Interest rate spread 13% 13% 
Nonperforming Loans on Total Loans 41% 11% 
Source:- 
1) 2004 data is from Table 1 in Chapter 1. As noted in Chapter 1, the data on 
NPLs is for 2001.  
2) 2008 data is from Beck et al.(2010). 
 
The table shows that there has not been any significant financial deepening in the 
banking sector. Liquid liabilities to GDP ratio in 2008 was 36% and private credit to 
GDP ratio in 2008 was 24% both of which are lower than the figures for 2004 (Beck et 
al., 2010).281 The figures of interest rate spreads and interest rate margins are almost 
identical to the figures for 2008.282  
 
The table shows that the key improvement in the banking sector in Kenya is the quality 
of credit. The ratio of non-performing loans on total loans in 2008 was 10.9% (Beck et 
al., 2010) and therefore a dramatic improvement from the figure of 41% in 2001. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, economic factors play a key role in determining the level of 
NPLs and Kenya experienced significant GDP growth of approximately 6% from 2004 
                                                 
281 As discussed in Chapter 1, these are the two main indicators of financial deepening. See Chapter 1, 
Table 1 
282 Refer to discussions on interest rate spreads in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3 and Section 4.4.4.  
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onwards. Furthermore, it shows that the regulatory measures brought in by CBK that 
we discussed in Chapter 4 and the changes in lending practices brought in by banks 
themselves that we discussed in Chapter 6 have borne fruit. However, as pointed out by 
Beck et al.(2010) this ratio is still considerably higher than NPL ratio for other emerging 
markets for example Brazil and South Africa which had NPL ratios of 4.4% and 1.1% 
respectively, and therefore there is still room for considerable improvement.  
 
While we do not have the complete disaggregated data for the different segments, Beck 
et al.(2010) show the cost of funds is still higher for private banks. In 2008 the average 
deposit rate for private banks was 3.81% but for foreign owned banks was 2.09% and 
government owned banks was 2.08%.283 
 
Overall this indicates that while the banking sector in Kenya has become slightly more 
stable, it still remains fairly shallow, inefficient and highly segmented. 
 
9.3.2 Industry Structure 
Some of the key specific developments in the banking sector have been consolidations 
and takeovers: CFC Bank (LPOB numbered 16) and Stanbic Bank (FOB numbered 4) 
merged in 2008 to create a large integrated financial services firm including an 
investment bank (Gikunju, 2008).284 EABS Bank (SPOB numbered 24) was taken over 
by ECOBank a West African banking group in 2008 (Okoth, 2010). At the end of 2009, 
the CBK had approved the merger of Southern Credit Banking Corporation (SPOB 
numbered 30) and Equatorial Commercial Bank (SPOB numbered 34). This merger was 
to ensure that both banks met the new minimum capital requirement of KShs. 350 
million and will operate under the name of Equatorial Commercial Bank (Michira, 
2010). CBK had also approved the takeover of City Finance Bank (SPOB numbered 41) 
by a newly established microfinance bank – Jamii Bora Bank (Anyanzwa, 2010a). We 
view all these developments as positive. It is hoped the large LPOB – CFC-Stanbic 
Bank will be able to overcome some of the reputation bias of LPOB and compete with 
                                                 
283 The authors do not differentiate between large private owned banks and small private owned banks as 
we have in the thesis.  
284 The numbering refers to the bank number in Table 19 in Chapter 4. This numbering is distinct from 
the labels used in discussing the interview data - Bank 1 to Bank 7. As discussed in Chapter 1 we have not 
disclosed the names of the banks we have interviewed.  
255 
FOB. It is also hoped that larger SPOB will be able to compete more effectively across 
their segment with some LPOB.  
 
There was only one bank failure between 2006 and 2010: Charterhouse Bank (SPOB 
numbered 31) was put into statutory management in 2006. In the terminology used in 
Table 17 in Chapter 4 this bank can be referred to as political with African and Asian-
African ownership. This case is particularly intriguing as reports indicate that it was 
neither illiquid nor insolvent but was put under statutory management due to suspicion 
of money laundering activities being carried out in the bank (Anyanzwa, 2010b; Mutua, 
2010). We have not found any detailed analysis of the reasons for this bank failure 
published by the CBK or any other economist. Newspaper reports indicate a tussle 
between the head of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority who is arguing that there is 
firm evidence for fraud carried out in this bank and the Attorney General and Director 
of Public Prosecution who are arguing that they do not have any evidence to prosecute 
former directors of the bank (Anyanzwa, 2010b; Mutua, 2010). To date there has been 
no resolution of this situation and the bank has not been re-opened nor put into 
liquidation. We would like to argue that this is an extremely negative development.  This 
prolonging of the ‘Charterhouse saga’ only adds to the lack of trust that depositors have 
in banks in the SPOB segment in general.  
 
One of the key changes in the banking sector has been the rise of Equity Bank (LPOB 
numbered 21). In 2005, Equity Bank was the 13th largest bank in Kenya with an asset 
size of KShs. 11.5 billion and a market share of 1.8%. By 2008 it was the sixth largest 
bank in Kenya by asset size with assets of over KShs. 78.8 billion and market share of 
6.5% (Think Business Ltd, 2009).285 Furthermore, due to a listing on the NSE and an 
injection of capital by the private equity firm Helios Capital, Equity Bank becomes the 
third largest bank in Kenya by capitalization with a total capital of KShs. 19.5 billion 
(Omondi, 2007a). In Chapter 4, we had discussed the dominance of the three largest 
banks in terms of both asset size and capital base – Barclays Bank, KCB and Standard 
Chartered Bank – since independence. While Equity Bank has not broken this 
dominance in terms of total assets, it has broken it in terms of total capital and this is 
undoubtedly a remarkable achievement. It is all the more remarkable as in 1994 Equity 
Building Society was declared technically insolvent by the CBK and was only spared 
                                                 
285 Equity Bank had over 2 million customers and 76 branches and 350 ATM machines (G. Wright & 
Cracknell, 2008). 
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liquidation due to a shareholder injection of capital (G. Wright & Cracknell, 2008).  
Equity Bank is a microfinance bank and has received numerous accolades due to is 
focus on making financial services available to the poor and the ‘unbanked’ (Equity 
Bank Ltd, 2009). Studies have attributed their success to developing innovative products 
including ‘no-collateral’ loans, customer focus, investment in human resources and 
investment in technology (Coates, 2007; G. Wright & Cracknell, 2008). The average 
loan size of Equity Bank is only KShs. 16,000.286 Therefore, in terms of the broader 
debate on finance and development, it is highly questionable whether the Equity Bank 
model can fulfil the long-term needs of investment in the real sector.287  
 
Furthermore, we would like to argue that the rise of Equity Bank only emphasizes our 
key argument that social factors and trust are extremely important in banking systems in 
developing countries. We would like to argue that a key reason for the success of Equity 
Bank is the close association between the Chairman (Mr. Peter K. Munga), key 
shareholder (Mr. Jimnah Mbaru of Britac Investments), and CEO (Dr. James Mwangi) 
and the government of President Mwai Kibaki.288 This has meant that while Equity 
Bank is not a government owned bank, its reputation in terms of stability and trust of 
depositors, is close to that of a government owned bank. This argument is further 
                                                 
286 This is equivalent to USD 220 at exchange rate for December 2005. This is very small compared to the 
minimum average of $137,100 for LPOB and $68,500 for SPOB as discussed in Chapter 6.  
287 All the arguments on the sustainability of microfinance and the questions on whether microfinance 
reaches the poorest in a country apply in this case as well (Hailu, 2008; Morduch & Armendariz, 2004; 
Nissanke, 2002).  
288  While Kenya registered impressive GDP growth between 2002 and 2007 under the Kibaki 
administration it has been shown that this was very skewed in terms of geographical and ethnic 
distribution (Kanyinga, 2007). It has been argued that Kikuyuization of economic resources under 
Kenyatta and Kalenjinization under Moi was followed by re-Kikyuization under Kibaki (Lynch, 
forthcoming). During the 2007 election the two main contenders were Raila Odinga of the Organge 
Democratic Party and the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity. While the all 
the early polling results indicated that Raila Odinga would win the election, the results announced by the 
electoral commission put Mwai Kibaki as the winner and he was sworn in an extremely hurried ceremony 
(Cheeseman, 2008). The results were highly disputed and were followed by eruption of inter-ethnic 
violence (Cheeseman, 2008). During this period the camp of Raila Odinga, attempted to mobilize support 
by boycotting businesses close to Mwai Kibaki. Equity Bank was on the list of business that were 
boycotted by the supporters of Raila Odinga. After intense negotiations, under the auspices of the African 
Union, a peace accord was signed on 27th February 2008 and Raila Odinga joined the government of 
President Kibaki as his Prime Minister.  
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corroborated by the data that Equity Bank enjoys the highest net interest margin and the 
lowest cost of deposits of all banks in Kenya (Coates, 2007).  
 
9.3.3 Innovations 
Another key development has been the issue of bonds by some FOB and a few LPOB 
to raise finance directly from the Nairobi Stock Exchange. In 2008, bonds were issued 
by Barclays Bank (FOB numbered 1), newly merged CFC-Stanbic Bank (now a FOB) 
and I&M Bank (LPOB numbered 19). Again this is a positive development as it allows 
banks to raise funds at a cheaper rate than from depositors. However we can raise two 
points of concern. First, diffused bond holders will not be able to exert any monitoring 
role of the banks and therefore it should not be assumed that the issuance of bonds will 
increase market discipline on the banks concerned. Secondly, is to recognize that no 
SPOB has been able to issue a bond to date and therefore the cost of funds for this 
segment will continue to be high.  
 
Another key development in the financial services sector in Kenya has been the launch 
of M-Pesa by mobile phone service provider Safaricom in March 2007. M-Pesa (“M” 
stands for mobile and “Pesa” is the Swahili word for money) is a small value electronic 
payment and store of value system that is accessible from ordinary mobile phones (Mas 
& Radcliffe, 2010a). Its growth has been phenomenal and in 2010 had over 9 million 
registered users which corresponds to 40% of Kenya’s adult population (Mas & 
Radcliffe, 2010a). It has become the most popular money transfer mechanism in Kenya 
and it is estimated that USD 415 million per month is transacted in person-to-person 
transfers, equal to 17% of Kenya’s 2009 GDP on an annualized basis (FSD Kenya, 
2009b; Mas & Radcliffe, 2010b). Studies that estimate access to semiformal finance in 
Kenya have calculated that it has increased from 7.5% in 2006 to 18% in 2009 (FSD 
Kenya, 2009a).289 There is also evidence the M-Pesa users use the account as a savings 
mechanism even though it does not pay interest (FSD Kenya, 2009a).  
 
In May 2010 there was another interesting innovation with the launch of M-Kesho 
jointly by Safaricom and Equity Bank (M. Kamau, 2010). Kesho is the Swahili word for 
                                                 
289 As discussed in Chapter 1, this thesis does not discuss access to finance or financial inclusion of the 
poor but instead focuses on formal finance. However we are discussing it here due to the remarkable 
growth of this service.  
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tomorrow and the product allows users to move money between their M-PESA ‘mobile 
wallet’ and an interest-bearing account held with Equity Bank. If successful, this tie-up 
would dramatically expand poor households’ access to savings accounts. However two 
key concerns can be raised. First, the CBK needs to formalise the regulation of mobile 
banking and (branchless banking in general) to contain the inherent risks (Alexandre, 
Mas, & Radcliffe, 2010). Secondly, while financial access is an extremely valid 
development goal, it does not resolve the key question we had posed in the beginning of 
this thesis  - which is the need for financial institutions that are able to finance long-
term productive investment.  
 
9.4 Issues for Research and Policy Directions 
This thesis has shown the value of country specific social factors in understanding the 
institutional constraints that impact the shallowness and fragility of a banking system.  
 
With reference to banking sectors in SSA and other developing countries this thesis 
emphasizes that the research agenda should include studies that: - 
• Bring together understanding of lending, deposit mobilization, corporate 
governance and regulation of banking specific countries rather large cross-
country studies.  
• Put the level of trust between banks and borrowers and banks and depositors at 
the heart of the research.  
• Attempt to understand the social factors that affect lending relationships.  
• Attempt to elucidate the social factors that shape the trust depositors have in the 
banks they save with moving away from studies that simply emphasize the 
pernicious effects of deposit insurance.  
• Aim to understand the history of ownership patterns of banks and the 
implication of these ownership patterns for the design of corporate governance 
regulation.   
• Use both qualitative and quantitative data.  
• Bring together plural and heterodox theoretical concepts.  
• Quantitative studies using non-parametric statistical techniques that do not 
specify dependent and independent variables a priori, including cluster or factor 
analysis (Finch & McMaster, 2003).  
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With specific reference to the banking sector in Kenya the following would greatly 
increase our understanding above and beyond the analysis in this thesis:- 
• The need to consolidate our understanding of bank failures by collecting and 
analyzing data on failed banks from the Deposit Protection Fund Board. 290  
• Interdisciplinary research to understand why and how informal social 
monitoring mechanisms between Asian-African banks and their predominantly 
Asian-African clients developed and then broke down.  
• Interviews of depositors of banks of different segments to understand the non-
price reasons why they bank with the bank they do and why they trust the bank 
in which they are depositing their savings.  
 
We now discuss some suggestions on policy based on the findings of this thesis. In the 
literature the key policy question is generally stated as “how should regulators ensure 
competitive markets to increase financial intermediation while ensuring stability?” This 
study while based on the specific context of the banking sector in Kenya, has suggested 
that the key question for policy makers attempting to improve any SSA banking system 
should be: - “how can regulators increase trust in the entire system?” As we have shown, 
trust is based on several social factors and therefore not under the direct control of a 
regulator – although we do believe there are policies the regulator can put in place to 
support the establishment of trust relationships. One suggestion is to increase the 
minimum capital requirement of all banks. We envisage that increasing size is one route 
through which private banks can overcome the reputation bias against them. 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 8, better capitalized banks are less prone to insider 
lending and a reduction in bank failures in the SPOB segment will increase the trust of 
banks in that segment as a whole. As discussed in Chapter 4 the minimum capital 
requirements in Kenya are set to rise to KShs. 1 billion (approximately US$ 12.5 million) 
by 2012, which - if enforced - should strengthen the sector.  
 
In terms of prudential regulation we would like to argue that besides the Basel Capital 
Ratios a key statistic that regulators should monitor is the cost of funds for banks. A 
very high cost of funds is an early indicator that the bank will experience solvency 
problems in the future and should prompt the regulators to be vigilant of the bank 
                                                 
290 As we had discussed in Chapter 1, we were not able to get data from or speak to anyone at the Deposit 
Protection Fund Board which is responsible for liquidating failed banks. 
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concerned and if necessary take corrective steps including asking the management to 
curtail lending and / or asking the shareholders to increase capital in the bank.  
 
Finally we would like to advocate that other stakeholders including a representative of 
depositors should be given legislated role on the board of banks. This will increase the 
direct monitoring of banks and therefore be an additional safeguard against insider 
lending. It would also help to build and maintain trust relationships between the bank 
and the depositor base and potentially reduce the cost of funds for the bank. We realise 
that this mechanism has not been tried and would require significant legal changes. 
However, we believe that this a better mechanism than the current system of simply 
publishing financial information of banks in the media and expecting all market 
participants to act on it.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
261 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Aaronovitch, S., & Aaronovitch, K. (1947). Crisis in Kenya. London: Lawrence & Wishart. 
Abdi, A. (1977). Commercial Banks and Economic Development : The Experience of Eastern 
Africa. New York: Praeger. 
Abu-Bader, S., & Abu-Qarn, A. (2008a). Financial Development and Economic Growth: 
Empirical Evidence from Six MENA Countries. Review of Development Economics, 
12(4), 803-817. 
Abu-Bader, S., & Abu-Qarn, A. (2008b). Financial Development and Economic 
Growth: The Egyptian Experience. Journal of Policy Modeling, 30(5), 887-898. 
Adam, C., & O'Connell, S. (1999). Aid, Taxation and Development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Economics & Politics, 11(3), 225. 
African Centre for Open Governance (AFRICOG). (2008). Mission Impossible? 
Implementing the Ndung'u Report. Nairobi. 
Agarwala, R. (1983). Price Distortions and Growth in Developing Countries. Policy 
Research Working Paper(575). 
Aikaeli, J. (2006). Efficiency and the Problem of Excess Liquidity in Commercial Banks in 
Tanzania. University of Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam. 
Aikaeli, J. (2008). Commercial Banks Efficiency in Tanzania, CSAE Conference 2008 - 
Economic Development in Africa. Oxford. 
Akinboade, O. (2000). The Relationship between Financial Deepening and Economic 
Growth in Tanzania. Journal of International Development, 12, 939-950. 
Al-Zubi, K., Al-Rjoub, S., & Abu-Mhareb, E. (2006). Financial Development and 
Economic Growth: A New Empirical Evidence From The Mena Countries, 
1989-2001. Applied Econometrics and International Development, 6(3). 
Alawode, A. (2003). Evaluating Banking Supervision in Africa. World Bank Africa Region 
Working Paper Series, 53. 
Alexandre, C., Mas, I., & Radcliffe, D. (2010). Regulating New Banking Models that can Bring 
Financial Services to All. Seattle, Washington: Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
Allen, F. (2005). Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 21(2), 164-177. 
Allen, F., & Gale, D. (2004). Competition and Financial Stability. Journal of Money, Credit 
& Banking, 36(3), 453-480. 
Anonymous Depositor. (1999, 11th May 2009). The Inside Story of Reliance Bank's 
Woes. East African Standard. 
Anyanzwa, J. (2009, 4th June 2009 ). CBK Predicts Major Mergers in Banking Sector 
East African Standard. 
Anyanzwa, J. (2010a, 29th March 2010). City Finance Buys Out Jamii Bora. East African 
Standard. 
Anyanzwa, J. (2010b, 8th October 2010). Don't Reopen Bank, says KACC. East African 
Standard. 
Arestis, P., & Eatwell, J. (Eds.). (2008). Issues in Finance and Industry: Essays in Honour of 
Ajit Singh. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Armour, J., Deakin, S., Lele, P., & Siems, M. (2007). How Do Legal Rules Evolve? 
Evidence from a Cross-Country Comparison, Finance and Development Conference. 
LSE: World Economy and Finance Research Programme. 
Armour, J., Deakin, S., Sarkar, P., Siems, M., & Singh, A. (2008). Shareholder Protection 
and Stock Market Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins 
Hypothesis. World Economy and Finance Research Programme Working Paper Series, 
0041. 
Armour, J., & Lele, P. (2008). Law, Finance, and Politics: The Case of India. Centre for 
Business Research, University Of Cambridge Working Papers, 361. 
262 
Arun, T., & Turner, J. (2004). Corporate Governance of Banks in Developing 
Economies: Concepts and Issues. Corporate Governance, 12(3), 371-377. 
Aryeetey, E. (2003). Recent Developments in African Financial Markets: Agenda for 
Further Research Journal of African Economies, 12(Supplement 2), ii111-ii152. 
Aryeetey, E., Hettice, H., Nissanke, M., & Steel, W. (1997). Informal Financial Markets 
under Liberalisation in four African Countries. World Development, 25, 817-830. 
Aryeetey, E., Senbet, L., & Udy, C. (1997). Financial Liberalization and Financial 
Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of African Economies, 6(Suppl.1), to find. 
Aryeetey, E., & Udy, C. (1997). The Characteristics of Informal Financial Markets in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of African Economies, 6(Suppl. 1), 161-203. 
Atieno-Odhiambo, E. (2000). Mugo's Prophesy. In B. Ogot & W. Ochieng' (Eds.), Kenya: 
The Making of a Nation 1895-1995. Maseno and Kisumu: Maseno University. 
Aybar, S., & Lapavitsas, C. (2001). Financial System Design and the post-Washington 
Consensus. In B. Fine, C. Lapavitsas & J. Pincus (Eds.), Development Policy in the 
twenty-first century : beyond the post-Washington Consensus London: Routledge. 
Ayogu, M. (2001). Corporate Governance in Africa: The Record and Policies for Good 
Corporate Governance. African Development Review, 13(2), 308-330. 
Azam, J.-P. (1996). Savings and Interest Rate: The Case of Kenya. Savings and Development, 
XX(1), 33- 43. 
Baker, A. (2008). International Corporate Governance Principles, the Politics of Give 
and Take and the Virtues of Heterogeneity, The Political Economy of Corporate 
Governance. Queen's University, Belfast. 
Balachandran, P. (1981). An Embattled Community: Asians in East Africa Today. 
African Affairs, 80(320), 317-325. 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). (2006). Core Principles for Effective Supervision. 
Basel. 
Bank of Zambia. (2004). Financial Sector Development Programme (2004-2009). Lusaka: Bank 
of Zambia. 
Barth, J., Caprio, G., & Levine, R. (2006). Rethinking Bank Regulation and Supervision: Till 
Angels Govern. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Baumol, W., Panzar, J., & Willig, R. (1982). Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industrial 
Structure. San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
Becht, M., Jenkinson, T., & Mayer, C. (2005). Corporate Governance: An Assessment. 
Oxf Rev Econ Policy, 21(2), 155-163. 
Beck, T., Cull, R., Fuchs, M., Getenga, J., Gatere, P., Randa, J., et al. (2010). Banking 
Sector Stability, Efficiency, and Outreach in Kenya. World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper, 5442. 
Beck, T., Cull, R., & Jerome, A. (2005). Bank Privatization and Performance: Empirical 
Evidence from Nigeria. Journal of Banking & Finance, 29(8-9), 2355-2379. 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2000 - revised 2009). A New Database on 
Financial Development and Structure. World Bank Economic Review, 14, 597-605. 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2003). Law, Endowments and Finance. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 70, 137-181. 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2006). Bank Concentration, Competition, 
and Crises: First Results. Journal of Banking & Finance, 30, 1581-1603. 
Beck, T., & Fuchs, M. (2004). Structural Issues in the Kenyan Financial System: 
Improving Competition and Access. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 
3363. 
Beck, T., & Levine, R. (2002). Industry Growth and Capital Allocation: Does having a 
Market or Bank Based System Matter? Journal of Financial Economics(64), 147-180. 
Beck, T., & Levine, R. (2004). Stock markets, Banks, and Growth: Panel Evidence. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 28, 423-442. 
263 
Bencivenga, V., & Smith, B. (1991). Financial Intermediation and Endogenous Growth. 
Review of Economic Studies(58), 195-209. 
Benston, G., & Smith, C. (1976). A Transaction Cost Approach to the Theory of 
Financial Intermediation. Journal of Finance, 31, 215-231. 
Berger, A., & Humphrey, D. (1997). Efficiency of Financial Institutions: International 
Survey and Directions for Future Research  European Journal of Operational 
Research, 98 (2), 175-212. 
Berger, A., Hunter, W., & Timme, S. (1993). The Efficiency of Financial Institutions: A 
Review and Preview of Research Past, Present, and Future. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 17(2), 221- 249. 
Berle, A., & Means, G. (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1991 ed.). New 
Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers. 
Bernanke, B. (1983). Non Monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in Propagation of the 
Great Depression. American Economic Review, 73(3), 257-276. 
Bernanke, B., & Gertler, M. (1987). Banking in General Equilibrium In W. Barnett & K. 
Singleton (Eds.), New Approaches to Monetary Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Besanko, D., & Thakor, A. (1992). Banking Deregulation: Allocational Consequences of 
Relaxing Entry Barriers. Journal of Banking and Finance, 16, 909-932. 
Bhaduri, A. (1977). On the Formation of Usurious Interest Rates in Backward 
Agriculture. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1(4), 341-352. 
Bhaduri, A. (1981). Class Relations and the Pattern of Accumulation in an Agrarian 
Economy. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 5(1), 33-46. 
Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (2002). The Non-Correlation Between Board Indpendence and 
Long-Term Firm Performance. Journal of Corporation Law, 27(2), 231. 
Bhattacharya, S., & Thakor, A. V. (1993). Contemporary Banking Theory. Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, 3(1), 2-50. 
Black, J. (2002). M0, M1, M2, M3, A Dictionary of Economics. Oxford Oxford University 
Press. 
Blaikie, N. (2000). Designing Social Research: The Logic of Anticipation. Cambridge, UK, 
Malden, MA: Polity Press: Blackwell. 
Blin, M., & Siegmann, K. (2006). The Best of Two Worlds: Between-Method 
Triangulation in Feminist Economic Research. SOAS Deparment of Economics 
Working Paper Series, 146. 
Bosire Commission Report. (2004). The Judicial Commission of Inquiry  into The 
Goldenberg Affair. Nairobi: Government Printer. 
Boyd, J., & Prescott, E. (1986). Financial Intermediary-coalitions. Journal of Economic 
Theory, 38(2), 211-232. 
Brown, C. O., & Sedar, D. (2005). The Politics of Bank Failures: Evidence from 
Emerging Markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(4), 1413. 
Brownbridge, M. (1998a). Financial Distress in Local Banks in Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda 
and Zambia: Causes and Implications for Regulatory Policy. Development Policy 
Review, 16, 173-188. 
Brownbridge, M. (1998b). Government Policies & the Development of Banking in 
Kenya. In M. Brownbridge & C. Harvey (Eds.), Banking in Africa (pp. 79-103): 
Africa World Press, James Curry. 
Brownbridge, M., & Harvey, C. (1998). Banking in Africa: Africa World Press, Inc. 
Brownbridge, M., & Kirkpatrick, C. (2002). Financial Regulation and Supervision in 
Developing Countries: An Overview of the Issues. Development Policy Review, 
20(3), 243-245  
Brownbridge, M., Kirkpatrick, C., & Maimbo, S. (2005). Financial Regulation in 
Developing Countries: Policy and Recent Experience. In C. Green, C. 
264 
Kirkpatrick & V. Murinde (Eds.), Finance and Development: Surveys of Theory, 
Evidence and Policy. Cheltenham & Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 
Bruno, V., & Claessens, S. (2007). Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can There Be 
Too Much of a Good Thing? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 4140. 
Buchanan, J., & Deakin, S. (2007). Japan's Paradoxical Response to the New 'Global 
Standard' in Corporate Governance, Finance and Development Conference. LSE, 
London. 
Buchs, T., & Mathisen, J. (2005). Competition and Efficiency in Banking: Behavioral 
Evidence from Ghana. IMF Working Paper, 05(17). 
Byrd, J. W., & Hickman, K. A. (1992). Do outside directors monitor managers? : 
Evidence from tender offer bids. Journal of Financial Economics, 32(2), 195-221. 
Cable, V. (1969). The Asians of Kenya. African Affairs, 68(272), 218-231. 
Calomiris, C., & Kahn, C. (1991). The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal 
Banking Arrangements. American Economic Review, 81(3), 497-513. 
Capital Markets Authority. (2002). Guidelines on Corporate Governance Practices by 
Public Listed Companies in Kenya. Nairobi: Capital Markets Authority. 
Caprio, G. (1994). Banking on Financial Reform? A Case of Sensitive Dependence on 
Initial Conditions. In G. Caprio, I. Atiyas & P. Honohan (Eds.), Financial Reform. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Caprio, G., Atiyas, I., & Hanson, J. (1994). Financial Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Caprio, G., & Honohan, P. (2004). Can the Unsophisticated Market Provide Discipline? 
In C. Borio, W. Hunter, G. Kaufman & K. Tsatsaronis (Eds.), Market Discipline 
Across Countries and Industries. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
Caprio, G., & Klingebiel, D. (1996). Bank Insolvencies: Bad Luck, Bad Policy or Bad 
Banking?, Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics (ABCDE). 
Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
Caprio, G., Klingebiel, D., Laeven, L., & Noguera, G. (2005). Banking Crisis Database. 
In P. Honohan & L. Laeven (Eds.), Systemic Financial Crises : Containment and 
Resolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Caprio, G., & Levine, R. (2002). Corporate Governance in Finance: Concepts and International 
Observations. Paper presented at the Building the Pillars of Financial Sector 
Governance: The Roles of Public and Private Sectors - The 2002 World Bank, 
IMF and Brookings Institution Conference. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (1972). Money and Banking in Kenya (pp. 34). Nairobi: Central 
Bank of Kenya. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (1976). The First Ten Years. Nairobi: Central Bank of Kenya. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (1986). Central Bank of Kenya - It's Evolution, Responsibilities 
and Organization. Nairobi: Central Bank of Kenya. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (1995). Annual Report and Financial Statements July 1994 - 
June 1995. Nairobi: Central Bank of Kenya. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (1996). Annual Report and Financial Statements July 1995 - 
June 1996. Nairobi: Central Bank of Kenya. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (1997). Annual Report and Financial Statements July 1996 - 
June 1997. Nairobi: Central Bank of Kenya. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (1998). Bank Supervision Annual Report 1998. Nairobi: Central 
Bank of Kenya. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (1999). Annual Report and Financial Statements July 1998 - 
June 1999. Nairobi: Central Bank of Kenya. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (2000a). Bank Supervision Annual Report 2000. Nairobi: 
Central Bank of Kenya. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (2000b). Prudential Guidelines 2000. Nairobi: Central Bank of 
Kenya. 
265 
Central Bank of Kenya. (2001). Bank Supervision Annual Report 2001. Nairobi: Central 
Bank of Kenya. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (2002a). Bank Supervision Annual Report 2002. Nairobi: 
Central Bank of Kenya. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (2002b). Statistical Bulletin December 2002. Nairobi: Central 
Bank of Kenya. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (2003). Bank Supervision Annual Report 2003. Nairobi: Central 
Bank of Kenya. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (2004). Bank Supervision Annual Report 2004. Nairobi: Central 
Bank of Kenya. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (2005). Bank Supervision Annual Report 2005. Nairobi: Central 
Bank of Kenya. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (2006a). Bank Supervision Annual Report 2006. Nairobi: 
Central Bank of Kenya. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (2006b). Prudential Guidelines 2006. Nairobi: Central Bank of 
Kenya. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (2006c). Statistical Bulletin December 2006. Nairobi: Central 
Bank of Kenya. 
Central Bank of Kenya. (2008). Bank Supervision Annual Report 2008. Nairobi: Central 
Bank of Kenya. 
Centre for Corporate Governance Kenya. (2004). A Study of Corporate Governance Practices 
in the Commerical Banking Sector in Kenya: Centre for Corporate Governance Kenya. 
Chang, C., Liao, G., Yu, X., & Ni, Z. (2009). Information from Relationship Lending: 
Evidence from Loan Defaults in China. SSRN eLibrary. 
Chang, H.-J., Park, H.-J., & Yoo, C. G. (1998). Interpreting the Korean Crisis: Financial 
Liberalisation, Industrial Policy and Corporate Governance. Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 22, 735-746. 
Cheeseman, N. (2008). The Kenyan Elections of 2007: An Introduction. Journal of 
Eastern African Studies, 2(2), 166 - 184. 
Chege, M. (1997). Paradigms of Doom and the Development Management Crisis in 
Kenya. Journal of Development Studies, 33(4), 552-567. 
Cheng, X., & Degryse, H. (2010). Information Sharing and Credit Rationing: Evidence 
from the Introduction of a Public Credit Registry. European Banking Center 
Discussion Paper, 07S. 
Chick, V. (1992). The Evolution of the Banking System and Theory of Saving, 
Investment and Interest. In P. Arestis & S. Dow (Eds.), On Money, Method and 
Keynes: Selected Essays by Victoria Chick. London: Macmillan. 
Chick, V. (1997). Some Reflections on Financial Fragility in Banking and Finance. 
Journal of Economic Issues, 31(2), 535-541. 
Chick, V. (2008). Could the Crisis at Northern Rock Have Been Predicted?: An 
Evolutionary Approach. Contributions to Political Economy, 27(1), 115-124. 
Chirwa, E. (2001). Market Structure, Liberalisation and Performance of the Malawian 
Banking Industry. AERC Research Paper(108). 
Ciancanelli, P., & Reyes-Gonzalez, J. A. (2000). Corporate Governance in Banking: A 
Conceptual Framework. Paper presented at the European Financial Management 
Association Conference, Athens. 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. (2000). The Separation of Ownership and Control 
in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 81-112. 
Claessens, S., & Laeven, L. (2003). What Drives Bank Competition? Some International 
Evidence. Policy Research Working Paper(3113). 
Coates, B. (2007). Equity Bank. Stanford Graduate School of Business Case Study, E260. 
266 
Collier, P. (2004). African Growth: Why a Big Push is Needed - Plenary Session: 
Commission For Africa AERC Biannual Research Workshop. Nairobi, Kenya: 
AERC. 
Cramer, C. (2002). Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, 
Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War. World Development, 30(11), 
1845-1864. 
Cramer, C. (2003). Does Inequality Cause Conflict? Journal of International Development, 
15(4), 397-412. 
Cull, R., Fuchs, M., & Lovegrove, A. (2008). Financial Sector Effiiciency and Outreach in 
Kenya. Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
Cull, R., Haber, S., & Imai, M. (2006). All Bad, All of the Time? Related Lending and 
Financial Development. Wesleyan University, Deparment of Economics Working Paper, 
015. 
Cull, R., & Martinez Peria, M. S. (2007). Foreign Bank Participation and Crises in 
Developing Countries. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 4128. 
Dankova, P. (2006). Contemporary Corporate Governance - Shifting of the Accents. 
Economic Annals of University of Belgrade, 169(April 2006 - June 2006), 43- 61. 
Daumont, R., Gall, F., & Leroux, F. (2004). Banking in Sub-Saharan Africa: What went 
wrong? IMF Working Paper, 04(55). 
Deaton, A., Banerjee, A., Lustig, N., Rogoff, K., & Hsu, E. (2006). An Evaluation of 
World Bank Research 1998 - 2005 World Bank. 
Dedman, E. B. (2002). The Cadbury Committee Recommendations on Corporate 
Governance - A Review of Compliance and Performance Impacts. International 
Journal of Management Reviews, 4, 335-352. 
Deidda, L., & Fattouh, B. (2005). Financial Intermediaries, Markets and Growth: 
CeFims, School of Oriental and African Studies. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Detragiache, E. (1997). The Determinants of Banking Crises: 
Evidence from Developing and Developed Countries. IMF Working Paper, 
97(106). 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Detragiache, E. (2000). Monitoring Banking Sector Fragility: A 
Multivariate Logit Approach. World Bank Economic Review, 14(2), 287-307. 
Demirguc-Kunt, A., Kane, E., & Laeven, L. (2008). Deposit Insurance Design and 
Implementation: Policy Lessons from Research and Practice. In A. Demirguc-
Kunt, E. Kane & L. Laeven (Eds.), Deposit Insurance around the World: Issues of 
Design and Implementation. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: The MIT Press. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2001). Financial Structure and Economic Growth: A Cross 
Country Comparison of Banks, Markets and Development. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Diamond, D. (1984). Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring. Review of 
Economic Studies, 51, 393-414. 
Diamond, D., & Dybvig, P. (1983). Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity. Journal 
of Political Economy, 91, 401-419. 
dos Santos, P. (2007). Foreign Capital and Familial Control in Phillipine Banking. University 
of London, London. 
Dow, S. (1998). Knowledge, Information and Credit Creation. In R. Rotheim (Ed.), New 
Keynesian Economics/Post Keynesian Alternatives (pp. 214-226). London and New 
York: Routledge. 
Dow, S. (2002). Economic Methodology: an Inquiry. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Dow, S., Ghosh, D., & Ruziev, K. (2008). A Stages Approach to Banking Development 
in Transition Economies. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 31(1), 3-33. 
Downward, P., Finch, J., & Ramsay, J. (2003). Seeking a Role for Empirical Analysis in 
Critical Realist Explanation. In P. Downward (Ed.), Applied Economics and the 
Critical Realist Critique. London and New York: Routledge. 
267 
Downward, P., & Mearman, A. (2007). Retroduction as Mixed-Methods Triangulation 
in Economic Research: Reorienting Economics into Social Science. Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 31(1), 77-99(23). 
Economist Intelligence Unit. (1986). Kenya Country Report. London: The Economist. 
Egesa, K. (2006). Financial Sector Liberalisation and Productivity Change in Uganda's 
Commercial Banking Sector (Final Report), AERC Biannual Research Workshop 
Nairobi Kenya: AERC. 
Engberg, H. (1965). Commercial Banking in East Africa, 1950-1963. The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 3(2), 175-200. 
Equity Bank Ltd. (2009). Annual Report and Accounts. Nairobi. 
Evans, A., Green, C., & Murinde, V. (2002). Human Capital and Financial Development 
in Economic Growth: New Evidence Using the Translog Production Function. 
International Journal of Finance & Economics, 7(2), 123-140. 
Ewing, J., & Barclay, E. (2008). Safaricom's Big IPO in Africa. Businesweek. 
Fama, E. (1980). Banking in the Theory of Finance. Journal of Monetary Economics, 6(1), 
39-57. 
Fama, E., & Jensen, M. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 26, 301-325. 
Fare, R., Grosskopf, S., Lindgren, B., & Roos, P. (1994). Productivity Developments in 
Swedish Hospitals: A Malmquist Output Index Approach. In A. Charnes, W. 
Cooper, W. Lewin & L. Seifor (Eds.), Data Envelopment Analysis : Theory, 
Methodology, and Application. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Fargernas, S., Sarkar, P., & Singh, A. (2007). Legal Origin, Shareholder Protection and 
the Stock Market: New Challenges from Time Series Analysis, Finance and 
Development (Vol. World Economy & Finance Research Programme). LSE. 
Finch, J., & McMaster, R. (2003). A Pragmatic Alliance between Critical Realism and 
Simple Non-parametric Statistical Techniques. In P. Downward (Ed.), Applied 
Economics and the Critical Realist Critique. London and New York: Routledge. 
Fine, B. (2004). Addressing the Critical and the Real in Critical Realism. In P. Lewis 
(Ed.), Transforming Economics: Perspectives on the Critical Realist Project. London: 
Routledge. 
Fleetwood, S. (2007). Causal Laws, Functional Relations and Tendencies, Association of 
Heterodox Economists (AHE) Postgraduate Workshop. Bristol. 
Fosu, A., Kimenyi, M., & Ndung'u, N. (2003). Economic Reforms and Restructuring in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview. Journal of African Economies, 12(Supplement 2), 
ii1-ii11. 
Freixas, X., & Rochet, J.-C. (1997). Microeconomics of Banking (4th ed.). Cambridge and 
London: The MIT Press. 
Fry, M. (1988). Money, Interest and Banking in Economic Development. Baltimore, Maryland: 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
FSD Kenya. (2009a). FinAcess 2009 (Survey of Financial Access in Kenya 2009). Nairobi: 
Financial Sector Deepening Trust. 
FSD Kenya. (2009b). What Makes a Successful Mobile Money Implementation? M-Pesa in Kenya 
and Tanzania. Nairobi: Financial Sector Deepening Trust. 
Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: The 
Free Press Paperbacks. 
Fullbrook, E. (Ed.). (2004). A Guide to What's Wrong with Economics (First ed.). London: 
Anthem Press. 
Gerschenkron, A. (1962). Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Gertler, M., & Rose, A. (1994). Finance, Public Policy and Growth. In G. Caprio, I. 
Atiyas & P. Honohan (Eds.), Financial Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
268 
Ghirmay, T. (2004). Financial Development and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan 
African Countries: Evidence from Time Series Analysis. African Development 
Review, 16(3), 415-432. 
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. 
Cambridge: Polity. 
Gikunju, W. (2007, 17th December 2007). Kimunya hands Equity Nine Year Deal to 
Keep Real Owners Secret Business Daily Africa. 
Gikunju, W. (2008, 16th July 2008). CFC Stanbic Holdings Exempted Over Ownership. 
Business Daily Africa. 
Glen, J., & Singh, A. (2005). Corporate Governance, Competition, and Finance: Re-
Thinking Lessons From The Asian Crisis. Eastern Economic Journal, 31(2), 219-
243. 
Godbillon-Camus, B., & Godlewski, C. J. (2005). Credit Risk Management in Banks: 
Hard Information, Soft Information and Manipulation. Large Working Paper Series. 
Goldsmith, R. (1969). Financial Structure and Development. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press. 
Goodhart, C., Hartmann, P., Lleewllyn, D., Rojas-Suarez, L., & Weisbrod, S. (1998). 
Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now? London: Routledge and Bank of 
England. 
Gordon, A. (1998). The Wages of Affluence: Labour Management in Postwar Japan. Cambridge 
M.A.: Harvard University Press. 
Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness. The American Journal of Sociology, 91(3), 481-510. 
Granovetter, M. (1992). Economic Action and Social Structure : the Problem of 
Embeddedness. In M. Granovetter & R. Swedberg (Eds.), The Sociology of 
Economic Life (pp. vi, 399 p.). Boulder: Westview Press. 
Greenwald, B., & Stiglitz, J. (1993). Financial Market Imperfections and Business Cycles. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 77-114. 
Greenwood, J., & Jovanovic, B. (1990). Financial Development, Growth and the 
Distribution of Income. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5, part 1), 1076-1107. 
Greif, A. (1993). Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The 
Maghribi Traders' Coalition. American Economic Review, 83(3), 525. 
Grosh, B. (1991). Public Enterprises in Kenya : What Works, What Doesn't and Why. Boulder 
& London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Gurley, J., & Shaw, E. (1960). Money in the Theory of Finance. Washington: Brookings 
Institution. 
Guttentag, J., & Herring, R. (1987). Emergency Liquidity Assistance for International 
Banks. In R. Portes & A. Swoboda (Eds.), Threats to International Financial Stability. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Haas, R., & Naaborg, I. (2005). Does Foreign Bank Entry Reduce Small Firms' Access 
to Credit? Evidence from European Transition Economies. Netherlands Central 
Bank, Research Department, DNB Working Papers, 050. 
Haber, S. (2004). Comment on "How Foreign Participation and Market Concentration 
Impact Bank Spreads: Evidence from Latin America" by Maria Soledad 
Martinez Peria and Ashoka Mody. Journal of Money, Credit & Banking, 36(3), 539-
542. 
Habyarimana, J. (2005). The Benefits of Banking Relationships: Evidence from 
Uganda's Banking Crisis: Georgetown University. 
Hailu, D. (2008). Equitable Access to Financial Services: Is Microfinancing Sufficient? 
International Poverty Centre Policy Research Brief, 59. 
Harris, L. (1994). Financial Fragility in the Transition to Market Economies. SOAS 
Deparment of Economics Working Paper Series, 47. 
269 
Harriss, J. (2002). The Case for Cross-Disciplinary Approaches in International 
Development. World Development, 30(3), 487-496. 
Harriss, J. (2003). Widening the Radius of Trust: Ethnographic Explorations of Trust 
and Indian Business. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 9(4), 755-773. 
Hasan, Z. (2005). Evaluation of Islamic Banking Performance: On the Current Use of 
Econometric Models. Munich Personal RePEc Archive 7272. 
Hazlewood, A. (1979). The Economy of Kenya - The Kenyatta Era. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hertig, G. (2005). On-Going Board Reforms: One Size Fits All and Regulatory Capture. 
Oxf Rev Econ Policy, 21(2), 269-282. 
Heugens, P., & Otten, J. (2007). Beyond the Dichotomous Worlds Hypothesis: towards 
a plurality of corporate governance logics. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 15(6), 1288-1300. 
Himbara, D. (1994). Kenyan Capitalists, the State and Development. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner. 
Hodgson, G. (1988). Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modern Institutional 
Economics. Cambridge: Polity. 
Hodgson, G. (1998). The Approach of Institutional Economics. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 36(1), 166-192. 
Hodgson, G. (2001). How Economics Forgot History: The Problem of Historical Specificity in 
Social Science. London and New York: Routledge. 
Hoggarth, G., Reidhill, J., & Sinclair, P. J. (2004). On the Resolution of Banking Crises: Theory 
and Evidence: SSRN. 
Holmström, B., & Tirole, J. (1993). Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring. The 
Journal of Political Economy, 101(4), 678-709. 
Honohan, P. (2000). Banking System Failures in Developing and Transtion Countries: 
Diagnosis and Prediction. Economic Notes by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, 
2000(1), 83-109. 
Honohan, P., & Beck, T. (2007). Making Finance Work for Africa (1st ed.). Washington 
DC: World Bank. 
Irungu, G. (2007, 2nd October 2007). How Safe is Your Money in the Bank? Business 
Daily Africa. 
Irungu, G. (2010, 3rd June 2010). Why Top Banks are Wary of Small Rivals. Business 
Daily Africa. 
Isaksson, A., & Wihlborg, C. (2002). Financial Constraints on Kenyan Manufacturing. 
In A. Bigsten & P. Kimuyu (Eds.), Structure and Performance of Kenyan Manufacturing 
(1st ed.). Oxford and New York: Centre for the Study of African Economies, 
University of Oxford and Palgrave. 
Iskander, M., & Chamlou, N. (2000). Corporate Governance : A Framework for Implementation. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Jacobs, P. (2008). A New Generation of Heterodox Development Scholars. Review of 
African Political Economy, 35, 335-340. 
Jappelli, T., & Pagano, M. (1993). Information Sharing in Credit Markets. The Journal of 
Finance, 43(5), 1693-1718. 
Jappelli, T., & Pagano, M. (2002). Information Sharing, Lending and Defaults: Cross-
Country Evidence. The Journal of Banking & Finance, 26, 2017-2045. 
Jensen, M. (1993). The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal 
Control Systems. The Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831-880. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. 
Jeucken, M. (2001). Sustainable Finance and Banking : The Financial Sector and the Future of the 
Planet. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd. 
270 
John, K., & Senbet, L. (1998). Corporate Governance and Board Effectiveness. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 22, 371-403. 
Johnson, S. (2003). "Moving Mountains": An Institutional Analysis of Financial Markets Using 
Evidence from Kenya. University of Bath, Bath. 
Johnson, S. (2004a). Gender Norms in Financial Markets: Evidence from Kenya. World 
Development, 32(8), 1355-1374. 
Johnson, S. (2004b). The Impact of Microfinance Institutions in Local Financial 
Markets: A Case Study from Kenya. Journal of International Development, 16, 501-
517. 
Johnson, S. (2004c). 'Milking The Elephant' : Financial Markets as Real Markets in 
Kenya Development and Change, 35(2), 247-274. 
Johnson, S. (2005). Fragmentation and Embeddedness: An Alternative Approach to the 
Analysis of Rural Financial Markets. Oxford Development Studies, 33(3&4), 357-375. 
Kagira, B., & Kirkpatrick, C. (2001). Overview of the Kenyan Financial Sector and 
Recent Policy Reforms, International Conference on Finance and Development: Evidence 
and Policy Issues. Nairobi: KIIPRA. 
Kamau, A., Karingi, S., Ndung'u, N., & Mwaura, S. (2004). Capital Requirements and 
Bank Behaviour in Kenya: Empirical Evidence. KIPPRA Discussion Paper(36). 
Kamau, M. (2010, 18th May 2010). Equity Bank, Safaricom Unveil Product for the 
Unbanked. East African Standard. 
Kanyinga, K. (2000a). Re-distribution from Above : The Politics of Land Rights and Squatting in 
Coastal Kenya. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 
Kanyinga, K. (2000b). Re-distribution from Above: The Politics of Land Rights and Squatting in 
Coastal Kenya. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 
Kanyinga, K. (2007). Governance Institutions and Inequality in Kenya. In Society for 
International Development (Ed.), Readings on Inequality in Kenya: Sectoral Dynamics 
and Perspectives. Nairobi: Society for International Development. 
Kariuki, P. (1993). The Impact of Interest Rate Liberalisation on Financial Savings: The Case of 
Kenya. University of Sussex, Brighton. 
Kariuki, P. (1995). The Impact of Interest Rate Liberalisation on Financial Savings: The 
Case of Kenya. African Review of Money, Finance and Banking, 95, 5-20. 
Keeley, M. (1990). Deposit Insurance, Risk and Market Power in Banking. American 
Economic Review, 80(5), 1183-1200. 
Kenny, C., & Williams, D. (2001). What Do We Know About Economic Growth? Or, 
Why Don't We Know Very Much? World Development, 29(1), 1-22. 
Keynes. (1921 [1973]). A Treatise on Probability reprinted as The Collected Works of J.M. Keynes 
vol. VIII. London: Macmillan. 
Khatkhate, D. (1988). Assessing the Impact of Interest Rates in Less Developed 
Countries. World Development, 16(5), 577-588. 
Kiboi, E. (2006). Protection of the Rights and Interests of Minority Shareholders. Nairobi: Ameli 
Inyangu and Partners Advocates. 
Klausner, M., & White, L. (1993). Bank Regulatory Reform and Bank Structure. In M. 
Klausner & L. White (Eds.), Structural Change in Banking. New York: New York 
University. 
Klopp, J. (2000). Pilfering the Pubic: The Problem of Land Grabbing in Contemporary 
Kenya. Africa Today, 47(1), 6-26. 
KPMG. (1999). Trust Bank Limited: Scheme of Arrangement. Nairobi: KPMG. 
Kroll Associates. (2007). The Looting of Kenya under President Moi - 'The Kroll Report'  
Kumba, S. (2008, 19th September 2008). Time Running Out for Millions Lost in Euro 
Bank Scandal Daily Nation. 
Kyendo, M. (1999). CBK Seeks More Powers to Police Banks. Daily Nation. 
Kyereboah-Coleman, A. (2007). Corporate Governance and Shareholder Value 
Maximization: An African Perspective. African Development Review, 19(2), 350-367. 
271 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1998). Law and Finance. 
Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1113-1155. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000). Investor Protection 
and Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2), 3-27. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Zamarripa, G. (2003). Related Lending. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1). 
Lamoreaux, N. (1994). Insider Lending : Banks, Personal Connections, and Economic 
Development in Industrial New England Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lapavitsas, C. (2003). Social Foundations of Markets, Money, and Credit. London: Routledge. 
Lapavitsas, C. (2007). Information and Trust as Social Aspects of Credit. Economy and 
Society, 36(3), 416-436. 
Law, J., & Smullen, J. (Eds.). (2002). A Dictionary of Economics: Oxford University Press. 
Lawson, T. (1997). Economics and Reality. London: Routledge. 
Lawson, T. (2003). Reorienting Economics. London: Routledge. 
Lee, F. (2002). Theory Creation and the Methodological Foundation of Post Keynesian 
Economics. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 26, 789-804. 
Lee, F. (2007). The Research Assessment Exercise, the State and the Dominance of 
Mainstream Economics in British Universities. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 31, 
309-325. 
Leland, H., & Pyle, D. (1977). Information Assymetries, Financial Structure and 
Financial Intermediation. The Journal of Finance, 32, 371-387. 
Levine, R. (1997). Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda. 
Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (June), 688-726. 
Levine, R. (2002). Bank-Based or Market-Based Financial Systems: Which is Better? 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 11(4), 398-428. 
Levine, R. (2004). The Corporate Governance of Banks: A Concise Discussion of 
Concepts and Evidence. Policy Research Working Paper, 3404. 
Levy-Yeyati, E., Martinez Peria, M. S., & Schmukler, S. (2004). Market Discipline in 
Emerging Economies: Beyong Bank Fundamentals. In C. Borio, W. Hunter, G. 
Kaufman & K. Tsatsaronis (Eds.), Market Discipline Across Countries and Industries. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
Leys, C. (1975). Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism. London: 
Heinemann, Educational Books. 
Lin, J. (2009). Walk, Don't Run. The Economist, 11th July 2009. 
Lindgren, C.-J. (2007). Actual and Near-Miss Cross Border Crises. In D. Evanoff, G. 
Kaufman & J. R. LaBrosse (Eds.), International Financial Instability: Global Banking 
and National Regulation New Jersey: World Scientific. 
Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. (1992). A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate 
Governance. Business Lawyer, 48, 59-77. 
Lleewllyn, D. (2005). Banking Regulation after Recent Financial Crises: Lessons For 
Developing and Developed Countries. In C. Green, C. Kirkpatrick & V. 
Murinde (Eds.), Finance and Development : Surveys of Theory, Evidence and Policy. 
Cheltenham & Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 
Llewellyn, D. (2004). Inside the "Black Box" of Market Discipline. In C. Borio, W. 
Hunter, G. Kaufman & K. Tsatsaronis (Eds.), Market Discipline Across Countries 
and Industries. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
Love, I., & Mylenko, N. (2003). Credit Reporting and Financing Constraints. World Bank 
Working Paper, 3142. 
Lucas, R. (1988). On the Mechanics of Economic Development. Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 22(1), 3-42. 
Lumiti, C. (2008, 30th August 2008). IFC Lauds Kenya’s Credit Bureau Regulations East 
African Business Week. 
272 
Macey, J., & O'Hara, M. (2001). The Corporate Governance of Banks. Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York Economic Policy Review. 
Maganda, W. (2009). The Indian Diasporic Politics in Post Colonial East Africa, 
Contemporary India-East Africa Relations: Shifting Terrains of Engagement. The British 
Institute in Eastern Africa, Nairobi. 
Maimbo, S. (2002). The Diagnosis and Prediction of Bank Failures in Zambia 1990-98. 
Development Policy Review, 20(3), 261-278. 
Mamdani, M. (1999). There Can be no African Renaissance without and African-
focused Intelligentsia. In M. Makgoba (Ed.), African Renaissance: The New Struggle. 
Cape Town: Mafube Publishing. 
Mangat, J. (1968). A History of the Asians in Kenya. c.1886 - 1945. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Martinez Peria, M. S., & Mody, A. (2004). How Foreign Participation and Market 
Concentration Impact Bank Spreads: Evidence from Latin America. Journal of 
Money, Credit & Banking, 36(3), 511-537. 
Mas, I., & Radcliffe, D. (2010a). Mobile Payments go Viral: M‐PESA in Kenya. Seattle, 
Washington: Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
Mas, I., & Radcliffe, D. (2010b). Scaling Mobile Money. Seattle, Washington: Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation. 
Maurer, N., & Haber, S. (2007a). Related Lending and Economic Performance: 
Evidence from Mexico. The Journal of Economic History, 67(3). 
Maurer, N., & Haber, S. (2007b). Related Lending: Manifest Looting or Good 
Governance? Lessons from the Economic History of Mexico. In S. Edwards, G. 
Esquivel & G. Mafarquez (Eds.), The Decline of Latin American Economies: Growth, 
Institutions, and Crises (pp. 213-242). Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
Mavrotas, G. (2005). Savings and Financial Sector Development: Assessing the 
Evidence. In C. Green, C. Kirkpatrick & V. Murinde (Eds.), Finance and 
Development: Surveys of Theory, Evidence and Policy. Cheltenham. Northhampton: 
Edward Elgar. 
Maxon, R. (1992). The Colonial Financial System. In W. Ochieng & R. Maxon (Eds.), 
An Economic History of Kenya. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers. 
Maxon, R., & Ndege, P. (1995). The Economics of Structural Adjustment. In B. Ogot & 
W. Ochieng' (Eds.), Decolonization and Independence in Kenya, 1940-93. 
Mayes, D. (2004). An Approach to Bank Insolvency in Transition and Emerging 
Economies. Bank of Finland Discussion Papers, 4. 
Mazuri, A. (1976). The De-Indianization of Uganda: Who is a Citizen? In D. Smock & 
K. Bentsi-Enchill (Eds.), The Search for National Integration in Africa (pp. 77-90). 
New York: The Free Press. 
McKinnon, R. (1973). Money and Capital in Economic Development. Washington DC: 
Brookings Institute. 
McKinnon, R. (1988). Financial Liberalisation in Retrospect: Interest Rate Policies in 
LDCs. In G. Ranis & T. Shultz (Eds.), The State in Development Economics: Progress 
and Perspectives. New York: Basil Blackwell. 
Mearman, A. (2003). 'Open Systems' and Economic Methodology, INEM Conference. 
Leeds. 
Michira, M. (2010, 2nd June 2010). Equatorial and Southern Credit Merger Gets Nod. 
Business Daily Africa. 
Miles, M., & Huberman, M. (1994). Qualitative Data Analysis. Newbury Park, Califormia: 
Sage. 
Milonakis, D., & Fine, B. (2008). From Political Economy to Economics : Method, the Social and 
the Historical in the Evolution of Economic Theory. New York: Routledge. 
Mines, M. (1994). Public Faces, Private Voices: Community and Individuality in South India. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
273 
Minsky, H. (1982). Can "It" Happen Again? : Essays on Instability and Finance. New York: 
Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe. 
Mkandawire, T. (1999). The Political Economy of Financial Reform in Africa. Journal of 
International Development, 11, 321-342. 
Mkandawire, T., & Soludo, C. (1999). Our Continent, Our Future: African Perspectives on 
Structural Adjustment. Dakar: CODESRIA. 
Monks, R., & Nell, M. (2004). Corporate Governance (3rd ed.). Malden: Blackwell Pub. 
Morck, R. (2007). Behavioral Finance in Corporate Governance - Independent 
Directors and Non-Executive Chairs, University of Alberta Working Paper Series: 
SSRN. 
Morduch, J., & Armendariz, B. (2004). Microfinance: Where Do We Stand? In C. 
Goodhart (Ed.), Financial Development and Economic Growth: Explaining the Links. 
Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Moss, T. (2003). Adventure Capitalism - Globalization and the Political Economy of Stock 
Markets in Africa (1st ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Mpuga, P. (2002). The 1998-99 Banking Crisis in Uganda: What was the Role of the 
New Capital Requirement? Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 10(3), 
224-242. 
Mugume, A. (2006). Market Structure and Performance in Uganda's Banking Industry, 
AERC Biannual Workshop 2006. Nairobi, Kenya: AERC. 
Muiruri, S. (2003, 27th February 2003). Euro Bank Officials Quizzed. Daily Nation. 
Musikali, L. (2008). The Law Affecting Corporate Governance in Kenya: A Need for 
Review International Company and Commercial Law Review, 19(7), 213-227. 
Musonda, A. (2008). Deregulation, Market Power and Competition: An Empirical 
Investigation of the Zambian Banking Industry, CSAE Conference 2008 - Economic 
Development in Africa. Oxford. 
Mutua, M. (2010, 1st November 2010). No Evidence Against Charterhouse. East African 
Standard. 
Mwega, F., Ngola, S., & Mwangi, N. (1990). Real Interest Rates and the Mobilization of 
Private Savings in Africa. AERC Research Paper, 2. 
Nasibi, R. (1992). Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy in Post-Independence 
Kenya. In W. Ochieng & R. Maxon (Eds.), An Economic History of Kenya. Nairobi: 
East African Educational Publishers. 
Ncube, M. (2007). Financial Services and Economic Development in Africa. Journal of 
African Economies, 16(Suppl. 1), 13-57. 
Ndebbio, J. (2004). Financial Deepening, Economic Growth and Development: 
Evidence from Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries. AERC Research Paper, 
142. 
Ndege, P. (2000). Modernisation of the Economy 1964-1970. In B. Ogot & W. 
Ochieng' (Eds.), Kenya: The Making of a Nation 1895-1995. Maseno and Kisumu: 
Maseno University. 
Ndii, D. (1994). An Assymetric Information Analysis of Financial Sector Policy in Kenya. 
University of Oxford, St. Anthony's College, Oxford. 
Ndii, D. (1998, 28th September 1998). Weak Regulation Could Undermine Kenyan 
Banking. The East African. 
Ndung'u, N., & Ngugi, R. (1999). Adjustment and Liberalization in Kenya: The 
Financial and Foreign Exchange Markets. Journal of International Development, 11, 
465-491. 
Ndung'u, N., & Ngugi, R. (2000). Banking Sector Interest Rate Spread in Kenya (Vol. 5). 
Nairobi: Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis. 
Ndungu Land Commission Report. (2004). Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land. Nairobi: Government Printer. 
274 
Ndungu, P. (2006). Tackling Land Related Corruption In Kenya: World Bank Site 
Resources. 
Neve, G. D. (2005). Trust, Trade and Knowledge: Exploring Family Business Histories 
from South India Anthropology Seminar 2005 London: SOAS, University of 
London. 
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). (2006). African Peer Review 
Mechanism: Country Review Report of the Republic of Kenya. Johanesburg: NEPAD. 
Nganga, S., Jain, V., & Artivor, M. (2003). Corporate Governance in Africa : A Survey of 
Publicly Listed Companies. London: London Business School. 
Ngugi, R. (2000). Financial Sector Reform Process in Kenya: 1989-96. African 
Development Review, 12(1), 52-77. 
Ngugi, R. (2001). An Empirical Analysis of Interest Rate Spread in Kenya. AERC 
Research Paper, 106. 
Ngugi, R. (2004). Determinants of Interest Rate Spread in Kenya. KIPPRA Discussion 
Paper Series, 41. 
Ngugi, R., & Kabubo, J. (1998). Financial Sector Reforms and Interest Rate 
Liberalization: The Kenya Experience. AERC Research Paper, 72. 
Nissanke, M. (2001). Financing Enterprise Development in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 25, 343-367. 
Nissanke, M. (2002). Donors' Support for Microcredit as Social Enterprise: A Critical 
Reappraisal. UNU-WIDER Research Paper, 127. 
Nissanke, M., & Aryeetey, E. (1998). Financial Integration and Development: Liberalisation and 
Reform in sub-Saharan Africa: Routledge. 
Nissanke, M., & Aryeetey, E. (2006). Institutional Analysis of Financial Market 
Fragmentation in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Risk-Cost Configuration Approach. 
UNU-WIDER Research Paper, 87. 
Nissanke, M., & Stein, H. (2003). Financial Globalization and Economic Development: 
Toward an Institutional Foundation. Eastern Economic Journal, 29(2), 287-308. 
Njenga, G., Ngugi, R., & Mwaura, M. (2006). Development Finance Institutions in 
Kenya: Issues and Policy Options. KIPPRA Working Paper, 14/2006. 
North, D. C. (1989). Institutions and Economic Growth: An Historical Introduction. 
World Development, 17(9), 1319-1332. 
Nowrojee, P. (2001). Asian African Business - The National Perspective: Asian African 
Heritage Trust. 
Nzioka, P. (1999, 8th June 1999). CBK Lifts Halt on Licensing Banks. The People. 
Odhiambo, N. (2008). Financial Depth, Savings and Economic Growth in Kenya: A 
Dynamic Causal Linkage. Economic Modelling, 25, 704-713. 
Odhiambo, N. (2009). Interest Rate Reforms, Financial Deepening and Economic 
Growth in Kenya: An Empirical Investigation The Journal of Developing Areas, 
43(1). 
Okoth, J. (2010, 10th February 2010). Ecobank’s Lot to Improve as Gamble Pays Off. 
East African Standard. 
Olsen, W. (2006). Pluralism, Poverty and Sharecropping: Cultivating Open-Mindedness 
in Development Studies. Journal of Development Studies, 42(7), 1130-1157. 
Olsen, W. (2008). Realist Ontology and Epistemology for Rural Research. Brooks Poverty 
Institute Working Paper, 53. 
Olsen, W., & Morgan, J. (2004). A Critical Epistemology of Analytical Statistics: 
Addressing the Sceptical Realist, British Sociological Association. York. 
Olukoshi, A. (2006). African scholars and African Studies. Development in Practice, 16(6), 
533-544. 
Omondi, M. (2007a, 15th November 2007). Equity Races Ahead of Rivals with Sh11bn 
Capital Injection. Business Daily Africa. 
275 
Omondi, M. (2007b, 6th June 2007 ). NBK Earnings Forecast to Soar as State Settles 
Debts Business Daily Africa. 
Onyonka, Z. (1968). Agricultural Development Banking: A Case Study of Kenya. Syracuse 
University, New York. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2004). The OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance. Paris: OECD. 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2004). The OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance. Paris: OECD. 
Oshikoya, T. (1992). Interest Rate Liberalization, Savings, Investment and Growth: The 
Case of Kenya. Savings and Development, XVI, 305-320. 
Pagano, M. (1993). Financial Markets and Growth an Overview. European Economic 
Review, 37(April), 613-622. 
Pandurang, M. (2009). Scrutinising the Past: A Review of Socio-Literary Narratives of 
the East African Asian Diasporic Experience. South Asian Diaspora, 1(1), 47-61. 
Panzar, J., & Rosse, J. (1987). Testing For 'Monopoly' Equilibrium. Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 35(4), 443. 
Patel, Z. (2009). Race Relations Between Kenya's Africans and South Asians 
Contemporary India-East Africa Relations: Shifting Terrains of Engagement. The British 
Institute in Eastern Africa, Nairobi. 
Patrick, H. (1966). Financial Development and Economic Growth in Underdeveloped 
Countries. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 14(2), 174-189. 
Popiel, P. (1994). Financial Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank Discussion Papers 
Africa Technical Department Series, 260. 
Porter, M. (1979). How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy. Harvard Business Review, 
57(2), 137-145. 
Raheja, C. G. (2005). Determinants of Board Size and Composition: A Theory of 
Corporate Boards. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 40(2), 283-306. 
Ramakrishnan, R., & Thakor, A. (1984). Information Reliability and a Theory of 
Financial Intermediation. Review of Economic Studies, 51, 415-432. 
Reinhart, C., & Tokatlidis, I. (2003). Financial Liberalisation: The African Experience. 
Journal of African Economies, 12 (Supplement 1), 53-88. 
Repulic of Kenya. (1968). Development Plan 1969-1974. Nairobi: Government Printer. 
Repulic of Kenya. (2003). Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment 
Creation. In M. o. P. a. N. Development (Ed.). Nairobi: Government Printer. 
Robinson, J. (1952). The Rate of Interest and Other Essays. London: Macmillan. 
Rochet, J.-C. (2004). Market Discipline in Banking: Where Do We Stand? In C. Borio, 
W. Hunter, G. Kaufman & K. Tsatsaronis (Eds.), Market Discipline Across 
Countries and Industries. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
Rochet, J.-C. (2008). Why Are There So Many Banking Crises: The Politics and Policy of Bank 
Regulation. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Romer, P. M. (1986). Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth. Journal of Political 
Economy, 94(5), 1002-1037. 
Ruziev, K. (2006). Money and Banks in Transition Economies: The Case of Uzebekistan. 
University of Stirling, Stirling, Scotland. 
Sanda, A., Mikailu, A., & Garba, T. (2005). Corporate Governance Mechanisms and 
Firm Financial Performance in Nigeria. AERC Research Paper, 149. 
Sanda, A., Mikailu, A., & Garba, T. (2007). Board Independence and Firm Financial 
Performance: Evidence from Nigeria, AERC Biannual Research Workshop, 
December 2007. Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania: AERC. 
Schumpeter, J. (1911). The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Seidenberg, D. (1996). Mercantile Adventurers : the World of East African Asians 1750-1985. 
New Delhi: New Age International. 
276 
Serieux, J. (2008). Financial Liberalization and Domestic Resource Mobilization in 
Africa: An Assessment. International Poverty Centre Working Paper, 45. 
Shackle, G. (1972). Epistemics and Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Shaw, E. (1973). Financial Deepening in Economic Development. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Shipton, P. (1992). Debts and Trespasses: Land, Mortgages, and The Ancestors In 
Western Kenya. Africa, 62(3), 357-388. 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance, 
52, 737-783. 
Singh, A. (1992). The Stock Market and Economic Development: Should Developing 
Countries Encourage Stock Markets? UNCTAD Discussion Paper (49). 
Singh, A. (2005). Corporate Governance, Competition and Finance: Re-thinking the 
Lessons from the Asian Crisis. Eastern Economic Journal, 31(2), 219 - 243. 
Singh, A. (2009). Better to be Rough and Relevant than to be Precise and Irrelevant: 
Reddaway's Legacy to Economics. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 33, 363-379. 
Singh, A., & Weisse, B. (1999). The Asian Model : A Crisis Foretold? International Social 
Science Journal, 51(2), 203-215. 
Singh, A., & Zammit, A. (2006). Corporate Governance, Crony Capitalism and 
Economic Crises: should the US business model replace the Asian way of doing 
business? Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14(4), 220-233. 
Smullen, J., & Hand, N. (2005). A Dictionary of Finance and Banking. (Oxford Reference 
Online ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Söderbom, M. (2001). Constraints and Opportunities in Kenyan Manufacturing: Report on the 
Kenyan Manufacturing Enterprise Survey 2000: UNIDO and CSAE. 
Southall, R. (2005). The Ndungu Report: Land & Graft in Kenya. Review of African 
Political Economy, 32(103), 142-151. 
Soyibo, A. (1997). Banking Sector Reforms in Africa: Effects on Savings, Investment 
and Development. African Development Review, 9(1), 52-76. 
Soyibo, A. (1997). Financial Liberalisation and Bank Restructuring in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Some Lessons for Sequencing and Policy Design. Journal of African 
Economies, 6(1), 100-150. 
Soyibo, A., & Adekanye, F. (1992). The Nigerian Banking System in the Context of 
Policies of Financial Regulation and Deregulation. AERC Research Paper, 17. 
Soyibo, A., Alashi, S., & Ahmad, M. (2004). A Positive and Nornamtive Analysis of 
Bank Supervision in Nigeria. AERC Research Paper, 145. 
Stiglitz, J. (1985). Credit Markets and the Control of Capital. Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, 17(2), 133-152. 
Stiglitz, J. (1993). The Role of the State in Financial Markets. In World Bank (Ed.), 
Proceeding of the World Bank Conference on Development Economics (pp. 41-46). 
Washington, D.C: World Bank. 
Stiglitz, J., Helmann, T., & Murdoch, K. (2000). Liberalisation, Moral Hazard in Banking 
and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough? American 
Economic Review, 90(1), 147-165. 
Stiglitz, J., & Weiss, A. (1981). Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. 
American Economic Review, 393-410. 
Suehiro, A. (2001). Family Business Gone Wrong? Ownership Patterns and Corporate 
Performance in Thailand. ADB Institute Working Paper, 19. 
Sun, L. (Ed.). (2003). Ownership and Governance of Enterprises: Recent Innovative Developments. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan Press. 
The Asian-African Heritage Trust. (2000). The Asian-African Heritage Exhibition: Identity 
and History. Nairobi: National Museums of Kenya and The Asian-African 
Heritage Trust. 
277 
Think Business Ltd. (2009). Banking Survey 2009. Think Business (formerly Market 
Intelligence), Annual Special Edition. 
Throup, D. (1987). The Construction and Destruction of the Kenyan State. In M. 
Schatzberg (Ed.), The Political Economy of Kenya. New York: Praeger. 
Tobin, D. (2008). Creating Order in the Absence of Formal Regulations and Law: a 
Historical Perspective on Corporate Governance and Its Lessons for 
Developing Countries, The Political Economy of Corporate Governance. Queen's 
University Belfast. 
Tobin, D., & Singh, S. (2008). International Best Practices, Domestic Constraints and 
International Listing: Evidence From China's State Banking Sector. Journal of 
Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 6(4), 341-361. 
Trust Bank Ltd. (1997). Annual Report and Accounts. Nairobi. 
Tsatsaronis, K. (2004). Comments on the Theory of Market Discipline. In C. Borio, W. 
Hunter, G. Kaufman & K. Tsatsaronis (Eds.), Market Discipline Across Countries 
and Industries. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
Upadhyaya, R. (2008). “The Stock Market is Not a Fish Market”: The Stock Market and 
the Distribution of Economic Opportunities in Kenya, African Studies Seminar: 
Neglected Themes of the Kenya Crisis. St Antony’s College, Oxford. 
Uzzi, B. (1999). Embeddedness in the Making of Financial Capital: How Social 
Relations and Networks Benefit Firms Seeking Financing. American Sociological 
Review, 64, 481-505. 
Vandenberg, P. (2003). Ethnic-sectoral Cleavages and Economic Development: 
Reflections on the Second Kenya Debate The Journal of Modern African Studies, 
41(3). 
Vandenberg, P. (2006). The African-Asian Divide : Analyzing Institutions and Accumulation in 
Kenya. New York ; London: Routledge. 
Vittas, D. (1991). Measuring Commercial Bank Efficiency. World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper, 806. 
Vives, X. (2001). Competition in the Changing World of Banking. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 17(4). 
Wade, R. (2007). A New Global Financial Architecture. New Left Review, 46, 113-129. 
Wai, U. (1992). What Have We Learned About Informal Finance in Three Decades'. In 
D. Adams & D. Fitchett (Eds.), Informal Finance in Low Income Countries (pp. 337-
348). Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Warutere, P. (2005). The Goldenberg Conspiracy: The Game of Paper Gold, Money 
and Power. The Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper, 177. 
Weisbach, M. S. (1988). Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 20, 431-460. 
Wooldridge, J. (2006). Introductory Econometrics : A Modern Approach (3rd ed.). Australia ; 
United Kingdom: Thomson/South-Western. 
World Bank. (1989). Kenya: Report and Recommendations of the President of the International 
Development Association to the Executive Directors on the Proposed Financial Sector 
Adjustment Credit. Washington D.C: World Bank. 
World Bank. (1994). Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead. Washington 
DC: World Bank. 
World Bank. (1998). East Asia: The Road to Recovery. Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
Wright, G., & Cracknell, D. (2008). The Market Led Revolution of Equity Bank. 
Microsave Credit Note, 63. 
Wright, R. (1998). Two Ventrices of America's Early Financial Heart: Bank Lending in New 
York and Pennsylvania, 1781- 1830. Paper presented at the Economic History 
Association Meetings, Durham, North Carolina. 
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of 
Directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185-211. 
278 
Yin, R. (2003). Applications of Case Study Research (2nd ed. Vol. 34). Sage Publications. 
 
 
279 
Appendix 1: Major Bank Insolvencies in Africa 1980-2000 
Country Period NPLs 
(% of 
total) 
Fiscal 
Costs 
(% of 
GDP) 
Output 
Loss 
(% of 
GDP) 
Details 
Benin 1988-1990 80 17 1.9 All three commercial banks 
collapsed 
Burkina Faso 1988-1994 25 NA 45.2 3 banks were restructured 
and 2 other large banks 
continued to experience 
liquidity problems.  
Burundi 1994- 25 NA 66.3 In 1995 one bank was 
liquidated 
Cameroon 1987-1993 
 
65 
 
NA 118.1 Five banks closed and 3 
banks restructured 
Cameroon 1995-1998 30 NA NA Two banks closed and three 
banks restructured 
Cape Verde 1993- 30    
Central African 
Republic 
1976-1992 NA NA NA Four banks liquidated 
Central African 
Republic 
1995-1999 40 NA 1.1 Two largest banks 
accounting for 90 percent of 
assets were restructured 
Chad 1980s NA NA NA Banking sector experience 
insolvency problems 
Chad 1992- 35 NA 37.2  
Congo, Dem. 
Republic of  
1980s NA NA NA Banking sector experience 
insolvency problems 
Congo, Dem. 
Republic of 
1991-1992 NA NA 81 Four state-owned banks 
were insolvent; a fifth bank 
was to be recapitalized with 
private participation 
Congo, Dem. 
Republic of 
1993-1996 75 NA NA Two state-owned banks 
have been liquidated and 
two other state banks 
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Country Period NPLs 
(% of 
total) 
Fiscal 
Costs 
(% of 
GDP) 
Output 
Loss 
(% of 
GDP) 
Details 
privatized. In 1997, 12 banks 
were having serious financial 
difficulty 
Cote d’Ivoire 1988-91 50 25 NA Four large banks accounting 
for 90 percentage of assets 
insolvent. Six government 
banks closed.  
Djibouti 1991-1993 NA NA 22.6 Two of six commercial 
banks ceased operations in 
1991-1992. Other banks 
experienced difficulties. 
Ghana 1982-89 35 6 15.8 7 out of 11 banks were 
insolvent and had to be 
recapitalized 
Guinea 1985,  NA 3 NA 6 banks accounting for 99% 
of deposits were deemed 
insolvent.  
Guinea 1993-94 45 NA NA 2 banks deemed insolvent 
Kenya 1985-89, 
1992, 
1993-95, 
1998-2003 
   See details in Chapter 4 
Madagascar 1988 25 NA NA Government absorbed 
losses of NPLs and 
recapitalized loans 
Mali 1987 75 NA 5.7% Largest commercial bank 
declared insolvent 
Mauritania 1983-93 70 15 NA 5 major banks experienced 
liquidity and insolvency 
issues 
Mozambique 1987 – NA NA NA Main commercial bank 
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Country Period NPLs 
(% of 
total) 
Fiscal 
Costs 
(% of 
GDP) 
Output 
Loss 
(% of 
GDP) 
Details 
1997 became insolvent.  
Nigeria 1990s 77 NA 0.4 Almost half the bank in the 
country were insolvent. 
Senegal  1988-91 50 17 25.4 7 banks closed accounting 
for 30% of total assets 
Swaziland 1995   21.6 3 banks had to be taken over 
by the government 
Tanzania 1987 70 10 NA All the largest financial 
institutions had half their 
portfolio as non-performing 
Tanzania 1995 NA NA NA National Bank of 
Commerce accounting for 
95% of the banking system 
assets was insolvent.  
Togo 1993- 
1997 
NA NA 27.7 Whole sector experienced 
solvency problems 
Uganda 1994- 
2000 
NA NA NA About half the banks 
experienced solvency 
problems and 3 banks were 
closed 
Zambia 1995 NA 1.4 0.5 One bank accounting for 
13% of total assets was 
declared insolvent 
Source: Caprio, G., Klingebiel, D., Laeven, L., & Noguera, G. (2005). Banking Crisis 
Database. In P. Honohan & L. Laeven (Eds.), Systemic Financial Crises : Containment and 
Resolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Notes:- NA – means not available 
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Appendix 2: Summary and Full List of Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
Broad Question 
Areas Sub Section 
Q No 
From 
Q No 
To 
Lending Relationship General 1 2 
Lending Relationship Ex-Ante Decision Making 3 22 
Lending Relationship Ex-Post Monitoring 23 26 
Lending Relationship Non-Performing Loans 27 37 
Deposit Mobilization Liability Management 38 42 
Portfolio Management Asset - Liability Management / Liquidity 43 45 
Other Assets  Investment In Other Assets 46 47 
Deposit Mobilization Cost Of Funds 48 48 
Portfolio Management Asset - Liability Management / Liquidity 49 51 
Corporate Governance  General 52 61 
Corporate Governance  Market Discipline 62 64 
Regulation Regulation 65 70 
Other General 71 72 
 
1. What proportion of assets in long term / short term 
2. What industries do you target / have a niche 
3. Do you have a set credit manual If no, who other guidelines do you use If yes, is the 
credit manual adequate 
4. What are the steps that take place before a credit is granted 
5. What is the chain in the decision making 
6. Is decision made at branch level or head office level 
7. What information do you get from a potential client, what quantitative / hard / 
financial information do you gather and how is it analyzed 
8. How can you be sure that the figures being show in financial statements are accurate 
9. What qualitative / soft / personal information do you gather and how is it analyzed 
10. Do you visit client offices / businesses 
11. What is the role of collateral in granting a loans, what percentage of loans are non-
secure 
12. Are there cases when a client can meet all the set requirements but a loan is still not 
granted, why would this happen 
13. Are there cases when a client does not meet the set requirements but a loan is still 
granted, why would this happen 
14. How can you be sure that the client you are granting a loan to was not rejected by 
another bank 
15. What is the most influential information in the ultimate decision on credits 
16. What procedures do you have to check the legal requirements of the loan 
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17. Is there a large overlap between the clients who are depositors and clients who are 
borrowers 
18. On average how long are your relationships with your clients 
19. What percentage of loans granted in a year are new clients compared to old clients 
20. Do you feel restricted within an ethnic group in terms of your market 
21. From your experience what makes the difference between a good loan and a bad 
loan 
22. What is the level of insider lending in your banks, how are insider loans allocated 
23. What sort of on-going information do you collect once a loan has been disbursed 
24. Do you have a set procedure when dealing with bad loans 
25. Is the decision made at branch level or head office level 
26. Can you detect that a loan may go bad before it actually does 
27. Do you think the non-performing clients are having genuine business difficulties or 
did they not disclose some information to you 
28. Are there any specific sectors in which you experience higher NPLs 
29. Main reason for trend in NPLs 
30. On average after how long does a loan become NPL 
31. NPLs mainly new clients or old clients 
32. Were you not able to get proper credit ref 
33. Difficulty in finding credit worthy borrowers 
34. Problems with internal controls 
35. Problems with judicial system, what are the legal or political impediments in 
enforcing contracts and recovering collateral, how long are the average cases that are 
pending 
36. Of total operating costs what % is the legal cost 
37. Have you had any cases of successful restructuring 
38. What are your target depositors 
39. Constraints in raising deposits 
40. What proportion of accounts are in savings accounts vs. term deposits 
41. What is the number of depositors you have 
42. What is average term of your term deposits 
43. How do you overcome the inherent problem of short term liability structures vs. 
long term asset structures 
44. How do you manage liquidity  
45. Do you think there is excess liquidity in the Kenyan market, what are the main 
reasons for liquidity 
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46. Is there any investment in equities  
47. Off balance sheet activities 
48. What is the main determinant of your cost of funds 
49. What other risks besides credit risk are important and how do you manage these 
Stress tests 
50. Do you use the interbank market 
51. Do you use the CBK discount facilities 
52. History of the bank, how business started 
53. Ownership structure, related parties 
54. What is the board size and how often does the board meet 
55. What is the organization decision making structure, what committees do you have in 
place  
56. How are board members identified and chosen 
57. What drives corporate governance - domestic regulation, foreign regulation 
international financial markets, domestic financial markets, individual banks 
58. How are disputes about strategy at board level resolved 
59. What sort of incentive structure do you have for management to align their interests 
with shareholders 
60. What are the check and balances on different decision makers 
61. Are there any checks and balances on insider lending 
62. Do you feel that there is a significant threat of takeover that disciplines management 
63. How have recent moves to increase public knowledge of bank financial health 
affected the market 
64. How do you make decisions on IT investment 
65. What do you think of the current capital requirements Are they sufficient to prevent 
excessive risk taking 
66. Do you use the data you generate for CBK reporting for your own internal decision 
making 
67. How do you prepare for on-site and off site supervision 
68. Have CBK prudential guidelines and risk guidelines helped you 
69. What is the cost of compliance to new regulations and are the costs justified 
70. General regulation 
71. Human resources constraint 
72. Other point miscellaneous 
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Appendix 3: Variables in Financial Statements Database for Kenyan Banks 
1 Total Assets 
2 Total Liabilities 
3 Net Assets (Shareholders' funds or capital)  
4 Customer deposits 
5 Other deposits 
6 Total deposits 
7 Borrowed funds 
8 Loans & advances to customers (net of provisions) 
9 Total Loans & advances to customers 
10 Cash & Balances with the CBK 
11 Government securities 
12 
Deposits and balances due from banking institutions (Placements 
with other banks) 
13 Government Securities & Placement with other banks 
14 Cash & Balances with the CBK 
15 Interest on loans & Advances 
16 Interest on Government securities 
17 
Interest on deposits and placements & bank balances with banking 
institutions 
18 Other interest income 
19 Total Interest income 
20 Net interest income 
21 Foreign Exchange Earnings 
22 Fees & Commissions Income 
23 Net Fees & Commissions income 
24 
Other Operating income(including gains from dealings in securities 
& disposal or change in carrying amounts of investment securities) 
25 Total net Operating income 
26 Other non-operating income(includes dividends) 
27 Total Income 
28 Interest on Customer Deposits 
29 
Interest on borrowed funds (and deposits and placements from 
other banks)  
30 Other interest expense 
31 Total interest expense 
32 Fees & Commissions expenses 
33 General administrative expenses 
34 Total Operating expense 
35 Other non-operating  expenses 
36 Total expenditure 
37 Operating profits before provisions 
38 Losses on loans and advances 
39 Exceptional Items/Provisions for other losses and expenses 
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40 Profit Before Tax (after exceptional Item) 
41 Total Provisions and interest in suspense for loans and advances  
42 
Non-performing loans and advances (Net of provisions and interest 
in suspense) 
43 Provisions - specific & interests in suspense 
44 Total non-performing loans and advances  (less general provisions) 
45 Realisable Value of securities 
46 Net NPL exposure (excess) 
47 Directors, shareholders & Associates 
48 Employees 
49 Total insider loans 
50 Core Capital (Bank) 
51 Supplementary capital (Bank) 
52 Total Capital 
53 Quick Assets 
54 Total Risk weighted assets 
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Appendix 4: Variables in Corporate Governance Database for Kenyan Banks 
 Corporate Governance Database (CGD) 
 Data on all banks from 2000 - 2005  
1 Weighted average interest on insider loans 
2 Auditors Remuneration 
3 Directors Emoluments 
4 No of directors 
5 No of Executive Directors 
6 Non of non-Executive Directors 
7 Proportion of non-executive directors 
8 Board Credit Committee Existing 
9 Board Audit Committee Existing 
10 Non executive Director in audit committee 
11 Non executive Director in credit committee 
12 Corp Gov Statement 
13 Shareholder (% controlled by top 3 shareholders) 
14 Executive Chairman 
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Appendix 5: Summary of Stages of Banking Development 
 
Stage 1: Pure financial intermediation 
• Banks lend out savings  
• Payment in commodity money 
• No bank multiplier 
• Saving precedes investment 
Stage 2: Bank deposits used as money 
• Convenient to use paper money as means of payment  
• Reduced drain on bank reserves  
• Multiplier process possible  
• Bank credit creation with fractional reserves  
• Investment can now precede saving  
Stage 3: Inter-bank lending  
• Credit creation still constrained by reserves  
• Risk of reserves loss offset by development of inter-bank lending  
• Multiplier process works more quickly 
• Multiplier larger because banks can hold lower reserves  
Stage 4: Lender-of-last-resort facility 
• Central bank perceives need to promote confidence in banking system  
• Lender-of-last-resort facility provided if inter-bank lending inadequate  
• Reserves now respond to demand  
• Credit creation freed from reserves constraint 
Stage 5: Liability management  
• Competition form non-bank financial intermediaries drives struggle over 
market share  
• Banks actively supply credit and seek deposits  
• Competition over deposits pushes up interest rates, adding to cost-push 
inflation and encouraging industrial concentration as marginal firms fail cover costs 
• Credit expansion diverges from real economic activity  
Stage 6: Securitisation  
• Capital adequacy ratios introduced to curtail credit  
• Banks have an increasing proportion of bad loans because of over-lending 
in Stage 5 
• Securitisation of bank assets 
• Increase in off-balance sheet activity 
• Drive to liquidity 
• Bank are now highly vulnerable to market fluctuations in value of securities 
as well as in capacity to raise capital  
Stage 7: Market structural diffusion  
• Trend to universalization in financial services: diffusion between retail and 
investment banking 
• Competitive pressure due to deregulation  
• Increased emphasis on services requiring increased on marketing  
• Structural regulation being replaced by supervisory re-regulation, addressing 
moral hazard issues, off-balance sheet activities, global diffusion 
Source: Ruziev, K. (2006). Money and Banks in Transition Economies: The Case of Uzebekistan. 
PhD. University of Stirling, Stirling, Scotland. 
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Appendix 6: Plea for Pluralistic and Rigorous Economics 
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Appendix 7: Kenya GDP Growth, Inflation, Exchange Rates and T-Bill Rates 
(1990-2005)  
 
YEAR GDP 
growth 
rate (%) 
  
Inflation rate 
- consumer 
prices annual 
% 
Exchange 
rate to $ - 
period 
average 
Exchange 
rate to $ - 
end of year 
T bill rate -  
annual 
average % 
1990  4.19 17.78 23  24  NA 
1991  1.44 20.08 28  28  17  
1992  -0.80 27.33 32  36  18  
1993  0.35 45.98 58  68  56  
1994  2.63 28.81 56  45  25  
1995  4.41 1.55 51  56  19  
1996  4.15 8.86 57  55  23  
1997  0.47 11.36 59  63  22  
1998  3.29 6.72 60  62  23  
1999  2.31 5.74 70  73  13  
2000  0.60 9.98 76  78  12  
2001  3.78 5.74 79  79  13  
2002  0.55 1.96 79  77  9  
2003  2.93 9.82 76  76  4  
2004  5.10 11.62 79  77  3  
2005  5.91 10.31 76  72  8  
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Appendix 8: Methodology of Decomposition of Interest Rate Spreads used in 
Beck and Fuchs (2004) 
 
iL is defined as loan interest rate and iD as interest rate on time deposits, using the one-
year rates, averaged over all banks and over the year 2002. 
 
The decomposition is based on the identity that loans have to be financed with available 
deposits, i.e. deposits net of reserves with the central bank, or L = (1 - R)*D, where L is 
loans, R is reserve requirements, and D is deposits.  
 
The weighted average lending rate across loans of different maturities and a weighted 
average deposit rate across demand, savings and time deposits of different maturities is 
calculated. It is assumed that there is a similar maturity structure across different 
currencies as disaggregated loan and deposit maturity distribution data for local and 
foreign currency is unavailable.  
 
LLP is defined as loans loss provisions net of recoveries relative to loans. It is assumed 
that local and foreign currency loans have similar default rates.  
OC are the overhead costs attributable to loans. The share of overhead costs 
attributable to loans is by calculated using the ratio of loan interest revenue in total 
revenue. Again it is assumed that size ratio is the same across local and foreign currency 
loans. 
 
The tax rate τ is set at 30 percent as this is official corporate tax rate and also because , 
banks indicated to the World Bank mission that tax payments constitute around 30 
percent of profits. 
 
The profit margin (profit relative to loans) was then calculated as residual after 
accounting for the other four components: 
PM = (1-τ)*(iL-LLP – iD/(1 – R) – OC) 
 
Rearranging gives the sum of the different components of the interest rate spread: 
iL - iD = LLP + iD*R/(1 – R) + OC + PM + τ∗[PM − LLP - iD*R/(1 – R) - OC] 
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Appendix 9: Return on Assets by Segment 2000 - 2005 
  Return on Assets 
                
SEGMENT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average 
FOB 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
GOB -2% 0% 0% 2% 1% 3% 1% 
LPOB 2% 3% 3% 4% 3% 3% 3% 
SPOB -1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 
Total 0% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Appendix 10: Core Capital on Total Risk Weighted Assets by Segment 2000 - 
2005 
  Core capital/total risk weighted assets 
                
SEGMENT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average 
FOB  27% 27% 28% 25% 26% 27% 
GOB  13% 14% 26% 35% 28% 23% 
LPOB  27% 26% 28% 24% 21% 25% 
SPOB  30% 34% 31% 28% 28% 30% 
Total   24% 25% 28% 28% 26% 28% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Appendix 11: Loans on Total Assets by Segment 2000 - 2005 
  Loans /Total Assets 
                
SEGMENT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average 
FOB 38% 38% 36% 38% 44% 44% 40% 
GOB 55% 54% 55% 52% 49% 51% 53% 
LPOB 51% 50% 50% 49% 51% 54% 50% 
SPOB 51% 51% 52% 53% 54% 53% 52% 
Total 49% 48% 48% 48% 49% 50% 49% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Appendix 12: Government Securities on Total Loans by Segment 2000 - 2005 
  Government Securities /Total Loans 
                
SEGMENT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average 
FOB 95% 116% 131% 157% 103% 101% 117% 
GOB 11% 30% 16% 37% 30% 30% 26% 
LPOB 35% 40% 40% 55% 37% 32% 38% 
SPOB 24% 34% 38% 36% 28% 25% 31% 
Total 41% 55% 56% 71% 50% 47% 53% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Appendix 13: Total Loans on Total Deposits by Segment 2000 - 2005 
  Total Loans/Total Deposits 
                
SEGMENT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average 
FOB 61% 61% 52% 53% 60% 59% 58% 
GOB 312% 145% 143% 110% 109% 102% 153% 
LPOB 88% 81% 78% 81% 74% 96% 82% 
SPOB 291% 173% 166% 112% 105% 98% 158% 
Total 188% 115% 110% 89% 87% 89% 116% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Appendix 14: Non-Performing Loans by Segment 2000 - 2005 
  Total NPL/Total Loans 
                
SEGMENT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average 
FOB 16% 11% 9% 7% 5% 6% 9% 
GOB 58% 41% 49% 46% 45% 35% 46% 
LPOB 30% 18% 17% 13% 10% 11% 16% 
SPOB 39% 29% 26% 24% 25% 24% 28% 
Total 36% 25% 25% 23% 21% 19% 22% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Appendix 15: Cost of Funds by Segment 2000 - 2005 
  Cost of funds 
                
SEGMENT 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average 
FOB 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 2% 3% 
GOB 7% 6% 6% 3% 2% 2% 4% 
LPOB 7% 6% 5% 3% 2% 5% 5% 
SPOB 9% 7% 6% 4% 3% 4% 6% 
Total 7% 6% 5% 3% 2% 3% 5% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Appendix 16: Number of Branches per Bank 2005 
   2005 
1 Barclays Bank of Kenya FOB 49 
2 Standard Chartered Bank FOB 31 
3 Citibank FOB 3 
4 Stanbic Bank FOB 3 
5 Bank of Baroda FOB 7 
6 Bank of India FOB 2 
7 Bank of Africa FOB 2 
8 Habib A.G. Zurich  FOB 5 
9 K-Rep Bank FOB 3 
10 Habib Bank Ltd FOB 6 
11 Kenya Commercial Bank GOB 113 
12 National Bank of Kenya GOB 24 
13 Consolidated Bank GOB 12 
14 Development Bank of Kenya  GOB 1 
15 Co-operative Bank of Kenya LPOB 28 
16 CFC Bank LPOB 5 
17 Commercial Bank of Africa LPOB 15 
18 NIC Bank LPOB 3 
19 I&M LPOB 4 
20 Diamond Trust LPOB 3 
21 Equity Bank LPOB 2 
22 Imperial Bank LPOB 3 
23 Trans-National Bank LPOB 6 
24 EABS Bank SPOB 4 
25 Fina Bank SPOB 4 
26 Prime Bank SPOB 7 
27 ABC Bank SPOB 8 
28 Giro Commercial Bank SPOB 6 
29 Guardian Bank  SPOB 6 
30 
Southern Credit Bank (Merged with 
Bullion Bank) SPOB 5 
31 Charterhouse Bank Ltd. SPOB 1 
32 Victoria Commercial Bank SPOB 1 
33 Middle East Bank SPOB 3 
34 Equatorial Commercial Bank SPOB 3 
35 Credit Bank SPOB 3 
36 Chase Bank SPOB 2 
37 Fidelity Commercial Bank SPOB 1 
38 Paramount Universal Bank SPOB 3 
39 
Oriental Commercial Bank (formerly 
Delphis Bank) SPOB 5 
40 Dubai Bank (formerly Mashreq Bank) SPOB 3 
41 City Finance Bank SPOB 1 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Appendix 17: Average Number of Branches per Segment 2005 
 FOB FOB Average 11 
 GOB GOB Average 38 
 LPOB LPOB Average 8 
 SPOB SPOB Average 4 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Appendix 18: Old Credit Analysis, Bank 6, SPOB (up to 2004) 
BANK 6 SPOB 
Date : 18.03.2004    
NOTE TO THE CREDIT COMMITTEE 
NAME OF BORROWER: New Oshwal Distributors Limited  
               
PURPOSE OF REQUEST AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE 
PROPOSAL: 
 
Proposal for increase in regular OD limit by K.Shs 3,000,000, i.e. from K.Shs 3,000,000 
to K.Shs 6,000,000. The increased limit to be valid for 28.02.05, changed from the 
anniversary date of 31.10.2004. 
 
Nature of facility Position  
as at 
17.03.2004 
Previous 
limits  
(K.Shs) 
Proposed 
limit 
Variation 
OD 9,472,889* Dr 3,000,000 6,000,000 3,000,000 
*Includes inward cheques, however temporary excess up to K.Shs 8,000,000 authorised 
till 31.03.2004. Customer has requested for a continuation of excess for a further period 
of 1 month. 
 
Expiry Date             OD : 28.02.2005 
 
Background information/activity 
Company is operating business outlet within CBD and deals in general merchandise.  
Existing regular OD limit of K.Shs 3,000,000 was sanctioned in May 1999 and conduct 
of account has been satisfactory. Regular OD limit is adhered to and there are good 
swings in outstanding balances. Moreover account turnover is high and deposits of 
K.Shs 1,000,000 on average are made occasionally. 
Due to increased volume of business, customer has requested for an increase in OD 
limit from K.Shs 3,000,000 to K.Shs 6,000,000. Requested additional working capital 
facility will be secured by supplemental debenture charge over all assets of the Co. Co. 
have also requested for a continuation of temporary excess up to K.Shs  8,000,000 for a 
further period of 1 month till 30.04.2004. 
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FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS 
The Company’s summarized key financial figures are shown below:  
 12 months ended 
30.09.2003 
(unaudited) 
30.09.2002 30.09.2001 
Sales 242,189 256,872 247,741 
Net Profit         925       194        415 
Depreciation N/A    1,313        587 
Total Assets 51,404 55,963 53,515 
Total Borrowings   3,000   5,933   9,661 
Net worth   1,290   1,096   9,720 
Debtors   6,984   7,079    9,713 
Creditors 42,935 43,488 37,851 
 
Comments on Financial Performance 
Profitability : Gross margins over the period under review was satisfactory as costs of 
sales remained low. However net margins reduced slightly. It has been advised that there 
was significant improvement in sales registered during 3 months ended 31.12.03 of 
K.Shs 69.977m. On this trend Co. expects to sustain steady growth rate and hence sales 
will increase further. 
 
Liquidity : Both creditors and debtors turnover improved as at 30.09.03. Total 
borrowings also reduced significantly during the period under review. Moreover there 
are Directors funds in the business K.Shs 5.069m (as at 30.09.03) which supplements 
the working capital. 
 
Solvency : Total net worth is low, however net profits realized are being ploughed back 
into the business to supplement working capital and also augment capital base. 
 
Future forecasts : Scope of increased volume of business especially in foreign exchange 
for imports 
 
Relationship with Fina Bank Ltd. 
Period since relationship started : August 1999 
Income earned :  
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Income Type 
(OD account) 
Last 12 months 
ended 31.12.2003 
(K.Shs) 
Last 12 months 
ended 31.12.2002 
(K.Shs) 
Interest 924,110 1,272,196 
Commission 114,247 7,851 
Miscellaneous 72,085 50,019 
 
Balances during last 12 months ended 31.12.2003 
Account type Maximum (K.Shs) Minimum (K.Shs) 
OD A/C 9,239,894 on 31.10.2003 770,929 on 28.02.2003 
 
Credit Turnover for last 12 months ended 31.12.2003 :K.Shs 281,173,555 
 
Relationship with other Banks : None 
Previously Co. was dealing with Akiba Bank but have since shifted entire business to us. 
Regarding collection from upcountry clients, it is being routed through Co-op Bank. 
 
SUMMARY OF RISK ANALYSIS 
 
Strengths 
Conduct of OD account is satisfactory with high account turnover  
High volume of sales 
 
Weaknesses 
Working capital facility will be availed against debenture which is a weak collateral 
Business is operated with very low margins. Nevertheless, Co. has sustained a steady 
growth rate over the years vis a vie a comfortable share of the business and hence high 
volumes 
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Security Held 
General Debenture charge for K.Shs 3,000,000 over the entire assets of the Co  
value as at 30.09.2002 
 
Book Value (K.Shs) 
Fixed Assets  4,323,877  
Stock         42,652,947 
Debtors  7,079,414 
TOTAL          54,056,238 
 
(For lending purposes K.Shs 13,514,060, i.e. 25% of value) 
 
Credit Agreement for K.Shs 3,000,000 executed under common seal of the Co. 
supported by Board Resolution 
Individual Guarantee for K.Shs 3,000,000 each executed by the Directors of the Co.  
 
Security Proposed 
Supplemental debenture charge for K.Shs 3,000,000 over entire assets of the Co. 
Credit agreement for K.Shs 6,000,000 executed by all the Directors of the Company 
supported by Board Resolution 
Individual Guarantees for K.Shs 6,000,000 signed by each of the Directors of the 
Company 
 
Recommendation & Justification 
Going by the satisfactory track record, we recommend: 
Continuation of temporary excess up to K.Shs 8,000,000 for a further period of 1 
month, till 30.04.2004. 
Review of overdraft facility with increase in limit by K.Shs 3,000,000, i.e. up to K.Shs 
6,000,000 for a period till 28.02.2005  
Interest to be levied at 13.5% p.a. 
Commitment fees to be recovered at 1% p.a. on the renewed limit and the continued 
excess on pro rata basis 
Security documents to be perfected as proposed. 
F R KINYANJUI     POONAM SHAH    
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SENIOR RELATIONSHIP OFFICER  RELATIONSHIP OFFICER 
  
COMMENTS BY : 
 
CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER 
 
 
 
 
CREDIT COMMITTEE 
 
Considered at the Credit Committee held on……………………………………….and 
it was 
resolved to approve the request/reject it/recommend it for approval to the Board of 
Directors subject to : ………………………. 
Member   Member    Member 
 
Date………………  Date…………………………  Date…………… 
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Appendix 19: New Credit Analysis, Bank 6, SPOB (From 2004) 
 
Customer :                                         Ltd                                      LAF       : 
CB/307/566 
Date      : 14TH June 2006 
 
PROPOSAL  
 
REQUIREMENTS/SECURITY 
Requirement  
 
Annual review, with continuation of existing overdraft limit with increase in limit to 
K.Shs 15 Million for a further period of 12 months up to 31.05.2006.  
 
Security 
All tangible security held is perfected and in place.  
 
CREDIT POLICY 
Complied with. 
 
STRATEGY 
Grow 
 
RECOMMENDATION 
Satisfactory conduct of account. 
Successful track record of over 9 years. 
No history of default. 
Satisfactory financials. 
Company is deemed to have the ability to service its commitments. 
 
In view of the above, we recommend renewal of credit facility as proposed. 
 
RELATIONSHIP MANAGER  
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ATTACHMENTS        
 YES/NO 
 
Fact Sheet   Yes      
Business Risk   Yes      
Financial Risk   Yes      
Management Risk  Yes     
Structural Risk   Yes      
Security Risk   Yes      
Account Performance Risk Yes    
Financial Spread Sheet  Yes 
Other Bank Reports  Yes – Monthly Turnover 
Balance Sheet   Yes 
Credit Grade Score Card Yes  
 
ATTACHMENT NO. 1 
 
FACT SHEET 
 
HISTORY AND  PROGRESS TO DATE 
Established in 1975, the company deals in wholesale and retail of footwear, hardware 
and general merchandise. They have 2 outlets located in the CBD and Gikomba Area 
respectively. 
 
Our relationship with the customer dates back to 1996 and we have a satisfactory track 
record.  
 
OWNERSHIP / ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE 
The following are Directors of the Company who are also involved in the day to day 
activities of the business.  
 
XX                  62.5% 
XX         37.5% 
XX    (Director Only) 
XX   (Director Only) 
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ACTIVITIES / PRODUCTS 
 
The main activity is wholesale and retail of footwear, hardware and general merchandise. 
Main suppliers include Mabati Rolling Mills Ltd, Budget Shoes Ltd and Technoplast Ltd 
to name a few. Credit extended is up to 60 days. Company has a good client base with 
whom they maintain cordial business relationship with 70% of sales on cash basis and 
30% on credit basis. 
 
The Company wants to start importing hardware and other items including nails, 
utensils from China where suppliers will give the Co. open credit. Goods will be of 
higher quality and cheaper in price. 
 
MARKETS 
Limited to Kenya with core business in Nairobi, however goods are sold on wholesale 
basis to upcountry markets through agents. 
 
COMPETITORS 
The company is faced with competition by other wholesale businesses around the same 
area. However they do not pose any threat as :  
 
There is demand for the products and they have control of comfortable market share 
going by high sales registered.  
Company has also mitigated risk by purchasing goods in bulk to take advantage of 
discounted prices. 
Company will start importing items from China which are of better quality and cheaper 
in price. 
  
LOCATION OF BUSINESS 
Company is operating two business outlets dealing in footwear in one shop located 
within CBD and hardware and general merchandise at the other shop located at 
Gikomba Area. 
 
The business premises which is owner occupied in Gikomba Area is comprised of a 3 
floor building with the ground floor as the shop and 2 floors used for storage of goods. 
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MANAGEMENT, LABOUR & OTHER RESOURCES 
This is a family business with Directors of the Company being father and sons assisted 
by 7 permanent staff. Mr XXX is the key decision maker of the business whilst the 
other Directors are involved in the day to day running of the business. 
 
Accounting is handled by a qualified staff whereas marketing is done by the Directors 
themselves.  
 
Monitoring and control of the business using appropriate MIS is not a problem as they 
are ably assisted by skilled and experienced staff and have the right computer software 
to generate requisite and timely MIS. 
 
Total Staff – 7 permanent staff 
 
ATTACHMENT NO. 2 
 
BUSINESS RISK 
Strengths 
Comfortable market share and products will be sold at attractive price compared to 
those offered by their main competitors 
Satisfactory performance as depicted by high sales registered. 
Directors well versed in the line of business with experience of over 20 years.  
Have an excellent relationship with suppliers and hence enjoy credit periods extending 
up to 90 days. 
 
Weaknesses 
Low equity, however Directors have assured to increase paid up capital during next 
financial year. 
Though this is admittedly a very competitive industry with many players, the Co. 
however, has maintained long term relationships with both buyers and suppliers.  
Turnover and margins heavily dependent upon successful negotiation of large orders to 
take advantage of discount prices. (Mitigated as many are repeat orders, and relationship 
with both suppliers and buyers is well established, with OD facility used to purchase 
stocks.) 
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Opportunities 
There is a large untapped market for products that Company sells upcountry which 
Company is looking into through importation of hardware and other items from China.  
 
Threats 
Kenya has generally high interest rates. However benchmark interest rates are 
acceptably stable for trade purposes. 
 
Conclusion  
 
With strengths and opportunities outweighing the weaknesses and threats, the business 
risk can be termed ‘acceptable’. 
 
ATTACHMENT NO. 3 
 
FINANCIAL RISK 
  
Balance Sheet Dated 31.12.2005 
Auditors G.C.Patel & Co. 
Standing & Reputation Acceptable 
Accounting Principles International Standards on Auditing 
Auditor’s Certificate Qualified No 
 
 
OTHER BANK AND FINANCIAL LINES 
 
Company multi banks with Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd and Barclays Bank Ltd. 
Accounts were opened due to banking from remote areas by customers, however we 
have advised customer of our arrangements with Co-operative Bank. Moreover no 
credit facilities are availed by the said banks. 
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BALANCE SHEET ANALYSIS 
   
       (KES 000)          
Narration 
 
2003 2004 2005 
Sales 116,675 113,814 82,743 
Gross Profit  7,371   7,967 7,860 
Net Profit  541 435 -137 
NCFO (1,380)    (383)   (527) 
Net Worth  4,278 4,716 4,578 
Total ST Borrowings 7,087 7,410 8,661 
Gearing 1.66 1.57 1.89 
 
a.  Liquidity 
Sales have been on a declining trend during the last three years. During last financial 
year, sales reduced by 27% mainly due to Co. getting out slowly from footwear business. 
However with the start of importation of materials from China, Co. is optimistic that 
sales will improve.  
 
b. Working Capital 
70% of sales are on cash basis however 30% are extended credit of maximum 60 days 
hence debtors turnover of 36 days. Creditors turnover of 117 days is high however this 
is as at a particular day.  Cash flow is satisfactory as depicted by large fluctuations in the 
outstanding balances in the account. 
With majority of the stocks being within 60-90 days, the stock position is acceptable in 
view of the nature of the products being dealt with.  
 
c.  Profitability 
Due to a significant drop in sales last year, Co. incurred losses as at 31.12.2005 which 
will be turned around by the next financial year with introduction of new lines. 
 
d. Gearing 
Net worth is low however previous years profits are retained in the business. Moreover 
we have advised Directors to increase share capital during next financial year. 
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e.  Post Balance Sheet Events 
Turnover in the account with us for 5 months ended 31.05.2006 is reflected at 45.7 
Million which is high. 
  
f. Projections 
Demand for the products are high and there is large potential for growth and Directors 
are optimistic that next financial year will show an even better performance. 
 
g. Summary / Conclusion 
The Financial Risk is considered ‘acceptable’. 
 
ATTACHMENT NO. 4 
 
MANAGEMENT RISK 
All Directors are involved in day to day operations of the business together. Mr XXX is 
the key decision maker of the business and well versed in this line. Due to this direct 
participation of the owner in business, there is no mismanagement.  
 
Directors are assisted by 7 experienced staff.  
 
SUCCESSION RISK 
Company is jointly managed mainly by all Directors, and moreover Company operations 
can continue in the absence of the Directors with the assistance of the employees who 
are conversant with the business.  
 
Based on the above, the management risk is termed as ‘acceptable’. 
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ATTACHMENT NO. 5 
 
STRUCTURAL RISK 
 
The overdraft facility is need based and structured as per customer requirement mainly 
for working capital purposes. Conduct of the account is satisfactory with regular limit 
being respected at all times and a high turnover reflected. Client has requested for an 
increase in facility due to introduction of new line, that is importation of materials from 
China. Following discussions with the client, Mr xxx advised that he increase is only for 
emergency used and will not be utilized at all times. 
 
Facility is availed against tangible security, and OD account is well conducted hence, the 
Structural Risk is ‘acceptable’.  
 
ATTACHMENT NO. 6 
 
 
SECURITY RISK 
The following support for OD facility is held by XXX Bank: 
 
FLC for K.Shs 10 Million on commercial property  LR No 209/9791/21 on Directors 
of the Co.  
Individual Guarantees for K.Shs 13 Million by all Directors of the Company viz XXX 
Board Resolution authorizing Co. to borrow up to K.Shs 15 Million. 
 
NB : Client is not agreeable to upstamping of legal charge to K.Shs 15 Million as they 
advised that facility is only required for emergency use and will not be fully utilized. 
However fresh internal security documents of K.Shs 15 Million shall be obtained. 
 
 
With a satisfactory and trouble free experience of over 9 years with XXX Bank, the 
above mentioned support / security risk is considered ‘acceptable’. 
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ATTACHMENT NO. 7 
 
ACCOUNT PERFORMANCE RISK 
 
Account conduct satisfactory with large fluctuations in the account and regular limit 
adhered to at all times.  
 
Based on our dealings with XXXX over the years and current financial information in 
our possession the company is deemed to have the ability service all of its 
commitments.  
 
Account Performance Risk is ‘acceptable’ 
  
 
Risk/Reward : 
 
Our earnings from the relationship in 2005 was KES 1.2 Million and for 5 months 
ended 31.05.2006 earnings were KES 0.527 Million which is satisfactory. 
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Appendix 20: Control of Publicly Traded Firms Around the World, 1996 (%) (of 
the 20 largest firms under each Category) 
 
Economy Widely Held Family Owned State Owned 
Australia 65 5 5 
Austria 5 15 70 
Belgium 5 50 5 
Canada 60 25  
Denmark 40 35 15 
Finland 35 10 35 
France 60 20 15 
Germany 50 10 25 
Greece 10 50 30 
Ireland 65 10  
Italy 20 15 40 
Japan 90 5 5 
Netherlands 30 20 5 
New Zealand 30 25 25 
Norway 25 25 35 
Portugal 10 45 25 
Spain 35 15 30 
Sweden 25 45 10 
Switzerland 60 3  
UK 100   
USA 80 20  
  
Source: 
Iskander, M., & Chamlou, N. (2000). Corporate Governance : A Framework for Implementation. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
 
 
  
 
 
 
317 
Appendix 21: Duties of Directors in the 2006 CBK Guidelines 
 
1) Regulating the manner in which the business is conducted. 
2) Corporate planning 
3) Establish and ensure the effective functioning of Board and Management 
Committees in key areas 
4) Set-up an effective internal audit department of management audit. 
5) Set-up an independent Compliance Function  
6) Maintain adequate capital base 
7) Observe Laws and guidelines 
8) Appoint, dismiss and define the duties of management 
9) Be informed about business condition of the institution 
10) Attend Board meetings regularly 
11) Maintain Positive Image 
Source: 
Central Bank of Kenya (2006) Prudential Guidelines 2006. Nairobi: Central Bank of 
Kenya pp., 30-32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
